115 HR 7207 IH: Prohibit Venezuelan Oil Importation Act
U.S. House of Representatives
2022-03-24
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EN
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I
117th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 7207
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
March 24, 2022
Mr. Donalds (for himself, Mr. Weber of Texas, Mr. Gibbs, and Mr. Diaz-Balart) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned
A BILL
To prohibit the importation of petroleum products from Venezuela, and for other purposes.
1.

Short title
This Act may be cited as the “Prohibit Venezuelan Oil Importation Act”.
2.

Findings; sense of Congress
(a)

Findings
Congress finds the following:
(1)
From 1959 to 1999, Venezuela, officially known as the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, had a form of government that embraced democratic principles.
(2)
In 1999, Hugo Chávez was elected as the President of Venezuela, where he maintained power by redistributing the country’s vast oil reserves towards social welfare programs, suppressing dissent and independent media, and corrupting Venezuela’s democratic institutions, while simultaneously nationalizing the country’s private businesses, which he did so until his death on March 5, 2013.
(3)
On April 24, 2013, Nicolás Maduro became President of Venezuela, notwithstanding multiple claims of election fraud and constitutional violations against Maduro.
(4)
During this time, Venezuela’s economy had become strongly dependent on the exportation of oil, with crude accounting for 86 percent of its exports.
(5)
However, in 2014, Venezuela entered into an economic recession, which led to the Venezuelan regime’s partnership with Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), a state oil company, to combat the highly fluctuating price of oil in Venezuela along with the country’s overall steep decrease in oil production.
(6)
In 2015, Venezuela’s economic struggles continued, with Venezuela having the world’s highest rate of inflation that surpassed 100 percent, resulting from the Maduro regime’s socialist economic policy that ultimately redistributed the oil-generated wealth to Venezuela’s oligarchs.
(7)
In January 2016, Maduro declared an “economic emergency” due to the country’s inability to provide for basic human needs to its citizens, leading to riots in the streets of Venezuela.
(8)
In 2017, Maduro announced that leading opposition parties would be barred from taking part in the country’s Presidential election, which led the United States and other countries formally recognizing Juan Guaidó as the President of Venezuela, although countries such as China, Russia, Cuba, and Iran still continued to recognize President Nicolás Maduro.
(9)
In August 2019, President Donald Trump signed an Executive order to impose tough sanctions against Maduro’s totalitarian regime.
(b)

Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that Congress—
(1)
recognizes that Venezuela has been impacted by hyperinflation, rampant crime, and significant government corruption;
(2)
condemns the totalitarian Maduro regime and calls for the return of constitutional democratic government to Venezuela similar to the form of government that existed in the country from 1959 to 1999; and
(3)
calls on President Joseph Biden to use relevant constitutional and statutory authorities that grant emergency powers to waive unnecessary environmental permitting requirements until the United States can reliably produce enough oil and natural gas to recapture America’s global energy dominance.
3.

Statement of policy
It shall be the policy of the United States—
(1)
to support the desire of the people of Venezuela for freedom and democracy;
(2)
to promote its national security interests by prohibiting the importation of petroleum products from Venezuela in the midst of the ongoing Russian attack on Ukraine;
(3)
to stress the importance of American energy independence, particularly from countries such as Russia and Venezuela; and
(4)
to implement America-first energy policies that contradict President Biden’s overall energy policy approach.
4.

Prohibition on importation of petroleum products from Venezuela
(a)

In general
The President shall prohibit the importation of all petroleum products (as such term is defined in section 3 of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (42 U.S.C. 6202)) originating from Venezuela into the customs territory of the United States (as such term is defined in General Note 2 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule).
(b)

Modification or removal of prohibition
The President may modify or remove the prohibition under subsection (a) with respect to some or all petroleum products described in such subsection only if the President—
(1)
reimplements and maintains the sanctions imposed against Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA);
(2)
directs the Executive Office of the President to conduct and submit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership a study that—
(A)
outlines the impacts and implications of Executive Order 13990 of January 20, 2021 (86 Fed. Reg. 7037; relating to protecting public health and the environment and restoring science to tackle the climate crisis), specifically pertaining to the decision to revoke—
(i)
Executive Order 13766 of January 24, 2017 (82 Fed. Reg. 8657; relating to expediting environmental review and approvals for high priority infrastructure projects);
(ii)
Executive Order 13778 of February 28, 2017 (82 Fed. Reg. 12497; relating to restoring the rule of law, federalism, and economic growth by reviewing the “Waters of the United States” rule);
(iii)
Executive Order 13783 of March 28, 2017 (82 Fed. Reg. 16093; relating to promoting energy independence and economic growth);
(iv)
Executive Order 13792 of April 26, 2017 (82 Fed. Reg. 20429; relating to review of designations under the Antiquities Act);
(v)
Executive Order 13795 of April 28, 2017 (82 Fed. Reg. 20815; relating to implementing an America-first offshore energy strategy);
(vi)
Executive Order 13868 of April 10, 2019 (84 Fed. Reg. 15495; relating to promoting energy infrastructure and economic growth); and
(vii)
Executive Order 13807 of August 15, 2017 (82 Fed. Reg. 40463; relating to establishing discipline and accountability in the environmental review and permitting process for infrastructure projects);
(B)
provides the necessary and appropriate recommendations for the President to reimplement an America-first offshore energy strategy, as in effect on January 19, 2020;
(C)
reports on the effects of President Biden’s—
(i)
decision to institute a moratorium on offshore and onshore oil and gas leasing on Federal land, including the directive to the Department of the Interior to pause all oil and gas lease sales on Federal lands;
(ii)
actions that threaten to raise royalty rates for any onshore and offshore projects relating to the oil and gas industry;
(iii)
statements that create significant regulatory uncertainty, including the President’s threats of implementing new excessive and burdensome regulations on the oil and gas industry;
(iv)
decision to stop the lease sales in the Coastal Plain (as defined in section 20001(a)(1) of the Public Law 115–97 (16 U.S.C. 668dd note(a)(1))) of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska;
(v)
directive to the Department of Energy to delay the review of certain liquified natural gas export licenses;
(vi)
allocation of authority to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to change its certificate policy statement governing interstate natural gas pipeline reviews;
(vii)
decision to shut down critical mining projects, such as Twin Metals copper-nickel mine in Minnesota;
(viii)
guidance to the Department of the Treasury that prevents the Department of Energy, the United States Agency for International Development, and the Department of State from investing in loans or grants for fossil fuel projects abroad;
(ix)
refusal to permit mining projects, such as Resolution Copper in Arizona;
(x)
decision to reinstitute National Monuments, including Bears Ears National Monument and Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, to prevent the development of fossil fuel projects; and
(xi)
response to the Bureau of Land Management’s ongoing backlog of pending applications for permits to drill on Federal land;
(D)
includes supplemental background information pertaining to the President’s decision to implement a temporary moratorium on all Federal activities relating to the implementation of the Coastal Plain Oil and Gas Leasing Program (as established by the Record of Decision signed August 17, 2020) in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge; and
(E)
describes the potential impacts of pausing all new discretionary regulatory policy that would negatively impact the oil and gas sector, including—
(i)
the proposed rule titled “Standards of Performance for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources and Emissions Guidelines for Existing Sources: Oil and Natural Gas Sector Climate Review” and published on November 15, 2021 (86 Fed. Reg. 63110);
(ii)
the Environmental Protection Agency’s decision to reconsider the previous Administration’s decision to retain, without revision, the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for particulate matter and ozone;
(iii)
the development by the Environmental Protection Agency of a new definition of the term “waters of the United States” for any purpose that affects the oil and gas sector; and
(iv)
the modification by the Corps of Engineers of nationwide permit (NWP) regulations under section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 1344) and section 10 of the Act of March 3, 1899 (33 U.S.C. 403);
(3)
renews the authorization of the Keystone XL pipeline for the purpose of importing oil from Canada to the United States, as described in the Presidential permit of March 29, 2019 (84 Fed. Reg. 13101);
(4)
resumes oil and gas leasing on Federal land; and
(5)
notifies the appropriate congressional committees and leadership that, in the determination of the President, such modification or removal is appropriate given the situation in Ukraine, and includes with such notification—
(A)
an explanation of the rationale for such modification or removal; and
(B)
if the modification does not result in the full removal of the prohibition, a description of the criteria to be met by Venezuela for further modification or removal of remaining elements of the prohibition.
(c)

Penalties
The President is authorized to use appropriate authorities to impose such civil or criminal penalties as may be necessary to enforce the prohibition under subsection (a).
(d)

Appropriate congressional committees and leadership defined
For purposes of this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees and leadership” means—
(1)
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate;
(2)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
(3)
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.