[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1146 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
117th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 1146
To counter Saudi Arabia's possible pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
April 15, 2021
Mr. Markey (for himself and Mr. Merkley) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To counter Saudi Arabia's possible pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Stopping Activities Underpinning
Development In Weapons of Mass Destruction Act'' or the ``SAUDI WMD
Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The People's Republic of China (in this Act referred to
as ``China''), became a full-participant of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group in 2004, committing it to apply a strong
presumption of denial in exporting nuclear-related items that a
foreign country could divert to a nuclear weapons program.
(2) China also committed to the United States, in November
2000, to abide by the foundational principles of the 1987
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to not ``assist, in
any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles
that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons (i.e., missiles
capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kilograms to a
distance of at least 300 kilometers)''.
(3) In the 1980s, China secretly sold the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia (in this Act referred to as ``Saudi Arabia'')
conventionally armed DF-3A ballistic missiles, and in 2007,
reportedly sold Saudi Arabia dual-use capable DF-21 medium-
range ballistic missiles of a 300 kilometer, 500 kilogram range
and payload threshold which should have triggered a denial of
sale under the MTCR.
(4) The 2020 Department of State Report on the Adherence to
and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and
Disarmament Agreements and Commitments found that China
``continued to supply MTCR-controlled goods to missile programs
of proliferation concern in 2019'' and that the United States
imposed sanctions on nine Chinese entities for covered missile
transfers to Iran.
(5) A June 5, 2019, press report indicated that China
allegedly provided assistance to Saudi Arabia in the
development of a ballistic missile facility, which if
confirmed, would violate the purpose of the MTCR and run
contrary to the longstanding United States policy priority to
prevent weapons of mass destruction proliferation in the Middle
East.
(6) The Arms Export and Control Act of 1976 (Public Law 93-
329) requires the President to sanction any foreign person or
government who knowingly ``exports, transfers, or otherwise
engages in the trade of any MTCR equipment or technology'' to a
country that does not adhere to the MTCR.
(7) China concluded two nuclear cooperation agreements with
Saudi Arabia in 2012 and 2017, respectively, which may
facilitate China's bid to build two reactors in Saudi Arabia to
generate 2.9 Gigawatt-electric (GWe) of electricity.
(8) On August 4, 2020, a press report revealed the alleged
existence of a previously undisclosed uranium yellowcake
extraction facility in Saudi Arabia allegedly constructed with
the assistance of China, which if confirmed, would indicate
significant progress by Saudi Arabia in developing the early
stages of the nuclear fuel cycle that precede uranium
enrichment.
(9) Saudi Arabia's outdated Small Quantities Protocol and
its lack of an in force Additional Protocol to its
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Comprehensive
Safeguards Agreement severely curtails IAEA inspections, which
has led the Agency to call upon Saudi Arabia to either rescind
or update its Small Quantities Protocol.
(10) On January 19, 2021, in response to a question about
Saudi Arabia's reported ballistic missile cooperation with
China, incoming Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken stated
that ``we want to make sure that to the best of our ability all
of our partners and allies are living up to their obligations
under various nonproliferation and arms control agreements and,
certainly, in the case of Saudi Arabia that is something we
will want to look at''.
(11) On March 15, 2018, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia,
Mohammad bin-Salman, stated that ``if Iran developed a nuclear
bomb, we would follow suit as soon as possible,'' raising
questions about whether a Saudi Arabian nuclear program would
remain exclusively peaceful, particularly in the absence of
robust international IAEA safeguards.
(12) An August 9, 2019, study by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights found that the Saudi Arabia-led
military coalition airstrikes in Yemen and its restrictions on
the flow of humanitarian assistance to the country, both of
which have disproportionately impacted civilians, may be
violations of international humanitarian law.
SEC. 3. DETERMINATION OF POSSIBLE MTCR TRANSFERS TO SAUDI ARABIA.
(a) MTCR Transfers.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a written determination, and any documentation
to support that determination detailing--
(1) whether any foreign person knowingly exported,
transferred, or engaged in trade of any item designated under
Category I of the MTCR Annex item with Saudi Arabia in the
previous three fiscal years; and
(2) the sanctions the President has imposed or intends to
impose pursuant to section 11B(b) of the Export Administration
Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4612(b)) against any foreign person who
knowingly engaged in the export, transfer, or trade of that
item or items.
(b) Waiver.--Notwithstanding any provision of paragraphs (3)
through (7) of section 11(B)(b) of the Export Administration Act of
1979 (50 U.S.C. 4612(b)), the President may only waive the application
of sanctions under such section with respect to Saudi Arabia if that
country is verifiably determined to no longer possess an item
designated under Category I of the MTCR Annex received in the previous
three fiscal years.
(c) Form of Report.--The determination required under subsection
(a) shall be unclassified with a classified annex.
SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON UNITED STATES ARMS SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA IF IT
IMPORTS NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY WITHOUT SAFEGUARDS.
(a) In General.--The United States shall not sell, transfer, or
authorize licenses for export of any item designated under Category
III, IV, VII, or VIII on the United States Munitions List pursuant to
section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1))
to Saudi Arabia, other than ground-based missile defense systems, if
Saudi Arabia has, in the previous 3 fiscal years--
(1) knowingly imported any item classified as ``plants for
the separation of isotopes of uranium'' or ``plants for the
reprocessing of irradiated nuclear reactor fuel elements''
under Part 110 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission export
licensing authority; or
(2) engaged in nuclear cooperation related to the
construction of any nuclear-related fuel cycle facility or
activity that has not been notified to the IAEA and would be
subject to complementary access if an Additional Protocol was
in force.
(b) Waiver.--The Secretary of State may waive the prohibition under
subsection (a) with respect to a foreign country if the Secretary
submits to the appropriate committees of Congress a written
certification that contains a determination, and any relevant
documentation on which the determination is based, that Saudi Arabia--
(1) has brought into force an Additional Protocol to the
IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement based on the model
described in IAEA INFCIRC/540;
(2) has concluded a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement
with the United States under section 123 of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) or another supplier that prohibits
the enrichment of uranium or separation of plutonium on its own
territory; and
(3) has rescinded its Small Quantities Protocol and is not
found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in noncompliance
with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
(c) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed
as superseding the obligation of the President under section 502B(a)(2)
or section 620I(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2304(a)(2), 22 U.S.C. 2378-1(a)), respectively, to not furnish security
assistance to Saudi Arabia or any country if it--
(1) engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights; or
(2) prohibits or otherwise restricts, directly or
indirectly, the transport or delivery of United States
humanitarian assistance.
SEC. 5. MIDDLE EAST NONPROLIFERATION STRATEGY.
(a) In General.--Starting with the first report after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Energy, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence,
shall provide the appropriate committees of Congress, as an appendix to
the Report on the Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, a report
on MTCR compliance and a United States strategy to prevent the spread
of nuclear weapons and missiles in the Middle East.
(b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
include the following elements:
(1) An assessment of China's compliance, in the previous
fiscal year, with its November 2000 commitment to abide by the
MTCR and United States diplomatic efforts to address non-
compliance.
(2) A description of every foreign person that, in the
previous fiscal year, engaged in the export, transfer, or trade
of MTCR items to a country that is a non-MTCR adherent, and a
description of the sanctions the President imposed pursuant to
section 11B(b) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50
U.S.C. 4612(b)).
(3) A detailed strategy to prevent the proliferation of
ballistic missile and sensitive nuclear technology in the
Middle East and North Africa from China and other foreign
countries, including the following elements:
(A) An assessment of the proliferation risks
associated with concluding or renewing a civilian
nuclear cooperation ``123'' agreement with any country
in the Middle-East and North Africa and the risks of
such if that same equipment and technology is sourced
from a foreign state.
(B) An update on United States bilateral and
multilateral diplomatic actions to commence
negotiations on a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone
(WMDFZ) since the 2015 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
Review Conference.
(C) A description of United States Government
efforts to achieve global adherence and compliance with
the Nuclear Suppliers Group, MTCR, and the 2002
International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile
Proliferation guidelines.
(4) An account of the briefings to the appropriate
committees of Congress in the reporting period detailing
negotiations on any new or renewed civilian nuclear cooperation
``123'' agreement with any country consistent with the intent
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.).
(c) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
be unclassified with a classified annex.
SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate;
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate;
(C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representative; and
(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives.
(2) Foreign person; person.--The terms ``foreign person''
and ```person''' mean--
(A) a natural person that is an alien;
(B) a corporation, business association,
partnership, society, trust, or any other
nongovernmental entity, organization, or group, that is
organized under the laws of a foreign country or has
its principal place of business in a foreign country;
(C) any foreign governmental entity operating as a
business enterprise; and
(D) any successor, subunit, or subsidiary of any
entity described in subparagraph (B) or (C).
(3) Middle east and north africa.--The term ``Middle East
and North Africa'' means those countries that are included in
the Area of Responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern Affairs.
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