[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 503 Engrossed in House (EH)]

<DOC>
H. Res. 503

                In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

                                                         June 30, 2021.
Whereas January 6, 2021, was one of the darkest days of our democracy, during 
        which insurrectionists attempted to impede Congress's Constitutional 
        mandate to validate the presidential election and launched an assault on 
        the United States Capitol Complex that resulted in multiple deaths, 
        physical harm to over 140 members of law enforcement, and terror and 
        trauma among staff, institutional employees, press, and Members;
Whereas, on January 27, 2021, the Department of Homeland Security issued a 
        National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin that due to the ``heightened 
        threat environment across the United States,'' in which ``[S]ome 
        ideologically-motivated violent extremists with objections to the 
        exercise of governmental authority and the presidential transition, as 
        well as other perceived grievances fueled by false narratives, could 
        continue to mobilize to incite or commit violence.'' The Bulletin also 
        stated that--

    (1) ``DHS is concerned these same drivers to violence will remain 
through early 2021 and some DVEs [domestic violent extremists] may be 
emboldened by the January 6, 2021 breach of the U.S. Capitol Building in 
Washington, D.C. to target elected officials and government facilities.''; 
and

    (2) ``Threats of violence against critical infrastructure, including 
the electric, telecommunications and healthcare sectors, increased in 2020 
with violent extremists citing misinformation and conspiracy theories about 
COVID-19 for their actions'';

Whereas, on September 24, 2020, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
        Christopher Wray testified before the Committee on Homeland Security of 
        the House of Representatives that--

    (1) ``[T]he underlying drivers for domestic violent extremism - such as 
perceptions of government or law enforcement overreach, sociopolitical 
conditions, racism, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, misogyny, and reactions to 
legislative actions - remain constant.'';

    (2) ``[W]ithin the domestic terrorism bucket category as a whole, 
racially-motivated violent extremism is, I think, the biggest bucket within 
the larger group. And within the racially-motivated violent extremists 
bucket, people subscribing to some kind of white supremacist-type ideology 
is certainly the biggest chunk of that.''; and

    (3) ``More deaths were caused by DVEs than international terrorists in 
recent years. In fact, 2019 was the deadliest year for domestic extremist 
violence since the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995'';

Whereas, on April 15, 2021, Michael Bolton, the Inspector General for the United 
        States Capitol Police, testified to the Committee on House 
        Administration of the House of Representatives that--

    (1) ``The Department lacked adequate guidance for operational planning. 
USCP did not have policy and procedures in place that communicated which 
personnel were responsible for operational planning, what type of 
operational planning documents its personnel should prepare, nor when its 
personnel should prepare operational planning documents.''; and

    (2) ``USCP failed to disseminate relevant information obtained from 
outside sources, lacked consensus on interpretation of threat analyses, and 
disseminated conflicting intelligence information regarding planned events 
for January 6, 2021.''; and

Whereas the security leadership of the Congress under-prepared for the events of 
        January 6th, with United States Capitol Police Inspector General Michael 
        Bolton testifying again on June 15, 2021, that--

    (1) ``USCP did not have adequate policies and procedures for FRU (First 
Responder Unit) defining its overall operations. Additionally, FRU lacked 
resources and training for properly completing its mission.'';

    (2) ``The Department did not have adequate policies and procedures for 
securing ballistic helmets and vests strategically stored around the 
Capitol Complex.''; and

    (3) ``FRU did not have the proper resources to complete its mission.'': 
Now, therefore, be it

    Resolved,

SECTION 1. ESTABLISHMENT.

    There is hereby established the Select Committee to Investigate the January 
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (hereinafter referred to as the ``Select 
Committee'').

SEC. 2. COMPOSITION.

    (a) Appointment of Members.--The Speaker shall appoint 13 Members to the 
Select Committee, 5 of whom shall be appointed after consultation with the 
minority leader.
    (b) Designation of Chair.--The Speaker shall designate one Member to serve 
as chair of the Select Committee.
    (c) Vacancies.--Any vacancy in the Select Committee shall be filled in the 
same manner as the original appointment.

SEC. 3. PURPOSES.

    Consistent with the functions described in section 4, the purposes of the 
Select Committee are the following:
            (1) To investigate and report upon the facts, circumstances, and 
        causes relating to the January 6, 2021, domestic terrorist attack upon 
        the United States Capitol Complex (hereafter referred to as the 
        ``domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol'') and relating to the 
        interference with the peaceful transfer of power, including facts and 
        causes relating to the preparedness and response of the United States 
        Capitol Police and other Federal, State, and local law enforcement 
        agencies in the National Capital Region and other instrumentalities of 
        government, as well as the influencing factors that fomented such an 
        attack on American representative democracy while engaged in a 
        constitutional process.
            (2) To examine and evaluate evidence developed by relevant Federal, 
        State, and local governmental agencies regarding the facts and 
        circumstances surrounding the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol 
        and targeted violence and domestic terrorism relevant to such terrorist 
        attack.
            (3) To build upon the investigations of other entities and avoid 
        unnecessary duplication of efforts by reviewing the investigations, 
        findings, conclusions, and recommendations of other executive branch, 
        congressional, or independent bipartisan or nonpartisan commission 
        investigations into the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol, 
        including investigations into influencing factors related to such 
        attack.

SEC. 4. FUNCTIONS.

    (a) Functions.--The functions of the Select Committee are to--
            (1) investigate the facts, circumstances, and causes relating to the 
        domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol, including facts and 
        circumstances relating to--
                    (A) activities of intelligence agencies, law enforcement 
                agencies, and the Armed Forces, including with respect to 
                intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination and 
                information sharing among the branches and other 
                instrumentalities of government;
                    (B) influencing factors that contributed to the domestic 
                terrorist attack on the Capitol and how technology, including 
                online platforms, financing, and malign foreign influence 
                operations and campaigns may have factored into the motivation, 
                organization, and execution of the domestic terrorist attack on 
                the Capitol; and
                    (C) other entities of the public and private sector as 
                determined relevant by the Select Committee for such 
                investigation;
            (2) identify, review, and evaluate the causes of and the lessons 
        learned from the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol regarding--
                    (A) the command, control, and communications of the United 
                States Capitol Police, the Armed Forces, the National Guard, the 
                Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia, and 
                other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies in the 
                National Capital Region on or before January 6, 2021;
                    (B) the structure, coordination, operational plans, 
                policies, and procedures of the Federal Government, including as 
                such relate to State and local governments and nongovernmental 
                entities, and particularly with respect to detecting, 
                preventing, preparing for, and responding to targeted violence 
                and domestic terrorism;
                    (C) the structure, authorities, training, manpower 
                utilization, equipment, operational planning, and use of force 
                policies of the United States Capitol Police;
                    (D) the policies, protocols, processes, procedures, and 
                systems for the sharing of intelligence and other information by 
                Federal, State, and local agencies with the United States 
                Capitol Police, the Sergeants at Arms of the House of 
                Representatives and Senate, the Government of the District of 
                Columbia, including the Metropolitan Police Department of the 
                District of Columbia, the National Guard, and other Federal, 
                State, and local law enforcement agencies in the National 
                Capital Region on or before January 6, 2021, and the related 
                policies, protocols, processes, procedures, and systems for 
                monitoring, assessing, disseminating, and acting on intelligence 
                and other information, including elevating the security posture 
                of the United States Capitol Complex, derived from 
                instrumentalities of government, open sources, and online 
                platforms; and
                    (E) the policies, protocols, processes, procedures, and 
                systems for interoperability between the United States Capitol 
                Police and the National Guard, the Metropolitan Police 
                Department of the District of Columbia, and other Federal, 
                State, and local law enforcement agencies in the National 
                Capital Region on or before January 6, 2021; and
            (3) issue a final report to the House containing such findings, 
        conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures described in 
        subsection (c) as it may deem necessary.
    (b) Reports.--
            (1) Interim reports.--In addition to the final report addressing the 
        matters in subsection (a) and section 3, the Select Committee may report 
        to the House or any committee of the House from time to time the results 
        of its investigations, together with such detailed findings and 
        legislative recommendations as it may deem advisable.
            (2) Treatment of classified or law enforcement-sensitive matter.--
        Any report issued by the Select Committee shall be issued in 
        unclassified form but may include a classified annex, a law enforcement-
        sensitive annex, or both.
    (c) Corrective Measures Described.--The corrective measures described in 
this subsection may include changes in law, policy, procedures, rules, or 
regulations that could be taken--
            (1) to prevent future acts of violence, domestic terrorism, and 
        domestic violent extremism, including acts targeted at American 
        democratic institutions;
            (2) to improve the security posture of the United States Capitol 
        Complex while preserving accessibility of the Capitol Complex for all 
        Americans; and
            (3) to strengthen the security and resilience of the United States 
        and American democratic institutions against violence, domestic 
        terrorism, and domestic violent extremism.
    (d) No Markup of Legislation Permitted.--The Select Committee may not hold a 
markup of legislation.

SEC. 5. PROCEDURE.

    (a) Access to Information From Intelligence Community.--Notwithstanding 
clause 3(m) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Select 
Committee is authorized to study the sources and methods of entities described 
in clause 11(b)(1)(A) of rule X insofar as such study is related to the matters 
described in sections 3 and 4.
    (b) Treatment of Classified Information.--Clause 11(b)(4), clause 11(e), and 
the first sentence of clause 11(f) of rule X of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives shall apply to the Select Committee.
    (c) Applicability of Rules Governing Procedures of Committees.--Rule XI of 
the Rules of the House of Representatives shall apply to the Select Committee 
except as follows:
            (1) Clause 2(a) of rule XI shall not apply to the Select Committee.
            (2) Clause 2(g)(2)(D) of rule XI shall apply to the Select Committee 
        in the same manner as it applies to the Permanent Select Committee on 
        Intelligence.
            (3) Pursuant to clause 2(h) of rule XI, two Members of the Select 
        Committee shall constitute a quorum for taking testimony or receiving 
        evidence and one-third of the Members of the Select Committee shall 
        constitute a quorum for taking any action other than one for which the 
        presence of a majority of the Select Committee is required.
            (4) The chair of the Select Committee may authorize and issue 
        subpoenas pursuant to clause 2(m) of rule XI in the investigation and 
        study conducted pursuant to sections 3 and 4 of this resolution, 
        including for the purpose of taking depositions.
            (5) The chair of the Select Committee is authorized to compel by 
        subpoena the furnishing of information by interrogatory.
            (6)(A) The chair of the Select Committee, upon consultation with the 
        ranking minority member, may order the taking of depositions, including 
        pursuant to subpoena, by a Member or counsel of the Select Committee, in 
        the same manner as a standing committee pursuant to section 3(b)(1) of 
        House Resolution 8, One Hundred Seventeenth Congress.
            (B) Depositions taken under the authority prescribed in this 
        paragraph shall be governed by the procedures submitted by the chair of 
        the Committee on Rules for printing in the Congressional Record on 
        January 4, 2021.
            (7) Subpoenas authorized pursuant to this resolution may be signed 
        by the chair of the Select Committee or a designee.
            (8) The chair of the Select Committee may, after consultation with 
        the ranking minority member, recognize--
                    (A) Members of the Select Committee to question a witness 
                for periods longer than five minutes as though pursuant to 
                clause 2(j)(2)(B) of rule XI; and
                    (B) staff of the Select Committee to question a witness as 
                though pursuant to clause 2(j)(2)(C) of rule XI.
            (9) The chair of the Select Committee may postpone further 
        proceedings when a record vote is ordered on questions referenced in 
        clause 2(h)(4) of rule XI, and may resume proceedings on such postponed 
        questions at any time after reasonable notice. Notwithstanding any 
        intervening order for the previous question, an underlying proposition 
        shall remain subject to further debate or amendment to the same extent 
        as when the question was postponed.
            (10) The provisions of paragraphs (f)(1) through (f)(12) of clause 4 
        of rule XI shall apply to the Select Committee.

SEC. 6. RECORDS; STAFF; TRAVEL; FUNDING.

    (a) Sharing Records of Committees.--Any committee of the House of 
Representatives having custody of records in any form relating to the matters 
described in sections 3 and 4 shall provide copies of such records to the Select 
Committee not later than 14 days of the adoption of this resolution or receipt 
of such records. Such records shall become the records of the Select Committee.
    (b) Staff.--The appointment and the compensation of staff for the Select 
Committee shall be subject to regulations issued by the Committee on House 
Administration.
    (c) Detail of Staff of Other Offices.--Staff of employing entities of the 
House or a joint committee may be detailed to the Select Committee to carry out 
this resolution and shall be deemed to be staff of the Select Committee.
    (d) Use of Consultants Permitted.--Section 202(i) of the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1946 (2 U.S.C. 4301(i)) shall apply with respect to the 
Select Committee in the same manner as such section applies with respect to a 
standing committee of the House of Representatives.
    (e) Travel.--Clauses 8(a), (b), and (c) of rule X of the Rules of the House 
of Representatives shall apply to the Select Committee.
    (f) Funding; Payments.--There shall be paid out of the applicable accounts 
of the House of Representatives such sums as may be necessary for the expenses 
of the Select Committee. Such payments shall be made on vouchers signed by the 
chair of the Select Committee and approved in the manner directed by the 
Committee on House Administration. Amounts made available under this subsection 
shall be expended in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Committee on 
House Administration.

SEC. 7. TERMINATION AND DISPOSITION OF RECORDS.

    (a) Termination.--The Select Committee shall terminate 30 days after filing 
the final report under section 4.
    (b) Disposition of Records.--Upon termination of the Select Committee--
            (1) the records of the Select Committee shall become the records of 
        such committee or committees designated by the Speaker; and
            (2) the copies of records provided to the Select Committee by a 
        committee of the House under section 6(a) shall be returned to the 
        committee.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.