[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 9700 Introduced in House (IH)]
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117th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 9700
To clarify the legal basis for the position of the United States on
sovereignty over Taiwan and distinguish such position from the People's
Republic of China's ``one China'' principle, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
December 30, 2022
Mr. Chabot introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To clarify the legal basis for the position of the United States on
sovereignty over Taiwan and distinguish such position from the People's
Republic of China's ``one China'' principle, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Taiwan Status Diplomacy Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) Taiwan's indigenous peoples have inhabited the island
for over 6,000 years, with various political entities
exercising control over parts of it until colonial powers
conquered increasingly large swaths of the island by force,
beginning in the 17th century.
(2) Dutch Formosa (1636-1662) in southern Taiwan and
Spanish Formosa (1626-1642) in northern Taiwan were the first
colonial endeavors that exercised control over some parts of
the island.
(3) In 1662, Ming loyalist general Zheng Chenggong
(Koxinga) ended Dutch control in Taiwan, and his independent
Kingdom of Tungning ruled parts of the island until it was
conquered by the Manchu Qing Empire in 1683.
(4) Qing rule in western Taiwan was undeniably colonial and
Taiwan was not considered a traditional province of China,
becoming a province of the Qing Empire for merely 10 years
beginning in 1885, and lasting until 1895.
(5) On April 17, 1895, the Manchu Qing Empire signed the
Treaty of Shimonoseki with the Japanese Empire and agree to
cede ``to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty . . . the
island of Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or
belonging to the said island of Formosa . . . [and] the
Pescadores Group''.
(6) No colonial power can claim historical rights to
sovereignty over Taiwan as several colonial powers have
successively administered the island from the 17th through the
20th century.
(7) During the 1920s and 1930s, Chinese geographers and
political figures generally considered Taiwan to be outside of
China's national territory, as is evidenced by the Chinese
Communist Party's declaration of war against Japan in December
1941, which listed the people of Taiwan separately from the
Chinese.
(8) On July 16, 1936, in an interview with American
journalist Edgar Snow, Mao Zedong stated, ``it is the immediate
task of China to regain all our lost territories, not merely to
defend our sovereignty below the Great Wall. This means that
Manchuria must be regained. We do not, however, include Korea,
formerly a Chinese colony, but when we have re-established the
independence of the lost territories of China, and if the
Koreans wish to break away from the chains of Japanese
imperialism, we will extend them our enthusiastic help in their
struggle for independence. The same thing applies to Formosa''.
(9) The Cairo and Potsdam Declarations are legally
nonbinding statements of intent regarding postwar control over
Taiwan by the Republic of China (ROC), that do not make any
transfer of sovereignty over Taiwan.
(10) On August 17, 1945, Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers, General Douglas MacArthur, issued General Order No. 1,
listing the island of Formosa as a separate entity from China.
(11) On June 27, 1950, President Harry Truman declared that
``the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a
direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United
States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions
in that area'' and added, ``the determination of the future
status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the
Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the
United Nations''.
(12) The Treaty of Peace with Japan done in San Francisco,
California, on September 8, 1951, and signed by Japan along
with 48 nations, remains the only legally binding agreement on
Taiwan's territorial disposition in force today and states that
``Japan renounces all right, title, and claim to Formosa and
the Pescadores'', but did not transfer sovereignty to any other
party or country.
(13) The Treaty of Peace between the ROC and Japan, done at
Taipei, Taiwan, on April 28, 1952, ``recognizes'' Japan's
renunciation of its claims to Taiwan, but does not transfer
sovereignty over the island to the ROC.
(14) On February 3, 1961, the State Department's Legal
Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs, John J. Czyzak, produced a
legal memo which states, ``the most tenable theory regarding
the status of Formosa and the Pescadores is that sovereignty
over the islands has not yet been finally determined . . .
Because of differences among the Allied Powers as to who
represented China, no agreement on the disposition of Formosa
and the Pescadores could be reached in the Japanese Peace
Treaty. That the San Francisco Peace Treaty was intended to
divest Japan of its sovereignty over the islands without
transferring that sovereignty to any other country is
abundantly clear from the record. There does not appear to have
occurred anything subsequent to the Peace Treaty which can be
said to have effected a transfer of that sovereignty''.
(15) The People's Republic of China (PRC) claims
sovereignty over Taiwan as flowing from its sovereignty over
``China'' and PRC officials routinely state the PRC's ``one
China'' principle as, ``There is only one China in the world.
The Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole
legal government representing the whole of China, and Taiwan is
an inalienable part of China's territory''.
(16) As the PRC has grown increasingly confident, it has
increasingly sought to actively assert its ``one China''
principle over any other position on Taiwan's legal status,
including over the position of the United States, by waging a
global campaign to persuade or force governments, international
organizations, private corporations, and individuals to refer
to Taiwan as a part of China.
(17) Since the PRC won the Chinese civil war, it has sought
to delegalize Taiwan and isolate it from participation in the
international community and international organizations.
(18) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971)
recognized the PRC as the rightful Government of ``China''
without defining its geographical boundaries or making mention
of Taiwan under any name. However, due to PRC influence
efforts, the United Nations has routinely and erroneously
interpreted the resolution by referring to Taiwan as ``Taiwan,
Province of China'', presuming resolution of Taiwan's status.
(19) Taiwan has transitioned into a fully functioning
democracy since 1996, when the island held its first direct
Presidential election.
(20) In contrast, the Chinese Communist Party has prevented
the people of the PRC from developing a representative
democracy.
(21) An overwhelming majority of the people of Taiwan favor
the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, in which Taiwan is not
part of the PRC.
(22) In the 3 Communiques with the PRC issued in 1972,
1979, and 1982, the United States withheld recognition of the
PRC's territorial claims on Taiwan merely acknowledging,
without affirming, the ``Chinese'' position that there is one
China and Taiwan is part of China's territory.
(23) A State Department memorandum titled ``International
Documents of a Non-Binding Character'' references the Shanghai
Communique (1972) as a statement of policy, not an
international legally binding commitment.
(24) On January 1, 1979, the United States recognized the
People's Republic of China as the legitimate Government of
``China'' while leaving the country's territory undefined.
(25) On April 10, 1979, the Taiwan Relations Act (Public
Law 96-8) was enacted into law and established the policy of
the United States to--
(A) ``preserve and promote extensive, close, and
friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations
between the people of the United States and the people
on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland
and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area'';
(B) ``declare that peace and stability in the area
are in the political, security, and economic interests
of the United States, and are matters of international
concern'';
(C) ``make clear that the United States decision to
establish diplomatic relations with the People's
Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the
future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful
means'';
(D) ``consider any effort to determine the future
of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by
boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and
security of the Western Pacific area and of grave
concern to the United States'';
(E) ``provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive
character''; and
(F) ``maintain the capacity of the United States to
resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion
that would jeopardize the security, or the social or
economic system, of the people on Taiwan''.
(26) On July 14, 1982, President Ronald Reagan instructed
his representative in Taiwan, American Institute in Taiwan
Director James R. Lilley, to relay a set of assurances, which
have become known as the Six Assurances, to Taiwan's then-
President Chiang Ching-kuo including the assurance that the
United States ``has not altered its position regarding
sovereignty over Taiwan''.
(27) In 2016, the House of Representatives and the Senate
passed H. Con. Res. 88 and S. Con. Res. 38, respectively, which
reaffirm the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances as
cornerstones of the United States-Taiwan relations.
(28) On authority of the President and without codified
endorsement from Congress, the United States maintains a policy
regarding the status of Taiwan, that is called its ``one
China'' policy, under which the United States recognizes the
People's Republic of China as the Government of ``China'' and
under which the United States takes the position that Taiwan's
legal status has not been determined and takes no position on
the future status of Taiwan.
(29) The ``one China'' policy of the United States is not
the PRC's ``one China'' principle.
(30) The ``one China'' policy of the United States was
originally developed in a Cold War context as an expedient to
serve Cold War purposes and has not been updated to reflect
changing conditions, the clear trend of history toward
increasing democracy especially after the fall of the Soviet
Union, or the democratic development of Taiwan's polity.
(31) The PRC's ``one China'' principle does not reflect the
objective state of affairs that the Government of Taiwan
represents a self-governing democracy of 23,600,000 people.
(32) Unlike other colonies held by imperial powers, and
against the clear historical trend to grant colonies
independence, the universal right to self-determination of the
people of Taiwan have not been broadly considered by the
international community.
(33) Neither the PRC's ``one China'' principle nor the
``one China'' policy of the United States reflect the objective
state of affairs that the Government of Taiwan has attained a
high degree of legitimacy and administers the territory under
its control in the manner of a sovereign state and with the
attributes of sovereignty such as exclusive legal jurisdiction,
the printing of currency, the maintenance of armed forces,
customs administration, and the conduct of foreign policy.
(34) The United States is a party to the Convention on the
Rights and Duties of States done at Montevideo, Uruguay, on
December 26, 1933, and Taiwan meets all 4 criteria of statehood
laid down therein, namely a permanent population, a defined
territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into
relations with other states.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) while the PRC claims sovereignty over Taiwan, the ``one
China'' policy of the United States does not recognize that
Taiwan is part of China;
(2) persistent concerns regarding the impact on United
States-China relations have prevented the United States from
engaging in meaningful outreach to partners and allies with
respect to the legal status of Taiwan, allowing the Chinese
Communist Party to monopolize the information space and push
its baseless ``one China'' principle;
(3) the effectiveness of the Chinese Communist Party's
information campaigns regarding sovereignty over Taiwan
jeopardizes peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait by
preparing the information environment for the use of military
force to annex Taiwan to the PRC;
(4) the position of the United States on the legal status
of sovereignty over Taiwan is often presented in a manner so
nuanced as to be confusing in public discourse and prohibitive
toward explaining the interests of the United States in
Taiwan's continued peaceful evolution; and
(5) officials of the United States should seek to
distinguish the ``one China'' policy from the PRC's ``one
China'' principle.
SEC. 4. POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States to--
(1) make clear through public and private diplomacy the
legal case for its position on Taiwan's status;
(2) call on the PRC Government to refrain from erroneously
conflating the ``one China'' policy of the United States with
its ``one China'' principle in public messaging; and
(3) call on the United Nations to accurately interpret
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 and not
erroneously infer resolution of Taiwan's status.
SEC. 5. LEGAL OPINION REGARDING TAIWAN'S STATUS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall issue a legal
opinion detailing the reasoning supporting the position of the United
States regarding the international status of sovereignty over Taiwan
and its nonrecognition of the PRC's territorial claim over Taiwan.
(b) Summary.--In addition to the legal opinion described in
subsection (a), the Secretary shall issue a memorandum that summarizes
such opinion in not more than 1,200 words.
(c) Consultation.--Before issuing the legal opinion described in
subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall consult with the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations on its contents.
(d) Publication.--The documents listed in subsections (a) and (b)
shall be published on a publicly available, Department of State
internet website.
SEC. 6. DIPLOMACY REGARDING TAIWAN'S STATUS.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State, acting through subordinate
officers as appropriate, shall conduct diplomatic efforts to inform and
persuade countries of the legal reasoning supporting the position of
the United States regarding--
(1) Taiwan's status;
(2) the nonrecognition of the PRC's territorial claim over
Taiwan;
(3) where appropriate, the PRC's use of ethnonationalism to
justify its claims to Taiwan; and
(4) the meaning and history of United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 2758 and its subordinate resolutions
throughout the system of the United Nations and the PRC's
efforts to distort such meaning and history.
(b) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees a report describing
the diplomatic efforts carried out pursuant to subsection (a).
(2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) A description of the lines of effort used to
conduct the diplomatic activities carried out pursuant
to subsection (a).
(B) A list of states contacted as part of such
activities, with a special emphasis on countries in the
Indo-Pacific.
(C) An assessment of the effectiveness of such
activities.
(3) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be
issued in a classified form, but may contain an unclassified
annex, if appropriate.
(4) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this
subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
includes the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate.
SEC. 7. MAPS DEPICTING TAIWAN.
Not later than 15 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of State, acting through the Geographer of the Department of
State, shall issue guidance to reconcile with United States policy
guidelines on the procurement and production of maps that depict Taiwan
by prohibiting such procurement and production of maps which depict
Taiwan to be sovereign territory of the People's Republic of China.
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