[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5988 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>






117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 5988

 To restrict the use of Federal Funds for gain-of-function research in 
                    the People's Republic of China.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 16, 2021

Mr. Stewart (for himself, Mr. Jackson, and Ms. Malliotakis) introduced 
 the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and 
  Commerce, and in addition to the Committees on Science, Space, and 
Technology, Oversight and Reform, and Foreign Affairs, for a period to 
      be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for 
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the 
                          committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
 To restrict the use of Federal Funds for gain-of-function research in 
                    the People's Republic of China.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Fairness and Accountability in 
Underwriting Chinese Institutions Act'' or the ``FAUCI Act''.

SEC. 2. RESTRICTIONS ON FEDERAL FUNDING OF CERTAIN GAIN-OF-FUNCTION 
              RESEARCH.

    (a) Gain-of-Function Research Definition.--In this section, the 
term ``gain-of-function research'' means any research that--
            (1) may be reasonably anticipated to confer attributes to 
        influenza, MERS, or SARS viruses such that the virus would have 
        enhanced pathogenicity or transmissibility in any organism; or
            (2) involves the enhancement of potential pandemic 
        pathogens or related risky research with potentially dangerous 
        pathogens.
    (b) Funding Limitations.--
            (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
        law, no Federal funding may be made available for any purpose, 
        including under any contract, grant, subgrant, or other 
        assistance, to laboratories or research institutions in the 
        People's Republic of China for the purposes of gain-of-function 
        research.
            (2) Certification.--Any recipient of Federal funding for 
        the purposes of scientific research shall certify to the 
        issuing authority that such recipient will not distribute any 
        such Federal funds, whether directly or through subgrants, to 
        any qualifying laboratory or research institution that is in 
        the People's Republic of China or that receives any funding 
        from the People's Republic of China, for the purposes of gain-
        of-function research.
    (c) Penalty for Lack of Candor.--With respect to any official or 
employee of the National Institutes of Health, or grantee or employee 
or contractor of a grantee of the National Institutes of Health, who is 
determined by the Inspector General of the Department of Health and 
Human Services to have intentionally misled, or omitted information in 
a disclosure to, Congress, the National Institutes of Health, or any 
relevant Inspector General about the direction, scope, or extent of 
Federal funding of international gain-of-function research, in addition 
to being subject to all other applicable criminal penalties--
            (1) such person shall not be eligible for any new Federal 
        grant or other funding;
            (2) if such person previously received a Federal grant or 
        other funding, such grant or other funding shall be immediately 
        terminated and any unexpended funds shall be rescinded; and
            (3) such person shall not be eligible for Federal 
        employment.
    (d) Report Required.--Not later than 30 months after the date of 
enactment of this Act, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, in 
consultation with the Department of Health and Human Services, the 
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the 
Director of National Intelligence, and the Department of State, shall 
submit, in both classified and unclassified forms, a report to the 
appropriate committees of Congress providing an assessment of--
            (1) the United States capacity to determine the extent of 
        gain-of-function research conducted by any laboratories of 
        research institutions in the People's Republic of China, 
        including the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and safety protocols 
        followed by laboratories or research institutions in the 
        People's Republic of China, including the Wuhan Institute of 
        Virology, in conducting any gain-of-function research;
            (2) the United States capacity to determine whether 
        cooperation or relationships between laboratories or research 
        facilities in the People's Republic of China conducting gain-
        of-function research and the People's Liberation Army exist;
            (3) costs and potential risks or benefits of any United 
        States cooperation or funding with laboratories or research 
        facilities in the People's Republic of China conducting gain-
        of-function research;
            (4) a recommendation of whether the United States should 
        resume or continue to suspend any cooperation or funding of 
        laboratories or research facilities in the People's Republic of 
        China conducting gain-of-function research;
            (5) a list of all gain-of-function research currently being 
        funded with financial support of any agency of the Federal 
        Government, including the purpose, cost, pathogens, and 
        location of research;
            (6) a detailed list of all Federal funding for research 
        being conducted in or with the People's Republic of China; and
            (7) a determination of whether the Chinese laboratories 
        identified in the report have had, or continue to have, a 
        connection to the proliferation of fentanyl and fentanyl-
        analogues in the United States.
    (e) National Security Waiver.--The President may waive the 
limitation under subsection (b) with respect to particular research 
described in such subsection upon a determination that such a waiver 
would be in the national security interest. Such waiver shall be made 
publicly available at the time of its issuance.
                                 <all>