[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 503 Introduced in House (IH)]

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117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 503

Establishing the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack 
                     on the United States Capitol.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 28, 2021

 Ms. Pelosi submitted the following resolution; which was referred to 
                         the Committee on Rules

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION


 
Establishing the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack 
                     on the United States Capitol.

Whereas January 6, 2021, was one of the darkest days of our democracy, during 
        which insurrectionists attempted to impede Congress's Constitutional 
        mandate to validate the presidential election and launched an assault on 
        the United States Capitol Complex that resulted in multiple deaths, 
        physical harm to over 140 members of law enforcement, and terror and 
        trauma among staff, institutional employees, press, and Members;
Whereas, on January 27, 2021, the Department of Homeland Security issued a 
        National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin that due to the ``heightened 
        threat environment across the United States,'' in which ``[S]ome 
        ideologically-motivated violent extremists with objections to the 
        exercise of governmental authority and the presidential transition, as 
        well as other perceived grievances fueled by false narratives, could 
        continue to mobilize to incite or commit violence.'' The Bulletin also 
        stated that--

    (1) ``DHS is concerned these same drivers to violence will remain 
through early 2021 and some DVEs [domestic violent extremists] may be 
emboldened by the January 6, 2021 breach of the U.S. Capitol Building in 
Washington, D.C. to target elected officials and government facilities.''; 
and

    (2) ``Threats of violence against critical infrastructure, including 
the electric, telecommunications and healthcare sectors, increased in 2020 
with violent extremists citing misinformation and conspiracy theories about 
COVID-19 for their actions'';

Whereas, on September 24, 2020, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
        Christopher Wray testified before the Committee on Homeland Security of 
        the House of Representatives that--

    (1) ``[T]he underlying drivers for domestic violent extremism - such as 
perceptions of government or law enforcement overreach, sociopolitical 
conditions, racism, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, misogyny, and reactions to 
legislative actions - remain constant.'';

    (2) ``[W]ithin the domestic terrorism bucket category as a whole, 
racially-motivated violent extremism is, I think, the biggest bucket within 
the larger group. And within the racially-motivated violent extremists 
bucket, people subscribing to some kind of white supremacist-type ideology 
is certainly the biggest chunk of that.''; and

    (3) ``More deaths were caused by DVEs than international terrorists in 
recent years. In fact, 2019 was the deadliest year for domestic extremist 
violence since the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995'';

Whereas, on April 15, 2021, Michael Bolton, the Inspector General for the United 
        States Capitol Police, testified to the Committee on House 
        Administration of the House of Representatives that--

    (1) ``The Department lacked adequate guidance for operational planning. 
USCP did not have policy and procedures in place that communicated which 
personnel were responsible for operational planning, what type of 
operational planning documents its personnel should prepare, nor when its 
personnel should prepare operational planning documents.''; and

    (2) ``USCP failed to disseminate relevant information obtained from 
outside sources, lacked consensus on interpretation of threat analyses, and 
disseminated conflicting intelligence information regarding planned events 
for January 6, 2021.''; and

Whereas the security leadership of the Congress under-prepared for the events of 
        January 6th, with United States Capitol Police Inspector General Michael 
        Bolton testifying again on June 15, 2021, that--

    (1) ``USCP did not have adequate policies and procedures for FRU (First 
Responder Unit) defining its overall operations. Additionally, FRU lacked 
resources and training for properly completing its mission.'';

    (2) ``The Department did not have adequate policies and procedures for 
securing ballistic helmets and vests strategically stored around the 
Capitol Complex.''; and

    (3) ``FRU did not have the proper resources to complete its mission.'': 
Now, therefore, be it

    Resolved,

SECTION 1. ESTABLISHMENT.

    There is hereby established the Select Committee to Investigate the 
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (hereinafter referred 
to as the ``Select Committee'').

SEC. 2. COMPOSITION.

    (a) Appointment of Members.--The Speaker shall appoint 13 Members 
to the Select Committee, 5 of whom shall be appointed after 
consultation with the minority leader.
    (b) Designation of Chair.--The Speaker shall designate one Member 
to serve as chair of the Select Committee.
    (c) Vacancies.--Any vacancy in the Select Committee shall be filled 
in the same manner as the original appointment.

SEC. 3. PURPOSES.

    Consistent with the functions described in section 4, the purposes 
of the Select Committee are the following:
            (1) To investigate and report upon the facts, 
        circumstances, and causes relating to the January 6, 2021, 
        domestic terrorist attack upon the United States Capitol 
        Complex (hereafter referred to as the ``domestic terrorist 
        attack on the Capitol'') and relating to the interference with 
        the peaceful transfer of power, including facts and causes 
        relating to the preparedness and response of the United States 
        Capitol Police and other Federal, State, and local law 
        enforcement agencies in the National Capital Region and other 
        instrumentalities of government, as well as the influencing 
        factors that fomented such an attack on American representative 
        democracy while engaged in a constitutional process.
            (2) To examine and evaluate evidence developed by relevant 
        Federal, State, and local governmental agencies regarding the 
        facts and circumstances surrounding the domestic terrorist 
        attack on the Capitol and targeted violence and domestic 
        terrorism relevant to such terrorist attack.
            (3) To build upon the investigations of other entities and 
        avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts by reviewing the 
        investigations, findings, conclusions, and recommendations of 
        other executive branch, congressional, or independent 
        bipartisan or nonpartisan commission investigations into the 
        domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol, including 
        investigations into influencing factors related to such attack.

SEC. 4. FUNCTIONS.

    (a) Functions.--The functions of the Select Committee are to--
            (1) investigate the facts, circumstances, and causes 
        relating to the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol, 
        including facts and circumstances relating to--
                    (A) activities of intelligence agencies, law 
                enforcement agencies, and the Armed Forces, including 
                with respect to intelligence collection, analysis, and 
                dissemination and information sharing among the 
                branches and other instrumentalities of government;
                    (B) influencing factors that contributed to the 
                domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol and how 
                technology, including online platforms, financing, and 
                malign foreign influence operations and campaigns may 
                have factored into the motivation, organization, and 
                execution of the domestic terrorist attack on the 
                Capitol; and
                    (C) other entities of the public and private sector 
                as determined relevant by the Select Committee for such 
                investigation;
            (2) identify, review, and evaluate the causes of and the 
        lessons learned from the domestic terrorist attack on the 
        Capitol regarding--
                    (A) the command, control, and communications of the 
                United States Capitol Police, the Armed Forces, the 
                National Guard, the Metropolitan Police Department of 
                the District of Columbia, and other Federal, State, and 
                local law enforcement agencies in the National Capital 
                Region on or before January 6, 2021;
                    (B) the structure, coordination, operational plans, 
                policies, and procedures of the Federal Government, 
                including as such relate to State and local governments 
                and nongovernmental entities, and particularly with 
                respect to detecting, preventing, preparing for, and 
                responding to targeted violence and domestic terrorism;
                    (C) the structure, authorities, training, manpower 
                utilization, equipment, operational planning, and use 
                of force policies of the United States Capitol Police;
                    (D) the policies, protocols, processes, procedures, 
                and systems for the sharing of intelligence and other 
                information by Federal, State, and local agencies with 
                the United States Capitol Police, the Sergeants at Arms 
                of the House of Representatives and Senate, the 
                Government of the District of Columbia, including the 
                Metropolitan Police Department of the District of 
                Columbia, the National Guard, and other Federal, State, 
                and local law enforcement agencies in the National 
                Capital Region on or before January 6, 2021, and the 
                related policies, protocols, processes, procedures, and 
                systems for monitoring, assessing, disseminating, and 
                acting on intelligence and other information, including 
                elevating the security posture of the United States 
                Capitol Complex, derived from instrumentalities of 
                government, open sources, and online platforms; and
                    (E) the policies, protocols, processes, procedures, 
                and systems for interoperability between the United 
                States Capitol Police and the National Guard, the 
                Metropolitan Police Department of the District of 
                Columbia, and other Federal, State, and local law 
                enforcement agencies in the National Capital Region on 
                or before January 6, 2021; and
            (3) issue a final report to the House containing such 
        findings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective 
        measures described in subsection (c) as it may deem necessary.
    (b) Reports.--
            (1) Interim reports.--In addition to the final report 
        addressing the matters in subsection (a) and section 3, the 
        Select Committee may report to the House or any committee of 
        the House from time to time the results of its investigations, 
        together with such detailed findings and legislative 
        recommendations as it may deem advisable.
            (2) Treatment of classified or law enforcement-sensitive 
        matter.--Any report issued by the Select Committee shall be 
        issued in unclassified form but may include a classified annex, 
        a law enforcement-sensitive annex, or both.
    (c) Corrective Measures Described.--The corrective measures 
described in this subsection may include changes in law, policy, 
procedures, rules, or regulations that could be taken--
            (1) to prevent future acts of violence, domestic terrorism, 
        and domestic violent extremism, including acts targeted at 
        American democratic institutions;
            (2) to improve the security posture of the United States 
        Capitol Complex while preserving accessibility of the Capitol 
        Complex for all Americans; and
            (3) to strengthen the security and resilience of the United 
        States and American democratic institutions against violence, 
        domestic terrorism, and domestic violent extremism.
    (d) No Markup of Legislation Permitted.--The Select Committee may 
not hold a markup of legislation.

SEC. 5. PROCEDURE.

    (a) Access to Information From Intelligence Community.--
Notwithstanding clause 3(m) of rule X of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives, the Select Committee is authorized to study the 
sources and methods of entities described in clause 11(b)(1)(A) of rule 
X insofar as such study is related to the matters described in sections 
3 and 4.
    (b) Treatment of Classified Information.--Clause 11(b)(4), clause 
11(e), and the first sentence of clause 11(f) of rule X of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives shall apply to the Select Committee.
    (c) Applicability of Rules Governing Procedures of Committees.--
Rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives shall apply to the 
Select Committee except as follows:
            (1) Clause 2(a) of rule XI shall not apply to the Select 
        Committee.
            (2) Clause 2(g)(2)(D) of rule XI shall apply to the Select 
        Committee in the same manner as it applies to the Permanent 
        Select Committee on Intelligence.
            (3) Pursuant to clause 2(h) of rule XI, two Members of the 
        Select Committee shall constitute a quorum for taking testimony 
        or receiving evidence and one-third of the Members of the 
        Select Committee shall constitute a quorum for taking any 
        action other than one for which the presence of a majority of 
        the Select Committee is required.
            (4) The chair of the Select Committee may authorize and 
        issue subpoenas pursuant to clause 2(m) of rule XI in the 
        investigation and study conducted pursuant to sections 3 and 4 
        of this resolution, including for the purpose of taking 
        depositions.
            (5) The chair of the Select Committee is authorized to 
        compel by subpoena the furnishing of information by 
        interrogatory.
            (6)(A) The chair of the Select Committee, upon consultation 
        with the ranking minority member, may order the taking of 
        depositions, including pursuant to subpoena, by a Member or 
        counsel of the Select Committee, in the same manner as a 
        standing committee pursuant to section 3(b)(1) of House 
        Resolution 8, One Hundred Seventeenth Congress.
            (B) Depositions taken under the authority prescribed in 
        this paragraph shall be governed by the procedures submitted by 
        the chair of the Committee on Rules for printing in the 
        Congressional Record on January 4, 2021.
            (7) Subpoenas authorized pursuant to this resolution may be 
        signed by the chair of the Select Committee or a designee.
            (8) The chair of the Select Committee may, after 
        consultation with the ranking minority member, recognize--
                    (A) Members of the Select Committee to question a 
                witness for periods longer than five minutes as though 
                pursuant to clause 2(j)(2)(B) of rule XI; and
                    (B) staff of the Select Committee to question a 
                witness as though pursuant to clause 2(j)(2)(C) of rule 
                XI.
            (9) The chair of the Select Committee may postpone further 
        proceedings when a record vote is ordered on questions 
        referenced in clause 2(h)(4) of rule XI, and may resume 
        proceedings on such postponed questions at any time after 
        reasonable notice. Notwithstanding any intervening order for 
        the previous question, an underlying proposition shall remain 
        subject to further debate or amendment to the same extent as 
        when the question was postponed.
            (10) The provisions of paragraphs (f)(1) through (f)(12) of 
        clause 4 of rule XI shall apply to the Select Committee.

SEC. 6. RECORDS; STAFF; TRAVEL; FUNDING.

    (a) Sharing Records of Committees.--Any committee of the House of 
Representatives having custody of records in any form relating to the 
matters described in sections 3 and 4 shall provide copies of such 
records to the Select Committee not later than 14 days of the adoption 
of this resolution or receipt of such records. Such records shall 
become the records of the Select Committee.
    (b) Staff.--The appointment and the compensation of staff for the 
Select Committee shall be subject to regulations issued by the 
Committee on House Administration.
    (c) Detail of Staff of Other Offices.--Staff of employing entities 
of the House or a joint committee may be detailed to the Select 
Committee to carry out this resolution and shall be deemed to be staff 
of the Select Committee.
    (d) Use of Consultants Permitted.--Section 202(i) of the 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (2 U.S.C. 4301(i)) shall apply 
with respect to the Select Committee in the same manner as such section 
applies with respect to a standing committee of the House of 
Representatives.
    (e) Travel.--Clauses 8(a), (b), and (c) of rule X of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives shall apply to the Select Committee.
    (f) Funding; Payments.--There shall be paid out of the applicable 
accounts of the House of Representatives such sums as may be necessary 
for the expenses of the Select Committee. Such payments shall be made 
on vouchers signed by the chair of the Select Committee and approved in 
the manner directed by the Committee on House Administration. Amounts 
made available under this subsection shall be expended in accordance 
with regulations prescribed by the Committee on House Administration.

SEC. 7. TERMINATION AND DISPOSITION OF RECORDS.

    (a) Termination.--The Select Committee shall terminate 30 days 
after filing the final report under section 4.
    (b) Disposition of Records.--Upon termination of the Select 
Committee--
            (1) the records of the Select Committee shall become the 
        records of such committee or committees designated by the 
        Speaker; and
            (2) the copies of records provided to the Select Committee 
        by a committee of the House under section 6(a) shall be 
        returned to the committee.
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