Short title

This Act may be cited as the

Bunker Buster Act

Findings

Congress finds the following: (1)The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission defines high-enriched uranium as uranium enriched to at least 20 percent uranium–235. (2)Under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran agreed to refrain from producing enriched uranium containing more than 3.67 percent uranium–235 for 15 years. (3)On January 13, 2019, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Dr. Ali Akbar Salehi, told the Fars News Agency, If we want to come out of the nuclear deal and produce, within four days we could start our 20 percent.. (4)On June 17, 2019, the spokesman for Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, Behrouz Kamalvandi, suggested that Iran’s enrichment could reach up to 20 percent. (5)On April 16, 2021, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Dr. Ali Akbar Salehi, told the state television that Iran had begun enriching uranium to 60 percent. (6)On July 14, 2021, the former President of Iran, President Hassan Rouhani, says during a press conference that Iran has the knowledge and ability to enrich weapons-grade uranium at 90 percent. (7)On September 7, 2021, the International Atomic Energy Agency warned in their quarterly report of the knowledge gained by Iran about advanced centrifuge performance and higher-level enrichment that cannot be fully reversed. The report showed that the stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium grew from 2.4 kilograms in May to 10 kilograms. It also indicated Iran reconfigured its 60 percent production lines at Natanz and appears to be enriching to that level more efficiently and consistently.

Sense of Congress

It is the sense of Congress that the United States should— (1)seek to extend the limitations on Iran’s enriched uranium, including through engagement in multilateral diplomatic initiatives; (2)ensure that Israel and other allies are prepared for all contingencies if Iran pursues development of a nuclear weapon; (3)send a clear signal to Iran that development of a nuclear weapon will never be tolerated; and (4)reaffirm the United States commitment to deter Iranian nuclear development with a credible military threat.

Study and report

(a)

Study

The President, acting through the Secretary of Defense, shall seek to conduct a study with the Government of Israel on Israeli military requirements to defend itself against a wide range of threats to Israel’s qualitative military edge (as such term is defined in section 36(h)(3) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776(h)(3))) and national security, including an Iranian nuclear weapon. Such study shall include an analysis of gaps in Israel’s security requirements, including infrastructure, munitions, intelligence sharing, satellites, and the extent to which the transfer of United States ordnance to Israel would advance the national interests of both countries. (b)

Report

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to Congress a report that contains the results of the study described in subsection (a). (c)

Form

The report referred to in subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

Actions to ensure israel is prepared for all contingencies if Iran seeks to develop a nuclear weapon

(a)

In general

Subject to the preliminary conditions described in subsection (b), the President is authorized to take the actions described in subsection (c), upon the request of the Government of Israel, to ensure Israel is prepared for all contingencies if Iran seeks to develop a nuclear weapon. (b)

Preliminary conditions

The President may exercise the authority of subsection (a) only if the President first determines and certifies to Congress that— (1)it is consistent with the results of the study and report required under section 4 to do so; and (2)it is vital to the national security interests of the United States to do so. (c)

Actions described

The actions described in this subsection are the following: (1)To provide for the construction of infrastructure in Israel to accommodate large ordnance systems that are designed to destroy underground nuclear infrastructure, including— (A)construction of extended runways for aircraft that carry the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP); (B)basing options for such aircraft; and (C)munition storage facilities. (2) (A)To store in the territory of Israel the MOP or related munitions described in paragraph (1), to be used by the United States except as provided in subparagraph (B). (B)To transfer the MOP or related munitions described in paragraph (1) to Israeli custody if the President determines and certifies to Congress that— (i)Iran— (I)is in noncompliance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement; (II)has modified its implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement (including modified Code 3.1); or (III)as determined by the President, has reduced access of inspectors of the Agency in such a manner so as to be prejudicial to the Agency’s ability to provide confidence as to the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and absence of undeclared nuclear activities; (ii)it is vital to the national security of the United States to do so; (iii)Israel has no other means to achieve a mutual national security objective of destroying Iran’s underground nuclear infrastructure or facilities; and (iv)a dual key control system is in place requiring approval by the President, acting through the Secretary of Defense (which may not be further delegated) for deployment of the MOP or related munitions described in paragraph (1) prior to Israeli deployment of such munitions. (3)To provide for training of Israeli personnel with respect to the MOP or related munitions described in paragraph (1). (4)To conduct joint research and development with Israel to— (A)enhance United States ordnance; and (B)develop Israeli capability for ordnance to destroy underground infrastructure, including Hezbollah rocket storage and manufacturing facilities and underground Iranian nuclear facilities. (d)

NPT safeguards agreement defined

In this section, the term NPT Safeguards Agreement means the Agreement between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which entered into force on May 15, 1974.

Rule of construction

Nothing in this Act may be construed to serve as an authorization for the use of military force against Iran.