116 HR 9010 IH: Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 U.S. House of Representatives 2022-09-28 text/xml EN Pursuant to Title 17 Section 105 of the United States Code, this file is not subject to copyright protection and is in the public domain.

I117th CONGRESS2d SessionH. R. 9010IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVESSeptember 28, 2022Mr. McCaul (for himself, Mr. Chabot, Mr. Wilson of South Carolina, Mr. Banks, Mr. Reschenthaler, Mr. Gallagher, Mr. Burchett, Mr. Johnson of Ohio, Mr. Kinzinger, Mr. Tiffany, Mr. Bilirakis, Mr. Curtis, Mr. Crenshaw, Mrs. Miller-Meeks, Mrs. Radewagen, Mr. Lamborn, Ms. Tenney, Mr. Green of Tennessee, Ms. Stefanik, Mr. Barr, Mr. Issa, Mrs. Kim of California, Mr. DesJarlais, Mr. Meuser, Mr. Carter of Georgia, Mr. Womack, Ms. Mace, Mr. Smith of New Jersey, Mrs. Wagner, Mr. Waltz, Mr. Gooden of Texas, Mrs. Cammack, Mr. Fallon, Mrs. Hinson, Mr. Katko, Mr. Cline, and Ms. Malliotakis) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Armed Services, Financial Services, Ways and Means, and Homeland Security, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concernedA BILLTo provide for United States policy toward Taiwan.

1.

Short title; table of contents

(a)

Short title

This Act may be cited as the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022.(b)

Table of contents

The table of contents for this Act is as follows:Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.Sec. 2. Findings.Sec. 3. Definitions.Title I—United States policy toward TaiwanSec. 101. Declaration of policy.Sec. 102. Treatment of the Government of Taiwan.Sec. 103. Reauthorization of Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020.Sec. 104. Prohibition on maps depicting Taiwan as part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China.Sec. 105. Taiwan symbols of sovereignty.Sec. 106. Designation and references to Taiwan Representative Office.Sec. 107. Clarifying amendments.Sec. 108. Senate confirmation of the Director of the Taipei office of the American Institute in Taiwan.Title II—Implementation of an enhanced defense partnership between the United States and TaiwanSec. 201. Increasing the strategic clarity of United States policy towards Taiwan’s defense.Sec. 202. Security assistance to modernize Taiwan’s security capabilities to deter and defeat aggression by the People's Republic of China.Sec. 203. Anticipatory planning and annual review of the United States strategy to defend Taiwan.Sec. 204. Joint assessment.Sec. 205. Requirements regarding definition of counter intervention capabilities.Sec. 206. Comprehensive training program.Sec. 207. Joint exercises with Taiwan.Sec. 208. Assessment of Taiwan’s needs for civilian defense and resilience.Sec. 209. Annual report on cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan.Sec. 210. Prioritizing excess defense article transfers for Taiwan.Sec. 211. Fast-tracking sales to Taiwan under the Foreign Military Sales program.Sec. 212. Arms export delivery solutions.Sec. 213. Whole-of-government deterrence measures to respond to the People's Republic of China's force against Taiwan.Sec. 214. Increase in annual regional contingency stockpile additions and support for Taiwan.Sec. 215. Emergency drawdown authority of Taiwan Strait contingencies.Sec. 216. Designation of Taiwan as a major non-NATO ally.Title III—Countering People’s Republic of China’s aggression and influence campaignsSec. 301. Strategy to respond to influence and information operations targeting Taiwan.Sec. 302. Strategy to counter economic coercion by the People's Republic of China targeting countries and entities that support Taiwan.Sec. 303. Shared planning for the defense of Taiwan.Title IV—Inclusion of Taiwan in international organizationsSec. 401. Participation of Taiwan in international organizations.Sec. 402. Clarification regarding United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI).Sec. 403. Participation of Taiwan in the Inter-American Development Bank.Sec. 404. Plan for Taiwan's participation in the Inter-American Development Bank.Sec. 405. Report concerning member state status for Taiwan at the Inter-American Development Bank.Sec. 406. Support for Taiwan admission to the IMF.Sec. 407. Meaningful participation of Taiwan in the International Civil Aviation Organization.Title V—Enhanced development and economic cooperation between the United States and TaiwanSec. 501. Findings.Sec. 502. Sense of Congress on a free trade agreement and bilateral tax agreement with Taiwan, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, and CBP Preclearance.Sec. 503. Sense of Congress on United States-Taiwan development cooperation.Sec. 504. Report.Title VI—Taiwan Fellowship ProgramSec. 601. Taiwan Fellowship Program.Title VII—Miscellaneous provisionsSec. 701. Invitation of Taiwanese counterparts to high-level bilateral and multilateral forums and exercises.Sec. 702. Report on Taiwan Travel Act.Sec. 703. Authorization of Global Cooperation and Training Framework.Sec. 704. Prohibitions against undermining United States policy regarding Taiwan.Sec. 705. Amendments to the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (Taipei) Act of 2019.Sec. 706. Rule of construction.Sec. 707. Consolidation of reports.

2.

Findings

Congress finds the following:(1)Since 1949, the close relationship between the United States and Taiwan has been of enormous benefit to both parties and to the Indo-Pacific region as a whole.(2)The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) has enabled the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan to maintain a strong and important relationship that promotes regional security, prosperity, and shared democratic values.(3)The security of Taiwan and the ability for the people of Taiwan to determine their own future is fundamental to United States interests and values.(4)The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States and the American Institute in Taiwan facilitate critical consular relations that—(A)protect the interests of the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan; and (B)strengthen people-to-people ties.(5)Increased engagement between public officials, commercial interests, civil society leaders, and others enhances United States-Taiwan relations and its economic, security, and democratic dimensions.(6)Taiwan serves as a critical partner on regional and transnational issues, such as public health, climate change, critical and emerging technologies, cybersecurity, trade, and freedom of navigation.(7)Taiwan exemplifies a thriving democracy consisting of more than 23,000,000 people who value their suffrage, free markets, right to due process, freedom of expression, and other individual liberties.(8)President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China (referred to in this Act as the PRC) continues to repeat his desire to stifle the freedom of Taiwan, as evidenced by his July 2021 proclamation, in which he stated, All sons and daughters of China, including compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, must work together and move forward in solidarity, resolutely smashing any Taiwan independence plots..(9)As President Xi Jinping consolidates his power in the Chinese Communist Party (referred to in this Act as the CCP), he is escalating the PRC’s campaign of coercion and intimidation against Taiwan, as evidenced by—(A)the accelerated preparations made by the PRC and its People’s Liberation Army (referred to in this Act as the PLA) for an offensive attack against Taiwan, such as the PLA's January 2022 incursion of nearly 40 fighters, bombers, and other warplanes into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone;(B)the PLA’s growing offensive preparations in the Taiwan Strait, such as amphibious assault and live-fire exercises and record-scale incursions into Taiwanese air space;(C)the Foreign Ministry’s diplomatic efforts to isolate Taiwan, such as abusing its position in international institutions and multilateral fora to exclude Taiwanese participation despite Taiwan’s demonstrated expertise in relevant subjects, such as public health;(D)threats and actions to compromise Taiwan’s economy and critical suppliers, such as draconian export controls and the 31 Measures intended to lure Taiwanese talent to mainland China and away from Taiwan;(E)persistent and targeted cyberattacks, numbering nearly 20,000,000 per month, which are intended to compromise Taiwan’s critical infrastructure and inflict civilian harm;(F)political and economic pressure on other countries who seek closer ties with Taiwan, such as recent export controls related to Lithuania after Lithuania announced a permanent Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania.(10)On multiple occasions, through both formal and informal channels, the United States has expressed its concern for the PRC’s destabilizing activities in the Taiwan Strait and on the international stage that aim to subvert Taiwan’s democratic institutions.(11)The Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States—(A)identifies Taiwan as an important leading regional partner;(B)seeks to bolster Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities; and (C)reaffirms that Taiwan’s future must be determined peacefully and in accordance with the wishes and best interests of the people of Taiwan. (12)The PRC considers stifling the freedom of Taiwan as a critical and necessary step to displacing the United States as the preeminent military power in the Indo-Pacific and continues its modernization campaign to enhance the power-projection capabilities of the PLA and its ability to conduct joint operations.(13)Taiwan maintains a modern, ready, self-defense force that adheres to the highest democratic principles and benefits from continued state-of-the-art security assistance.(14)It is a vital national security interest of the United States to defend Taiwan for the purposes of—(A)mitigating the PLA’s ability to project power and establish contested zones within the First and Second Island Chains and limiting the PLA’s freedom of maneuver to conduct unconstrained power projection capabilities beyond the First Island Chain in order to protect United States territory, such as Hawaii and Guam;(B)defending the territorial integrity of Indo-Pacific allies, such as Japan;(C)deterring other countries and competitors from exercising force as a means to revise the established status quo;(D)championing democratic institutions and societies in the Indo-Pacific region and throughout the world; and(E)maintaining a rules-based international order that—(i)constrains authoritarian powers;(ii)enshrines collective security;(iii)promotes democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and (iv)promotes peace and prosperity.

3.

Definitions

In this Act:(1)

Appropriate committees of Congress

Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the term appropriate committees of Congress means—(A)the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;(B)the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;(C)the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;(D)the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;(E)the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and(F)the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. (2)

People’s Liberation Army; PLA

The terms People’s Liberation Army and PLA mean the Armed Forces of the People’s Republic of China.(3)

Republic of China

The term Republic of China means the East Asia island country commonly known as Taiwan.(4)

Sharp power

The term sharp power means the coordinated and often concealed application of disinformation, media manipulation, economic coercion, cyber-intrusions, targeted investments, and academic censorship that is intended—(A)to corrupt political and nongovernmental institutions and interfere in democratic elections and encourage self-censorship of views at odds with those of the Government of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party; or(B)to foster attitudes, behavior, decisions, or outcomes in Taiwan and elsewhere that support the interests of the Government of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party.