[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 503 Introduced in House (IH)]
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117th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. RES. 503
Establishing the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
June 28, 2021
Ms. Pelosi submitted the following resolution; which was referred to
the Committee on Rules
_______________________________________________________________________
RESOLUTION
Establishing the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol.
Whereas January 6, 2021, was one of the darkest days of our democracy, during
which insurrectionists attempted to impede Congress's Constitutional
mandate to validate the presidential election and launched an assault on
the United States Capitol Complex that resulted in multiple deaths,
physical harm to over 140 members of law enforcement, and terror and
trauma among staff, institutional employees, press, and Members;
Whereas, on January 27, 2021, the Department of Homeland Security issued a
National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin that due to the ``heightened
threat environment across the United States,'' in which ``[S]ome
ideologically-motivated violent extremists with objections to the
exercise of governmental authority and the presidential transition, as
well as other perceived grievances fueled by false narratives, could
continue to mobilize to incite or commit violence.'' The Bulletin also
stated that--
(1) ``DHS is concerned these same drivers to violence will remain
through early 2021 and some DVEs [domestic violent extremists] may be
emboldened by the January 6, 2021 breach of the U.S. Capitol Building in
Washington, D.C. to target elected officials and government facilities.'';
and
(2) ``Threats of violence against critical infrastructure, including
the electric, telecommunications and healthcare sectors, increased in 2020
with violent extremists citing misinformation and conspiracy theories about
COVID-19 for their actions'';
Whereas, on September 24, 2020, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Christopher Wray testified before the Committee on Homeland Security of
the House of Representatives that--
(1) ``[T]he underlying drivers for domestic violent extremism - such as
perceptions of government or law enforcement overreach, sociopolitical
conditions, racism, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, misogyny, and reactions to
legislative actions - remain constant.'';
(2) ``[W]ithin the domestic terrorism bucket category as a whole,
racially-motivated violent extremism is, I think, the biggest bucket within
the larger group. And within the racially-motivated violent extremists
bucket, people subscribing to some kind of white supremacist-type ideology
is certainly the biggest chunk of that.''; and
(3) ``More deaths were caused by DVEs than international terrorists in
recent years. In fact, 2019 was the deadliest year for domestic extremist
violence since the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995'';
Whereas, on April 15, 2021, Michael Bolton, the Inspector General for the United
States Capitol Police, testified to the Committee on House
Administration of the House of Representatives that--
(1) ``The Department lacked adequate guidance for operational planning.
USCP did not have policy and procedures in place that communicated which
personnel were responsible for operational planning, what type of
operational planning documents its personnel should prepare, nor when its
personnel should prepare operational planning documents.''; and
(2) ``USCP failed to disseminate relevant information obtained from
outside sources, lacked consensus on interpretation of threat analyses, and
disseminated conflicting intelligence information regarding planned events
for January 6, 2021.''; and
Whereas the security leadership of the Congress under-prepared for the events of
January 6th, with United States Capitol Police Inspector General Michael
Bolton testifying again on June 15, 2021, that--
(1) ``USCP did not have adequate policies and procedures for FRU (First
Responder Unit) defining its overall operations. Additionally, FRU lacked
resources and training for properly completing its mission.'';
(2) ``The Department did not have adequate policies and procedures for
securing ballistic helmets and vests strategically stored around the
Capitol Complex.''; and
(3) ``FRU did not have the proper resources to complete its mission.'':
Now, therefore, be it
Resolved,
SECTION 1. ESTABLISHMENT.
There is hereby established the Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (hereinafter referred
to as the ``Select Committee'').
SEC. 2. COMPOSITION.
(a) Appointment of Members.--The Speaker shall appoint 13 Members
to the Select Committee, 5 of whom shall be appointed after
consultation with the minority leader.
(b) Designation of Chair.--The Speaker shall designate one Member
to serve as chair of the Select Committee.
(c) Vacancies.--Any vacancy in the Select Committee shall be filled
in the same manner as the original appointment.
SEC. 3. PURPOSES.
Consistent with the functions described in section 4, the purposes
of the Select Committee are the following:
(1) To investigate and report upon the facts,
circumstances, and causes relating to the January 6, 2021,
domestic terrorist attack upon the United States Capitol
Complex (hereafter referred to as the ``domestic terrorist
attack on the Capitol'') and relating to the interference with
the peaceful transfer of power, including facts and causes
relating to the preparedness and response of the United States
Capitol Police and other Federal, State, and local law
enforcement agencies in the National Capital Region and other
instrumentalities of government, as well as the influencing
factors that fomented such an attack on American representative
democracy while engaged in a constitutional process.
(2) To examine and evaluate evidence developed by relevant
Federal, State, and local governmental agencies regarding the
facts and circumstances surrounding the domestic terrorist
attack on the Capitol and targeted violence and domestic
terrorism relevant to such terrorist attack.
(3) To build upon the investigations of other entities and
avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts by reviewing the
investigations, findings, conclusions, and recommendations of
other executive branch, congressional, or independent
bipartisan or nonpartisan commission investigations into the
domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol, including
investigations into influencing factors related to such attack.
SEC. 4. FUNCTIONS.
(a) Functions.--The functions of the Select Committee are to--
(1) investigate the facts, circumstances, and causes
relating to the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol,
including facts and circumstances relating to--
(A) activities of intelligence agencies, law
enforcement agencies, and the Armed Forces, including
with respect to intelligence collection, analysis, and
dissemination and information sharing among the
branches and other instrumentalities of government;
(B) influencing factors that contributed to the
domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol and how
technology, including online platforms, financing, and
malign foreign influence operations and campaigns may
have factored into the motivation, organization, and
execution of the domestic terrorist attack on the
Capitol; and
(C) other entities of the public and private sector
as determined relevant by the Select Committee for such
investigation;
(2) identify, review, and evaluate the causes of and the
lessons learned from the domestic terrorist attack on the
Capitol regarding--
(A) the command, control, and communications of the
United States Capitol Police, the Armed Forces, the
National Guard, the Metropolitan Police Department of
the District of Columbia, and other Federal, State, and
local law enforcement agencies in the National Capital
Region on or before January 6, 2021;
(B) the structure, coordination, operational plans,
policies, and procedures of the Federal Government,
including as such relate to State and local governments
and nongovernmental entities, and particularly with
respect to detecting, preventing, preparing for, and
responding to targeted violence and domestic terrorism;
(C) the structure, authorities, training, manpower
utilization, equipment, operational planning, and use
of force policies of the United States Capitol Police;
(D) the policies, protocols, processes, procedures,
and systems for the sharing of intelligence and other
information by Federal, State, and local agencies with
the United States Capitol Police, the Sergeants at Arms
of the House of Representatives and Senate, the
Government of the District of Columbia, including the
Metropolitan Police Department of the District of
Columbia, the National Guard, and other Federal, State,
and local law enforcement agencies in the National
Capital Region on or before January 6, 2021, and the
related policies, protocols, processes, procedures, and
systems for monitoring, assessing, disseminating, and
acting on intelligence and other information, including
elevating the security posture of the United States
Capitol Complex, derived from instrumentalities of
government, open sources, and online platforms; and
(E) the policies, protocols, processes, procedures,
and systems for interoperability between the United
States Capitol Police and the National Guard, the
Metropolitan Police Department of the District of
Columbia, and other Federal, State, and local law
enforcement agencies in the National Capital Region on
or before January 6, 2021; and
(3) issue a final report to the House containing such
findings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective
measures described in subsection (c) as it may deem necessary.
(b) Reports.--
(1) Interim reports.--In addition to the final report
addressing the matters in subsection (a) and section 3, the
Select Committee may report to the House or any committee of
the House from time to time the results of its investigations,
together with such detailed findings and legislative
recommendations as it may deem advisable.
(2) Treatment of classified or law enforcement-sensitive
matter.--Any report issued by the Select Committee shall be
issued in unclassified form but may include a classified annex,
a law enforcement-sensitive annex, or both.
(c) Corrective Measures Described.--The corrective measures
described in this subsection may include changes in law, policy,
procedures, rules, or regulations that could be taken--
(1) to prevent future acts of violence, domestic terrorism,
and domestic violent extremism, including acts targeted at
American democratic institutions;
(2) to improve the security posture of the United States
Capitol Complex while preserving accessibility of the Capitol
Complex for all Americans; and
(3) to strengthen the security and resilience of the United
States and American democratic institutions against violence,
domestic terrorism, and domestic violent extremism.
(d) No Markup of Legislation Permitted.--The Select Committee may
not hold a markup of legislation.
SEC. 5. PROCEDURE.
(a) Access to Information From Intelligence Community.--
Notwithstanding clause 3(m) of rule X of the Rules of the House of
Representatives, the Select Committee is authorized to study the
sources and methods of entities described in clause 11(b)(1)(A) of rule
X insofar as such study is related to the matters described in sections
3 and 4.
(b) Treatment of Classified Information.--Clause 11(b)(4), clause
11(e), and the first sentence of clause 11(f) of rule X of the Rules of
the House of Representatives shall apply to the Select Committee.
(c) Applicability of Rules Governing Procedures of Committees.--
Rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives shall apply to the
Select Committee except as follows:
(1) Clause 2(a) of rule XI shall not apply to the Select
Committee.
(2) Clause 2(g)(2)(D) of rule XI shall apply to the Select
Committee in the same manner as it applies to the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence.
(3) Pursuant to clause 2(h) of rule XI, two Members of the
Select Committee shall constitute a quorum for taking testimony
or receiving evidence and one-third of the Members of the
Select Committee shall constitute a quorum for taking any
action other than one for which the presence of a majority of
the Select Committee is required.
(4) The chair of the Select Committee may authorize and
issue subpoenas pursuant to clause 2(m) of rule XI in the
investigation and study conducted pursuant to sections 3 and 4
of this resolution, including for the purpose of taking
depositions.
(5) The chair of the Select Committee is authorized to
compel by subpoena the furnishing of information by
interrogatory.
(6)(A) The chair of the Select Committee, upon consultation
with the ranking minority member, may order the taking of
depositions, including pursuant to subpoena, by a Member or
counsel of the Select Committee, in the same manner as a
standing committee pursuant to section 3(b)(1) of House
Resolution 8, One Hundred Seventeenth Congress.
(B) Depositions taken under the authority prescribed in
this paragraph shall be governed by the procedures submitted by
the chair of the Committee on Rules for printing in the
Congressional Record on January 4, 2021.
(7) Subpoenas authorized pursuant to this resolution may be
signed by the chair of the Select Committee or a designee.
(8) The chair of the Select Committee may, after
consultation with the ranking minority member, recognize--
(A) Members of the Select Committee to question a
witness for periods longer than five minutes as though
pursuant to clause 2(j)(2)(B) of rule XI; and
(B) staff of the Select Committee to question a
witness as though pursuant to clause 2(j)(2)(C) of rule
XI.
(9) The chair of the Select Committee may postpone further
proceedings when a record vote is ordered on questions
referenced in clause 2(h)(4) of rule XI, and may resume
proceedings on such postponed questions at any time after
reasonable notice. Notwithstanding any intervening order for
the previous question, an underlying proposition shall remain
subject to further debate or amendment to the same extent as
when the question was postponed.
(10) The provisions of paragraphs (f)(1) through (f)(12) of
clause 4 of rule XI shall apply to the Select Committee.
SEC. 6. RECORDS; STAFF; TRAVEL; FUNDING.
(a) Sharing Records of Committees.--Any committee of the House of
Representatives having custody of records in any form relating to the
matters described in sections 3 and 4 shall provide copies of such
records to the Select Committee not later than 14 days of the adoption
of this resolution or receipt of such records. Such records shall
become the records of the Select Committee.
(b) Staff.--The appointment and the compensation of staff for the
Select Committee shall be subject to regulations issued by the
Committee on House Administration.
(c) Detail of Staff of Other Offices.--Staff of employing entities
of the House or a joint committee may be detailed to the Select
Committee to carry out this resolution and shall be deemed to be staff
of the Select Committee.
(d) Use of Consultants Permitted.--Section 202(i) of the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (2 U.S.C. 4301(i)) shall apply
with respect to the Select Committee in the same manner as such section
applies with respect to a standing committee of the House of
Representatives.
(e) Travel.--Clauses 8(a), (b), and (c) of rule X of the Rules of
the House of Representatives shall apply to the Select Committee.
(f) Funding; Payments.--There shall be paid out of the applicable
accounts of the House of Representatives such sums as may be necessary
for the expenses of the Select Committee. Such payments shall be made
on vouchers signed by the chair of the Select Committee and approved in
the manner directed by the Committee on House Administration. Amounts
made available under this subsection shall be expended in accordance
with regulations prescribed by the Committee on House Administration.
SEC. 7. TERMINATION AND DISPOSITION OF RECORDS.
(a) Termination.--The Select Committee shall terminate 30 days
after filing the final report under section 4.
(b) Disposition of Records.--Upon termination of the Select
Committee--
(1) the records of the Select Committee shall become the
records of such committee or committees designated by the
Speaker; and
(2) the copies of records provided to the Select Committee
by a committee of the House under section 6(a) shall be
returned to the committee.
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