Restrictions on Federal funding of certain gain-of-function research

(a)

Gain-of-Function research definition

In this section, the term gain-of-function research means any research that—(1)may be reasonably anticipated to confer attributes to influenza, MERS, or SARS viruses such that the virus would have enhanced pathogenicity or transmissibility in any organism; or(2)involves the enhancement of potential pandemic pathogens or related risky research with potentially dangerous pathogens.(b)

Funding limitations

(1)

In general

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no Federal funding may be made available for any purpose, including under any contract, grant, subgrant, or other assistance, to laboratories or research institutions in the People’s Republic of China for the purposes of gain-of-function research.(2)

Certification

Any recipient of Federal funding for the purposes of scientific research shall certify to the issuing authority that such recipient will not distribute any such Federal funds, whether directly or through subgrants, to any qualifying laboratory or research institution that is in the People’s Republic of China or that receives any funding from the People’s Republic of China, for the purposes of gain-of-function research.(c)

Penalty for lack of candor

With respect to any official or employee of the National Institutes of Health, or grantee or employee or contractor of a grantee of the National Institutes of Health, who is determined by the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services to have intentionally misled, or omitted information in a disclosure to, Congress, the National Institutes of Health, or any relevant Inspector General about the direction, scope, or extent of Federal funding of international gain-of-function research, in addition to being subject to all other applicable criminal penalties—(1)such person shall not be eligible for any new Federal grant or other funding;(2)if such person previously received a Federal grant or other funding, such grant or other funding shall be immediately terminated and any unexpended funds shall be rescinded; and(3)such person shall not be eligible for Federal employment.(d)

Report required

Not later than 30 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, in consultation with the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Department of State, shall submit, in both classified and unclassified forms, a report to the appropriate committees of Congress providing an assessment of—(1)the United States capacity to determine the extent of gain-of-function research conducted by any laboratories of research institutions in the People’s Republic of China, including the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and safety protocols followed by laboratories or research institutions in the People’s Republic of China, including the Wuhan Institute of Virology, in conducting any gain-of-function research;(2)the United States capacity to determine whether cooperation or relationships between laboratories or research facilities in the People’s Republic of China conducting gain-of-function research and the People’s Liberation Army exist;(3)costs and potential risks or benefits of any United States cooperation or funding with laboratories or research facilities in the People’s Republic of China conducting gain-of-function research;(4)a recommendation of whether the United States should resume or continue to suspend any cooperation or funding of laboratories or research facilities in the People’s Republic of China conducting gain-of-function research;(5)a list of all gain-of-function research currently being funded with financial support of any agency of the Federal Government, including the purpose, cost, pathogens, and location of research;(6)a detailed list of all Federal funding for research being conducted in or with the People’s Republic of China; and(7)a determination of whether the Chinese laboratories identified in the report have had, or continue to have, a connection to the proliferation of fentanyl and fentanyl-analogues in the United States.(e)

National security waiver

The President may waive the limitation under subsection (b) with respect to particular research described in such subsection upon a determination that such a waiver would be in the national security interest. Such waiver shall be made publicly available at the time of its issuance.