[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4260 Introduced in House (IH)]

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117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 4260

 To extend the life of the Minuteman III and pause the development of 
 the new ground-based strategic deterrent program to reduce immediate 
                          and long-term costs.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 30, 2021

 Mr. Garamendi (for himself, Mr. Khanna, Mr. Beyer, Mr. McGovern, Mr. 
Huffman, Mr. Doggett, Mr. Lieu, Mr. Blumenauer, Ms. Lee of California, 
 and Mr. Foster) introduced the following bill; which was referred to 
 the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on 
   Appropriations, for a period to be subsequently determined by the 
  Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
           within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
 To extend the life of the Minuteman III and pause the development of 
 the new ground-based strategic deterrent program to reduce immediate 
                          and long-term costs.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Investing in Commonsense Ballistic 
Missiles Act of 2021'' or the ``ICBM Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) According to the Congressional Budget Office, the 
        projected cost to sustain and modernize the United States 
        nuclear arsenal, as of 2017, ``is $1.2 trillion in 2017 dollars 
        over the 2017-2046 period: more than $800 billion to operate 
        and sustain (that is, incrementally upgrade) nuclear forces and 
        about $400 billion to modernize them''. With inflation, the 
        cost rises to $1,700,000,000,000 and does not include the cost 
        of the additional nuclear capabilities proposed in the 2018 
        Nuclear Posture Review.
            (2) The Government Accountability Office found in July 2020 
        that the Department of Defense and the National Nuclear 
        Security Administration have still not taken meaningful steps 
        to address affordability concerns or heeded the Government 
        Accountability Office's recommendation to consider ``deferring 
        the start of or cancelling specific modernization programs'', 
        including the W87-1 warhead modification program, to address 
        increases in the weapons activities budget requests of the 
        National Nuclear Security Administration.
            (3) The ground-based strategic deterrent program is 
        expected to cost between $93,100,000,000 and $95,800,000,000 
        which does not include the cost of the W87-1 warhead 
        modification program or the cost to produce new plutonium pits 
        for the warhead. The total estimated life cycle cost of the 
        ground based strategic deterrent program is $264,000,000,000, 
        and the program is intended to replace 400 deployed Minuteman 
        III missiles with more than 600 new missiles, to allow for test 
        flights and spares.
            (4) The Air Force awarded a sole-source contract to 
        Northrop Grumman for the engineering and manufacturing 
        component of the ground-based strategic deterrent program in 
        September 2020, raising concerns that the absence of 
        competition for the award may result in higher than projected 
        costs to United States taxpayers.
            (5) The National Nuclear Security Administration is also in 
        the early stages of developing a replacement intercontinental 
        ballistic missile warhead, the W87-1, and expanding plutonium 
        pit production to build new warhead cores, costing at least 
        $12,000,000,000 and $9,000,000,000, respectively, to meet the 
        modernization needs of the ground-based strategic deterrent 
        program.
            (6) Maintaining and updating the current Minuteman III 
        missiles is possible for multiple decades and, according to the 
        Congressional Budget Office, through 2036 this would cost 
        $37,000,000,000 less in 2017 dollars than developing and 
        deploying the ground-based strategic deterrent program.
            (7) On April 3, 2019, Lieutenant General Richard M. Clark, 
        then-Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence 
        and Nuclear Integration, noted in testimony before the 
        Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives 
        that we have ``one more opportunity'' to conduct life extension 
        on the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile, 
        indicating the technical feasibility of extending the Minuteman 
        III missile despite his stated preference for the ground-based 
        strategic deterrent.
            (8) Even in the absence of an intercontinental ballistic 
        missile leg of the triad, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review 
        signaled that the United States would have an assured 
        retaliatory capability in the form of ballistic missile 
        submarines, which are, ``at present, virtually undetectable, 
        and there are no known, near-term credible threats to the 
        survivability of the [ballistic missile submarine] force'', a 
        benefit that will be enhanced as the Department of Defense 
        moves to replace the Ohio class ballistic submarine fleet with 
        the new Columbia class ballistic missile fleet.
            (9) While intercontinental ballistic missiles had 
        historically been the most responsive leg of the United States 
        nuclear triad, advances in ballistic missile submarine 
        communications now provide immediate dissemination of 
        information during wartime.
            (10) Intercontinental ballistic missiles cannot be 
        recalled, leaving decision-makers with mere minutes to decide 
        whether to launch the missiles before they are destroyed, known 
        as a posture of ``launch on warning'' or ``launch under 
        attack'' in the face of a perceived nuclear attack, greatly 
        increasing the risk of a national leader initiating a nuclear 
        war by mistake.
            (11) In 1983, Stanislav Petrov, a former lieutenant colonel 
        of the Soviet Air Defense Forces correctly identified a false 
        warning in an early warning system that showed several United 
        States incoming nuclear missiles, preventing Soviet leaders 
        from launching a retaliatory response, earning Colonel Petrov 
        the nickname ``the man who saved the world''.
            (12) Former Secretary of Defense William Perry, who once 
        briefed President Bill Clinton on a suspected Russian first 
        nuclear strike, wrote that the ground-based leg of the nuclear 
        triad is ``destabilizing because it invites an attack'' and 
        intercontinental ballistic missiles are ``some of the most 
        dangerous weapons in the world'' and ``could even trigger an 
        accidental nuclear war''.
            (13) General James Cartwright, former vice chair of the 
        Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander of the United States 
        Strategic Command, wrote, with Secretary Perry, ``[T]he 
        greatest danger is not a Russian bolt but a US blunder--that we 
        might accidentally stumble into nuclear war. As we make 
        decisions about which weapons to buy, we should use this simple 
        rule: If a nuclear weapon increases the risk of accidental war 
        and is not needed to deter an intentional attack, we should not 
        build it. . . . Certain nuclear weapons, such as . . . the 
        [intercontinental ballistic missile], carry higher risks of 
        accidental war that, fortunately, we no longer need to bear. We 
        are safer without these expensive weapons, and it would be 
        foolish to replace them.''.
            (14) General George Lee Butler, the former Commander-in-
        Chief of the Strategic Air Command and subsequently Commander-
        in-Chief of the United States Strategic Command, said, ``I 
        would have removed land-based missiles from our arsenal a long 
        time ago. I'd be happy to put that mission on the submarines. 
        So, with a significant fraction of bombers having a nuclear 
        weapons capability that can be restored to alert very quickly, 
        and with even a small component of Trident submarines--with all 
        those missiles and all those warheads on patrol--it's hard to 
        imagine we couldn't get by.''.
            (15) While a sudden ``bolt from the blue'' first strike 
        from a near-peer nuclear adversary is a highly unlikely 
        scenario, extending the Minuteman III would maintain the 
        purported role of the intercontinental ballistic missile leg of 
        the triad to absorb such an attack.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON SERVICE LIFE OF MINUTEMAN III 
              INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES AND PAUSE IN 
              DEVELOPMENT OF GROUND-BASED STRATEGIC DETERRENT PROGRAM.

    It is the policy of the United States that--
            (1) the operational life of the Minuteman III 
        intercontinental ballistic missiles can be safely extended 
        until at least 2040; and
            (2) the research, development, testing, and evaluation of 
        the ground-based strategic deterrent program can be paused 
        until 2031.

SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR GROUND BASED STRATEGIC 
              DETERRENT PROGRAM AND W87-1 WARHEAD MODIFICATION PROGRAM.

    (a) Prohibition.--None of the funds authorized to be appropriated 
or otherwise made available for any of fiscal years 2022 through 2031 
may be obligated or expended for the ground-based strategic deterrent 
program (including with respect to supporting infrastructure) or the 
W87-1 warhead modification program, and such funds authorized to be 
appropriated for the W87-1 warhead modification program that are 
unobligated as of the date of the enactment of this Act may not be 
transferred or reprogrammed.
    (b) Transfer.--The Secretary of Defense shall transfer the amounts 
made available for the Department of Defense for the research, 
development, testing, and evaluation of the ground-based strategic 
deterrent program that are unobligated as of the date of the enactment 
of this Act to the Secretary of the Air Force for such purposes as the 
Secretary of the Air Force determines appropriate. Amounts so 
transferred shall be merged with and be available for the same purposes 
as the amounts to which transferred.

SEC. 5. LIFE EXTENSION OF MINUTEMAN III INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC 
              MISSILES.

    (a) Life Extension Program.--Beginning not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense 
shall carry out a life extension program of Minuteman III 
intercontinental ballistic missiles to extend the life of such missiles 
to 2040.
    (b) Elements of Program.--In carrying out the life extension 
program under subsection (a), the Secretary shall ensure the following:
            (1) The program will incorporate new and necessary 
        technologies that could also be incorporated in the future 
        ground-based strategic deterrent program, including with 
        respect to technologies that--
                    (A) increase the resilience against adversary 
                missile defenses; and
                    (B) incorporate new nuclear command, control, and 
                communications systems.
            (2) The program will use nondestructive testing methods and 
        technologies similar to the testing methods used by the Navy 
        for Trident II D5 submarine launched ballistic missiles to 
        reduce destructive testing.
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