[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3524 Introduced in House (IH)]
<DOC>
117th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 3524
To revitalize and reassert United States leadership, investment, and
engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and globally.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
May 25, 2021
Mr. Meeks introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on
Financial Services, Ways and Means, the Judiciary, and Intelligence
(Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the
Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall
within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To revitalize and reassert United States leadership, investment, and
engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and globally.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Ensuring American
Global Leadership and Engagement Act'' or the ``EAGLE Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Statement of policy.
Sec. 4. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 5. Rules of construction.
TITLE I--INVESTING IN AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS
Subtitle A--Science and Technology
Sec. 101. Authorization to assist United States companies with global
supply chain diversification and
management.
Subtitle B--Global Infrastructure and Energy Development
Sec. 111. Appropriate committees of Congress defined.
Sec. 112. Sense of Congress on international quality infrastructure
investment standards.
Sec. 113. Supporting economic independence from China.
Sec. 114. Strategy for advanced and reliable energy infrastructure.
Sec. 115. Report on the People's Republic of China's investments in
foreign energy development.
Sec. 116. Ensuring the International Development Finance Corporation is
positioned to achieve national security,
economic, and development objectives.
Subtitle C--Economic Diplomacy and Leadership
Sec. 121. Findings on regional economic order.
Sec. 122. Review of PRC trade and economic engagement globally.
Sec. 123. Report on entrenching American economic diplomacy in the
Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 124. Sense of Congress on the need to bolster American leadership
in APEC.
Sec. 125. Sense of Congress on digital technology issues.
Sec. 126. Digital trade agreements.
Sec. 127. Digital connectivity and cybersecurity partnership.
Subtitle D--Financial Diplomacy and Leadership
Sec. 131. Findings on Chinese financial industrial policy.
Sec. 132. Report on importance of American financial strength for
global leadership.
Sec. 133. Review of Chinese companies on United States capital markets.
Sec. 134. Report on diplomatic and economic implications of changes to
cross-border payment and financial
messaging systems.
TITLE II--INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS
Subtitle A--Strategic and Diplomatic Matters
Sec. 201. Appropriate committees of Congress defined.
Sec. 202. United States commitment and support for allies and partners
in the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 203. Boosting Quad cooperation.
Sec. 204. Establishment of Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group.
Sec. 205. Statement of policy on cooperation with ASEAN.
Sec. 206. United States representation in standards-setting bodies.
Sec. 207. Sense of Congress on negotiations with G7 and G20 countries.
Sec. 208. Enhancing the United States-Taiwan partnership.
Sec. 209. Taiwan Fellowship Program.
Sec. 210. Increasing Department of State personnel and resources
devoted to the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 211. Diplomatic and economic efforts to deter PRC use of force
against Taiwan.
Sec. 212. Report on bilateral efforts to address Chinese fentanyl
trafficking.
Sec. 213. Facilitation of increased equity investments under the Better
Utilization of Investments Leading to
Development Act of 2018.
Sec. 214. Expanding investment by United States International
Development Finance Corporation for vaccine
manufacturing.
Sec. 215. Ensuring United States diplomatic posts align with American
strategic national security and economic
objectives.
Sec. 216. Authorization of appropriations for the Fulbright-Hays
Program.
Sec. 217. Supporting independent media and countering disinformation.
Sec. 218. Global Engagement Center.
Subtitle B--International Security Matters
Sec. 221. Definitions.
Sec. 222. Additional funding for international military education and
training in the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 223. Statement of policy on maritime freedom of operations in
international waterways and airspace of the
Indo-Pacific and on artificial land
features in the South China Sea.
Sec. 224. Report on capability development of Indo-Pacific allies and
partners.
Subtitle C--Multilateral Strategies to Bolster American Power
Sec. 231. Findings on multilateral engagement.
Sec. 232. Statement of policy on America's multilateral engagement.
Sec. 233. Support for Americans at the United Nations.
Sec. 234. Report on American employment in international organizations.
Subtitle D--Regional Strategies To Bolster American Power
Sec. 241. Statement of policy on cooperation with allies and partners
around the world.
Part I--Western Hemisphere
Sec. 242. Sense of Congress regarding United States-Canada relations.
Sec. 243. Sense of Congress regarding the Government of China's
arbitrary imprisonment of Canadian
citizens.
Sec. 244. Strategy to enhance cooperation with Canada.
Sec. 245. Strategy to strengthen economic competitiveness, governance,
human rights, and the rule of law in Latin
America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 246. Engagement in international organizations and the defense
sector in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 247. Defense cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 248. Engagement with civil society in Latin America and the
Caribbean regarding accountability, human
rights, and the risks of pervasive
surveillance technologies.
Sec. 249. Caribbean energy initiative as alternative to China's Belt
and Road Initiative.
Sec. 250. U.S.-Caribbean resilience partnership.
Part II--Transatlantic Relationships
Sec. 255. Sense of Congress on Transatlantic relationships.
Sec. 256. Strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation with respect to
the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 257. Enhancing Transatlantic cooperation on promoting private
sector finance.
Sec. 258. Report and briefing on cooperation between China and Iran and
between China and Russia.
Part III--South and Central Asia
Sec. 261. Sense of Congress on South and Central Asia.
Sec. 262. Strategy to enhance cooperation with South and Central Asia.
Sec. 263. Indian Ocean Region Strategic Review.
Part IV--Africa
Sec. 271. Assessment of political, economic, and security activity of
the People's Republic of China in Africa.
Sec. 272. Increasing the competitiveness of the United States in
Africa.
Sec. 273. Digital security cooperation with respect to Africa.
Sec. 274. Increasing personnel in United States embassies in sub-
Saharan Africa focused on the People's
Republic of China.
Sec. 275. Support for Young African Leaders Initiative.
Sec. 276. Africa broadcasting networks.
Sec. 277. Expansion of authorities of the United States International
Development Finance Corporation in sub-
Saharan Africa.
Part V--Middle East and North Africa
Sec. 281. Strategy to counter Chinese influence in, and access to, the
Middle East and North Africa.
Sec. 282. Sense of Congress on Middle East and North Africa engagement.
Part VI--Arctic Region
Sec. 285. Arctic diplomacy.
Part VII--Oceania
Sec. 291. Statement of policy on United States engagement in Oceania.
Sec. 292. Oceania strategic roadmap.
Sec. 293. Oceania Security Dialogue.
Sec. 294. Oceania Peace Corps partnerships.
Part VIII--Pacific Islands
Sec. 295. Short title.
Sec. 296. Findings.
Sec. 297. Statement of policy.
Sec. 298. Definitions.
Sec. 299. Authority to consolidate reports; form of reports.
Sec. 299A. Diplomatic presence in the Pacific Islands.
Sec. 299B. Coordination with regional allies.
Sec. 299C. Climate resilient development in the Pacific Islands.
TITLE III--INVESTING IN OUR VALUES
Sec. 301. Sense of Congress on the continued violation of rights and
freedoms of the people of Hong Kong.
Sec. 302. Authorization of appropriations for promotion of democracy in
Hong Kong.
Sec. 303. Hong Kong people's freedom and choice.
Sec. 304. Export prohibition of munitions items to the Hong Kong police
force.
Sec. 305. Sense of Congress condemning the ongoing genocide and crimes
against humanity against Uyghurs and other
minority groups.
Sec. 306. Prevention of Uyghur forced labor.
Sec. 307. Uyghur human rights protection.
Sec. 308. Removal of members of the United Nations Human Rights Council
that commit human rights abuses.
Sec. 309. Policy with respect to Tibet.
Sec. 310. United States policy and international engagement on the
succession or reincarnation of the Dalai
Lama and religious freedom of Tibetan
Buddhists.
Sec. 311. Development and deployment of internet freedom and Great
Firewall circumvention tools for the people
of Hong Kong.
Sec. 312. Authorization of appropriations for protecting human rights
in the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 313. Repeal of sunset applicable to authority under Global
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.
Sec. 314. Sense of Congress condemning anti-Asian racism and
discrimination.
Sec. 315. Annual reporting on censorship of free speech with respect to
international abuses of human rights.
TITLE IV--INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT
Sec. 401. Sense of Congress regarding the PRC's industrial policy.
Sec. 402. Economic defense response teams.
Sec. 403. Countering overseas kleptocracy.
TITLE V--ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY
Sec. 501. Cooperation on a strategic nuclear dialogue.
Sec. 502. Report on United States efforts to engage the People's
Republic of China on nuclear issues and
ballistic missile issues.
Sec. 503. Countering China's proliferation of ballistic missiles and
nuclear technology to the Middle East.
TITLE VI--INVESTING IN A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE
Sec. 601. Ensuring national security and economic priorities with China
and other countries account for
environmental issues and climate change.
Sec. 602. Enhancing security considerations for global climate
disruptions.
Sec. 603. Balancing accountability and cooperation with China.
Sec. 604. Promoting responsible development alternatives to the Belt
and Road Initiative.
Sec. 605. Using climate diplomacy to better serve national security and
economic interests.
Sec. 606. Driving a global climate change resilience strategy.
Sec. 607. Addressing international climate change mitigation,
adaptation, and security.
Sec. 608. Reducing the negative impacts from black carbon, methane, and
high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons.
Sec. 609. Building United States economic growth and technological
innovation through the Green Climate Fund.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--Unless otherwise
defined, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives.
(2) CCP.--The term ``CCP'' means the Chinese Communist
Party.
(3) People's liberation army; pla.--The terms ``People's
Liberation Army'' and ``PLA'' mean the armed forces of the
People's Republic of China.
(4) PRC; china.--The terms ``PRC'' and ``China'' mean the
People's Republic of China.
SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
(a) Objectives.--It is the policy of the United States to pursue
the following objectives:
(1) The United States global leadership role is sustained
and its political system and major foundations of national
power are secured for the long-term in the political, economic,
technological, and military domains.
(2) The United States position as an indispensable power in
the Indo-Pacific and globally is sustained through diplomacy,
multilateralism, and engagement.
(3) The United States deters military confrontation with
the PRC and both nations work to reduce the risk of conflict.
(4) The United States and its allies maintain a stable
balance of power in the Indo-Pacific with China. The United
States and its allies maintain unfettered access to the region,
including through freedom of navigation and the free flow of
commerce, consistent with international law and practice.
(5) The allies and partners of the United States--
(A) maintain confidence in United States leadership
and its commitment to the Indo-Pacific region;
(B) can withstand and combat subversion by the PRC;
and
(C) work closely with the United States in setting
global rules, norms, and standards that benefit the
international community.
(6) The combined weight of the United States and its allies
and partners is strong enough to demonstrate to the PRC that
the risks of attempts to dominate other states outweigh the
potential benefits.
(7) The United States leads the free and open international
order, which comprises resilient states and institutions that
uphold and defend principles, such as sovereignty, rule of law,
individual freedom, and human rights. The international order
is strengthened to withstand attempts at destabilization by
illiberal and authoritarian actors.
(8) The key rules, norms, and standards of international
engagement in the 21st century are maintained, including--
(A) the protection of human rights, commercial
engagement and investment, and technology; and
(B) that such rules, norms, and standards are in
alignment with the values and interests of the United
States, its allies and partners, and other stakeholders
in the liberal international order.
(9) The United States counters attempts by the PRC to--
(A) undermine open and democratic societies;
(B) distort global markets;
(C) manipulate the international trade system;
(D) coerce other nations via economic and military
means; or
(E) use its technological advantages to undermine
individual freedoms or other states' national security
interests.
(10) The United States deters military confrontation with
the PRC and both nations work to reduce the risk of conflict.
(b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States, in pursuit of
the objectives set forth in subsection (a)--
(1) to strengthen the United States domestic foundation by
reinvesting in market-based economic growth, education,
scientific and technological innovation, democratic
institutions, and other areas that improve the ability of the
United States to pursue its vital economic, foreign policy, and
national security interests;
(2) to maximize the United States strengths in the
political, diplomatic, economic, development, military,
informational, and technological realms in order to safeguard
United States interests and the values of United States allies
and partners, and to strengthen incentives for the PRC to
collaborate in addressing common global and regional
challenges;
(3) to lead a free, open, and secure international system
characterized by the rule of law, open markets and the free
flow of commerce, and a shared commitment to security and
peaceful resolution of disputes, human rights, good and
transparent governance, and freedom from coercion;
(4) to strengthen and deepen United States alliances and
partnerships by pursuing greater bilateral and multilateral
cooperative initiatives that advance shared interests and
values and bolster partner countries' confidence that the
United States is and will remain a strong, committed, and
reliable partner that respects the views and interests of its
allies and friends;
(5) to encourage and collaborate with United States allies
and partners in boosting their own capabilities and resiliency
to pursue, defend, and protect shared interests and values,
free from coercion and external pressure;
(6) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and healthy,
constructive competition in United States-China economic
relations by--
(A) advancing policies that harden the United
States economy against unfair and illegal commercial or
trading practices and the coercion of United States
businesses; and
(B) improving United States laws and regulations as
necessary to prevent any PRC attempts to harm United
States economic competitiveness;
(7) to demonstrate the value of private sector-led growth
in emerging markets around the world, including through the use
of United States Government tools that--
(A) support greater private sector investment and
advance capacity-building initiatives that are grounded
in the rule of law;
(B) promote open markets;
(C) establish clear policy and regulatory
frameworks;
(D) improve the management of key economic sectors;
(E) combat corruption; and
(F) foster and support greater collaboration with
and among partner countries and the United States
private sector to develop secure and sustainable
infrastructure;
(8) to play a leading role in advancing international rules
and norms that foster free and reciprocal trade and open and
integrated markets;
(9) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy in support of
United States companies and businesses in partner countries
that seek fair competition;
(10) to ensure that the United States is second to none in
the innovation of critical and emerging technologies, such as
next-generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence,
quantum computing, semiconductors, and biotechnology, by--
(A) providing necessary investment and concrete
incentives for the private sector to accelerate
development of such technologies;
(B) modernizing export controls and investment
screening regimes and associated policies and
regulations;
(C) enhancing the role of the United States in
technical standards-setting bodies and avenues for
developing norms regarding the use of emerging critical
technologies;
(D) reducing United States barriers and increasing
incentives for collaboration with allies and partners
on the research and co-development of critical
technologies;
(E) collaborating with allies and partners to
protect critical technologies by--
(i) coordinating and aligning export
control measures;
(ii) building capacity for defense
technology security;
(iii) safeguarding chokepoints in
strategically critical supply chains; and
(iv) ensuring diversification; and
(F) designing major defense capabilities for export
to vetted allies and partners;
(11) to collaborate with like-minded democracies and other
willing partners to promote ideals and principles that--
(A) advance a free and open international order;
(B) strengthen democratic institutions;
(C) protect and promote human rights; and
(D) uphold a free press and fact-based reporting;
(12) to develop comprehensive strategies and policies to
counter PRC disinformation campaigns;
(13) to demonstrate effective leadership at the United
Nations, its associated agencies, and other multilateral
organizations and ensure the integrity and effectiveness of
these organizations in facilitating solutions to global
challenges;
(14) to advocate for the defense of fundamental freedoms
and human rights in the United States relationship with the
PRC;
(15) to cooperate with allies, partners, and multilateral
organizations that sustain and strengthen a free and open order
and address regional and global challenges posed by the
Government of the PRC regarding--
(A) violations and abuses of human rights;
(B) restrictions on religious practices; and
(C) the undermining and abrogation of treaties,
other international agreements, and other international
norms related to human rights;
(16) to expose the PRC's use of corruption, repression, and
coercion to attain unfair economic advantages or compel other
nations to defer to its political and strategic objectives in
ways that threaten the United States or its allies and
partners;
(17) to maintain United States access to the Western
Pacific, including through necessary investments in United
States military capabilities, policies, and concepts in the
Indo-Pacific, as well as robust cooperation, exercises, and
interoperability with allies and partners;
(18) to deter the PRC from--
(A) initiating armed conflict;
(B) coercing nations; or
(C) using malign grey-zone tactics to achieve
national goals;
(19) to attempt to strengthen United States-PRC military-
to-military communication and improve both military and
civilian crisis avoidance and management procedures to de-
conflict operations and reduce the risk of unwanted conflict;
and
(20) to strengthen stability and reduce suspicions,
cooperate with the PRC when interests align, including through
bilateral or multilateral means and at the United Nations, as
appropriate, and especially in the following areas--
(A) global fight against climate change;
(B) nuclear security; and
(C) global financial stability.
SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the policy
described in section 3(b) requires the following actions:
(1) Revitalizing American leadership globally and in the
Indo-Pacific will require the United States--
(A) to marshal sustained political will to protect
its vital interests, promote its values, and advance
its economic and national security objectives; and
(B) to achieve this sustained political will,
persuade the American people and United States allies
and partners of--
(i) the current challenges facing the
international rules based order; and
(ii) the need for long-term investments and
engagement to defend shared interests and
values.
(2) The United States must coordinate closely with allies
and partners to compete effectively with the PRC, including to
encourage allies and partners to assume, as appropriate,
greater roles in balancing and checking aggressive PRC
behavior.
(3) Effective United States strategy toward China
requires--
(A) bipartisan cooperation within Congress; and
(B) frequent, sustained, and meaningful
collaboration and consultation between the executive
branch and Congress.
(4) The United States must ensure close integration among
economic and foreign policymakers and provide support to the
private sector, civil society, universities and academic
institutions, and other relevant actors in free and open
societies to enable such actors--
(A) to collaborate to advance common interests; and
(B) to identify appropriate policies--
(i) to strengthen the United States and its
allies; and
(ii) to promote a compelling vision of a
free and open order.
(5) The United States must ensure that all Federal
departments, agencies, and overseas missions are organized and
resourced to effectively defend and advance United States
interests, by--
(A) dedicating more personnel in the Indo-Pacific
region, at posts around the world, and in Washington,
DC;
(B) placing greater numbers of foreign service
officers, international development professionals,
members of the foreign commercial service, intelligence
professionals, and other United States Government
personnel in the Indo-Pacific region; and
(C) ensuring that this workforce has the training,
demonstrated proficiency in language and culture,
technical skills, and other competencies required to
advance a successful strategy in relation to the PRC.
(6) The United States must place renewed priority and
emphasis on strengthening the nonmilitary instruments of
national power, including diplomacy, information, technology,
economics, foreign assistance and development finance,
commerce, intelligence, and law enforcement, which are crucial
for addressing the challenges posed by the PRC.
(7) The United States must sustain military capabilities
necessary to achieve United States political objectives in the
Indo-Pacific, including--
(A) promoting regional security in the Indo-
Pacific;
(B) reassuring allies and partners while protecting
them from coercion; and
(C) deterring PRC aggression and preventing
unwanted conflict.
(8) Competition with the PRC requires skillful adaptation
to the information environment of the 21st century. United
States public diplomacy and messaging efforts must
effectively--
(A) promote the value of partnership with the
United States; and
(B) counter CCP propaganda and disinformation that
threatens United States interests.
SEC. 5. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.
(a) Applicability of Existing Restrictions on Assistance to Foreign
Security Forces.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed to diminish,
supplant, supersede, or otherwise restrict or prevent responsibilities
of the United States Government under section 620M of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) or section 362 of title 10,
United States Code.
(b) No Authorization for the Use of Military Force.--Nothing in
this Act may be construed as authorizing the use of military force.
TITLE I--INVESTING IN AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS
Subtitle A--Science and Technology
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES COMPANIES WITH GLOBAL
SUPPLY CHAIN DIVERSIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT.
(a) Authorization To Contract Services.--The Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, is authorized to establish
a program to facilitate the contracting by the Department of State for
the professional services of qualified experts, on a reimbursable fee
for service basis, to assist interested United States persons and
business entities with supply chain management issues related to the
PRC, including--
(1) exiting from the PRC market or relocating certain
production facilities to locations outside the PRC;
(2) diversifying sources of inputs, and other efforts to
diversify supply chains to locations outside of the PRC;
(3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other challenges in
the course of the activities described in paragraphs (1) and
(2); and
(4) identifying alternative markets for production or
sourcing outside of the PRC, including through providing market
intelligence, facilitating contact with reliable local partners
as appropriate, and other services.
(b) Chief of Mission Oversight.--The persons hired to perform the
services described in subsection (a) shall--
(1) be under the authority of the United States Chief of
Mission in the country in which they are hired, in accordance
with existing United States laws;
(2) coordinate with Department of State and Department of
Commerce officers; and
(3) coordinate with United States missions and relevant
local partners in other countries as needed to carry out the
services described in subsection (a).
(c) Prioritization of Micro-, Small-, and Medium-Sized
Enterprises.--The services described in subsection (a) shall be
prioritized for assisting micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises
with regard to the matters described in subsection (a).
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $15,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for
the purposes of carrying out this section.
(e) Prohibition on Access to Assistance by Foreign Adversaries.--
None of the funds appropriated pursuant to this section may be provided
to an entity--
(1) under the foreign ownership, control, or influence of
the Government of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese
Communist Party, or other foreign adversary;
(2) determined to have beneficial ownership from foreign
individuals subject to the jurisdiction, direction, or
influence of foreign adversaries; and
(3) that has any contract in effect at the time of the
receipt of such funds, or has had a contract within the
previous one year that is no longer in effect, with--
(A) the Government of the People's Republic of
China;
(B) the Chinese Communist Party;
(C) the Chinese military;
(D) an entity majority-owned, majority-controlled,
or majority-financed by the Government of the People's
Republic of China, the CCP, or the Chinese military; or
(E) a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of an entity
described in subparagraph (D).
(f) Definitions.--The terms ``foreign ownership, control, or
influence'' and ``FOCI'' have the meanings given to those terms in the
National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (DOD 5220.22-M),
or a successor document.
Subtitle B--Global Infrastructure and Energy Development
SEC. 111. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.
In this subtitle, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 112. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL QUALITY INFRASTRUCTURE
INVESTMENT STANDARDS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should initiate collaboration among governments, the private
sector, and civil society to encourage the adoption of the standards
for quality global infrastructure development advanced by the G20 at
Osaka in 2018, including with respect to the following issues:
(1) Respect for the sovereignty of countries in which
infrastructure investments are made.
(2) Anti-corruption.
(3) Rule of law.
(4) Human rights and labor rights.
(5) Fiscal and debt sustainability.
(6) Social and governance safeguards.
(7) Transparency.
(8) Environmental and energy standards.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should launch a series of fora around the world showcasing the
commitment of the United States and partners of the United States to
high-quality development cooperation, including with respect to the
issues described in subsection (a).
SEC. 113. SUPPORTING ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE FROM CHINA.
(a) Findings.--It is in the national interest of the United States
to establish a coordinated interagency strategy to marshal the
resources of the United States Government to provide foreign countries
with financing that strengthens independent economic capacity and
therefore reduce a foreign government's need to enter into agreements
with China, including support from its Belt and Road Initiative.
(b) Strategy.--
(1) Authority.--Within 180 days of enactment of this Act,
the President should develop and submit a strategy to the
relevant congressional committees to utilize the resources of
Federal agencies to counteract offers of assistance and
financing from China to foreign governments that are of
strategic importance to the United States.
(2) Components of strategy.--The strategy should--
(A) identify primary sectors where the United
States could provide a competitive advantage to
increase a country's economic independence;
(B) select countries with corresponding economic
needs, with priority given to those who are vulnerable
to Chinese economic influence;
(C) identify any corresponding existing financing
available from United States Government entities to
prioritize and devise specific financing tailored to
the needs of such foreign governments if none are
currently available;
(D) identify any cooperative and complementary
assistance and financing from friendly foreign
governments, including coordinated assistance and co-
financing;
(E) create a streamlined decision-making process,
directed by the National Security Council, to devise
financing and make agency decisions and commitments on
a timely basis to support United States competitive
offers;
(F) establish a formal G7+European Commission
Working Group to develop a comprehensive strategy to
develop alternatives to the People's Republic of
China's Belt and Road Initiative for development
finance; and
(G) integrate existing efforts into the strategy,
including efforts to address the Government of the
People's Republic of China's use of the United Nations
to advance the Belt and Road Initiative, including the
proliferation of memoranda of understanding between the
People's Republic of China and United Nations funds and
programs regarding the implementation of the Belt and
Road Initiative.
(3) Participating agencies.--Participating Federal agencies
should include the Department of State, Department of the
Treasury, USAID, DFC, MCC, USTDA, Department of Commerce, and
other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate.
(4) Execution of strategy.--The President should issue an
Executive order to implement the strategy and make such changes
in agency regulations and procedures as are necessary to put
the strategy into effect.
(5) Relevant congressional committees.--For the purposes of
this subsection, the phrase ``relevant congressional
committees'' shall mean the House and Senate Committees on
Appropriations, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the House Committee on
Financial Services, and the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs.
(c) Authority.--The Secretary of State in coordination with the
USAID Administrator is authorized to establish or continue an
initiative, to be known as the ``Infrastructure Transaction and
Assistance Network'', under which the Secretary of State, in
consultation with other relevant Federal agencies, including those
represented on the Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee, may
carry out various programs to advance the development of sustainable,
transparent, and high-quality infrastructure worldwide in the Indo-
Pacific region by--
(1) strengthening capacity-building programs to improve
project evaluation processes, regulatory and procurement
environments, and project preparation capacity of countries
that are partners of the United States in such development;
(2) providing transaction advisory services and project
preparation assistance to support sustainable infrastructure;
and
(3) coordinating the provision of United States assistance
for the development of infrastructure, including infrastructure
that utilizes United States manufactured goods and services,
and catalyzing investment led by the private sector.
(d) Transaction Advisory Fund.--As part of the ``Infrastructure
Transaction and Assistance Network'' described under subsection (c),
the Secretary of State is authorized to provide support, including
through the Transaction Advisory Fund, for advisory services to help
boost the capacity of partner countries to evaluate contracts and
assess the financial and environmental impacts of potential
infrastructure projects, including through providing services such as--
(1) legal services;
(2) project preparation and feasibility studies;
(3) debt sustainability analyses;
(4) bid or proposal evaluation; and
(5) other services relevant to advancing the development of
sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure.
(e) Strategic Infrastructure Fund.----
(1) In general.--As part of the ``Infrastructure
Transaction and Assistance Network'' described under subsection
(c), the Secretary of State is authorized to provide support,
including through the Strategic Infrastructure Fund, for
technical assistance, project preparation, pipeline
development, and other infrastructure project support.
(2) Joint infrastructure projects.--Funds authorized for
the Strategic Infrastructure Fund should be used in
coordination with the Department of Defense, the International
Development Finance Corporation, like-minded donor partners,
and multilateral banks, as appropriate, to support joint
infrastructure projects.
(3) Strategic infrastructure projects.--Funds authorized
for the Strategic Infrastructure Fund should be used to support
strategic infrastructure projects that are in the national
security interest of the United States and vulnerable to
strategic competitors.
(f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2022 to 2026, $75,000,000 to the
Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network, of which $20,000,000
should be provided for the Transaction Advisory Fund.
SEC. 114. STRATEGY FOR ADVANCED AND RELIABLE ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE.
(a) In General.--The President shall direct a comprehensive, multi-
year, whole of government effort, in consultation with the private
sector, to counter predatory lending and financing by the Government of
the People's Republic of China, including support to companies
incorporated in the PRC that engage in such activities, in the energy
sectors of developing countries.
(b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to--
(1) regularly evaluate current and forecasted energy needs
and capacities of developing countries, and analyze the
presence and involvement of PRC state-owned industries and
other companies incorporated in the PRC, Chinese nationals
providing labor, and financing of energy projects, including
direct financing by the PRC government, PRC financial
institutions, or direct state support to state-owned
enterprises and other companies incorporated in the PRC;
(2) pursue strategic support and investment opportunities,
and diplomatic engagement on power sector reforms, to expand
the development and deployment of advanced energy technologies
in developing countries;
(3) offer financing, loan guarantees, grants, and other
financial products on terms that advance domestic economic and
local employment opportunities, utilize advanced energy
technologies, encourage private sector growth, and, when
appropriate United States equity and sovereign lending products
as alternatives to the predatory lending tools offered by
Chinese financial institutions;
(4) pursue partnerships with likeminded international
financial and multilateral institutions to leverage investment
in advanced energy technologies in developing countries; and
(5) pursue bilateral partnerships focused on the
cooperative development of advanced energy technologies with
countries of strategic significance, particularly in the Indo-
Pacific region, to address the effects of energy engagement by
the PRC through predatory lending or other actions that
negatively impact other countries.
(c) Advanced Energy Technologies Exports.--Not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter
for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary
of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
United States Government strategy to increase United States exports of
advanced energy technologies to--
(1) improve energy security in allied and developing
countries;
(2) create open, efficient, rules-based, and transparent
energy markets;
(3) improve free, fair, and reciprocal energy trading
relationships; and
(4) expand access to affordable, reliable energy.
SEC. 115. REPORT ON THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S INVESTMENTS IN
FOREIGN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT.
(a) In General.--No later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the
Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report that--
(1) identifies priority countries for deepening United
States engagement on energy matters, in accordance with the
economic and national security interests of the United States
and where deeper energy partnerships are most achievable;
(2) describes the involvement of the PRC government and
companies incorporated in the PRC in the development,
operation, financing, or ownership of energy generation
facilities, transmission infrastructure, or energy resources in
the countries identified in paragraph (1);
(3) evaluates strategic or security concerns and
implications for United States national interests and the
interests of the countries identified in paragraph (1), with
respect to the PRC's involvement and influence in developing
country energy production or transmission; and
(4) outlines current and planned efforts by the United
States to partner with the countries identified in paragraph
(1) on energy matters that support shared interests between the
United States and such countries.
(b) Publication.--The assessment required in subsection (a) shall
be published on the Department of State's website.
SEC. 116. ENSURING THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION IS
POSITIONED TO ACHIEVE NATIONAL SECURITY, ECONOMIC, AND
DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES.
(a) In General.--
(1) When establishing the U.S. International Development
Finance Corporation (DFC), Congress sought to facilitate the
participation of private sector capital and skills in the
economic development of countries with low- or lower-middle-
income economies and countries transitioning from nonmarket to
market economies in order to complement United States
assistance and foreign policy objectives.
(2) The priority for such support has been and remains
intended for less developed countries with a low-income economy
or a lower-middle-income economy; however, using income as a
discriminator for which countries merit investment will not
often capture other important factors, such as the wealth
disparity within a country, vulnerability to external shocks
including from natural disasters, and United States foreign
policy and national security concerns. For this reason,
Congress has currently authorized DFC investment in less
developed countries with an upper-middle-income economy where
the President certifies to the appropriate congressional
committees that such support furthers the national economic or
foreign policy interests of the United States and such support
is designed to produce significant developmental outcomes or
provide developmental benefits to the poorest population of
that country.
(3) It is the intent of Congress that this flexibility in
DFC directed assistance be made available to all countries,
including those with so-called high-income economies such as
the Bahamas, Barbados, Chile, Trinidad and Tobago, and other
allies and partners exceeding the Gross National Income per
Capita definition threshold for high-income country. Otherwise,
previously eligible partner countries find themselves now
ineligible.
(4) The United States already provides a similar national
security interest exception for high income countries under the
European Energy Security and Diversification Act of 2019, which
gives the DFC the authority to work in Europe and Eurasia on
energy and energy related investments regardless of the income
status of the countries.
(5) While continuing to prioritize DFC investment in low
and lower-middle income countries, it is the sense of Congress
that the DFC should support investments in certain projects in
both upper-middle income and high-income countries that address
key national security and economic interests. The DFC is
authorized to and should support projects in any country
regardless of income status when not doing so would damage the
United States interest or those of its allies and partners vis-
a-vis its global strategic competitors.
(b) Amendment.--To address the objectives in paragraph (1) above,
section 1412 of Public Law 115-254 pertaining to the United States
International Development Finance Corporation is amended, replacing the
text under section 1412(c) with the following: by striking subsection
(c) and inserting the following:
``(c) Support in Upper-Middle-Income and High-Income Countries/The
Less Developed Country Focus.--
``(1) In general.--The Corporation shall prioritize the
provision of support under title II in less developed countries
with a low-income economy or a lower-middle-income economy.
``(2) Support in upper-middle-income and high-income
countries.--The Corporation shall restrict the provision of
support under title II in countries with an upper-middle-income
or high-income economy unless--
``(A) the President certifies to the appropriate
congressional committees that such support furthers the
national economic, foreign policy, or development
interests of the United States; and
``(B) such support is designed to produce
significant developmental outcomes or provide
developmental benefits to the poorest, marginalized, or
equity-disadvantaged population groups of that
country.''.
Subtitle C--Economic Diplomacy and Leadership
SEC. 121. FINDINGS ON REGIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States played a leadership role in
constructing the architecture, rules, and norms governing the
international economic order following the Second World War,
yielding decades of domestic economic and geopolitical
prosperity and stability.
(2) In 2017, the United States withdrew from the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP), an economic pact that was negotiated
by 12 countries that covered 40 percent of the world economy,
leading the 11 remaining Asia-Pacific countries to sign the
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership (CPTPP) the following year, setting high-standard
rules for regional economic engagement.
(3) In 2020, the 10 countries of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations along with South Korea, China, Japan,
Australia, and New Zealand signed the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world's biggest trade deal in
terms of GDP.
(4) Reduced United States economic engagement has led
United States allies and partners to question the United States
commitment to the Indo-Pacific region. Despite its distortive
and unfair trade practices, the People's Republic of China is
taking advantage of this vacuum by deepening its partnerships
in the region and promoting its own state-led economic model.
(5) The United States is increasingly on the outside
looking in with regards to economic pacts in the Indo-Pacific.
United States absence from these agreements puts it at both a
strategic and competitive disadvantage in the region and allows
competitors to expand their economic influence at the United
States expense.
(6) Given that these partnerships and agreements will
define the rules and norms that will govern regional commerce
over the coming decades, the United States is currently not
well positioned to shape the coming economic landscape.
(7) It is in the United States vital interest to upgrade
its economic engagement and leadership in the Indo-Pacific and
develop concrete steps to strengthen its commercial diplomacy
to fully participle in the region's economic dynamism.
SEC. 122. REVIEW OF PRC TRADE AND ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT GLOBALLY.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the Department of Commerce,
shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that
describes the PRC's global trade and investment diplomacy and
engagement over the past decade, including any bilateral or
plurilateral trade and investment agreements it has signed, and their
impact on the United States economy, American companies and workers, as
well as on the countries that have entered into agreements with the PRC
and the global economy as a whole.
(b) Matters To Be Included.--The report shall include the
following:
(1) A Survey and Comparison of China's international
economic practices, which will--
(A) provide an overview of the PRC's distortive
trade policies;
(B) list the PRC's trade and investment agreements
globally, both agreements it has signed or entered into
and any ongoing negotiations it has with individual
countries or groups of countries;
(C) detail the other mechanisms the PRC uses to
advance its international economic objectives,
including economic and commercial dialogues and BRI
related activities;
(D) compare the United States and Chinese
approaches and priorities on trade and investment with
major global economies, United States allies, and for
each region of the world; and
(E) outline what further steps China may take in
the Indo-Pacific region to bolster its economic
position and influence.
(2) An evaluation of the impacts of China's trade and
investment policies, including--
(A) the impact of these trade and investment
agreements on China's economy, with a focus on its
trade and investment profile, the impact on China's
economic growth and per-capita income; and the impact
on the profitability and market share of Chinese
companies and SOEs;
(B) the impact of these agreements on China's
political and diplomatic relations with the countries
it entered into agreements with and by region; and
(C) the impact of China's trade and investment
relationships with other countries on the market share
of United States companies.
SEC. 123. REPORT ON ENTRENCHING AMERICAN ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IN THE
INDO-PACIFIC.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that United
States national interests and the primacy of United States power in the
Indo-Pacific are intimately tied to the following economic objectives:
(1) Deepening United States trade and investment
relationships in the region, especially with key allies and
partners.
(2) Confirming American leadership and participation in
global regional economic organizations and fora, including APEC
and the WTO.
(3) Leveraging bilateral and plurilateral sectoral
agreements on trade and investment, as well as negotiations at
the WTO to reassert United States economic leadership by
writing the rules of the road on critical economic questions.
(4) Building secure and resilient supply chains for
industries critical for United States national interest,
including semiconductors and vaccines and PPE.
(5) Showcasing the benefits and appeal of a market-based
economic model.
(b) Reporting.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the Department of Commerce,
shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that
presents the steps the United States is taking and plans to take to
achieve the objectives outlined in subsection (a) above and includes
specific action plans for the following:
(1) Enhancing American trade and investment relationships
in the region bilaterally and plurilaterally, especially with
American allies and ASEAN.
(2) Reenergizing APEC as a critical component of the
region's economic architecture.
(3) Work to ensure that the United States absence from
CPTPP and RCEP do not undermine the United States ability to
shape regional trade and investment rules.
(4) Working with allies and partners to build resilient and
trusted supply chains especially for critical and emerging
technologies, including semiconductors, and products and
components critical for national health, including vaccines and
related materials, and PPE.
(5) Driving the formation and adoption of high-standards
and rules for the region in the following areas:
(A) Advanced technologies and the digital sphere.
(B) Labor practices and environmental standards.
(C) Intellectual property rights.
(6) Developing roadmaps for how to counter the PRC's unfair
trade and economic practices, with a specific focus on--
(A) subsidies and unfair competition by state-owned
enterprises; and
(B) corruption and politicized infrastructure.
(c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Energy and Commerce.
SEC. 124. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE NEED TO BOLSTER AMERICAN LEADERSHIP
IN APEC.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States has benefitted from the regional
economic integration agenda of the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation forum since its inception in 1989;
(2) APEC is a hub of trade and commerce for 21 member
economies that, as of 2018, accounted for 60 percent of global
GDP and 48 percent of global trade;
(3) APEC has contributed to the reduction in trade
barriers, harmonization of regulations, and enhanced access to
global value chains, while raising the profile of critical
topics such as fair trade, sustainability, gender parity, and
inclusive growth;
(4) it is in the United States interest to engage and lead
at APEC to push for an open and inclusive regional economy that
benefits United States workers, consumers, and businesses and
better integrates the United States economy with others in the
region;
(5) when the United States last hosted APEC in 2011, it was
able to promote United States interests, while reassuring
allies and partners about its strong commitment to the region
in the economic arena;
(6) today, APEC can again be used as a forum to make
progress on several United States priorities, that are shared
by United States allies and partners, including--
(A) making regional commerce more inclusive;
(B) fostering innovation and digitization; and
(C) addressing climate change and environmental
protection;
(7) hosting APEC would provide a tremendous opportunity to
leverage American leadership to shape the regional economic
agenda;
(8) hosting APEC would allow the United States to advance
several of its own priorities in the region, including to--
(A) expand the participation of APEC stakeholders
to include labor groups, environmental advocates, and
other part of civil society;
(B) upgrade APEC's work to empower and promote
small and medium enterprises;
(C) spotlight best practices and plans to upgrade
skills for the next-generation of technology jobs;
(D) advance a climate and sustainable trade and
development agenda with a focus on green technologies,
infrastructure and finance; and
(E) advance work on digital trade, including by
expanding rules on data privacy, promoting digital
inclusiveness and promoting the free flow of data; and
(9) with no host confirmed for 2023, the United States
should immediately announce its interest to host APEC in 2023
and work with the APEC Secretariat and like-minded APEC members
to build support.
SEC. 125. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY ISSUES.
(a) Leadership in International Standards Setting.--It is the sense
of Congress that the United States must lead in international bodies
that set the governance norms and rules for critical digitally enabled
technologies in order to ensure that these technologies operate within
a free, secure, interoperable, and stable digital domain.
(b) Countering Digital Authoritarianism.--It is the sense of
Congress that the United States, along with allies and partners, should
lead an international effort that utilizes all of the economic and
diplomatic tools at its disposal to combat the expanding use of
information and communications technology products and services to
surveil, repress, and manipulate populations (also known as ``digital
authoritarianism'').
(c) Freedom of Information in the Digital Age.--It is the sense of
Congress that the United States should lead a global effort to ensure
that freedom of information, including the ability to safely consume or
publish information without fear of undue reprisals, is maintained as
the digital domain becomes an increasingly integral mechanism for
communication.
(d) Efforts To Ensure Technological Development Does Not Threaten
Democratic Governance or Human Rights.--It is the sense of Congress
that the United States should lead a global effort to develop and adopt
a set of common principles and standards for critical technologies to
ensure that the use of such technologies cannot be abused by malign
actors, whether they are governments or other entities, and that they
do not threaten democratic governance or human rights.
SEC. 126. DIGITAL TRADE AGREEMENTS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) as the COVID-19 pandemic accelerated our dependence on
digital tools, international rules around digital governance
and trade have remained largely piecemeal;
(2) the People's Republic of China is operating under and
advancing a set of digital rules that are contrary to United
States values and interests, and those of United States allies
and partners;
(3) a patchwork of plurilateral, trilateral, and bilateral
digital trade agreements, including the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP),
the Singapore-Australia Digital Trade Agreement, and the
Singapore-New Zealand-Chile Digital Economy Partnership
Agreement have emerged, creating a set of rules that the United
States should be driving;
(4) the United States has already underscored the need for
such agreements by signing the U.S.-Japan Digital Trade
Agreement in October 2019 and including a robust digital trade
or e-commerce chapter in the USMCA;
(5) a regional deal on digital governance and trade would
allow the United States to unite a group of like-minded
economies around common standards and norms, including the
principles of openness, inclusiveness, fairness, transparency,
and the free flow of data with trust, that are increasingly
vital for the global economy;
(6) such an agreement would facilitate the creation of
common rules and standards that govern cross-border data flows,
the protection of privacy, and cybersecurity at a time of
growing digital vulnerabilities for individuals, businesses,
and institutions around the world;
(7) such an agreement would facilitate the participation of
SMEs in the global economy through trade facilitation measures,
including e-marketing, e-invoicing and e-payment; and
(8) the United States Trade Representative, in consultation
with the Coordinator for Cyber Diplomacy at the Department of
State should negotiate bilateral and plurilateral agreements or
arrangements relating to digital trade with the like-minded
countries in the Indo-Pacific region, the European Union, the
member countries of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing
alliance, and other partners and allies, as appropriate.
SEC. 127. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY PARTNERSHIP.
(a) Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership.--The
President is authorized to establish a program, to be known as the
``Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership'' to help foreign
countries--
(1) expand and increase secure Internet access and digital
infrastructure in emerging markets;
(2) adopt policies and regulatory positions that foster and
encourage open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet,
the free flow of data, multi-stakeholder models of internet
governance, and pro-competitive and secure information and
communications technology (ICT) policies and regulations;
(3) promote exports of United States ICT goods and services
and increase United States company market share in target
markets;
(4) promote the diversification of ICT goods and supply
chain services to be less reliant on PRC imports; and
(5) build cybersecurity capacity, expand interoperability,
and promote best practices for a national approach to
cybersecurity.
(b) Implementation Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the Administrator
of the United States Agency for International Development shall jointly
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an implementation plan
for the coming three years to advance the goals identified in
subsection (a).
(c) Consultation.--In developing the action plan required by
subsection (b), the Secretary of State and USAID Administrator shall
consult with--
(1) the appropriate congressional committees;
(2) leaders of the United States industry;
(3) other relevant technology experts, including the Open
Technology Fund;
(4) representatives from relevant United States Government
agencies; and
(5) representatives from like-minded allies and partners.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated such sums as necessary for each of fiscal years 2022
through 2026 to carry out this section.
Subtitle D--Financial Diplomacy and Leadership
SEC. 131. FINDINGS ON CHINESE FINANCIAL INDUSTRIAL POLICY.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The People's Republic of China operates a system of
state-owned financial institutions including retail banks,
investment banks, asset managers, and insurers which are given
favorable treatment under Chinese law while foreign financial
institutions have strict restrictions on their ability to
operate in China.
(2) On October 24, 2020, Chinese billionaire Jack Ma
referred to ``pawnshop mentality'' of state-owned banks.
Shortly thereafter, the initial public offering of his firm Ant
Financial was canceled by Chinese regulators.
(3) In order to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
2001, the Chinese Government committed to opening the credit
card payment business to foreign firms by 2006.
(4) After years of China refusing to open its payment
market, the United States brought a case against China before
the WTO. In 2012, the WTO mandated China to open its card
payment market to global competitors.
(5) Even after the WTO's ruling, the PRC Government refused
to comply with the ruling and maintained a rule that required
all yuan-denominated payment cards to utilize China's Union Pay
network. Only in 2020, after the Chinese payment market had
grown to $27 trillion, did the PRC Government approve the
application of foreign firms to enter the market.
(6) The PRC continues to maintain aggressive capital
controls, limiting access to the Chinese market to foreign
investors while hamstringing its own citizens ability to
control their money.
(7) On November 5, 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping
announced that China would launch a technology innovation stock
exchange. The Shanghai Stock Exchange STAR Market launched on
July 22, 2019.
(8) The PRC Government is pioneering the use a fully
digitized yuan, which is set to be the world's first central
bank backed digital currency, and the People's Bank of China
and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority have already begun testing
the cross-border functionality of the digital currency.
SEC. 132. REPORT ON IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN FINANCIAL STRENGTH FOR
GLOBAL LEADERSHIP.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the dominance of the dollar as the global reserve
currency has yielded significant benefits to the United States
and the American people by allowing the United States to
maintain economic independence, better control its monetary
policy, and finance government outlays;
(2) American global leadership has benefited from the
United States monetary stability, creditworthiness, deep
capital markets, and financial technology innovations;
(3) effective diplomacy and safeguarding of American
national security rely on the United States role as the global
financial leader, hub of global trade, and source of economic
opportunity;
(4) by cracking down on dissent in the key financial center
of Hong Kong, driving the creation of a technology focused
stock exchange, and pushing forward a Central Bank digital
currency, the People's Republic of China is attempting to
become the leading hub of finance in the world; and
(5) the United States must maintain its position as a
global financial leader to continue its broader global
leadership role around the world.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit a report to the appropriate
congressional committees that--
(1) lists and examines the benefits to American foreign
policy that derive from the United States financial leadership
and the dollar's status as the world's global reserve currency;
(2) describes the actions taken by the People's Republic of
China that could cement China's role as the world's leading
financial center;
(3) analyzes the possible impact on American national
security and foreign policy were the yuan to supplant the
dollar as the world's leading reserve currency;
(4) outlines how the United States can work diplomatically
with allies, partners, and other nations to preserve a
financial system that is free, open, and fair; and
(5) identifies steps the United States can take to preserve
its status as the world's leading financial center and maintain
the dollar's position as the global reserve currency.
(c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives;
(2) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of
Representatives;
(3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(4) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of
the Senate.
SEC. 133. REVIEW OF CHINESE COMPANIES ON UNITED STATES CAPITAL MARKETS.
(a) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit a
report to the appropriate congressional committees that
describes the costs and benefits to the United States posed by
the presence of companies incorporated in the PRC that are
listed on American stock exchanges or traded over the counter
in the form of American depository receipts.
(2) Matters to be included.--The report shall--
(A) identify companies incorporated in the PRC
that--
(i) are listed or traded on one or several
stock exchanges within the United States,
including over-the-counter market and ``A
Shares'' added to indexes and exchange-traded
funds out of mainland exchanges in the PRC; and
(ii) based on the factors for consideration
described in paragraph (3), have knowingly and
materially contributed to--
(I) activities that undermine
United States national security;
(II) serious abuses of
internationally recognized human
rights; or
(III) a substantially increased
financial risk exposure for United
States-based investors;
(B) describe the activities of the companies
identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), and their
implications for the United States; and
(C) develop policy recommendations for the United
States Government, State governments, United States
financial institutions, United States equity and debt
exchanges, and other relevant stakeholders to address
the risks posed by the presence in United States
capital markets of the companies identified pursuant to
subparagraph (A).
(3) Factors for inclusion of a company.--In completing the
report under paragraph (1), the President shall consider
whether a company identified pursuant to paragraph (2)(A)--
(A) has materially contributed to the development
or manufacture, or sold or facilitated procurement by
the PLA, of lethal military equipment or component
parts of such equipment;
(B) has contributed to the construction and
militarization of features in the South China Sea;
(C) has been sanctioned by the United States or has
been determined to have conducted business with
sanctioned entities;
(D) has engaged in an act or a series of acts of
intellectual property theft;
(E) has engaged in corporate or economic espionage;
(F) has contributed to the proliferation of nuclear
or missile technology in violation of United Nations
Security Council resolutions or United States
sanctions;
(G) has contributed to the repression of religious
and ethnic minorities within the PRC, including in
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or Tibet Autonomous
Region;
(H) has contributed to the development of
technologies that enable censorship directed or
directly supported by the Government of the PRC; and
(I) has contributed to other activities or behavior
determined to be relevant by the President.
(4) Factors for making policy recommendations.--In
completing the report under paragraph (1), the President shall
weigh the national security implications considering the
following factors identified pursuant to paragraph (3)--
(A) the possibility that banning or delisting
companies from our markets could lead to an outflow of
companies to list in the PRC;
(B) the possibility that banning or delisting
companies from our markets could impact United States
leadership in the asset management industry,
particularly vis-a-vis the PRC;
(C) the possibility that banning or delisting
companies from our markets could impact the impact the
United States status as the world's leading capital
markets center, particularly vis-a-vis the PRC; and
(D) the impact on American foreign policy and
national security if United States leadership in
capital markets was weakened vis-a-vis the PRC.
(b) Report Form.--The report required under subsection (b)(1) shall
be submitted in unclassified form.
(c) Publication.--The unclassified portion of the report under
subsection (b)(1) shall be made accessible to the public online through
relevant United States Government websites.
SEC. 134. REPORT ON DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGES TO
CROSS-BORDER PAYMENT AND FINANCIAL MESSAGING SYSTEMS.
(a) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit a
report to the appropriate congressional committees on the
diplomatic and economic implications of cross-border payment
systems.
(2) Matters to be included.--The report shall--
(A) assess the extent to which American diplomacy
and global leadership hinge upon the current
infrastructure and existing ecosystem of cross-border
payment and financial messaging systems;
(B) examine the durability of the Society for
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
cooperative;
(C) review and analyze ways in which the Cross
Border Interbank Payment Systems (CIPS),
cryptocurrencies, and central bank digital currencies
could erode this system; and
(D) analyze how changes to global cross-border
payment systems could undermine United States national
security interests including impacts on the efficacy of
sanctions, the countering of terrorist finance, and the
enforcement of anti-money laundering provisions.
(b) Report Form.--The report required under subsection (a)(1) shall
be submitted in unclassified form.
(c) Publication.--The unclassified portion of the report under
subsection (a)(1) shall be made accessible to the public online through
relevant United States Government websites.
TITLE II--INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS
Subtitle A--Strategic and Diplomatic Matters
SEC. 201. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.
In this subtitle, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives.
SEC. 202. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT FOR ALLIES AND PARTNERS
IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific
provide a unique strategic advantage to the United States and
are among the Nation's most precious assets, enabling the
United States to advance its vital national interests, defend
its territory, expand its economy through international trade
and commerce, establish enduring cooperation with allies while
seeking to establish new partnerships, prevent the domination
of the Indo-Pacific and its surrounding maritime and air lanes
by a hostile power or powers, and deter potential aggressors;
(2) the Governments of the United States, Japan, the
Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are
critical allies in advancing a free and open order in the Indo-
Pacific region and tackling challenges with unity of purpose,
and have collaborated to advance specific efforts of shared
interest in areas such as defense and security, economic
prosperity, infrastructure connectivity, and fundamental
freedoms;
(3) the United States greatly values other partnerships in
the Indo-Pacific region, including with India, Singapore,
Indonesia, Taiwan, New Zealand, and Vietnam as well as its
trilateral and quadrilateral dialogues, and regional
architecture such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC), which
are essential to further shared interests;
(4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific demands
consistent United States and allied commitment to strengthening
and advancing alliances so that they are postured to meet these
challenges, and will require sustained political will, concrete
partnerships, economic, commercial, technological, and security
cooperation, consistent and tangible commitments, high-level
and extensive consultations on matters of mutual interest,
mutual and shared cooperation in the acquisition of key
capabilities important to allied defenses, and unified mutual
support in the face of political, economic, or military
coercion;
(5) fissures in the United States alliance relationships
and partnerships benefit United States adversaries and weaken
the collective ability to advance shared interests;
(6) the United States must work with allies to prioritize
human rights throughout the Indo-Pacific region;
(7) as the report released in August 2020 by the Expert
Group of the International Military Council on Climate and
Security (IMCCS), titled ``Climate and Security in the Indo-
Asia Pacific'' noted, the Indo-Pacific region is one of the
regions most vulnerable to climate impacts and as former Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment
Sherri Goodman, Secretary General of IMCCS, noted, climate
shocks act as a threat multiplier in the Indo-Pacific region,
increasing humanitarian response costs and impacting security
throughout the region as sea levels rise, fishing patterns
shift, food insecurity rises, and storms grow stronger and more
frequent;
(8) the United State should continue to engage on and
deepen cooperation with allies and partners of the United
States in the Indo-Pacific region, as laid out in the Asia
Reassurance Initiative Act (Public Law 115-409), in the areas
of--
(A) forecasting environmental challenges;
(B) assisting with transnational cooperation on
sustainable uses of forest and water resources with the
goal of preserving biodiversity and access to safe
drinking water;
(C) fisheries and marine resource conservation; and
(D) meeting environmental challenges and developing
resilience;
(9) the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the United States
Agency for International Development, should facilitate a
robust interagency Indo-Pacific climate resiliency and
adaptation strategy focusing on internal and external actions
needed--
(A) to facilitate regional early recovery, risk
reduction, and resilience to weather-related impacts on
strategic interests of the United States and partners
and allies of the United States in the region; and
(B) to address humanitarian and food security
impacts of weather-related changes in the region; and
(10) ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led mechanisms remain
essential to the evolving institutional architecture of the
Indo-Pacific region.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United
States--
(1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and security
cooperation between and among the United States, Japan, the
Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, as
appropriate, including through diplomatic engagement, regional
development, energy security and development, scientific and
health partnerships, educational and cultural exchanges,
intelligence-sharing, and other diplomatic and defense-related
initiatives;
(2) to uphold the United States multilateral and bilateral
treaty obligations, including--
(A) defending Japan consistent with the Treaty of
Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United
States of America and Japan, done at Washington,
January 19, 1960, and all related and subsequent
bilateral security agreements and arrangements
concluded on or before the date of enactment of this
Act;
(B) defending the Republic of Korea consistent with
the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and
the Republic of Korea, done at Washington, October 1,
1953, and all related and subsequent bilateral security
agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the
date of enactment of this Act;
(C) defending the Philippines consistent with
article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the
United States and the Republic of the Philippines, done
at Washington, August 30, 1951, and all related and
subsequent bilateral security agreements and
arrangements concluded on or before the date of
enactment of this Act;
(D) defending Thailand consistent with the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (``Manila
Pact''), done at Manila, September 8, 1954,
understanding thereto the Thanat-Rusk communique of
1962, and all related and subsequent bilateral security
agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the
date of enactment of this Act; and
(E) defending Australia consistent with the
Security Treaty Between Australia and the United States
of America, done at San Francisco, September 1, 1951,
and all related and subsequent bilateral security
agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the
date of enactment of this Act;
(3) to strengthen and deepen the United States bilateral
and regional partnerships, including with India, Taiwan, ASEAN,
and New Zealand;
(4) to cooperate with Japan, the Republic of Korea,
Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand to promote human
rights bilaterally and through regional and multilateral fora
and pacts; and
(5) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, economic, and
security cooperation with regional partners, such as Taiwan,
Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and India.
SEC. 203. BOOSTING QUAD COOPERATION.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) as a Pacific power, the United States should continue
to strengthen its cooperation with Australia, India, and Japan,
(through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or ``Quad'') to
enhance and implement a shared vision to meet regional
challenges and to promote a free, open, inclusive, resilient,
and healthy Indo-Pacific, characterized by respect for
democratic norms, rule of law, and market-driven economic
growth, and is free from undue influence and coercion;
(2) the United States should expand dialogue and
cooperation through the Quad with a range of partners to
support the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight,
peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and
territorial integrity, and to uphold peace and prosperity and
strengthen democratic resilience in the Indo-Pacific;
(3) the recent pledge from the first-ever Quad leaders
meeting on March 12, 2021, to respond to the economic and
health impacts of COVID-19, including expanding safe,
affordable, and effective vaccine production and equitable
access, and to address shared challenges, including in
cyberspace, critical technologies, counterterrorism, quality
infrastructure investment, and humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief, as well as maritime domains, further advances
the important cooperation among Quad nations that is so
critical to the Indo-Pacific region;
(4) building upon their announced commitment to finance
1,000,000,000 or more COVID-19 vaccines by the end of 2022 for
use in the Indo-Pacific region, the United States International
Development Finance Corporation, the Japan International
Cooperation Agency, and the Japan Bank for International
Cooperation, including through partnerships other multilateral
development banks, should also venture to finance development
and infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific region that are
competitive, transparent, and sustainable;
(5) the United States should participate in the Resilient
Supply Chain Initiative launched by Australia, Japan, and India
in 2020, along with similar initiatives that relocate supply
chains in the health, economic, and national security sectors
to the United States, its Quad partners, and other like-minded
countries; and
(6) the formation of a Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working
Group could--
(A) sustain and deepen engagement between senior
officials of the Quad countries on a full spectrum of
issues; and
(B) be modeled on the successful and long-standing
bilateral intra-parliamentary groups between the United
States and Mexico, Canada, and the United Kingdom, as
well as other formal and informal parliamentary
exchanges.
(b) Reporting Requirement.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall develop
and submit a comprehensive strategy for bolstering engagement
and cooperation with the Quad and submit a report to the
appropriate congressional committees laying out the strategy.
(2) Matters to be included.--The strategy required by
subsection (a) shall include the following:
(A) A description of how the United States intends
to demonstrate democratic leadership in the Indo-
Pacific through quadrilateral engagement with India,
Japan, and Australia on shared interests and common
challenges.
(B) A summary of--
(i) current and past Quad initiatives
across the whole of the United States
Government, including to promote broad based
and inclusive economic growth, trade,
investment, and to advance technology
cooperation, energy innovation, climate
mitigation and adaptation, physical and digital
infrastructure development, education, disaster
management, and global health security;
(ii) proposals shared among Quad nations to
deepen existing security cooperation,
intelligence sharing, economic partnerships,
and multilateral coordination; and
(iii) initiatives and agreements undertaken
jointly with Quad nations plus other like-
minded partners in the Indo-Pacific on areas of
shared interest.
(C) A description of efforts to jointly--
(i) expand ongoing COVID-19 cooperation to
prepare for the next pandemic by focusing on
medium-term vaccine and medical supply
production and building a broader dialogue on
global public health;
(ii) combat economic coercion, deepen
regional economic engagement and integration,
and strengthen regional rules and standards
around trade and investment;
(iii) strengthen climate actions on
mitigation, adaptation, resilience, technology,
capacity-building, and climate finance;
(iv) facilitate the development of quality
infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific through
joint financing, investment, technical
assistance, and standards setting;
(v) enhance joint maritime security and
maritime domain awareness initiatives to
protecting the maritime commons and supporting
international law and freedom of navigation in
the Indo-Pacific; and
(vi) develop international technology
standards and share or co-develop new
innovative technologies of the future.
SEC. 204. ESTABLISHMENT OF QUAD INTRA-PARLIAMENTARY WORKING GROUP.
(a) Establishment.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall seek to enter into
negotiations with the governments of Japan, Australia, and India
(collectively, with the United States, known as the ``Quad'') with the
goal of reaching a written agreement to establish a Quad Intra-
Parliamentary Working Group for the purpose of acting on the
recommendations of the Quad Working Groups described in section 203(6)
and to facilitate closer cooperation on shared interests and values.
(b) United States Group.--
(1) In general.--At such time as the governments of the
Quad countries enter into a written agreement described in
subsection (a), there shall be established a United States
Group, which shall represent the United States at the Quad
Intra-Parliamentary Working Group.
(2) Membership.--
(A) In general.--The United States Group shall be
comprised of not more than 24 Members of Congress.
(B) Appointment.--Of the Members of Congress
appointed to the United States Group under subparagraph
(A)--
(i) half shall be appointed by the Speaker
of the House of Representatives from among
Members of the House, not less than 4 of whom
shall be members of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs; and
(ii) half shall be appointed by the
President pro tempore of the Senate, based on
recommendations of the majority leader and
minority leader of the Senate, from among
Members of the Senate, not less than 4 of whom
shall be members of the Committee on Foreign
Relations (unless the majority leader and
minority leader determine otherwise).
(3) Meetings.--
(A) In general.--The United States Group shall seek
to meet not less frequently than annually with
representatives and appropriate staff of the
legislatures of Japan, Australia, and India, and any
other country invited by mutual agreement of the Quad
countries.
(B) Limitation.--A meeting described in
subparagraph (A) may be held--
(i) in the United States;
(ii) in another Quad country during periods
when Congress is not in session; or
(iii) virtually.
(4) Chairperson and vice chairperson.--
(A) House delegation.--The Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall designate the chairperson or vice
chairperson of the delegation of the United States
Group from the House from among members of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs.
(B) Senate delegation.--The President pro tempore
of the Senate shall designate the chairperson or vice
chairperson of the delegation of the United States
Group from the Senate from among members of the
Committee on Foreign Relations.
(5) Authorization of appropriations.--
(A) In general.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $1,000,000 for each fiscal year 2022
through 2025 for the United States Group.
(B) Distribution of appropriations.--
(i) In general.--For each fiscal year for
which an appropriation is made for the United
States Group, half of the amount appropriated
shall be available to the delegation from the
House of Representatives and half of the amount
shall be available to the delegation from the
Senate.
(ii) Method of distribution.--The amounts
available to the delegations of the House of
Representatives and the Senate under clause (i)
shall be disbursed on vouchers to be approved
by the chairperson of the delegation from the
House of Representatives and the chairperson of
the delegation from the Senate, respectively.
(6) Private sources.--The United States Group may accept
gifts or donations of services or property, subject to the
review and approval, as appropriate, of the Committee on Ethics
of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Ethics of
the Senate.
(7) Certification of expenditures.--The certificate of the
chairperson of the delegation from the House of Representatives
or the delegation of the Senate of the United States Group
shall be final and conclusive upon the accounting officers in
the auditing of the accounts of the United States Group.
(8) Annual report.--The United States Group shall submit to
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate a report for each fiscal year for which an appropriation
is made for the United States Group, which shall include a
description of its expenditures under such appropriation.
SEC. 205. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH ASEAN.
It is the policy of the United States to--
(1) stand with the nations of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) as they respond to COVID-19 and support
greater cooperation in building capacity to prepare for and
respond to pandemics and other public health challenges;
(2) support high-level United States participation in the
annual ASEAN Summit held each year;
(3) reaffirm the importance of United States-ASEAN economic
engagement, including the elimination of barriers to cross-
border commerce, and support the ASEAN Economic Community's
(AEC) goals, including strong, inclusive, and sustainable long-
term economic growth and cooperation with the United States
that focuses on innovation and capacity-building efforts in
technology, education, disaster management, food security,
human rights, and trade facilitation, particularly for ASEAN's
poorest countries;
(4) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster greater
integration and unity within the ASEAN community, as well as to
foster greater integration and unity with non-ASEAN economic,
political, and security partners, including Japan, the Republic
of Korea, Australia, the European Union, and India;
(5) recognize the value of strategic economic initiatives
like United States-ASEAN Connect, which demonstrates a
commitment to ASEAN and the AEC and builds upon economic
relationships in the region;
(6) support ASEAN nations in addressing maritime and
territorial disputes in a constructive manner and in pursuing
claims through peaceful, diplomatic, and, as necessary,
legitimate regional and international arbitration mechanisms,
consistent with international law, including through the
adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea that
represents the interests of all parties and promotes peace and
stability in the region;
(7) urge all parties involved in the maritime and
territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific region, including the
Government of the People's Republic of China--
(A) to cease any current activities, and avoid
undertaking any actions in the future, that undermine
stability, or complicate or escalate disputes through
the use of coercion, intimidation, or military force;
(B) to demilitarize islands, reefs, shoals, and
other features, and refrain from new efforts to
militarize, including the construction of new garrisons
and facilities and the relocation of additional
military personnel, material, or equipment;
(C) to oppose actions by any country that prevent
other countries from exercising their sovereign rights
to the resources in their exclusive economic zones and
continental shelves by enforcing claims to those areas
in the South China Sea that lack support in
international law; and
(D) to oppose unilateral declarations of
administrative and military districts in contested
areas in the South China Sea;
(8) urge parties to refrain from unilateral actions that
cause permanent physical damage to the marine environment and
support the efforts of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration and ASEAN to implement guidelines to address the
illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the region;
(9) urge ASEAN member states to develop a common approach
to encourage China and the Philippines to comply with the
decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration's 2016 ruling in
favor of the Republic of the Philippines in the case against
the People's Republic of China's excessive maritime claims;
(10) reaffirm the commitment of the United States to
continue joint efforts with ASEAN to halt human smuggling and
trafficking in persons and urge ASEAN to create and strengthen
regional mechanisms to provide assistance and support to
refugees and migrants;
(11) support the Mekong-United States Partnership;
(12) support newly created initiatives with ASEAN
countries, including the United States-ASEAN Smart Cities
Partnership, the ASEAN Policy Implementation Project, the
United States-ASEAN Innovation Circle, and the United States-
ASEAN Health Futures;
(13) encourage the President to communicate to ASEAN
leaders the importance of promoting the rule of law and open
and transparent government, strengthening civil society, and
protecting human rights, including releasing political
prisoners, ceasing politically motivated prosecutions and
arbitrary killings, and safeguarding freedom of the press,
freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom of speech
and expression;
(14) support efforts by organizations in ASEAN that address
corruption in the public and private sectors, enhance anti-
bribery compliance, enforce bribery criminalization in the
private sector, and build beneficial ownership transparency
through the ASEAN-USAID PROSPECT project partnered with the
South East Asia Parties Against Corruption (SEA-PAC);
(15) support the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative
as an example of a people-to-people partnership that provides
skills, networks, and leadership training to a new generation
that will create and fill jobs, foster cross-border cooperation
and partnerships, and rise to address the regional and global
challenges of the future;
(16) support the creation of initiatives similar to the
Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative for other parts of the
Indo-Pacific to foster people-to-people partnerships with an
emphasis on civil society leaders;
(17) acknowledge those ASEAN governments that have fully
upheld and implemented all United Nations Security Council
resolutions and international agreements with respect to the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear and ballistic
missile programs and encourage all other ASEAN governments to
do the same; and
(18) allocate appropriate resources across the United
States Government to articulate and implement an Indo-Pacific
strategy that respects and supports the crucial role of ASEAN
and supports ASEAN as a source of well-functioning and problem-
solving regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific community.
SEC. 206. UNITED STATES REPRESENTATION IN STANDARDS-SETTING BODIES.
(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Promoting
United States International Leadership in 5G Act of 2021''.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States and its allies and partners should
maintain participation and leadership at international
standards-setting bodies for 5th and future generation mobile
telecommunications systems and infrastructure;
(2) the United States should work with its allies and
partners to encourage and facilitate the development of secure
supply chains and networks for 5th and future generation mobile
telecommunications systems and infrastructure; and
(3) the maintenance of a high standard of security in
telecommunications and cyberspace between the United States and
its allies and partners is a national security interest of the
United States.
(c) Enhancing Representation and Leadership of United States at
International Standards-Setting Bodies.--
(1) In general.--The President shall--
(A) establish an interagency working group to
provide assistance and technical expertise to enhance
the representation and leadership of the United States
at international bodies that set standards for
equipment, systems, software, and virtually defined
networks that support 5th and future generation mobile
telecommunications systems and infrastructure, such as
the International Telecommunication Union and the 3rd
Generation Partnership Project; and
(B) work with allies, partners, and the private
sector to increase productive engagement.
(2) Interagency working group.--The interagency working
group described in paragraph (1)--
(A) shall be chaired by the Secretary of State or a
designee of the Secretary of State; and
(B) shall consist of the head (or designee) of each
Federal department or agency the President determines
appropriate.
(3) Briefings.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and subsequently
thereafter as provided under subparagraph (B), the
interagency working group described in paragraph (1)
shall provide a strategy to the appropriate
congressional committees that addresses--
(i) promotion of United States leadership
at international standards-setting bodies for
equipment, systems, software, and virtually
defined networks relevant to 5th and future
generation mobile telecommunications systems
and infrastructure, taking into account the
different processes followed by the various
international standard-setting bodies;
(ii) diplomatic engagement with allies and
partners to share security risk information and
findings pertaining to equipment that supports
or is used in 5th and future generation mobile
telecommunications systems and infrastructure
and cooperation on mitigating such risks;
(iii) China's presence and activities at
international standards-setting bodies relevant
to 5th and future generation mobile
telecommunications systems and infrastructure,
including information on the differences in the
scope and scale of China's engagement at such
bodies compared to engagement by the United
States or its allies and partners and the
security risks raised by Chinese proposals in
such standards-setting bodies; and
(iv) engagement with private sector
communications and information service
providers, equipment developers, academia,
federally funded research and development
centers, and other private-sector stakeholders
to propose and develop secure standards for
equipment, systems, software, and virtually
defined networks that support 5th and future
generation mobile telecommunications systems
and infrastructure.
(B) Subsequent briefings.--Upon receiving a request
from the appropriate congressional committees, or as
determined appropriate by the chair of the interagency
working group established pursuant to paragraph (1),
the interagency working group shall provide such
committees an updated briefing that covers the matters
described in clauses (i) through (iv) of subparagraph
(A).
SEC. 207. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH G7 AND G20 COUNTRIES.
(a) In General.--It is the sense of Congress that the President,
acting through the Secretary of State, should initiate an agenda with
G7 and G20 countries on matters relevant to economic and democratic
freedoms, including the following:
(1) Trade and investment issues and enforcement.
(2) Building support for international infrastructure
standards, including those agreed to at the G20 summit in Osaka
in 2018.
(3) The erosion of democracy and human rights.
(4) The security of 5G telecommunications.
(5) Anti-competitive behavior, such as intellectual
property theft, massive subsidization of companies, and other
policies and practices.
(6) Predatory international sovereign lending that is
inconsistent with Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and Paris Club principles.
(7) International influence campaigns.
(8) Environmental standards.
(9) Coordination with like-minded regional partners that
are not in the G7 and G20.
SEC. 208. ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN PARTNERSHIP.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to support the close economic, political, and security
relationship between Taiwan and the United States and recognize
Taiwan as a vital part of the approach to the United States
Indo-Pacific;
(2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its democracy a
vital national security interest of the United States;
(3) to reinforce all existing United States Government
commitments to Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act
(Public Law 96-8), the three joint communiques, and the ``Six
Assurances'';
(4) to support Taiwan's implementation of its asymmetric
defense strategy, including the priorities identified in
Taiwan's Overall Defense Concept;
(5) to urge Taiwan to increase its defense spending in
order to fully resource its defense strategy;
(6) to conduct regular transfers of defense articles to
Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan's self-defense capabilities,
particularly its efforts to develop and integrate asymmetric
capabilities, such as anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor,
air defense, advanced command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and
resilient command and control capabilities, into its military
forces;
(7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan's meaningful
participation in international organizations, including the
World Health Assembly, the International Civil Aviation
Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization,
and other international bodies as appropriate;
(8) to advocate for information sharing with Taiwan in the
International Agency for Research on Cancer;
(9) to promote meaningful cooperation among the United
States, Taiwan, and other like-minded partners;
(10) to enhance bilateral trade, including potentially
through new agreements or resumption of talks under the Trade
and Investment Framework Agreement;
(11) to actively engage in trade talks in pursuance of a
bilateral free trade agreement;
(12) to expand bilateral economic and technological
cooperation, including improving supply chain security;
(13) to support United States educational and exchange
programs with Taiwan, including by promoting the study of
Chinese language, culture, history, and politics in Taiwan; and
(14) to expand people-to-people exchanges between the
United States and Taiwan.
(b) Supporting United States Educational and Exchange Programs With
Taiwan.--
(1) Establishment of the united states-taiwan cultural
exchange foundation.--The Secretary of State should consider
establishing an independent nonprofit that--
(A) is dedicated to deepening ties between the
future leaders of Taiwan and the United States; and
(B) works with State and local school districts and
educational institutions to send high school and
university students to Taiwan to study the Chinese
language, culture, history, politics, and other
relevant subjects.
(2) Partner.--State and local school districts and
educational institutions, including public universities, are
encouraged to partner with the Taipei Economic and Cultural
Representative Office in the United States to establish
programs to promote an increase in educational and cultural
exchanges.
SEC. 209. TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.
(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Taiwan
Fellowship Act''.
(b) Findings; Purposes.--
(1) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(A) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22
U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) affirmed United States policy ``to
preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly
commercial, cultural, and other relations between the
people of the United States and the people on Taiwan,
as well as the people on the China mainland and all
other peoples of the Western Pacific area''.
(B) Consistent with the Asia Reassurance Initiative
Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-409), the United States has
grown its strategic partnership with Taiwan's vibrant
democracy of 23,000,000 people.
(C) Despite a concerted campaign by the People's
Republic of China to isolate Taiwan from its diplomatic
partners and from international organizations,
including the World Health Organization, Taiwan has
emerged as a global leader in the coronavirus global
pandemic response, including by donating more than
2,000,000 surgical masks and other medical equipment to
the United States.
(D) The creation of a United States fellowship
program with Taiwan would support--
(i) a key priority of expanding people-to-
people exchanges, which was outlined in
President Donald J. Trump's 2017 National
Security Strategy;
(ii) President Joseph R. Biden's commitment
to Taiwan, ``a leading democracy and a critical
economic and security partner'', as expressed
in his March 2021 Interim National Security
Strategic Guidance; and
(iii) April 2021 guidance from the
Department of State based on a review required
under the Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020
(subtitle B of title III of division FF of
Public Law 116-260) to ``encourage U.S.
government engagement with Taiwan that reflects
our deepening unofficial relationship''.
(2) Purposes.--The purposes of this Act are--
(A) to further strengthen the United States-Taiwan
strategic relationship and broaden understanding of the
Indo-Pacific region by temporarily assigning officials
of agencies of the United States Government to Taiwan
for intensive study in Mandarin Chinese and placement
as Fellows with the governing authorities on Taiwan or
a Taiwanese civic institution;
(B) to expand United States Government expertise in
Mandarin Chinese language skills and understanding of
the politics, history, and culture of Taiwan and the
Indo-Pacific region by providing eligible United States
personnel the opportunity to acquire such skills and
understanding through the Taiwan Fellowship Program
established under subsection (c); and
(C) to better position the United States to advance
its economic, security, and human rights interests and
values in the Indo-Pacific region.
(c) Taiwan Fellowship Program.--
(1) Definitions.--In this section:
(A) Agency head.--The term ``agency head'' means,
in the case of the executive branch of United States
Government, or in the case of a legislative branch
agency specified in subparagraph (B), the head of the
respective agency.
(B) Agency of the united states government.--The
term ``agency of the United States Government''
includes the Government Accountability Office, the
Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional Research
Service, and the United States-China Economic and
Security Review Commission of the legislative branch,
as well as any agency of the executive branch.
(C) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(i) the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate;
(ii) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate;
(iii) the Committee on Appropriations of
the House of Representatives;
(iv) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
the House of Representatives; and
(v) the Committee on Armed Services of the
House of Representatives.
(D) Detailee.--The term ``detailee'' means an
employee of an agency of the United States Government
on loan to the American Institute in Taiwan, without a
change of position from the agency at which such
employee is employed.
(E) Implementing partner.--The term ``implementing
partner'' means any United States organization
described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 and exempt from tax under section 501(a)
of such Code that--
(i) is selected through a competitive
process;
(ii) performs logistical, administrative,
and other functions, as determined by the
Department of State and the American Institute
of Taiwan, in support of the Taiwan Fellowship
Program; and
(iii) enters into a cooperative agreement
with the American Institute in Taiwan to
administer the Taiwan Fellowship Program.
(2) Establishment of taiwan fellowship program.--
(A) Establishment.--The Secretary of State shall
establish the ``Taiwan Fellowship Program'' (hereafter
referred to in this section as the ``Program'') to
provide a fellowship opportunity in Taiwan of up to two
years for eligible United States citizens through the
cooperative agreement established in subparagraph (B).
The Department of State, in consultation with the
American Institute in Taiwan and the implementing
partner, may modify the name of the Program.
(B) Cooperative agreements.--
(i) In general.--The American Institute in
Taiwan shall use amounts authorized to be
appropriated pursuant to paragraph (6)(A) to
enter into an annual or multi-year cooperative
agreement with an appropriate implementing
partner.
(ii) Fellowships.--The Department of State,
in consultation with the American Institute in
Taiwan and, as appropriate, the implementing
partner, shall award to eligible United States
citizens, subject to available funding--
(I) not fewer than five fellowships
during the first two years of the
Program; and
(II) not fewer than ten fellowships
during each of the remaining years of
the Program.
(C) International agreement; implementing
partner.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the American Institute in
Taiwan, in consultation with the Department of State,
shall--
(i) begin negotiations with the Taipei
Economic and Cultural Representative Office, or
with another appropriate entity, for the
purpose of entering into an agreement to
facilitate the placement of fellows in an
agency of the governing authorities on Taiwan;
and
(ii) begin the process of selecting an
implementing partner, which--
(I) shall agree to meet all of the
legal requirements required to operate
in Taiwan; and
(II) shall be composed of staff who
demonstrate significant experience
managing exchange programs in the Indo-
Pacific region.
(D) Curriculum.--
(i) First year.--During the first year of
each fellowship under this subsection, each
fellow should study--
(I) the Mandarin Chinese language;
(II) the people, history, and
political climate on Taiwan; and
(III) the issues affecting the
relationship between the United States
and the Indo-Pacific region.
(ii) Second year.--During the second year
of each fellowship under this section, each
fellow, subject to the approval of the
Department of State, the American Institute in
Taiwan, and the implementing partner, and in
accordance with the purposes of this Act, shall
work in--
(I) a parliamentary office,
ministry, or other agency of the
governing authorities on Taiwan; or
(II) an organization outside of the
governing authorities on Taiwan, whose
interests are associated with the
interests of the fellow and the agency
of the United States Government from
which the fellow had been employed.
(E) Flexible fellowship duration.--Notwithstanding
any requirement under this section, the Secretary of
State, in consultation with the American Institute in
Taiwan and, as appropriate, the implementing partner,
may award fellowships that have a duration of between
nine months and two years, and may alter the curriculum
requirements under subparagraph (D) for such purposes.
(F) Sunset.--The Program shall terminate ten years
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(3) Program requirements.--
(A) Eligibility requirements.--A United States
citizen is eligible for a fellowship under this section
if he or she--
(i) is an employee of the United States
Government;
(ii) has received at least one exemplary
performance review in his or her current United
States Government role within at least the last
three years prior to the beginning the
fellowship;
(iii) has at least two years of experience
in any branch of the United States Government;
(iv) has a demonstrated professional or
educational background in the relationship
between the United States and countries in the
Indo-Pacific region; and
(v) has demonstrated his or her commitment
to further service in the United States
Government.
(B) Responsibilities of fellows.--Each recipient of
a fellowship under this section shall agree, as a
condition of such fellowship--
(i) to maintain satisfactory progress in
language training and appropriate behavior in
Taiwan, as determined by the Department of
State, the American Institute in Taiwan and, as
appropriate, its implementing partner;
(ii) to refrain from engaging in any
intelligence or intelligence-related activity
on behalf of the United States Government; and
(iii) to continue Federal Government
employment for a period of not less than four
years after the conclusion of the fellowship or
for not less than two years for a fellowship
that is one year or shorter.
(C) Responsibilities of implementing partner.--
(i) Selection of fellows.--The implementing
partner, in close coordination with the
Department of State and the American Institute
in Taiwan, shall--
(I) make efforts to recruit
fellowship candidates who reflect the
diversity of the United States;
(II) select fellows for the Program
based solely on merit, with appropriate
supervision from the Department of
State and the American Institute in
Taiwan; and
(III) prioritize the selection of
candidates willing to serve a
fellowship lasting one year or longer.
(ii) First year.--The implementing partner
should provide each fellow in the first year
(or shorter duration, as jointly determined by
the Department of State and the American
Institute in Taiwan for those who are not
serving a two-year fellowship) with--
(I) intensive Mandarin Chinese
language training; and
(II) courses in the politic,
culture, and history of Taiwan, China,
and the broader Indo-Pacific.
(iii) Waiver of required training.--The
Department of State, in coordination with the
American Institute in Taiwan and, as
appropriate, the implementing partner, may
waive any of the training required under clause
(ii) to the extent that a fellow has Mandarin
Chinese language skills, knowledge of the topic
described in clause (ii)(II), or for other
related reasons approved by the Department of
State and the American Institute in Taiwan. If
any of the training requirements are waived for
a fellow serving a two-year fellowship, the
training portion of his or her fellowship may
be shortened to the extent appropriate.
(iv) Office; staffing.--The implementing
partner, in consultation with the Department of
State and the American Institute in Taiwan,
shall maintain an office and at least one full-
time staff member in Taiwan--
(I) to liaise with the American
Institute in Taiwan and the governing
authorities on Taiwan; and
(II) to serve as the primary in-
country point of contact for the
recipients of fellowships under this
section and their dependents.
(v) Other functions.--The implementing
partner should perform other functions in
association in support of the Program,
including logistical and administrative
functions, as prescribed by the Department of
State and the American Institute in Taiwan.
(D) Noncompliance.--
(i) In general.--Any fellow who fails to
comply with the requirements under this section
shall reimburse the American Institute in
Taiwan for--
(I) the Federal funds expended for
the fellow's participation in the
fellowship, as set forth in clauses
(ii) and (iii); and
(II) interest accrued on such funds
(calculated at the prevailing rate).
(ii) Full reimbursement.--Any fellow who
violates clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (B)
shall reimburse the American Institute in
Taiwan in an amount equal to the sum of--
(I) all of the Federal funds
expended for the fellow's participation
in the fellowship; and
(II) interest on the amount
specified in subclause (I), which shall
be calculated at the prevailing rate.
(iii) Pro rata reimbursement.--Any fellow
who violates subparagraph (B)(iii) shall
reimburse the American Institute in Taiwan in
an amount equal to the difference between--
(I) the amount specified in clause
(ii); and
(II) the product of--
(aa) the amount the fellow
received in compensation during
the final year of the
fellowship, including the value
of any allowances and benefits
received by the fellow;
multiplied by
(bb) the percentage of the
period specified in
subparagraph (B)(iii) during
which the fellow did not remain
employed by the United States
Government.
(E) Annual report.--Not later than 90 days after
the selection of the first class of fellows under this
Act, and annually thereafter for 10 years, the
Department of State shall offer to brief the
appropriate congressional committees regarding the
following issues:
(i) An assessment of the performance of the
implementing partner in fulfilling the purposes
of this section.
(ii) The number of applicants each year,
the number of applicants willing to serve a
fellowship lasting one year or longer, and the
number of such applicants selected for the
fellowship.
(iii) The names and sponsoring agencies of
the fellows selected by the implementing
partner and the extent to which such fellows
represent the diversity of the United States.
(iv) The names of the parliamentary
offices, ministries, other agencies of the
governing authorities on Taiwan, and
nongovernmental institutions to which each
fellow was assigned.
(v) Any recommendations, as appropriate, to
improve the implementation of the Program,
including added flexibilities in the
administration of the program.
(vi) An assessment of the Program's value
upon the relationship between the United States
and Taiwan or the United States and Asian
countries.
(F) Annual financial audit.--
(i) In general.--The financial records of
any implementing partner shall be audited
annually in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards by independent certified
public accountants or independent licensed
public accountants who are certified or
licensed by a regulatory authority of a State
or another political subdivision of the United
States.
(ii) Location.--Each audit under clause (i)
shall be conducted at the place or places where
the financial records of the implementing
partner are normally kept.
(iii) Access to documents.--The
implementing partner shall make available to
the accountants conducting an audit under
clause (i)--
(I) all books, financial records,
files, other papers, things, and
property belonging to, or in use by,
the implementing partner that are
necessary to facilitate the audit; and
(II) full facilities for verifying
transactions with the balances or
securities held by depositories, fiscal
agents, and custodians.
(iv) Report.--
(I) In general.--Not later than six
months after the end of each fiscal
year, the implementing partner shall
provide a report of the audit conducted
for such fiscal year under clause (i)
to the Department of State and the
American Institute in Taiwan.
(II) Contents.--Each audit report
shall--
(aa) set forth the scope of
the audit;
(bb) include such
statements, along with the
auditor's opinion of those
statements, as may be necessary
to present fairly the
implementing partner's assets
and liabilities, surplus or
deficit, with reasonable
detail;
(cc) include a statement of
the implementing partner's
income and expenses during the
year; and
(dd) include a schedule
of--
(AA) all contracts
and cooperative
agreements requiring
payments greater than
$5,000; and
(BB) any payments
of compensation,
salaries, or fees at a
rate greater than
$5,000 per year.
(III) Copies.--Each audit report
shall be produced in sufficient copies
for distribution to the public.
(4) Taiwan fellows on detail from government service.--
(A) In general.--
(i) Detail authorized.--With the approval
of the Secretary of State, an agency head may
detail, for a period of not more than two
years, an employee of the agency of the United
States Government who has been awarded a
fellowship under this Act, to the American
Institute in Taiwan for the purpose of
assignment to the governing authorities on
Taiwan or an organization described in
paragraph (2)(D)(ii)(II).
(ii) Agreement.--Each detailee shall enter
into a written agreement with the Federal
Government before receiving a fellowship, in
which the fellow shall agree--
(I) to continue in the service of
the sponsoring agency at the end of
fellowship for a period of at least
four years (or at least two years if
the fellowship duration is one year or
shorter) unless such detailee is
involuntarily separated from the
service of such agency; and
(II) to pay to the American
Institute in Taiwan any additional
expenses incurred by the United States
Government in connection with the
fellowship if the detailee voluntarily
separates from service with the
sponsoring agency before the end of the
period for which the detailee has
agreed to continue in the service of
such agency.
(iii) Exception.--The payment agreed to
under clause (ii)(II) may not be required of a
detailee who leaves the service of the
sponsoring agency to enter into the service of
another agency of the United States Government
unless the head of the sponsoring agency
notifies the detailee before the effective date
of entry into the service of the other agency
that payment will be required under this
subsection.
(B) Status as government employee.--A detailee--
(i) is deemed, for the purpose of
preserving allowances, privileges, rights,
seniority, and other benefits, to be an
employee of the sponsoring agency;
(ii) is entitled to pay, allowances, and
benefits from funds available to such agency,
which is deemed to comply with section 5536 of
title 5, United States Code; and
(iii) may be assigned to a position with an
entity described in paragraph (2)(D)(ii)(I) if
acceptance of such position does not involve--
(I) the taking of an oath of
allegiance to another government; or
(II) the acceptance of compensation
or other benefits from any foreign
government by such detailee.
(C) Responsibilities of sponsoring agency.--
(i) In general.--The agency of the United
States Government from which a detailee is
detailed should provide the fellow allowances
and benefits that are consistent with
Department of State Standardized Regulations or
other applicable rules and regulations,
including--
(I) a living quarters allowance to
cover the cost of housing in Taiwan;
(II) a cost of living allowance to
cover any possible higher costs of
living in Taiwan;
(III) a temporary quarters
subsistence allowance for up to seven
days if the fellow is unable to find
housing immediately upon arriving in
Taiwan;
(IV) an education allowance to
assist parents in providing the
fellow's minor children with
educational services ordinarily
provided without charge by public
schools in the United States;
(V) moving expenses to transport
personal belongings of the fellow and
his or her family in their move to
Taiwan, which is comparable to the
allowance given for American Institute
in Taiwan employees assigned to Taiwan;
and
(VI) an economy-class airline
ticket to and from Taiwan for each
fellow and the fellow's immediate
family.
(ii) Modification of benefits.--The
American Institute in Taiwan and its
implementing partner, with the approval of the
Department of State, may modify the benefits
set forth in clause (i) if such modification is
warranted by fiscal circumstances.
(D) No financial liability.--The American Institute
in Taiwan, the implementing partner, and any governing
authorities on Taiwan or nongovernmental entities in
Taiwan at which a fellow is detailed during the second
year of the fellowship may not be held responsible for
the pay, allowances, or any other benefit normally
provided to the detailee.
(E) Reimbursement.--Fellows may be detailed under
clause (A)(ii) without reimbursement to the United
States by the American Institute in Taiwan.
(F) Allowances and benefits.--Detailees may be paid
by the American Institute in Taiwan for the allowances
and benefits listed in subparagraph (C).
(5) GAO report.--Not later than one year prior to the
sunset of the Program pursuant to paragraph (2)(F), the
Comptroller General of the United States shall transmit to the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report
that includes the following:
(A) An analysis of United States Government
participants in the Program, including the number of
applicants and the number of fellowships undertaken,
the places of employment.
(B) An assessment of the costs and benefits for
participants in the Program and for the United States
Government of such fellowships.
(C) An analysis of the financial impact of the
fellowship on United States Government offices that
have detailed fellows to participate in the Program.
(D) Recommendations, if any, on how to improve the
Program.
(6) Funding.--
(A) Authorization of appropriations.--There are
authorized to be appropriated to the American Institute
in Taiwan--
(i) for fiscal year 2022, $2,900,000, of
which $500,000 should be used by an appropriate
implementing partner to launch the Program; and
(ii) for fiscal year 2023, and each
succeeding fiscal year, $2,400,000.
(B) Private sources.--The implementing partner
selected to implement the Program may accept, use, and
dispose of gifts or donations of services or property
in carrying out such program, subject to the review and
approval of the American Institute in Taiwan.
SEC. 210. INCREASING DEPARTMENT OF STATE PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES
DEVOTED TO THE INDO-PACIFIC.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In fiscal year 2020, the Department of State allocated
$1,500,000,000 to the Indo-Pacific region in bilateral and
regional foreign assistance (FA) resources, including as
authorized by section 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative
Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-409; 132 Stat. 5391), and
$798,000,000 in the fiscal year 2020 diplomatic engagement (DE)
budget. These amounts represent only 5 percent of the DE budget
and only 4 percent of the total Department of State-USAID
budget.
(2) Over the last 5 years the DE budget and personnel
levels in the Indo-Pacific averaged only 5 percent of the
total, while FA resources averaged only 4 percent of the total.
(3) In 2020, the Department of State began a process to
realign certain positions at posts to ensure that its personnel
footprint matches the demands of great-power competition,
including in the Indo-Pacific.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the size of the United States diplomatic corps must be
sufficient to meet the current and emerging challenges of the
21st century, including those in the Indo-Pacific region and
elsewhere;
(2) the increase must be designed to meet the objectives of
an Indo-Pacific strategy focused on strengthening the good
governance and sovereignty of states that adhere to and uphold
the rules-based international order; and
(3) the increase must be implemented with a focus on
increased numbers of economic, political, and public diplomacy
officers, representing a cumulative increase of at least 200
foreign service officer generalists, to--
(A) advance free, fair, and reciprocal trade and
open investment environments for United States
companies, and engaged in increased commercial
diplomacy in key markets;
(B) better articulate and explain United States
policies, strengthen civil society and democratic
principles, enhance reporting on global activities,
promote people-to-people exchanges, and advance United
States influence; and
(C) increase capacity at small- and medium-sized
embassies and consulates in the Indo-Pacific and other
regions around the world, as necessary.
(c) Statement of Policy.--
(1) It shall be the policy of the United States to ensure
Department of State funding levels and personnel footprint in
the Indo-Pacific reflect the region's high degree of importance
and significance to United States political, economic, and
security interests.
(2) It shall be the policy of the United States to increase
DE and FA funding and the quantity of personnel dedicated to
the Indo-Pacific region respective to the Department of State's
total budget.
(d) Action Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide to the
appropriate committees of Congress an action plan with the following
elements:
(1) Identification of requirements to advance United States
strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific and the personnel and
budgetary resources for the Department of State needed to meet
them, assuming an unconstrained resource environment.
(2) A plan to increase the portion of the Department's
budget dedicated to the Indo-Pacific in terms of DE and FA
focused on development, economic, and security assistance.
(3) A plan to increase the number of positions at posts in
the Indo-Pacific region and bureaus with responsibility for the
Indo-Pacific region, including a description of increases at
each post or bureau, a breakdown of increases by cone, and a
description of how such increases in personnel will advance
United States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.
(4) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks that the
Department will meet in implementing the action plan.
(5) A description of any barriers to implementing the
action plan.
(e) Updates to Report and Briefing.--Every 180 days after the
submission of the action plan described in subsection (c) for no more
than 3 years, the Secretary shall submit an update and brief the
appropriate committees of Congress on the implementation of such action
plan, with supporting data and including a detailed assessment of
benchmarks reached.
(f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated, for fiscal year 2022, $2,000,000,000, under titles III
and IV of the Foreign Assistance Act for the Indo-Pacific region and
$1,250,000,000 in diplomatic engagement resources to the Indo-Pacific
region.
(g) Inclusion of Amounts Appropriated Pursuant to Asia Reassurance
Initiative Act of 2018.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated under
subsection (f) include funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to
section 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public
Law 115-409).
(h) Secretary of State.--Not later than 2 years after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State should report on the
extent to which the benchmarks described in the action plan in
subsection (c) have been met or progress has been made.
SEC. 211. DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC EFFORTS TO DETER PRC USE OF FORCE
AGAINST TAIWAN.
(a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(b) Statement of Policy.--In order to deter the use of force by the
People's Republic of China to change the status quo on Taiwan, the
United States should coordinate with allies and partners to identify
and develop significant economic and diplomatic measures to deter and
impose costs on any such action by the People's Republic of China.
SEC. 212. REPORT ON BILATERAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS CHINESE FENTANYL
TRAFFICKING.
(a) China's Class Scheduling of Fentanyl and Synthetic Opioid
Precursors.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of State and Attorney General shall submit to
the appropriate committees of Congress a written report--
(1) detailing a description of United States Government
efforts to gain a commitment from the Chinese Government to
submit unregulated fentanyl precursors such as 4-AP to
controls; and
(2) detailing a plan for future steps the United States
Government will take to urge China to combat illicit fentanyl
production and trafficking originating in China.
(b) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection (c) shall
be unclassified with a classified annex.
SEC. 213. FACILITATION OF INCREASED EQUITY INVESTMENTS UNDER THE BETTER
UTILIZATION OF INVESTMENTS LEADING TO DEVELOPMENT ACT OF
2018.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that support
provided under section 1421(c)(1) of the Better Utilization of
Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9621(c)(1))
should be considered to be a Federal credit program that is subject to
the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661 et seq.) for
purposes of applying the requirements of such Act to such support.
(b) Maximum Contingent Liability.--Section 1433 of the Better
Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22
U.S.C. 9633) is amended by striking ``$60,000,000,000'' and inserting
``$100,000,000,000''.
SEC. 214. EXPANDING INVESTMENT BY UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION FOR VACCINE
MANUFACTURING.
(a) In General.--The Development Finance Corporation is authorized
to provide financing to entities in India and in other less developed
countries to increase vaccine manufacturing capacity for the following
purposes--
(1) manufacturing of Stringent Regulatory Authorization
(SRA) or World Health Organization (WHO) Emergency Use Listing
COVID-19 vaccines;
(2) manufacturing of SRA or WHO Emergency Use Listing
therapeutics used to treat symptoms related to COVID-19; and
(3) manufacturing of critical medical supplies needed for
preventing, detecting and treating COVID-19, including
ventilators, personal protective equipment (PPE), oxygen,
diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines.
(b) Reporting Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Chief Executive Officer of the
Development Finance Corporation, in coordination with the Secretary of
State, shall provide a report to the appropriate congressional
committees--
(1) outlining the countries where DFC financing could be
most impactful for vaccine manufacturing and to achieve the
goal of manufacturing 1 billion COVID-19 vaccines by 2022;
(2) a detailed explanation of the United States and partner
country interests served by the United States providing support
to such projects;
(3) a detailed description of any support provided by other
United States allies and partners to expand the initiatives
outlined in subsection (a); and
(4) a detailed description of any support provided by China
in support of the initiatives outlined in subsection (a).
(c) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form with a classified annex if necessary.
SEC. 215. ENSURING UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC POSTS ALIGN WITH AMERICAN
STRATEGIC NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES.
(a) Statement of Policy.--
(1) With 276 embassies and other representative offices
globally, China now has more diplomatic posts around the world
than any other country, including the United States. Many of
Beijing's new missions can be found in countries that recently
broke ties with Taiwan (Burkina Faso, the Dominican Republic,
El Salvador, the Gambia, and Sao Tome and Principe) or do not
have any United States diplomatic physical presence despite
these countries asking for increased United States engagement
and investment (Antigua and Barbuda and Dominica).
(2) It is the sense of Congress, that the Department of
State conduct an assessment of all United States diplomatic
posts to verify that they align with its United States national
security and economic interests, as well as ensuring that these
locations position the United States appropriately with its
strategic competitors to advance the national interest in every
country worldwide, including those countries currently lacking
any physical United States diplomatic presence whether an
embassy, consulate general, or principal officer post.
(b) Reporting.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and biennially thereafter, the Secretary of State
shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a
report assessing the number, location, and objectives of each of its
diplomatic missions and posts worldwide, including an assessment of any
gaps that exist compared to other country strategic competitors. The
Secretary of State shall coordinate with other Department and Agency
heads having an overseas presence at any and all United States
diplomatic missions to ensure this assessment reflects all Federal
Government equities and viewpoints, and then certify in writing the
findings of this assessment.
SEC. 216. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE FULBRIGHT-HAYS
PROGRAM.
There are authorized to be appropriated, for the 5-year period
beginning on October 1, 2021, $105,500,000, to promote education,
training, research, and foreign language skills through the Fulbright-
Hays Program, in accordance with section 102(b) of the Mutual
Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2452(b)).
SEC. 217. SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND COUNTERING DISINFORMATION.
(a) Authorization of USAGM Appropriations.--There is authorized to
be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for the
United States Agency for Global Media, $100,000,000 for ongoing and new
programs to support local media, build independent media, combat PRC
disinformation inside and outside of China, invest in technology to
subvert censorship, and monitor and evaluate these programs.
(b) Support for Local Media.--The Secretary of State, acting
through the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor and the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development, acting through the Assistant Administrator
for Development, Democracy, and Innovation, shall support and train
journalists on investigative techniques necessary to ensure public
accountability, promote transparency, fight corruption, and support the
ability of the public to develop informed opinions about pressing
issues facing their countries.
(c) Internet Freedom Programs.--The Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor shall continue to support internet freedom programs.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated to the Department of State and United States Agency for
International Development, for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026,
$170,000,000 for ongoing and new programs in support of press freedom,
training, and protection of journalists. Amounts appropriated pursuant
to this authorization are authorized to remain available until expended
and shall be in addition to amounts otherwise authorized to be
appropriated to support press freedom, training, and protection of
journalists.
SEC. 218. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER.
(a) Finding.--Congress established the Global Engagement Center to
``direct, lead, and coordinate efforts'' of the Federal Government to
``recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and non-
state propaganda and disinformation globally''.
(b) Extension.--Section 1287(j) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended
by striking ``the date that is 8 years after the date of the enactment
of this Act'' and inserting ``December 31, 2027''.
(c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the Global
Engagement Center should expand its coordinating capacity of diplomatic
messaging through the exchange of liaison officers with Federal
departments and agencies that manage aspects of identifying and
countering foreign disinformation, including the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence and Special Operations Command's Joint MISO
Web Operations Center.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $150,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 for the Global
Engagement Center to counter foreign state and non-state sponsored
propaganda and disinformation.
Subtitle B--International Security Matters
SEC. 221. DEFINITIONS.
In this subtitle:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee
on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations
of the House of Representatives.
(2) Company.--The term ``company'' means any corporation,
company, limited liability company, limited partnership,
business trust, business association, or other similar entity.
(3) Other security forces.--The term ``other security
forces''--
(A) includes national security forces that conduct
maritime security; and
(B) does not include self-described militias or
paramilitary organizations.
SEC. 222. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND
TRAINING IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.
There is authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years
2022 through fiscal year 2026 for the Department of State, out of
amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for assistance under
chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2347 et seq.) (relating to international military education and
training (IMET) assistance), $45,000,000 for activities in the Indo-
Pacific region in accordance with this Act.
SEC. 223. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MARITIME FREEDOM OF OPERATIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS AND AIRSPACE OF THE INDO-PACIFIC
AND ON ARTIFICIAL LAND FEATURES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA.
(a) Sense of Congress.--Congress--
(1) condemns coercive and threatening actions or the use of
force to impede freedom of navigation operations in
international airspace by military or civilian aircraft, to
alter the status quo, or to destabilize the Indo-Pacific
region;
(2) urges the Government of the People's Republic of China
to refrain from implementing the declared East China Sea Air
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in the South
China Sea, where contrary to freedom of overflight in
international airspace, and to refrain from taking similar
provocative actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region;
(3) reaffirms that the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration
decision is final and legally binding on both parties and that
the People's Republic of China's claims to offshore resources
across most of the South China Sea are unlawful; and
(4) condemns the People's Republic of China for failing to
abide by the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling,
despite the PRC's obligations as a state party to the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United
States to--
(1) reaffirm its commitment and support for allies and
partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including to the mutual
defense treaties with Indo-Pacific allies as referenced
elsewhere in this Act;
(2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and
lawful use of the sea, or the airspace above it, that are
available to all nations, and oppose the militarization of new
and reclaimed land features in the South China Sea;
(3) continue certain policies with respect to the PRC
claims in the South China Sea, namely--
(A) that PRC claims in the South China Sea,
including to offshore resources across most of the
South China Sea, are unlawful;
(B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a maritime
claim vis-a-vis the Philippines in areas that the
Permanent Court of Arbitration found to be in the
Philippines' Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or on its
continental shelf;
(C) to reject any PRC claim to waters beyond a 12
nautical mile territorial sea derived from islands it
claims in the Spratly Islands; and
(D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial or
maritime claim to James Shoal;
(4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in
destabilizing activities, including environmentally harmful and
provocative land reclamation;
(5) ensure that disputes are managed without intimidation,
coercion, or force;
(6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust claims in
accordance with international law;
(7) uphold the principle that territorial and maritime
claims, including territorial waters or territorial seas, must
derive from land features and otherwise comport with
international law;
(8) oppose the imposition of new fishing regulations
covering disputed areas in the South China Sea, regulations
which have raised tensions in the region;
(9) support an effective Code of Conduct, if that Code of
Conduct reflects the interests of Southeast Asian claimant
states and does not serve as a vehicle for the People's
Republic of China to advance its unlawful maritime claims;
(10) reaffirm that an existing body of international rules
and guidelines, including the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972
(COLREGs), is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation
between the United States Armed Forces and the forces of other
countries, including the People's Republic of China;
(11) support the development of regional institutions and
bodies, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense
Minister's Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the expanded
ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build practical cooperation in the
region and reinforce the role of international law;
(12) encourage the deepening of partnerships with other
countries in the region for maritime domain awareness and
capacity building, as well as efforts by the United States
Government to explore the development of appropriate
multilateral mechanisms for a ``common operating picture'' in
the South China Sea among Southeast Asian countries that would
serve to help countries avoid destabilizing behavior and deter
risky and dangerous activities;
(13) oppose actions by any country to prevent any other
country from exercising its sovereign rights to the resources
of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf by
making claims to those areas in the South China Sea that have
no support in international law; and
(14) assure the continuity of operations by the United
States in the Indo-Pacific region, including, when appropriate,
in cooperation with partners and allies, to reaffirm freedom of
navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea.
SEC. 224. REPORT ON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT OF INDO-PACIFIC ALLIES AND
PARTNERS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Secretary of State should expand and strengthen
existing measures under the United States Conventional Arms
Transfer Policy to provide capabilities to allies and partners
consistent with agreed-on division of responsibility for
alliance roles, missions and capabilities, prioritizing allies
and partners in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with
United States strategic imperatives;
(2) the United States should design for export to Indo-
Pacific allies and partners capabilities critical to
maintaining a favorable military balance in the region,
including long-range precision fires, air and missile defense
systems, anti-ship cruise missiles, land attack cruise
missiles, conventional hypersonic systems, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and command and
control systems consistent with law, regulation, policy, and
international commitments;
(3) the United States should pursue, to the maximum extent
possible, anticipatory technology security and foreign
disclosure policy on the systems described in paragraph (2);
and
(4) the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Secretary of Defense, should--
(A) urge allies and partners to invest in
sufficient quantities of munitions to meet contingency
requirements and avoid the need for accessing United
States stocks in wartime; and
(B) cooperate with allies to deliver such
munitions, or when necessary, to increase allies'
capacity to produce such munitions.
(b) Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In this section, the term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives.
(c) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, with the
concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a report that describes
United States priorities for building more capable security
partners in the Indo-Pacific region.
(2) Matters to be included.--The report required under
paragraph (1) shall--
(A) provide a priority list of defense and military
capabilities that Indo-Pacific allies and partners must
possess for the United States to be able to achieve its
military objectives in the Indo-Pacific region;
(B) identify, from the list referred to in
subparagraph (A), the capabilities that are best
provided, or can only be provided, by the United
States;
(C) identify--
(i) actions required to expedite fielding
the capabilities identified in subparagraph
(B); and
(ii) steps needed to fully account for and
a plan to integrate all means of United States
foreign military sales, direct commercial
sales, security assistance, and all applicable
authorities of the Department of State and the
Department of Defense;
(D) assess the requirements for United States
security assistance, including International Military
Education and Training, in the Indo-Pacific region, as
a part of the means to deliver critical partner
capability requirements identified in subparagraph (B);
(E) assess the resources necessary to meet the
requirements for United States security assistance, and
identify resource gaps;
(F) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling
requirements for United States security assistance in
the Indo-Pacific region, including resources and
personnel limits, foreign legislative and policy
barriers, and factors related to specific partner
countries;
(G) identify limitations on the ability of the
United States to provide such capabilities, including
those identified under subparagraph (B), because of
existing United States treaty obligations, United
States policies, or other regulations;
(H) recommend improvements to the process for
developing requirements for United States partner
capabilities; and
(I) identify required jointly agreed
recommendations for infrastructure and posture, based
on any ongoing mutual dialogues.
(3) Form.--The report required under this subsection shall
be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.
Subtitle C--Multilateral Strategies to Bolster American Power
SEC. 231. FINDINGS ON MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT.
Congress finds the following:
(1) Every UN member state is legally required to finance
the UN's core budget in order to ensure that these missions are
properly resourced, and assessment rates are renegotiated every
three years by the UN General Assembly.
(2) While the United States is the largest single financial
contributor to the UN system, the current model is beneficial
because it requires all UN member states, no matter how big or
small, to help shoulder the UN's regular and peacekeeping
budgets at specified levels.
(3) Failing to meet our financial commitments to the UN
also empowers the PRC, which has raised our annual shortfalls
to claim we are not a reliable partner and is seeking to
leverage its own contributions to the regular budget and
peacekeeping in ways that run counter to United States
interests and values.
(4) The People's Republic of China is now the second
largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping, having gone
from an assessment rate of just 3 percent in 2008 to more than
15 percent today, and is the ninth largest troop-contributor to
UN missions, providing more personnel than the other four
permanent members of the Security Council combined.
(5) With greater engagement comes greater influence, and
PRC diplomats have sought to use their expanded clout to push
back against the human rights, civilian protection, and gender-
based violence aspects of UN peacekeeping mandates, using
United States funding shortfalls as a pretext.
(6) The PRC has also used its growing clout to fill key
posts at UN agencies: Chinese nationals currently occupy the
top posts of four of the UN's 15 specialized agencies, while
the United States occupies only one.
(7) From 2021 to 2022, there will be 15 elections for the
heads of UN specialized agencies and five for major UN funds
and programs. With the exception of the World Food Programme,
none are currently led by Americans.
(8) A 2020 Department of State Inspector General Inspection
found that the Bureau for International Organizations did not
have a standard operating procedure for tracking and promoting
the employment of American Citizens in the UN system, and their
recommendation to the department to establish one remains open.
SEC. 232. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON AMERICA'S MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT.
It is the policy of the United States that--
(1) the Special Representative of the United States to the
United Nations serves as a standing member of the cabinet;
(2) assessed dues to multilateral organizations be paid in
full in a timely fashion;
(3) Federal agencies utilize all the authorities under
section 3343 of title 5, United States Code, and subpart C of
title 5, Code of Federal Regulations: Detail and Transfer of
Federal Employees to International Organizations to detail or
transfer employees to relevant international organizations;
(4) the Secretary of State shall assist the Department of
State and other Federal agencies in carrying out paragraph (3)
to the fullest extent;
(5) the Secretary of State shall support qualified American
candidates in their bid to win election to UN-related
leadership positions; and
(6) the Secretary of State shall support the placement of
Junior Professional Officers (JPOs) sponsored by the United
States in UN-affiliated agencies.
SEC. 233. SUPPORT FOR AMERICANS AT THE UNITED NATIONS.
(a) Establishment.--The Secretary of State is authorized to
establish within the Department of State's Bureau of International
Organization Affairs (IO) an Office for American Citizens.
(b) Duties.--The office established under subsection (a) of this
section will be responsible for--
(1) advocating for the employment of American citizens by
all international organizations of which the United States is a
member, including the United Nations and any of its agencies,
offices, and other affiliated entities;
(2) coordinating the interagency support of non-American
candidates for leadership roles within all international
organizations of which the United States is a member, including
the United Nations and any of its agencies, offices, and other
affiliated entities, when--
(A) no American candidate has been nominated for
election; and
(B) it is determined that providing such support is
in the interest of the United States;
(3) establishing and implementing a standard operating
procedure for the promotion and efficient tracking of United
States citizen employment at the United Nations and other
international organizations that includes Mission Geneva;
(4) monitoring the pipeline of United Nations jobs and
identifying qualified Americans and other qualified nationals
to promote for these positions;
(5) tracking leadership changes in United Nations
secretariat, funds, programs, and agencies, and developing
strategies to ensure that coalitions of likeminded states are
assembled to ensure leadership races are not won by countries
that do not share United States interests;
(6) eliminating current barriers to the employment of
United States nationals in the United Nations Secretariat,
funds, programs, and agencies; and
(7) increasing the number of qualified United States
candidates for leadership and oversight positions at the United
Nations Secretariat, funds, programs, agencies, and at other
international organizations.
SEC. 234. REPORT ON AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State,
in consultation with the heads of other Federal departments and
agencies as appropriate, shall develop and submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on how many Federal employees are
currently detailed or transferred to an international organization
during the immediately preceding 12-month period and a one-time
strategy for increasing the number of Federal employees so detailed or
transferred.
(b) Matters To Be Included.--Each report required by subsection (a)
shall include the following:
(1) The number of Federal employees detailed or transferred
to an international organization under section 3343 of title 5,
United States Code, and subpart C of title 5, Code of Federal
Regulations: Detail and Transfer of Federal Employees to
International Organizations, and--
(A) an identification of the Federal agency from
which such employees were detailed or transferred; and
(B) an identification of the international
organizations to and from which such employees have
been detailed or transferred.
(2) A list of international organizations to and from which
the United States previously detailed or transferred Federal
employees.
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives; and
(2) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
Subtitle D--Regional Strategies To Bolster American Power
SEC. 241. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS
AROUND THE WORLD.
It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to strengthen alliances and partnerships with like-
minded countries around the globe; and
(2) to work in collaboration with such allies and
partners--
(A) to address significant diplomatic, economic,
and military challenges posed by the People's Republic
of China;
(B) to deter the People's Republic of China from
pursuing military aggression;
(C) to promote the peaceful resolution of
territorial disputes in accordance with international
law;
(D) to promote private sector-led long-term
economic development while countering efforts by the
Government of the People's Republic of China to
leverage predatory economic practices as a means of
political and economic coercion in the Indo-Pacific
region and beyond;
(E) to promote the values of democracy and human
rights, including through efforts to end the repression
by the People's Republic of China of political
dissidents, Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities,
Tibetan Buddhists, Christians, and other ethnic
minorities;
(F) to respond to the crackdown by the People's
Republic of China, in contravention of the commitments
made under the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984
and the Basic Law of Hong Kong, on the legitimate
aspirations of the people of Hong Kong; and
(G) to counter the Chinese Government's efforts to
spread disinformation in China and beyond with respect
to its response to COVID-19.
PART I--WESTERN HEMISPHERE
SEC. 242. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES-CANADA RELATIONS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States and Canada have a unique relationship
based on shared geography, extensive personal connections, deep
economic ties, mutual defense commitments, and a shared vision
to uphold democracy, human rights, and the rules based
international order established after World War II;
(2) the United States and Canada can better address the
People's Republic of China's economic, political, and security
influence through closer cooperation on counternarcotics,
environmental stewardship, transparent practices in public
procurement and infrastructure planning, the Arctic, energy and
connectivity issues, trade and commercial relations, bilateral
legal matters, and support for democracy, good governance, and
human rights;
(3) amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States and
Canada should maintain joint initiatives to address border
management, commercial and trade relations and infrastructure,
a shared approach with respect to the People's Republic of
China, and transnational challenges, including pandemics,
energy security, and environmental stewardship;
(4) the United States and Canada should enhance cooperation
to counter Chinese disinformation, influence operations,
economic espionage, and propaganda efforts;
(5) the People's Republic of China's infrastructure
investments, particularly in 5G telecommunications technology,
extraction of natural resources, and port infrastructure, pose
national security risks for the United States and Canada;
(6) the United States should share, as appropriate,
intelligence gathered regarding--
(A) Huawei's 5G capabilities; and
(B) the PRC government's intentions with respect to
5G expansion;
(7) the United States and Canada should continue to advance
collaborative initiatives to implement the January 9, 2020,
United States-Canada Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals
Development Collaboration; and
(8) the United States and Canada must prioritize
cooperation on continental defense and in the Arctic, including
by modernizing the North American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD) sensor architecture to provide effective warning and
tracking of threats by peer competitors, including long-range
missiles and high-precision weapons, to the Northern
Hemisphere.
SEC. 243. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA'S
ARBITRARY IMPRISONMENT OF CANADIAN CITIZENS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Government of the People's Republic of China's
apparent arbitrary detention and abusive treatment of Canadian
nationals Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig in apparent
retaliation for the Government of Canada's arrest of Meng
Wanzhou is deeply concerning;
(2) the Government of Canada has shown international
leadership by--
(A) upholding the rule of law and complying with
its international legal obligations, including those
pursuant to the Extradition Treaty Between the United
States of America and Canada, signed at Washington
December 3, 1971; and
(B) launching the Declaration Against Arbitrary
Detention in State-to-State Relations, which has been
endorsed by 57 countries and the European Union, and
reaffirms well-established prohibitions under
international human rights conventions against the
arbitrary detention of foreign nationals to be used as
leverage in state-to-state relations; and
(3) the United States continues to join the Government of
Canada in calling for the immediate release of Michael Spavor
and Michael Kovrig and for due process for Canadian national
Robert Schellenberg.
SEC. 244. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH CANADA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President should submit a strategy to the
appropriate congressional committees, and the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, that describes
how the United States will enhance cooperation with the Government of
Canada in managing relations with the PRC government.
(b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall--
(1) identify key policy points of convergence and
divergence between the United States and Canada in managing
relations with the People's Republic of China in the areas of
technology, trade, economic practices, cyber security, secure
supply chains and critical minerals, and illicit narcotics;
(2) include a description of United States development and
coordination efforts with Canadian counterparts to enhance the
cooperation between the United States and Canada with respect
to--
(A) managing economic relations with the People's
Republic of China;
(B) democracy and human rights in the People's
Republic of China;
(C) technology issues involving the People's
Republic of China;
(D) defense issues involving the People's Republic
of China; and
(E) international law enforcement and transnational
organized crime issues.
(3) detail diplomatic efforts and future plans to work with
Canada to counter the PRC's projection of an authoritarian
governing model around the world;
(4) detail diplomatic, defense, and intelligence
cooperation to date and future plans to support Canadian
efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to Huawei's 5G
technology;
(5) detail diplomatic and defense collaboration--
(A) to advance joint United States-Canadian
priorities for responsible stewardship in the Arctic
Region; and
(B) to counter the PRC's efforts to project
political, economic, and military influence into the
Arctic Region; and
(6) detail diplomatic efforts to work with Canada to track
and counter the PRC's attempts to exert influence across the
multilateral system.
(c) Form.--The strategy required under this section shall be
submitted in an unclassified form that can be made available to the
public, but may include a classified annex, if necessary.
(d) Consultation.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than every 180 days
thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall consult with the
appropriate congressional committees, and the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, regarding the
development and implementation of the strategy required under this
section.
SEC. 245. STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS, GOVERNANCE,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation, as
appropriate, with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of
Commerce, the Administrator of USAID, the Attorney General, the United
States Trade Representative, and the Chief Executive Officer of the
United States International Development Finance Corporation, shall
submit a multi-year strategy for increasing United States economic
competitiveness and promoting good governance, human rights, and the
rule of law in Latin American and Caribbean countries, particularly in
the areas of investment, equitable, inclusive, and sustainable
development, commercial relations, anti-corruption activities, and
infrastructure projects, to--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives;
(5) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives; and
(6) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(b) Additional Elements.--The strategy required under subsection
(a) shall include a plan of action, including benchmarks to achieve
measurable progress, to--
(1) enhance the technical capacity of countries in the
region to advance the sustainable and inclusive development of
equitable economies;
(2) reduce trade and non-tariff barriers between the
countries of the Americas;
(3) facilitate a more open, transparent, and competitive
environment for United States businesses in the region;
(4) establish frameworks or mechanisms to review long term
financial sustainability and security implications of foreign
investments in strategic sectors or services, including
transportation, communications, natural resources, and energy;
(5) establish competitive, transparent, and inclusive
infrastructure project selection and procurement processes that
promote transparency, supplier diversity, open competition,
financial sustainability, adherence to robust global standards,
and the employment of a diverse local workforce and management;
(6) strengthen legal structures critical to robust
democratic governance, fair competition, combatting corruption,
and ending impunity; and
(7) enhance transparent, affordable, and equitable access
to the internet and digital infrastructure in the Western
Hemisphere.
(c) Briefing Requirement.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the
Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United
States Trade Representative, and the leadership of the United States
International Development Finance Corporation, shall brief the
congressional committees listed in subsection (a) regarding the
implementation of this part, including examples of successes and
challenges.
SEC. 246. ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DEFENSE
SECTOR IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.
(a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives;
(5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives; and
(6) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives.
(b) Reporting Requirement.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Defense
Intelligence Agency, shall submit a report to the appropriate
congressional committees that assesses the nature, intent, and
impact to United States strategic interests of Chinese
diplomatic activity aimed at influencing the decisions,
procedures, and programs of multilateral organizations in Latin
America and the Caribbean, including the World Bank,
International Monetary Fund, Organization of American States,
and the Inter-American Development Bank.
(2) Defense sector.--The report required under paragraph
(1) shall include an assessment of the nature, intent, and
impact on United States strategic interests of Chinese military
activity in Latin America and the Caribbean, including military
education and training programs, weapons sales, and space-
related activities in the military or civilian spheres, such
as--
(A) the satellite and space control station the
People's Republic of China constructed in Argentina;
and
(B) defense and security cooperation carried out by
the People's Republic of China in Latin America and the
Caribbean, including sales of surveillance and
monitoring technology to governments in the region such
as Venezuela, Cuba, Ecuador, and Colombia, and the
potential use of such technologies as tools of Chinese
intelligence services.
(3) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form and shall include classified
annexes.
SEC. 247. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.
(a) In General.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the
Department of State $13,500,000 for the International Military
Education and Training Program for Latin America and the Caribbean for
each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026.
(b) Modernization.--The Secretary of State shall take steps to
modernize and strengthen the programs receiving funding under
subsection (a) to ensure that such programs are vigorous, substantive,
and the preeminent choice for international military education and
training for Latin American and Caribbean partners.
(c) Required Elements.--The programs referred to in subsection (a)
shall--
(1) provide training and capacity-building opportunities to
Latin American and Caribbean security services;
(2) provide practical skills and frameworks for--
(A) improving the functioning and organization of
security services in Latin America and the Caribbean;
(B) creating a better understanding of the United
States and its values; and
(C) using technology for maximum efficiency and
organization; and
(3) promote and ensure that security services in Latin
America and the Caribbean respect civilian authority and
operate in compliance with international norms, standards, and
rules of engagement, including a respect for human rights, and
full compliance with Leahy Law requirements.
(d) Limitation.--Security assistance under this section is subject
to limitations as enshrined in the requirements of section 620M of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d).
SEC. 248. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE
CARIBBEAN REGARDING ACCOUNTABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE
RISKS OF PERVASIVE SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Government of the People's Republic of China is
exporting its model for internal security and state control of
society through advanced technology and artificial
intelligence; and
(2) the inclusion of communication networks and
communications supply chains with equipment and services from
companies with close ties to or that are susceptible to
pressure from governments or security services without reliable
legal checks on governmental powers can lead to breaches of
citizens' private information, increased censorship, violations
of human rights, and harassment of political opponents.
(b) Diplomatic Engagement.--The Secretary of State shall conduct
diplomatic engagement with governments and civil society organizations
in Latin America and the Caribbean to--
(1) help identify and mitigate the risks to civil liberties
posed by technologies and services described in subsection (a);
and
(2) offer recommendations on ways to mitigate such risks.
(c) Internet Freedom Programs.--The Chief Executive Officer of the
United States Agency for Global Media, who may work through the Open
Technology Fund, and the Secretary of State, working through the Bureau
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor's Internet Freedom and Business
and Human Rights Section, shall expand and prioritize efforts to
provide anti-censorship technology and services to journalists in Latin
America and the Caribbean, in order to enhance their ability to safely
access or share digital news and information.
(d) Support for Civil Society.--The Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development, shall work through nongovernmental
organizations to--
(1) support and promote programs that support internet
freedom and the free flow of information online in Latin
America and the Caribbean;
(2) protect open, interoperable, secure, and reliable
access to internet in Latin America and the Caribbean;
(3) provide integrated support to civil society for
technology, digital safety, policy and advocacy, and applied
research programs in Latin America and the Caribbean;
(4) train journalists and civil society leaders in Latin
America and the Caribbean on investigative techniques necessary
to ensure public accountability and prevent government
overreach in the digital sphere;
(5) assist independent media outlets and journalists in
Latin America and the Caribbean to build their own capacity and
develop high-impact, in-depth news reports covering governance
and human rights topics;
(6) provide training for journalists and civil society
leaders on investigative techniques necessary to improve
transparency and accountability in government and the private
sector;
(7) provide training on investigative reporting of
incidents of corruption and unfair trade, business and
commercial practices;
(8) assist nongovernmental organizations to strengthen
their capacity to monitor the activities described in paragraph
(7); and
(9) identify local resources to support the preponderance
of activities that would be carried out under this subsection.
SEC. 249. CARIBBEAN ENERGY INITIATIVE AS ALTERNATIVE TO CHINA'S BELT
AND ROAD INITIATIVE.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The countries of the Caribbean are heavily reliant upon
imported oil to provide for approximately 90 percent of their
energy production.
(2) The level of dependence is even higher including--
(A) Jamaica, which relies on oil for 95.9 percent
of its electricity;
(B) Barbados, which relies on oil for 96 percent of
its electricity;
(C) the Virgin Islands, which relies on oil for
nearly 100 percent of its electricity; and
(D) St. Lucia, which relies on oil for 100 percent
of its electricity.
(3) Overreliance on imported fossil fuels has had a
detrimental effect on economic development, growth, and
competitiveness in the Caribbean.
(4) Since 1970, more than 80 percent of Caribbean coral
reefs have been lost due to coastal development and pollution.
Soot particulates and climate change caused by burning fossil
fuels have seriously damaged coral reefs, which are a
significant source of tourism dollars, fishing, biodiversity,
and natural beauty.
(5) Air pollution caused by burning oil for electricity--
(A) has serious health impacts in the form of
higher rates of asthma and other lung ailments; and
(B) can also exacerbate climate change.
(6) The Caribbean region is particularly vulnerable to sea
level rise and stronger storms.
(7) Between 2005 and 2018, the dependence of the countries
of the Caribbean on oil was perpetuated by the Venezuelan-led
Petrocaribe oil alliance, which--
(A) offered preferential terms for oil sales; and
(B) supplies some countries with up to 40 percent
of their energy production needs.
(8) The ongoing domestic economic crisis and political
turmoil in Venezuela has forced the Government of Venezuela to
retract its commitments to the Petrocaribe oil alliance and
step away as a regional power. Only Cuba still receives
preferential Petrocaribe pricing on fuel exports from
Venezuela, while other Petrocaribe member countries are
experiencing a destabilized flow of oil.
(9) China has spent more than $244,000,000,000 on energy
projects worldwide since 2000, 25 percent of which was spent in
Latin America and the Caribbean. Although the majority of this
spending was for oil, gas, and coal, China has also been the
largest investor in clean energy globally for almost a decade.
(10) The World Bank estimates that the Caribbean will need
$12,000,000,000 in power investments through 2035.
(11) Renewable energy technology costs have decreased
dramatically in recent years, offering a more viable economic
alternative for energy production. Solar energy prices have
fallen by 80 percent since 2008, causing significant market
growth, and according to data released by the International
Renewable Energy Agency, \1/3\ of global power capacity is
based in renewable energy.
(12) In 2016, the International Monetary Fund estimated
that transportation accounted for 36 percent of the total
primary energy consumed in the Caribbean subregion.
(13) According to the United Nations Environment Programme,
Latin America and the Caribbean could achieve annual savings of
$621,000,000,000 and a reduction of 1,100,000,000 tons of
CO<INF>2</INF> by 2050 if the region's energy and transport
sectors reach net zero emissions.
(14) The Caribbean has an abundance of onshore and offshore
resources needed for renewable energy, including sun, wind,
geothermal, and some hydropower production capacity.
(15) The United States Government is deeply engaged in
providing technical and policy assistance to countries of the
Caribbean on energy issues through--
(A) the Energy and Climate Partnership of the
Americas;
(B) Connecting the Americas 2022; and
(C) bilateral assistance programs.
(16) On February 19, 2014, at the North American Leaders'
Summit, President Barack Obama, Prime Minister Stephen Harper
of Canada, and President Enrique Pena Nieto of Mexico
reaffirmed their commitment to bring affordable, reliable, and
increasingly renewable power to the Caribbean, while opening
wider markets for clean energy and green technology.
(17) On June 19, 2015, President Barack Obama announced the
Caribbean Energy Security Initiative, which would partner with
individual countries--
(A) to transform its energy sector;
(B) to work to increase access to finance, good
governance, and diversification; and
(C) to maximize the impact of existing donor
effects.
(18) On May 4, 2016, at the United States-Caribbean-Central
American Energy Summit, the energy security task force formally
launched the Caribbean Sustainable Energy Roadmap and Strategy
(C-SERMS) as a mechanism to manage regional coordination and
action on energy security and agreed to expand the regional
market and transmission system.
(19) The United States has an important opportunity--
(A) to deepen this engagement;
(B) to work as a partner with Caribbean countries
on a more regional and coordinated basis;
(C) to help ease the region's dependence on
imported oil; and
(D) to promote affordable alternative sources of
energy.
(b) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Caribbean countries.--The term ``Caribbean countries''
means countries in the Caribbean region, but does not including
Cuba or Venezuela.
(2) Caribbean governments.--The term ``Caribbean
governments'' means the national governments of the Caribbean
countries.
(c) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to
help Caribbean countries--
(1) achieve greater energy security and improve domestic
energy resource mobilization;
(2) lower their dependence on imported fuels;
(3) eliminate the use of diesel, heavy fuel oil, other
petroleum products, and coal for the generation of electricity;
(4) increase production of renewable energy; and
(5) meet the greenhouse gas mitigation goals of their
national determined contributions to the Paris Agreement.
(d) Strategy.--
(1) Submission.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Administrator of USAID, shall submit a
multi-year strategy to the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives that describes how the Department of State will
promote regional cooperation with Caribbean countries--
(A) to lower dependence on imported fuels, grow
domestic clean energy production in the region,
strengthen regional energy security, and lower energy
sector greenhouse gas emissions;
(B) to decrease dependence on oil in the
transportation sector;
(C) to increase energy efficiency, energy
conservation, and investment in alternatives to
imported fuels;
(D) to improve grid reliability and modernize
electricity transmission networks;
(E) to advance deployment of innovative solutions
to expand community and individuals' access to
electricity;
(F) to help reform energy markets to encourage good
regulatory governance and to promote a climate of
private sector investment; and
(G) to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions from the
energy and transportation sector.
(2) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a)
shall include--
(A) a thorough review and inventory of United
States Government activities that are being carried out
bilaterally, regionally, and in coordination with
multilateral institutions--
(i) to promote energy and climate security
in the Caribbean region; and
(ii) to reduce the region's reliance on oil
for electricity generation;
(B) opportunities for marshaling regional
cooperation--
(i) to overcome market barriers resulting
from the small size of Caribbean energy
markets;
(ii) to address the high transportation and
infrastructure costs faced by Caribbean
countries;
(iii) to ensure greater donor coordination
between governments, multilateral institutions,
multilateral banks, and private investors; and
(iv) to expand regional financing
opportunities to allow for lower cost energy
entrepreneurship;
(C) measures to ensure that each Caribbean
government has--
(i) an independent utility regulator or
equivalent;
(ii) affordable access by third party
investors to its electrical grid with minimal
regulatory interference;
(iii) effective energy efficiency and
energy conservation;
(iv) programs to address technical and
nontechnical issues;
(v) a plan to eliminate major market
distortions;
(vi) cost-reflective tariffs; and
(vii) no tariffs or other taxes on clean
energy solutions; and
(D) recommendations for how United States policy,
technical, and economic assistance can be used in the
Caribbean region--
(i) to advance renewable energy development
and the incorporation of renewable technologies
into existing energy grids and the development
and deployment of micro-grids where appropriate
and feasible to boost energy security and
reliability, particularly to underserved
communities;
(ii) to increase the generation of clean
energy sufficiently to replace and allow for
the retirement of obsolete fossil fuel energy
generation units in Caribbean countries;
(iii) to create regional financing
opportunities to allow for lower cost energy
entrepreneurship;
(iv) to deploy transaction advisors in the
region to help attract private investment and
break down any market or regulatory barriers;
and
(v) to establish a mechanism for each host
government to have access to independent legal
advice--
(I) to speed the development of
energy-related contracts; and
(II) to better protect the
interests of Caribbean governments and
citizens.
(3) Consultation.--In devising the strategy under this
subsection, the Secretary of State shall work with the
Secretary of Energy and shall consult with--
(A) the Secretary of the Interior;
(B) the Secretary of Commerce;
(C) the Secretary of the Treasury;
(D) the Board of Directors of the Export-Import
Bank of the United States;
(E) the Board of Directors of the Development
Finance Corporation;
(F) the Administrator of the United States Agency
for International Development;
(G) the Caribbean governments;
(H) the Inter-American Development Bank;
(I) the World Bank Group; and
(J) the Caribbean Electric Utility Services
Corporation.
SEC. 250. U.S.-CARIBBEAN RESILIENCE PARTNERSHIP.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States shares with the Caribbean a
collective vulnerability to natural disasters, which affects
the lives and the economies of our citizens.
(2) The April 9, 2021, eruption of the La Soufriere volcano
is another reminder of the devastation caused by the many
natural disasters the Caribbean confronts each year and the
region's vulnerability to external shocks. Hurricane Dorian,
the largest storm to hit the region, wiped out large parts of
the northern Bahamas in 2019, and Hurricanes Maria and Irma
devastated multiple islands across the region in 2017,
including Puerto Rico. According to IMF research, of the 511
plus disasters worldwide to hit small states since 1950, around
two-thirds (324) have been in the Caribbean.
(3) This region is seven times more likely to experience a
natural disaster than elsewhere. And, when one occurs, it will
incur as much as six times more damage.
(4) Extreme weather events and other environmental impacts
will only worsen over the coming years, and if not addressed,
we will see only increasing economic shocks on these countries,
driving irregular migration.
(5) While the United States has considerable expertise and
capacity in assisting countries with disaster response, there
remains a need for stronger partnerships that build regional
resilience through efficient and interoperable platforms,
protecting people and speeding recovery.
(6) The People's Republic of China has dramatically
increased its engagement in the Caribbean in the past five
years, including offering loans and grants related to disaster
response and resilience and sought to acquire property rights
in the Caribbean that would be detrimental to United States
national security interests.
(7) In 2019, the United States launched a new U.S.-
Caribbean Resilience Partnership to deepen cooperation and
investment to strengthen our disaster resilience throughout the
Caribbean region, including--
(A) to streamline early warning response networks
and formalize communication channels;
(B) to enhance, encourage, and work collaboratively
on further developing aviation disaster resilience
plans and partnerships;
(C) to prioritize regional technical exchange in
energy planning, risk reduction, and resilience;
(D) to increase communications network
interoperability between Caribbean partners and the
United States;
(E) to utilize storm surge mapping data and share
real-time information in preparation for potential
damage resulting from tropical cyclones and tsunamis;
(F) to use meteorological services to strengthen
and deepen physical and communications infrastructure,
data collection networks, and human and technical
capacity throughout the region, as well as interactions
with the public;
(G) to understand that while the use of
international and military and civil defense assets in
disaster response may only be considered as a last
resort, when local, national, and international
civilian capabilities are overwhelmed, civil-military
coordination should occur, in support of the affected
nation;
(H) to develop a framework that would govern the
deployment of international military and civil defense
assets in disaster response when local, national, and
international civilian capabilities are overwhelmed, in
support of the affected nation;
(I) to seek common mechanisms for ensuring rapid
disaster response and recovery, including waiving or
expediting diplomatic clearances, waiving of or
reducing customs fees, streamlining overflight and
airspace clearance, and ensuring that the first
responders have the ability to rapidly respond to
disasters in other countries;
(J) to promote the integration and coordination of
regional response mechanisms in the Caribbean,
including through the Caribbean Disaster Emergency
Management Agency, the Regional Security System, United
States Government Agencies, and allies in ways that
facilitate more effective and efficient planning,
mitigation, response, and resilience to natural
disasters;
(K) to share best practices in improved building
codes with national disaster organizations, including
building better programs, at regional, national and
community levels; and
(L) to promote community-based disaster
preparedness and mitigation activities, particularly in
underserved communities, with the aim of increasing
broad public participation and resilience.
(b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to help
Caribbean countries--
(1) increase their resilience and adapt to natural
disasters and the impacts of severe weather events and a
changing environment;
(2) partner with United States Federal, State, and local
agencies and engage in technical cooperation, dialogue, and
assistance activities;
(3) harmonize standards and practices related to paragraphs
(1) and (2) to promote increased investment and integration;
(4) increase investment from United States companies in the
Caribbean on resilience-building, adaptation, and climate-
related mitigation efforts;
(5) promote regional cooperation and ensure efforts by the
United States, Caribbean countries, and international partners
complement each other; and
(6) further assist with the efforts listed under subsection
(a)(7) above.
(c) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State in coordination with
other departments and agencies shall submit a multi-year strategy to
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that describes how the
Department of State will achieve the policy described in subsection (b)
above.
(d) Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated for
U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership activities, programs, technical
assistance, and engagement the following:
(1) $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2022.
(2) $25,000,000 for fiscal year 2023.
(3) $30,000,000 for fiscal year 2024 and thereafter.
(e) Reporting and Monitoring.--
(1) Of the appropriated amount each fiscal year, at least
five percent of all programming funding allocation must support
and be directed toward reporting, monitoring, and assessment of
effectiveness.
(2) The Department of State will ensure that at least 20
percent of appropriations for the U.S.-Caribbean Resilience
Partnership directly support the training of, engagement with,
collaboration with, and exchange of expertise on resilience
between United States Federal, State, and local officials and
their Caribbean government counterparts. Funding should also
support as appropriate increased academic, civil society,
media, and private sector engagement in the fields of
resilience-building, adaptation, and mitigation.
PART II--TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS
SEC. 255. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States, European Union, and European
countries are close partners, sharing values grounded in
democracy, human rights, transparency, and the rules-based
international order established after World War II;
(2) without a common approach by the United States,
European Union, and European countries on connectivity, trade,
transnational problems, and support for democracy and human
rights, the People's Republic of China will continue to
increase its economic, political, and security leverage in
Europe;
(3) the People's Republic of China's deployment of
assistance to European countries following the COVID-19
outbreak showcased a coercive approach to aid, but it also
highlighted Europe's deep economic ties to the People's
Republic of China;
(4) as European states seek to recover from the economic
toll of the COVID-19 outbreak, the United States must stand in
partnership with Europe to support our collective economic
recovery, reinforce our collective national security, and
defend shared values;
(5) the United States, European Union, and European
countries should coordinate on joint strategies to diversify
reliance on supply chains away from the People's Republic of
China, especially in the medical and pharmaceutical sectors;
(6) the United States, European Union, and European
countries should leverage their respective economic innovation
capabilities to support the global economic recovery from the
COVID-19 recession and draw a contrast with the centralized
economy of the People's Republic of China;
(7) the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union
should accelerate efforts to de-escalate their trade disputes,
including negotiating a United States-European Union trade
agreement that benefits workers and the broader economy in both
the United States and European Union;
(8) the United States, European Union, and Japan should
continue trilateral efforts to address economic challenges
posed by the People's Republic of China;
(9) the United States, European Union, and countries of
Europe should enhance cooperation to counter PRC
disinformation, influence operations, and propaganda efforts;
(10) the United States and European nations share serious
concerns with the repressions being supported and executed by
the Government of the People's Republic of China, and should
continue implementing measures to address the Government of the
People's Republic of China's specific abuses in Tibet, Hong
Kong, and Xinjiang, and should build joint mechanisms and
programs to prevent the export of China's authoritarian
governance model to countries around the world;
(11) the United States and European nations should remain
united in their shared values against attempts by the
Government of the People's Republic of China at the United
Nations and other multilateral organizations to promote efforts
that erode the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, like the
``community of a shared future for mankind'' and
``democratization of international relations'';
(12) the People's Republic of China's infrastructure
investments around the world, particularly in 5G
telecommunications technology and port infrastructure, could
threaten democracy across Europe and the national security of
key countries;
(13) as appropriate, the United States should share
intelligence with European allies and partners on Huawei's 5G
capabilities and the intentions of the Government of the
People's Republic of China with respect to 5G expansion in
Europe;
(14) the European Union's Investment Screening Regulation,
which came into force in October 2020, is a welcome
development, and member states should closely scrutinize PRC
investments in their countries through their own national
investment screening measures;
(15) the President should actively engage the European
Union on the implementation of the Export Control Reform Act
regulations and to better harmonize United States and European
Union policies with respect to export controls;
(16) the President should strongly advocate for the listing
of more items and technologies to restrict dual use exports
controlled at the National Security and above level to the
People's Republic of China under the Wassenaar Arrangement;
(17) the United States should explore the value of
establishing a body akin to the Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) that would specifically
coordinate United States and European Union export control
policies with respect to limiting exports of sensitive
technologies to the People's Republic of China; and
(18) the United States should work with counterparts in
Europe to--
(A) evaluate United States and European
overreliance on goods originating in the People's
Republic of China, including in the medical and
pharmaceutical sectors, and develop joint strategies to
diversify supply chains;
(B) counter PRC efforts to use COVID-19-related
assistance as a coercive tool to pressure developing
countries by offering relevant United States and
European expertise and assistance; and
(C) leverage the United States and European private
sectors to advance the post-COVID-19 economic recovery.
SEC. 256. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION WITH RESPECT TO
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall brief the Committee on
Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of
the House of Representatives on a strategy for how the United States
will enhance cooperation with the European Union, NATO, and European
partner countries with respect to the People's Republic of China.
(b) Elements.--The briefing required by subsection (a) shall do the
following:
(1) Identify the senior Senate-confirmed Department of
State official that leads United States efforts to cooperate
with the European Union, NATO, and European partner countries
to advance a shared approach with respect to the People's
Republic of China.
(2) Identify key policy points of convergence and
divergence between the United States and European partners with
respect to the People's Republic of China in the areas of
technology, trade, and economic practices.
(3) Describe efforts to advance shared interests with
European counterparts on--
(A) economic challenges with respect to the
People's Republic of China;
(B) democracy and human rights challenges with
respect to the People's Republic of China;
(C) technology issues with respect to the People's
Republic of China;
(D) defense issues with respect to the People's
Republic of China; and
(E) developing a comprehensive strategy to respond
to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) established by
the Government of the People's Republic of China.
(4) Describe the coordination mechanisms among key regional
and functional bureaus within the Department of State and
Department of Defense tasked with engaging with European
partners on the People's Republic of China.
(5) Detail diplomatic efforts up to the date of the
briefing and future plans to work with European partners to
counter the Government of the People's Republic of China's
advancement of an authoritarian governance model around the
world.
(6) Detail the diplomatic efforts made up to the date of
the briefing and future plans to support European efforts to
identify cost-effective alternatives to Huawei's 5G technology.
(7) Detail how United States public diplomacy tools,
including the Global Engagement Center of the Department of
State, will coordinate efforts with counterpart entities within
the European Union to counter Chinese propaganda.
(8) Describe the staffing and budget resources the
Department of State dedicates to engagement between the United
States and the European Union on the People's Republic of China
and provide an assessment of out-year resource needs to execute
the strategy.
(9) Detail diplomatic efforts to work with European
partners to track and counter Chinese attempts to exert
influence across multilateral fora, including at the World
Health Organization.
(c) Form.--The briefing required by section (a) shall be
classified.
(d) Consultation.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 3 years, the
Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate congressional
committees regarding the development and implementation of the elements
described in subsection (b).
SEC. 257. ENHANCING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION ON PROMOTING PRIVATE
SECTOR FINANCE.
(a) In General.--The President should work with transatlantic
partners to build on the agreement among the Development Finance
Corporation, FinDev Canada, and the European Development Finance
Institutions (called the DFI Alliance) to enhance coordination on
shared objectives to foster private sector-led development and provide
market-based alternatives to state-directed financing in emerging
markets, particularly as related to the People's Republic of China's
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including by integrating efforts such
as--
(1) the European Union Strategy on Connecting Europe and
Asia;
(2) the Three Seas Initiative and Three Seas Initiative
Fund;
(3) the Blue Dot Network among the United States, Japan,
and Australia; and
(4) a European Union-Japan initiative that has leveraged
$65,000,000,000 for infrastructure projects and emphasizes
transparency standards.
(b) Standards.--The United States and the European Union should
coordinate and develop a strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation
with the OECD and the Paris Club on ensuring the highest possible
standards for Belt and Road Initiative contracts and terms with
developing countries.
SEC. 258. REPORT AND BRIEFING ON COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND IRAN AND
BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA.
(a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Select
Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance,
and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the
Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Financial
Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b) Report and Briefing Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the
Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and such
other heads of Federal agencies as the Director considers
appropriate, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a
report and brief the appropriate committees of Congress on
cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the
Islamic Republic of Iran and between the People's Republic of
China and the Russian Federation.
(2) Contents.--The report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall include the following elements:
(A) An identification of major areas of diplomatic
energy, infrastructure, banking, financial, economic,
military, and space cooperation--
(i) between the People's Republic of China
and the Islamic Republic of Iran; and
(ii) between the People's Republic of China
and the Russian Federation.
(B) An assessment of the effect of the COVID-19
pandemic on such cooperation.
(C) An assessment of the effect that United States
compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) starting in January 14, 2016, and United States
withdrawal from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, had on the
cooperation described in subparagraph (A)(i).
(D) An assessment of the effect on the cooperation
described in subparagraph (A)(i) that would be had by
the United States reentering compliance with the JCPOA
or a successor agreement and the effect of the United
States not reentering compliance with the JCPOA or
reaching a successor agreement.
(3) Form.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(c) Sense of Congress on Sharing With Allies and Partners.--It is
the sense of Congress that the Director of National Intelligence and
the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies should
share the findings of the report submitted under subsection (b) with
important allies and partners of the United States, as appropriate.
PART III--SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA
SEC. 261. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States should continue to stand with friends
and partners, while also working to establish new partners in
South and Central Asia as they contend with efforts by the
Government of the People's Republic of China to interfere in
their respective political systems and encroach upon their
sovereign territory; and
(2) the United States should reaffirm its commitment to the
Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership with India and
further deepen bilateral defense consultations and
collaboration with India commensurate with its status as a
major defense partner.
SEC. 262. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the Committee on
Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of
the House of Representatives a strategy for how the United States will
engage with the countries of South and Central Asia, including through
the C5+1 mechanism, with respect to the People's Republic of China.
(b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall
include the following elements:
(1) A detailed description of the security and economic
challenges that the People's Republic of China poses to the
countries of South and Central Asia, including border disputes
with South and Central Asian countries that border the People's
Republic of China, PRC investments in land and sea ports,
transportation infrastructure, and energy projects across the
region.
(2) A detailed description of United States efforts to
provide alternatives to PRC investment in infrastructure and
other sectors in South and Central Asia.
(3) A detailed description of bilateral and regional
efforts to work with countries in South Asia on strategies to
build resilience against PRC efforts to interfere in their
political systems and economies.
(4) A detailed description of United States diplomatic
efforts to work with the Government of Afghanistan on
addressing the challenges posed by PRC investment in the Afghan
mineral sector.
(5) A detailed description of United States diplomatic
efforts with the Government of Pakistan with respect to matters
relevant to the People's Republic of China, including
investments by the People's Republic of China in Pakistan
through the Belt and Road Initiative.
(6) In close consultation with the Government of India,
identification of areas where the United States Government can
provide diplomatic and other support as appropriate for India's
efforts to address economic and security challenges posed by
the People's Republic of China in the region.
(7) A description of the coordination mechanisms among key
regional and functional bureaus within the Department of State
and Department of Defense tasked with engaging with the
countries of South and Central Asia on issues relating to the
People's Republic of China.
(8) A description of the efforts being made by Federal
departments and agencies, including the Department of State,
the United States Agency for International Development, the
Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, and the
Office of the United States Trade Representative, to help the
nations of South and Central Asia develop trade and commerce
links that will help those nations diversify their trade away
from the People's Republic of China.
(9) A detailed description of United States diplomatic
efforts with Central Asian countries, Turkey, and any other
countries with significant populations of Uyghurs and other
ethnic minorities fleeing persecution in the People's Republic
of China to press those countries to refrain from deporting
ethnic minorities to the People's Republic of China, protect
ethnic minorities from intimidation by Chinese government
authorities, and protect the right to the freedoms of assembly
and expression.
(c) Form.--The strategy required under section (a) shall be
submitted in an unclassified form that can be made available to the
public, but may include a classified annex as necessary.
(d) Consultation.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and not less than annually thereafter for 5
years, the Secretary of State shall consult with the Committee on
Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee
on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee of Foreign Affairs,
the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of
the House of Representatives regarding the development and
implementation of the strategy required under subsection (a).
SEC. 263. INDIAN OCEAN REGION STRATEGIC REVIEW.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Indian Ocean region is a vitally important part of
the Indo-Pacific where the United States has political,
economic, and security interests.
(2) The United States has an interest in working with
partners in the Indo-Pacific, including India, Japan, and
Australia, to address regional governance, economic
connectivity, and security challenges including threats to
freedom of navigation.
(b) Statement of Policy.--As a part of the United States engagement
in the Indo-Pacific, it shall be the policy of the United States to
strengthen engagement with the countries in the Indian Ocean region,
including with governments, civil society, and private sectors in such
countries to--
(1) promote United States political engagement with such
region, including through active participation in regional
organizations, and strengthened diplomatic relations with
United States partners in such region;
(2) enhance United States economic connectivity and
commercial exchange with such region;
(3) defend freedom of navigation in such region from
security challenges, including related to piracy;
(4) support the ability of governments and organizations in
such region to respond to natural disasters;
(5) support and facilitate the role of regional allies and
partners as net providers of security to such region and as
partners to the United States in addressing security challenges
in such region, including through assistance to such allies and
partners to build capacity in maritime security and maritime
domain awareness;
(6) continue to build the United States-India relationship
in order to regularize security cooperation through the
negotiation of agreements concerning access, communication, and
navigation, including through foundational agreements; and
(7) promote cooperation with United States allies in the
Indo-Pacific, including Japan and Australia, and major defense
partners, including India, and NATO allies, including the
United Kingdom and France, to support a rules-based order in
such region.
(c) Strategy.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a multi-year strategy for United
States engagement to support United States interests in the
Indian Ocean region. Such strategy shall--
(A) define United States political, economic, and
security interests in the Indian Ocean region;
(B) outline challenges to the interests of the
United States in such region;
(C) outline efforts to improve cooperation between
the United States and members of the Quad, including
India, Japan, and Australia, through coordination in
diplomacy and development priorities, joint military
exercises and operations, and other activities that
promote United States political, economic, and security
interests;
(D) outline efforts to support economic
connectivity in such region, including through the
United States-India-Japan Trilateral Infrastructure
Working Group, the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, and
other efforts to expand and enhance connectivity across
the Indo-Pacific, including with the countries of
Southeast Asia, that maintain high standards of
investment and support for civil society and people-to-
people connectivity;
(E) describe how the United States can engage with
regional intergovernmental organizations and entities,
including the Indian Ocean Rim Association, to promote
United States political, economic, and security
interests in such region;
(F) review the United States diplomatic posture in
such region, including an assessment of United States
diplomatic engagement in countries without a permanent
United States embassy or diplomatic mission, and an
assessment of ways to improve the cooperation with the
Maldives, the Seychelles, and Comoros;
(G) review United States diplomatic agreements with
countries in such region that facilitate United States
military operations in such region, including bilateral
and multilateral agreements, and describe efforts to
expand United States cooperation with such countries
through the negotiation of additional agreements; and
(H) include a security assistance strategy for such
region that outlines priorities, objectives, and
actions for United States security assistance efforts
to governments of countries in such region to promote
United States political, economic, and security
interests in such region.
(2) Inclusion.--The strategy required under paragraph (1)
may be submitted as a part of any other strategy relating to
the Indo-Pacific.
(3) Report on implementation.--Not later than one year
after the submission of the strategy required under paragraph
(1) and one year thereafter, the Secretary of State shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on
progress made toward implementing such strategy.
(d) United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission.--
(1) In general.--Subparagraph (E) of section 1238(c)(2) of
the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2001 (22 U.S.C. 7002(c)(2)) is amended--
(A) by inserting ``, including in the Indian Ocean
region'' after ``deployments of the People's Republic
of China military''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following new
sentence: ``In this subparagraph, the term `Indian
Ocean region' means the Indian Ocean, including the
Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, and the littoral
areas surrounding the Indian Ocean.''.
(2) Effective date.--The amendments made by paragraph (1)
shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and
apply beginning with the first report required under section
1238 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2001 (as amended by such paragraph) that is
submitted after such date.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on
Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations
and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.
(2) Indian ocean region.--The term ``Indian Ocean region''
means the Indian Ocean, including the Arabian Sea and the Bay
of Bengal, and the littoral areas surrounding the Indian Ocean.
PART IV--AFRICA
SEC. 271. ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY ACTIVITY OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN AFRICA.
(a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(b) Intelligence Assessment.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in
coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a report that assesses the nature
and impact of the People's Republic of China's political, economic,
sociocultural, and security sector activity in Africa, and its impact
on United States strategic interests, including--
(1) the amount and impact of direct investment, loans,
development financing, oil-for-loans deals, and other
preferential trading arrangements;
(2) the involvement of PRC state-owned enterprises in
Africa;
(3) the amount of African debt held by the People's
Republic of China;
(4) the involvement of PRC private security, technology and
media companies in Africa;
(5) the scale and impact of PRC arms sales to African
countries;
(6) the scope of Chinese investment in and control of
African energy resources and minerals critical for emerging and
foundational technologies;
(7) an analysis on the linkages between Beijing's aid and
assistance to African countries and African countries
supporting PRC geopolitical goals in international fora;
(8) the methods, tools, and tactics used to facilitate
illegal and corrupt activity, including trade in counterfeit
and illicit goods, to include smuggled extractive resources and
wildlife products, between Africa and China;
(9) the methods and techniques that the People's Republic
of China uses to exert undue influence on African governments
and facilitate corrupt activity in Africa, including through
the CCP's party-to-party training program, and to influence
African multilateral organizations; and
(10) an analysis of the soft power, cultural and
educational activities undertaken by the PRC and CCP to seek to
expand its influence in Africa.
SEC. 272. INCREASING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE UNITED STATES IN
AFRICA.
(a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Appropriations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Appropriations, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the
House of Representatives.
(b) Strategy Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in
consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of
Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative,
the Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, and the leadership of the United States International
Development Finance Corporation, submit to the appropriate committees
of Congress a report setting forth a multi-year strategy for increasing
United States economic competitiveness and promoting improvements in
the investment climate in Africa, including through support for
democratic institutions, the rule of law, including property rights,
and for improved transparency, anti-corruption and governance.
(c) Elements.--The strategy submitted pursuant to subsection (a)
shall include--
(1) a description and assessment of barriers to United
States investment in Africa for United States businesses,
including a clear identification of the different barriers
facing small-sized and medium-sized businesses, and an
assessment of whether existing programs effectively address
such barriers;
(2) a description and assessment of barriers to African
diaspora investment in Africa, and recommendations to overcome
such barriers;
(3) an identification of the economic sectors in the United
States that have a comparative advantage in African markets;
(4) a determination of priority African countries for
promoting two-way trade and investment and an assessment of
additional foreign assistance needs, including democracy and
governance and rule of law support, to promote a conducive
operating environment in priority countries;
(5) an identification of opportunities for strategic
cooperation with European allies on trade and investment in
Africa, and for establishing a dialogue on trade, security,
development, and environmental issues of mutual interest; and
(6) a plan to regularly host a United States-Africa Leaders
Summit to promote two-way trade and investment, strategic
engagement, and security in Africa.
(d) Assessment of United States Government Human Resources
Capacity.--The Comptroller General of the United States shall--
(1) conduct a review of the number of Foreign Commercial
Service Officers and Department of State Economic Officers at
United States embassies in sub-Saharan Africa; and
(2) develop and submit to the appropriate congressional
committees an assessment of whether human resource capacity in
such embassies is adequate to meet the goals of the various
trade and economic programs and initiatives in Africa,
including the African Growth and Opportunity Act and Prosper
Africa.
SEC. 273. DIGITAL SECURITY COOPERATION WITH RESPECT TO AFRICA.
(a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(b) Interagency Working Group To Counter PRC Cyber Aggression in
Africa.--
(1) In general.--The President shall establish an
interagency Working Group, which shall include representatives
of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and such other
agencies of the United States Government as the President
considers appropriate, on means to counter PRC cyber aggression
with respect to Africa.
(2) Duties.--The Working Group established pursuant to this
subsection shall develop and submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a set of recommendations such as for--
(A) bolstering the capacity of governments in
Africa to ensure the integrity of their data networks
and critical infrastructure where applicable;
(B) providing alternatives to Huawei;
(C) an action plan for United States embassies in
Africa to provide assistance to host-country
governments with respect to protecting their vital
digital networks and infrastructure from PRC espionage,
including an assessment of staffing resources needed to
implement the action plan in embassies in Africa;
(D) utilizing interagency resources to counter PRC
disinformation and propaganda in traditional and
digital media targeted to African audiences; and
(E) helping civil society in Africa counter digital
authoritarianism and identifying tools and assistance
to enhance and promote digital democracy.
SEC. 274. INCREASING PERSONNEL IN UNITED STATES EMBASSIES IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA FOCUSED ON THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
The Secretary of State may station on a permanent basis Department
of State personnel at such United States embassies in sub-Saharan
Africa as the Secretary considers appropriate focused on the
activities, policies and investments of the People's Republic of China
in Africa.
SEC. 275. SUPPORT FOR YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.
(a) Finding.--Congress finds that youth in Africa can have a
positive impact on efforts to foster economic growth, improve public
sector transparency and governance, and counter extremism, and should
be an area of focus for United States outreach on the continent.
(b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States, in cooperation
and collaboration with private sector companies, civic organizations,
nongovernmental organizations, and national and regional public sector
entities, to commit resources to enhancing the entrepreneurship and
leadership skills of African youth with the objective of enhancing
their ability to serve as leaders in the public and private sectors in
order to help them spur growth and prosperity, strengthen democratic
governance, and enhance peace and security in their respective
countries of origin and across Africa.
(c) Young African Leaders Initiative.--
(1) In general.--There is hereby established the Young
African Leaders Initiative, to be carried out by the Secretary
of State.
(2) Fellowships.--The Secretary is authorized to continue
to support the participation in the Initiative established
under this paragraph, in the United States, of fellows from
Africa each year for such education and training in leadership
and professional development through the Department of State as
the Secretary of State considers appropriate. The Secretary
shall establish and publish criteria for eligibility for
participation as such a fellow, and for selection of fellows
among eligible applicants for a fellowship.
(3) Reciprocal exchanges.--Under the Initiative, United
States citizens may engage in such reciprocal exchanges in
connection with and collaboration on projects with fellows
under paragraph (1) as the Secretary considers appropriate.
(4) Networks.--The Secretary is authorized to continue to
maintain an online network that provides information and online
courses for young leaders in Africa on topics related to
entrepreneurship and leadership.
(5) Regional centers.--The Administrator of the United
States Agency for International Development is authorized to
establish regional centers in Africa to provide in-person and
online training throughout the year in business and
entrepreneurship, civic leadership, and public management.
(d) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the
Secretary of State should increase the number of fellows from Africa
participating in the Mandela Washington Fellowship above the current
700 projected for fiscal year 2021.
SEC. 276. AFRICA BROADCASTING NETWORKS.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the CEO of the United States Agency for Global Media shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the resources
and timeline needed to establish within the Agency an organization
whose mission shall be to promote democratic values and institutions in
Africa by providing objective, accurate, and relevant news and
information to the people of Africa and counter disinformation from
malign actors, especially in countries where a free press is banned by
the government or not fully established, about the region, the world,
and the United States through uncensored news, responsible discussion,
and open debate.
SEC. 277. EXPANSION OF AUTHORITIES OF THE UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA.
(a) Promotion of and Support for Private Investment
Opportunities.--
(1) In general.--The United States International
Development Corporation (in this section referred to as the
``Corporation'') shall carry out feasibility studies for the
planning, development, and management of, and procurement for,
potential bilateral and multilateral development projects
eligible for support under title II of the Better Utilization
of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C.
9621 et seq.) in sub-Saharan Africa in accordance with the
provisions described in section 1421(e) of such Act (22 U.S.C.
9621(e)).
(2) Inapplicability of contributions to costs
requirement.--The requirements relating to contributions of
costs described in paragraph (2) of section 1421(e) of such Act
shall not apply with respect to any person receiving funds
under the authorities of paragraph (1).
(b) Special Projects and Programs.--The Corporation shall
administer and manage special projects and programs in support of
specific transactions undertaken by the Corporation or others in sub-
Saharan Africa in accordance with the provisions described in section
1421(f) of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development
Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9621(f)).
(c) Engagement With Investors.--
(1) In general.--The Corporation, acting through the Chief
Development Officer, shall, in cooperation with the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, carry out the activities described in paragraphs
(1) through (5) of section 1445(a) of the Better Utilization of
Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C.
9655(a)) with respect to sub-Saharan Africa.
(2) Assistance.--To achieve the goals described in
paragraph (1), the Corporation shall carry out the activities
described in paragraphs (1) through (10) of section 1445(b)
with respect to sub-Saharan Africa.
(3) Technical assistance.--The Corporation shall coordinate
with the United States Agency for International Development and
other agencies and departments, as necessary, on projects and
programs supported by the Corporation that include technical
assistance with respect to sub-Saharan Africa.
(d) Employees Stationed in Sub-Saharan Africa.--
(1) In general.--Subject to the availability of
appropriations, the Corporation shall take steps to ensure that
at least 6 full-time employees of the Corporation, which may
include personnel detailed to the Corporation from other
Federal agencies, are stationed in sub-Saharan Africa and whose
sole duties are to support the functions of the Corporation as
described in subsections (a), (b), and (c) or under any
provision of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to
Development Act of 2018 with respect to sub-Saharan Africa.
(2) Prohibition on conflicts of interest.--The Corporation
may not hire or retain any contractor or subcontractor to
support the functions of the Corporation as described in
paragraph (1) if the contractor or subcontractor has any equity
or other financial interest in any specific transactions
undertaken by the Corporation or others in sub-Saharan Africa
as described in this section.
(e) Definitions.--In this section, the term ``sub-Saharan Africa''
has the meaning given that term in section 107 of the African Growth
and Opportunity Act (19 U.S.C. 3706).
PART V--MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
SEC. 281. STRATEGY TO COUNTER CHINESE INFLUENCE IN, AND ACCESS TO, THE
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the People's Republic of China is upgrading its
influence in the Middle East and North Africa through its
energy and infrastructure investments, technology transfer, and
arms sales;
(2) the People's Republic of China seeks to establish
military or dual use facilities in geographically strategic
locations in the Middle East and North Africa to further its
Belt and Road Initiative at the expense of United States
national security interests; and
(3) the export of certain communications infrastructure
from the People's Republic of China degrades the security of
partner networks, exposes intellectual property to theft,
threatens the ability of the United States to conduct security
cooperation with compromised regional partners, and furthers
China's authoritarian surveillance model.
(b) Strategy Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator
of the United States Agency for International Development, and
the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall jointly
develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees
and the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the
House of Representatives a strategy for countering and limiting
the PRC's influence in, and access to, the Middle East and
North Africa.
(2) Elements.--The strategy required under paragraph (1)
shall include--
(A) an assessment of the People's Republic of
China's intent with regards to increased cooperation
with Middle East and North African countries and how
these activities fit into its broader global strategic
objectives;
(B) an assessment of how governments across the
region are responding to the People's Republic of
China's efforts to increase its military presence in
their countries;
(C) efforts to improve regional cooperation through
foreign military sales, financing, and efforts to build
partner capacity and increase interoperability with the
United States;
(D) an assessment of the People's Republic of
China's joint research and development with the Middle
East and North Africa, impacts on the United States
national security interests, and recommended steps to
mitigate the People's Republic of China's influence in
this area;
(E) an assessment of arms sales and weapons
technology transfers from the People's Republic of
China to the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on
United States national security interests, and
recommended steps to mitigate the People's Republic of
China's influence in this area;
(F) an assessment of the People's Republic of
China's military sales to the region including lethal
and non-lethal unmanned aerial systems;
(G) an assessment of People's Republic of China
military basing and dual-use facility initiatives
across the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on
United States national security interests, and
recommended steps to mitigate the People's Republic of
China's influence in this area;
(H) efforts to improve regional security
cooperation with United States allies and partners with
a focus on--
(i) maritime security in the Arabian Gulf,
the Red Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean;
(ii) integrated air and missile defense;
(iii) cyber security;
(iv) border security; and
(v) critical infrastructure security, to
include energy security;
(I) increased support for government-to-government
engagement on critical infrastructure development
projects including ports and water infrastructure;
(J) efforts to encourage United States private
sector and public-private partnerships in healthcare
technology and foreign direct investment in non-energy
sectors;
(K) efforts to expand youth engagement and
professional education exchanges with key partner
countries;
(L) specific steps to counter increased investment
from the People's Republic of China in
telecommunications infrastructure and diplomatic
efforts to stress the political, economic, and social
benefits of a free and open internet;
(M) efforts to promote United States private sector
engagement in and public-private partnerships on
renewable energy development;
(N) the expansion of public-private partnership
efforts on water, desalination, and irrigation
projects; and
(O) efforts to warn United States partners in the
Middle East and North Africa of the risks associated
with the People's Republic of China's
telecommunications infrastructure and provide
alternative ``clean paths'' to the People's Republic of
China's technology.
(c) Form.--The strategy required under section (b) shall be
submitted in an unclassified form that can be made available to the
public, but may include a classified annex as necessary.
SEC. 282. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA ENGAGEMENT.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States and the international community have
long-term interests in the stability, security, and prosperity
of the people of the Middle East and North Africa.
(2) In addition to and apart from military and security
efforts, the United States should harness a whole of government
approach, including bilateral and multilateral statecraft,
economic lines of effort, and public diplomacy to compete with
and counter PRC influence.
(3) A clearly articulated positive narrative of United
States engagement, transparent governance structures, and
active civil society engagement help counter predatory foreign
investment and influence efforts.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States
that the United States and the international community should continue
diplomatic and economic efforts throughout the Middle East and North
Africa that support reform efforts to--
(1) promote greater economic opportunity;
(2) foster private sector development;
(3) strengthen civil society; and
(4) promote transparent and democratic governance and the
rule of law.
PART VI--ARCTIC REGION
SEC. 285. ARCTIC DIPLOMACY.
(a) Sense of Congress on Arctic Security.--It is the sense of
Congress that--
(1) the rapidly changing Arctic environment--
(A) creates new national and regional security
challenges due to increased military activity in the
Arctic;
(B) heightens the risk of the Arctic emerging as a
major theater of conflict in ongoing strategic
competition;
(C) threatens maritime safety as Arctic littoral
nations have inadequate capacity to patrol the
increased vessel traffic in this remote region, which
is a result of diminished annual levels of sea ice;
(D) impacts public safety due to increased human
activity in the Arctic region where search and rescue
capacity remains very limited; and
(E) threatens the health of the Arctic's fragile
and pristine environment and the unique and highly
sensitive species found in the Arctic's marine and
terrestrial ecosystems; and
(2) the United States should reduce the consequences
outlined in paragraph (1) by--
(A) carefully evaluating the wide variety and
dynamic set of security and safety risks unfolding in
the Arctic;
(B) developing policies and making preparations to
mitigate and respond to threats and risks in the
Arctic, including by continuing to work with allies and
partners in the Arctic region to deter potential
aggressive activities and build Arctic competencies;
(C) adequately funding the National Earth System
Prediction Capability to substantively improve weather,
ocean, and ice predictions on the time scales necessary
to ensure regional security and trans-Arctic shipping;
(D) investing in resources, including a
significantly expanded icebreaker fleet, to ensure that
the United States has adequate capacity to prevent and
respond to security threats in the Arctic region; and
(E) pursuing diplomatic engagements with all states
in the Arctic region to reach an agreement for--
(i) maintaining peace and stability in the
Arctic region;
(ii) fostering cooperation on stewardship
and safety initiatives in the Arctic region;
(iii) ensuring safe and efficient
management of commercial maritime traffic in
the Arctic;
(iv) promoting responsible natural resource
management and economic development;
(v) countering China's Polar Silk Road
initiative;
(vi) examining the possibility of
reconvening the Arctic Chiefs of Defense Forum;
and
(vii) reducing black carbon and methane
emissions in the Artic Region, including by
working with observers of the Arctic Council,
including India and the PRC, to adopt
mitigation plans consistent with the findings
and recommendations of the Arctic Council's
Framework for Action on Black Carbon and
Methane.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to recognize only the states enumerated in subsection
(c)(1) as Arctic states, and to reject all other claims to this
status; and
(2) that the militarization of the Arctic poses a serious
threat to Arctic peace and stability, and the interests of
United States allies and partners.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Arctic states.--The term ``Arctic states'' means
Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway, Denmark (including
Greenland), Finland, Sweden, and Iceland.
(2) Arctic region.--The term ``Arctic Region'' means the
geographic region north of the 66.56083 parallel latitude north
of the equator.
(d) Designation of Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs.--There
is established within the Department of State an Ambassador at Large
for Arctic Affairs (referred to in this section as the ``Ambassador''),
appointed in accordance with paragraph (1).
(1) Appointment.--The Ambassador shall be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(2) Duties.--
(A) Diplomatic representation.--Subject to the
direction of the President and the Secretary of State,
the Ambassador is authorized to represent the United
States in matters and cases relevant to the Arctic
Region in--
(i) contacts with foreign governments,
intergovernmental organizations, and
specialized agencies of the United Nations, the
Arctic Council, and other international
organizations of which the United States is a
member; and
(ii) multilateral conferences and meetings
relating to Arctic affairs.
(B) Chair of the arctic council.--The Ambassador
shall serve as the Chair of the Arctic Council when the
United States holds the Chairmanship of the Arctic
Council.
(3) Policies and procedures.--The Ambassador shall
coordinate United States policies related to the Arctic Region,
including--
(A) meeting national security, economic, and
commercial needs pertaining to Arctic affairs;
(B) protecting the Arctic environment and
conserving its biological resources;
(C) promoting environmentally sustainable natural
resource management and economic development;
(D) strengthening institutions for cooperation
among the Arctic Nations;
(E) involving Arctic indigenous people in decisions
that affect them;
(F) enhancing scientific monitoring and research on
local, regional, and global environmental issues;
(G) integrating scientific data on the current and
projected effects of climate change in the Arctic
Region and ensure that such data is applied to the
development of security strategies for the Arctic
Region;
(H) making available the methods and approaches on
the integration of climate science to other regional
security planning programs in the Department of State
to better ensure that broader decision-making processes
may more adequately account for the effects of climate
change; and
(I) reducing black carbon and methane emissions in
the Arctic Region.
(e) Arctic Region Security Policy.--Arctic Region Security Policy
shall assess, develop, budget for, and implement plans, policies, and
actions--
(1) to bolster the diplomatic presence of the United States
in Arctic states, including through enhancements to diplomatic
missions and facilities, participation in regional and
bilateral dialogues related to Arctic security, and
coordination of United States initiatives and assistance
programs across agencies to protect the national security of
the United States and its allies and partners;
(2) to enhance the resilience capacities of Arctic states
to the effects of environmental change and increased civilian
and military activity by Arctic states and other states that
may result from increased accessibility of the Arctic Region;
(3) to assess specific added risks to the Arctic Region and
Arctic states that--
(A) are vulnerable to the changing Arctic
environment; and
(B) are strategically significant to the United
States;
(4) to coordinate the integration of environmental change
and national security risk and vulnerability assessments into
the decision-making process on foreign assistance awards with
Greenland;
(5) to advance principles of good governance by encouraging
and cooperating with Arctic states on collaborative
approaches--
(A) to responsibly manage natural resources in the
Arctic Region;
(B) to share the burden of ensuring maritime safety
in the Arctic Region;
(C) to prevent the escalation of security tensions
by mitigating against the militarization of the Arctic
Region;
(D) to develop mutually agreed upon multilateral
policies among Arctic states on the management of
maritime transit routes through the Arctic Region and
work cooperatively on the transit policies for access
to and transit in the Arctic Region by non-Arctic
states; and
(E) to facilitate the development of Arctic Region
Security Action Plans to ensure stability and public
safety in disaster situations in a humane and
responsible fashion;
(6) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, survivability,
and resiliency of United States interests and non-defense
assets in the Arctic Region; and
(7) to reduce black carbon and methane emissions in the
Arctic.
PART VII--OCEANIA
SEC. 291. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES ENGAGEMENT IN OCEANIA.
It shall be the policy of the United States--
(1) to elevate the countries of Oceania as a strategic
national security and economic priority of the United States
Government;
(2) to promote civil society, the rule of law, and
democratic governance across Oceania as part of a free and open
Indo-Pacific region;
(3) to broaden and deepen relationships with the Freely
Associated States of the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the
Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia
through robust defense, diplomatic, economic, and development
exchanges that promote the goals of individual states and the
entire region;
(4) to work with the governments of Australia, New Zealand,
and Japan to advance shared alliance goals of the Oceania
region concerning health, environmental protection, disaster
resilience and preparedness, illegal, unreported and
unregulated fishing, maritime security, and economic
development;
(5) to participate, wherever possible and appropriate, in
existing regional organizations and international structures to
promote the national security and economic goals of the United
States and countries of the Oceania region;
(6) to invest in a whole-of-government United States
strategy that will enhance youth engagement and advance long-
term growth and development throughout the region, especially
as it relates to protecting marine resources that are critical
to livelihoods and strengthening the resilience of the
countries of the Oceania region against current and future
threats resulting from extreme weather and severe changes in
the environment;
(7) to deter and combat acts of malign foreign influence
and corruption aimed at undermining the political,
environmental, social, and economic stability of the people and
governments of the countries of Oceania;
(8) to improve the local capacity of the countries of
Oceania to address public health challenges and improve global
health security;
(9) to help the countries of Oceania access market-based
private sector investments that adhere to best practices
regarding transparency, debt sustainability, and environmental
and social safeguards as an alternative to state-directed
investments by authoritarian governments;
(10) to ensure the people and communities of Oceania remain
safe from the risks of old and degrading munitions hazards and
other debris that threaten health and livelihoods;
(11) to cooperate with Taiwan by offering United States
support for maintaining Taiwan's diplomatic partners in
Oceania; and
(12) to work cooperatively with all governments in Oceania
to promote the dignified return of the remains of members of
the United States Armed Forces that are missing in action from
previous conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region.
SEC. 292. OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.
(a) Oceania Strategic Roadmap.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a strategic roadmap for
strengthening United States engagement with the countries of Oceania,
including an analysis of opportunities to cooperate with Australia, New
Zealand, and Japan, to address shared concerns and promote shared goals
in pursuit of security and resiliency in the countries of Oceania.
(b) Elements.--The strategic roadmap required by subsection (a)
shall include the following:
(1) A description of United States regional goals and
concerns with respect to Oceania and increasing engagement with
the countries of Oceania.
(2) An assessment, based on paragraph (1), of United States
regional goals and concerns that are shared by Australia, New
Zealand, and Japan, including a review of issues related to
anticorruption, maritime and other security issues,
environmental protection, fisheries management, economic growth
and development, and disaster resilience and preparedness.
(3) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives by the
governments of the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and
Japan in pursuit of those shared regional goals and concerns,
including with respect to the issues described in paragraph
(1).
(4) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives by
regional organizations and other related intergovernmental
structures aimed at addressing the issues described in
paragraph (1).
(5) A plan for aligning United States programs and
resources in pursuit of those shared regional goals and
concerns, as appropriate.
(6) Recommendations for additional United States
authorities, personnel, programs, or resources necessary to
execute the strategic roadmap.
(7) Any other elements the Secretary considers appropriate.
SEC. 293. OCEANIA SECURITY DIALOGUE.
(a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall brief the
appropriate committees of Congress on the feasibility and advisability
of establishing a United States-based public-private sponsored security
dialogue (to be known as the ``Oceania Security Dialogue'') among the
countries of Oceania for the purposes of jointly exploring and
discussing issues affecting the economic, diplomatic, and national
security of the Indo-Pacific countries of Oceania.
(b) Report Required.--The briefing required by subsection (a)
shall, at a minimum, include the following:
(1) A review of the ability of the Department of State to
participate in a public-private sponsored security dialogue.
(2) An assessment of the potential locations for conducting
an Oceania Security Dialogue in the jurisdiction of the United
States.
(3) Consideration of dates for conducting an Oceania
Security Dialogue that would maximize participation of
representatives from the Indo-Pacific countries of Oceania.
(4) A review of the funding modalities available to the
Department of State to help finance an Oceania Security
Dialogue, including grant-making authorities available to the
Department of State.
(5) An assessment of any administrative, statutory, or
other legal limitations that would prevent the establishment of
an Oceania Security Dialogue with participation and support of
the Department of State as described in subsection (a).
(6) An analysis of how an Oceania Security Dialogue could
help to advance the Boe Declaration on Regional Security,
including its emphasis on the changing environment as the
greatest existential threat to countries of Oceania.
(7) An evaluation of how an Oceania Security Dialogue could
help amplify the issues and work of existing regional
structures and organizations dedicated to the security of the
Oceania region, such as the Pacific Island Forum and Pacific
Environmental Security Forum.
(8) An analysis of how an Oceania Security Dialogue would
help with implementation of the strategic roadmap required by
section 292 and advance the National Security Strategy of the
United States.
(c) Interagency Consultation.--To the extent practicable, the
Secretary of State may consult with the Secretary of Defense and, where
appropriate, evaluate the lessons learned of the Regional Centers for
Security Studies of the Department of Defense to determine the
feasibility and advisability of establishing the Oceania Security
Dialogue.
SEC. 294. OCEANIA PEACE CORPS PARTNERSHIPS.
(a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Peace Corps shall submit to
Congress a report on strategies for to reasonably and safely expand the
number of Peace Corps volunteers in Oceania, with the goals of--
(1) expanding the presence of the Peace Corps to all
currently feasible locations in Oceania; and
(2) working with regional and international partners of the
United States to expand the presence of Peace Corps volunteers
in low-income Oceania communities in support of climate
resilience initiatives.
(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall--
(1) assess the factors contributing to the current absence
of the Peace Corps and its volunteers in Oceania;
(2) examine potential remedies that include working with
United States Government agencies and regional governments,
including governments of United States allies--
(A) to increase the health infrastructure and
medical evacuation capabilities of the countries of
Oceania to better support the safety of Peace Corps
volunteers while in those countries;
(B) to address physical safety concerns that have
decreased the ability of the Peace Corps to operate in
Oceania; and
(C) to increase transportation infrastructure in
the countries of Oceania to better support the travel
of Peace Corps volunteers and their access to necessary
facilities;
(3) evaluate the potential to expand the deployment of
Peace Corps Response volunteers to help the countries of
Oceania address social, economic, and development needs of
their communities that require specific professional expertise;
and
(4) explore potential new operational models to address
safety and security needs of Peace Corps volunteers in the
countries of Oceania, including--
(A) changes to volunteer deployment durations; and
(B) scheduled redeployment of volunteers to
regional or United States-based healthcare facilities
for routine physical and behavioral health evaluation.
(c) Volunteers in Low-Income Oceania Communities.--
(1) In general.--In examining the potential to expand the
presence of Peace Corps volunteers in low-income Oceania
communities under subsection (a)(2), the Director of the Peace
Corps shall consider the development of initiatives described
in paragraph (2).
(2) Initiatives described.--Initiatives described in this
paragraph are volunteer initiatives that help the countries of
Oceania address social, economic, and development needs of
their communities, including by--
(A) addressing, through appropriate resilience-
based interventions, the vulnerability that communities
in Oceania face as result of extreme weather, severe
environmental change, and other climate related trends;
and
(B) improving, through smart infrastructure
principles, access to transportation and connectivity
infrastructure that will help address the economic and
social challenges that communities in Oceania confront
as a result of poor or nonexistent infrastructure.
(d) Oceania Defined.--In this section, the term ``Oceania''
includes the following:
(1) Easter Island of Chile.
(2) Fiji.
(3) French Polynesia of France.
(4) Kiribati.
(5) New Caledonia of France.
(6) Nieu of New Zealand.
(7) Papua New Guinea.
(8) Samoa.
(9) Vanuatu.
(10) The Ashmore and Cartier Islands of Australia.
(11) The Cook Islands of New Zealand.
(12) The Coral Islands of Australia.
(13) The Federated States of Micronesia.
(14) The Norfolk Island of Australia.
(15) The Pitcairn Islands of the United Kingdom.
(16) The Republic of the Marshal Islands.
(17) The Republic of Palau.
(18) The Solomon Islands.
(19) Tokelau of New Zealand.
(20) Tonga.
(21) Tuvalu.
(22) Wallis and Futuna of France.
PART VIII--PACIFIC ISLANDS
SEC. 295. SHORT TITLE.
This part may be cited as the ``Boosting Long-term U.S. Engagement
in the Pacific Act'' or the ``BLUE Pacific Act''.
SEC. 296. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The Pacific Islands--
(A) are home to roughly 10 million residents,
including over 8.6 million in Papua New Guinea,
constituting diverse and dynamic cultures and peoples;
(B) are spread across an expanse of the Pacific
Ocean equivalent to 15 percent of the Earth's surface,
including the three sub-regions of Melanesia,
Micronesia, and Polynesia; and
(C) face shared challenges in development that have
distinct local contexts, including climate change and
rising sea levels, geographic distances from major
markets, and vulnerability to external shocks such as
natural disasters.
(2) The United States is a Pacific country with
longstanding ties and shared values and interests with the
Pacific Islands, including through the Compacts of Free
Association with the Freely Associated States, the Republic of
the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and
the Republic of Palau.
(3) The United States has vital national security interests
in the Pacific Islands, including--
(A) protecting regional peace and security that
fully respects the sovereignty of all nations;
(B) advancing economic prosperity free from
coercion through trade and sustainable development; and
(C) supporting democracy, good governance, the rule
of law, and human rights and fundamental freedoms.
(4) Successive United States administrations have
recognized the importance of the Pacific region, including the
Pacific Islands, in high-level strategic documents, including
the following:
(A) The 2015 National Security Strategy, which
first declared the rebalance to Asia and the Pacific,
affirmed the United States as a Pacific nation, and
paved the way for subsequent United States engagement
with the Pacific Islands, including several new
policies focused on conservation and resilience to
climate change announced in September 2016.
(B) The 2017 National Security Strategy, which
includes a commitment to ``shore up fragile partner
states in the Pacific Islands region to reduce their
vulnerability to economic fluctuations and natural
disasters''.
(C) The 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, which
identified the Pacific Islands as ``critical to U.S.
strategy because of our shared values, interests, and
commitments'' and committed the United States to
``building capacity and resilience to address maritime
security; Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing;
drug trafficking; and resilience to address climate
change and disaster response''.
(5) The United States has deepened its diplomatic
engagement with the Pacific Islands through several recent
initiatives, including--
(A) the Pacific Pledge, which provided an
additional $100,000,000 in 2019 and $200,000,000 in
2020, on top of the approximately $350,000,000 that the
United States provides annually to the region to
support shared priorities in economic and human
development, climate change, and more; and
(B) the Small and Less Populous Island Economies
(SALPIE) Initiative launched in March 2021 to
strengthen United States collaboration with island
countries and territories, including in the Pacific
Islands, on COVID-19 economic challenges, long-term
economic development, climate change, and other shared
interests.
(6) The Boe Declaration on Regional Security, signed by
leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum in 2018, affirmed that
climate change ``remains the single greatest threat to the
livelihoods, security, and wellbeing of the peoples of the
Pacific'' and asserted ``the sovereign right of every Member to
conduct its national affairs free of external interference and
coercion''.
(7) The Asian Development Bank has estimated that the
Pacific Islands region needs upwards of $2.8 billion a year in
investment needs through 2030, in addition to $300 million a
year for climate mitigation and adaptation over the same
period.
(8) The Pacific Islands swiftly enacted effective policies
to prevent and contain the spread of the Coronavirus Disease
2019 (commonly referred to as ``COVID-19'') pandemic to their
populations. The United States has provided over $130,000,000
in assistance to the Pacific Islands for their COVID-19
response. However, priorities must be met to ensure continued
success in preventing the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic,
achieving swift and widespread vaccinations, and pursuing long-
term economic recovery in the Pacific Islands, including
through--
(A) expanding testing capacity and acquisition of
needed medical supplies, including available COVID-19
vaccines and supporting vaccination efforts, through a
reliable supply chain;
(B) planning for lifting of lockdowns and reopening
of economic and social activities; and
(C) mitigating and recovering from the impacts of
the COVID-19 pandemic on the health system and the
reliance on food and energy imports as well as lost
tourism revenue and other economic and food security
damages caused by the pandemic.
(9) Since 1966, thousands of Peace Corps volunteers have
proudly served in the Pacific Islands, building strong people-
to-people relationships and demonstrating the United States
commitment to peace and development in the region. Prior to the
COVID-19 pandemic, the Peace Corps maintained presence in four
countries of the Pacific Islands. Peace Corps volunteers
continue to be in high demand in the Pacific Islands and have
been requested across the region.
SEC. 297. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to develop and commit to a comprehensive, multifaceted,
and principled United States policy in the Pacific Islands
that--
(A) promotes peace, security, and prosperity for
all countries through a rules-based regional order that
respects the sovereignty and political independence of
all nations;
(B) preserves the Pacific Ocean as an open and
vibrant corridor for international maritime trade and
promotes trade and sustainable development that
supports inclusive economic growth and autonomy for all
nations and addresses socioeconomic challenges related
to public health, education, renewable energy, digital
connectivity, and more;
(C) supports regional efforts to address the
challenges posed by climate change, including by
strengthening resilience to natural disasters and
through responsible stewardship of natural resources;
(D) improves civil society, strengthens democratic
governance and the rule of law, and promotes human
rights and the preservation of the region's unique
cultural heritages;
(E) assists the Pacific Islands in preventing and
containing the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic and in
pursuing long-term economic recovery; and
(F) supports existing regional architecture and
international norms;
(2) to support the vision, values, and objectives of
existing regional multilateral institutions and frameworks,
such as the Pacific Islands Forum and the Pacific Community,
including--
(A) the 2014 Framework for Pacific Regionalism;
(B) the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security;
and
(C) the Boe Declaration Action Plan;
(3) to extend and renew the provisions of the Compacts of
Free Association and related United States law that will expire
in 2023 for the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the
Federated States of Micronesia and in 2024 for the Republic of
Palau unless they are extended and renewed; and
(4) to work closely with United States allies and partners
with existing relationships and interests in the Pacific
Islands, including Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Taiwan,
in advancing common goals.
SEC. 298. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--Except as
otherwise provided, the term ``appropriate congressional
committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate.
(2) Pacific islands.--The terms ``Pacific Islands'' means
the Cook Islands, the Republic of Fiji, the Republic of
Kiribati, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated
States of Micronesia, the Republic of Nauru, Niue, the Republic
of Palau, the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, the
Independent State of Samoa, the Solomon Islands, the Kingdom of
Tonga, Tuvalu, and the Republic of Vanuatu.
SEC. 299. AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS; FORM OF REPORTS.
(a) Authority To Consolidate Reports.--Any reports required to be
submitted to the appropriate congressional committees under this Act
that are subject to deadlines for submission consisting of the same
units of time may be consolidated into a single report that is
submitted to appropriate congressional committees pursuant to such
deadlines and that contains all information required under such
reports.
(b) Form of Reports.--Each report required by this Act shall be
submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.
SEC. 299A. DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the strategic importance of the Pacific Islands
necessitates an examination of whether United States
diplomatic, economic, and development engagement and presence
in the Pacific Islands region is sufficient to effectively
support United States objectives and meaningful participation
in regional fora;
(2) improving shared understanding of and jointly
combatting the transnational challenges pertinent to the
Pacific Islands region with countries of the Pacific Islands
and regional partners such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan,
and Taiwan is vitally important to our shared long-term
interests of stability, security, and prosperity;
(3) the United States should seek to participate in and
support efforts to coordinate a regional response toward
maritime security, including through continued United States
and Pacific Islands participation in the Pacific Fusion Centre
in Vanuatu and Information Fusion Centre in Singapore, and
robust cooperation with regional allies; and
(4) the United States Government should commit to sending
appropriate levels of representation to regional events.
(b) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years,
the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of
Commerce and the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development, shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on the diplomatic and
development presence of the United States in the Pacific
Islands.
(2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) A description of the Department of State,
United States Agency for International Development,
United States International Development Finance
Corporation, Millennium Challenge Corporation, and
United States Commercial Service presence, staffing,
programming, and resourcing of operations in the
Pacific Islands, including programming and resourcing
not specifically allocated to the Pacific Islands.
(B) A description of gaps in such presence,
including unfilled full-time equivalent positions.
(C) A description of limitations and challenges
such gaps pose to United States strategic objectives,
including--
(i) gaps in support of the Pacific Islands
due to operations being conducted from the
United States Agency for International
Development offices in Manila and Suva; and
(ii) gaps in programming and resourcing.
(D) A strategy to expand and elevate such presence
to fill such gaps, including by establishing new
missions, expanding participation in regional forums,
and elevating United States representation in regional
forums.
(c) Authority To Enhance Diplomatic and Economic Engagement.--The
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce are authorized to hire
locally employed staff in the Pacific Islands for the purpose of
promoting increased diplomatic engagement and economic and commercial
engagement between the United States and the Pacific Islands.
(d) Regional Development Cooperation Strategy.--Not later than 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 5 years
thereafter, the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a regional development cooperation strategy for the Pacific
Islands.
SEC. 299B. COORDINATION WITH REGIONAL ALLIES.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall consult and
coordinate with regional allies and partners, including Australia,
Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan, and regional institutions such as the
Pacific Islands Forum and the Pacific Community, with respect to
programs to provide assistance to the Pacific Islands, including
programs established by this Act, including for purposes of--
(1) deconflicting programming;
(2) ensuring that any programming does not adversely affect
the absorptive capacity of the Pacific Islands; and
(3) ensuring complementary programs benefit the Pacific
Islands to the maximum extent practicable.
(b) Formal Consultative Process.--The Secretary of State shall
establish a formal consultative process with such regional allies and
partners to coordinate with respect to such programs and future-years
programming.
(c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that
includes--
(1) a review of ongoing efforts, initiatives, and programs
undertaken by regional allies and partners, including
multilateral organizations, to advance priorities identified in
this Act;
(2) a review of ongoing efforts, initiatives, and programs
undertaken by non-allied foreign actors that are viewed as
being potentially harmful or in any way detrimental to one or
more countries of the Pacific Islands;
(3) an assessment of United States programs in the Pacific
Islands and their alignment and complementarity with the
efforts of regional allies and partners identified in paragraph
(1); and
(4) a review of the formal consultative process required in
subsection (b) to summarize engagements held and identify
opportunities to improve coordination with regional allies and
partners.
SEC. 299C. CLIMATE RESILIENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States Government should leverage the full
range of authorities and programs available to assist the
Pacific Islands in achieving their development goals;
(2) United States development assistance should seek to
build on existing public and private sector investments while
creating new opportunities toward a favorable environment for
additional such investments; and
(3) United States development efforts should be coordinated
with and seek to build on existing efforts by like-minded
partners and allies and regional and international multilateral
organizations.
(b) Strategy.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Chief Executive
Officer of the United States International Development Finance
Corporation, shall develop and implement a strategy to--
(1) invest in and improve critical infrastructure,
including transport connectivity, information and
communications technology, food security, coastal zone
management, marine and water resource management, and energy
security and access to electricity in the Pacific Islands, with
an emphasis on climate resiliency and sustainable development;
(2) provide technical assistance to assist local government
and civil society leaders assess risks to local infrastructure,
especially those posed by climate change, consider and
implement risk mitigation efforts and policies to strengthen
resilience, and evaluate proposed projects and solutions for
their efficacy and sustainability; and
(3) support investment and improvement in ecosystem
conservation and protection for the long-term sustainable use
of ecosystem services, especially those that mitigate effects
of climate change and those that support food security and
livelihoods.
(c) Conduct of Strategy.--The strategy developed under this section
shall be coordinated with like-minded partners and allies, regional and
international multilateral organizations, and regional frameworks for
development in the Pacific Islands.
(d) International Financial Institutions.--The Secretary of the
Treasury shall direct the representatives of the United States to the
World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian
Development Bank to use the voice and vote of the United States to
support climate resilient infrastructure projects in the Pacific
Islands.
(e) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary
of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on foreign infrastructure developments in
the Pacific Islands.
(2) Matters to be included.--The report required by
paragraph (1) shall include--
(A) a review of foreign infrastructure developments
in the Pacific Islands by non-United States allies and
partners;
(B) assessments of the environmental impact and
sustainability of such developments; and
(C) an analysis of the financial sustainability of
such developments and their impacts on the debt of host
countries in the Pacific Islands.
(3) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this
subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Committee on Natural Resources of the House of
Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the
Senate.
(f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated $50,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2022 through 2026
to carry out this section.
TITLE III--INVESTING IN OUR VALUES
SEC. 301. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE CONTINUED VIOLATION OF RIGHTS AND
FREEDOMS OF THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Despite international condemnation, the Government of
the People's Republic of China (``PRC'') continues to disregard
its international legal obligations under the Joint Declaration
of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of
China on the Question of Hong Kong (``Joint Declaration''), in
which the PRC committed that--
(A) Hong Kong would enjoy a high degree of
autonomy;
(B) for at least 50 years the ``social and economic
systems in Hong Kong'' would remain unchanged; and
(C) the personal rights and freedoms of the people
of Hong Kong would be protected by law.
(2) As part of its continued efforts to undermine the
established rights of the Hong Kong people, the PRC National
People's Congress Standing Committee (``Standing Committee'')
passed and imposed upon Hong Kong oppressive and intentionally
vague national security legislation on June 30, 2020, that
grants Beijing sweeping powers to punish acts of ``separating
the country, subverting state power, and organizing terroristic
activities''.
(3) The legislative process by which the Standing Committee
imposed the national security law on Hong Kong bypassed Hong
Kong's local government in a potential violation of the Basic
Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China (``Basic Law''), and involved
unusual secrecy, as demonstrated by the fact that the
legislation was only the second law since 2008 that the
Standing Committee has passed without releasing a draft for
public comment.
(4) On July 30, 2020, election officials of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) disqualified twelve pro-
democracy candidates from participating in the September 6
Legislative Council elections, which were subsequently
postponed for a year until September 5, 2021, by citing the
public health risk of holding elections during the COVID-19
pandemic.
(5) On July 31, 2020, in an attempt to assert
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the HKSAR Government announced
indictments of and arrest warrants for six Hong Kong activists
living overseas, including United States citizen Samuel Chu,
for alleged violations of the national security law.
(6) On November 11, 2020, the HKSAR Government removed four
lawmakers from office for allegedly violating the law after the
Standing Committee passed additional legislation barring those
who promoted or supported Hong Kong independence and refused to
acknowledge PRC sovereignty over Hong Kong, or otherwise
violates the national security law, from running for or serving
in the Legislative Council.
(7) On December 2, 2020, pro-democracy activists Joshua
Wong, Agnes Chow, and Ivan Lam were sentenced to prison for
participating in 2019 protests.
(8) Ten of the twelve Hong Kong residents (also known as
``the Hong Kong 12'') who sought to flee by boat from Hong Kong
to Taiwan on August 23, 2020, were taken to mainland China and
sentenced on December 30, 2020, to prison terms ranging from
seven months to three years for illegal border crossing.
(9) On December 31, 2020, Hong Kong's highest court revoked
bail for Jimmy Lai Chee-Ying, a pro-democracy figure and
publisher, who was charged on December 12 with colluding with
foreign forces and endangering national security under the
national security legislation.
(10) On January 4, 2021, the Departments of Justice in
Henan and Sichuan province threatened to revoke the licenses of
two lawyers hired to help the Hong Kong 12.
(11) On January 5, 2021, the Hong Kong Police Force
arrested more than fifty opposition figures, including pro-
democracy officials, activists, and an American lawyer, for
their involvement in an informal July 2020 primary to select
candidates for the general election originally scheduled for
September 2020, despite other political parties having held
similar primaries without retribution.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that Congress--
(1) condemns the actions taken by the Government of the
People's Republic of China (``PRC'') and the Government of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (``HKSAR''), including
the adoption and implementation of national security
legislation for Hong Kong through irregular procedures, that
violate the rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong that
are guaranteed by the Joint Declaration and its implementing
document, the Basic Law;
(2) reaffirms its support for the people of Hong Kong, who
face grave threats to their rights and freedoms;
(3) calls on the governments of the PRC and HKSAR to--
(A) respect and uphold--
(i) commitments made to the international
community and the people of Hong Kong under the
Joint Declaration; and
(ii) the judicial independence of the Hong
Kong legal system; and
(B) release pro-democracy activists and politicians
arrested under the national security law; and
(4) encourages the President, the Secretary of State, and
the Secretary of the Treasury to coordinate with allies and
partners and continue United States efforts to respond to
developments in Hong Kong, including by--
(A) providing protection for Hong Kong residents
who fear persecution;
(B) supporting those who may seek to file a case
before the International Court of Justice to hold the
Government of the PRC accountable for violating its
binding legal commitments under the Joint Declaration;
(C) encouraging allies and partner countries to
instruct, as appropriate, their respective
representatives to the United Nations to use their
voice, vote, and influence to press for the appointment
of a United Nations special mandate holder to monitor
and report on human rights developments in Hong Kong;
(D) ensuring the private sector, particularly
United States companies with economic interests in Hong
Kong, is aware of risks the national security
legislation poses to the security of United States
citizens and to the medium and long-term interest of
United States businesses in Hong Kong;
(E) continuing to implement sanctions authorities,
especially authorities recently enacted to address
actions undermining the rights and freedoms of the Hong
Kong people such as the Hong Kong Autonomy Act (Public
Law 116-149) and the Hong Kong Human Rights and
Democracy Act of 2019 (Public Law 116-76), with respect
to officials of the Chinese Communist Party, the
Government of the PRC, or the Government of the HKSAR
who are responsible for undermining such rights and
freedoms; and
(F) coordinating with allies and partners to ensure
that such implementation of sanctions is multilateral.
SEC. 302. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN
HONG KONG.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 for the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the Department of State to
promote democracy in Hong Kong.
(b) Administration.--The Secretary of State shall designate an
office with the Department of State to administer and coordinate the
provision of such funds described in subsection (a) within the
Department of State and across the United States Government.
SEC. 303. HONG KONG PEOPLE'S FREEDOM AND CHOICE.
(a) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
(1) Joint declaration.--The term ``Joint Declaration''
means the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of
Hong Kong, signed on December 19, 1984, and entered into force
on May 27, 1985.
(2) Priority hong kong resident.--The term ``Priority Hong
Kong resident'' means--
(A) a permanent resident of Hong Kong who--
(i) holds no right to citizenship in any
country or jurisdiction other than the People's
Republic of China (referred to in this Act as
``PRC''), Hong Kong, or Macau as of the date of
enactment of this Act;
(ii) has resided in Hong Kong for not less
than the last 10 years as of the date of
enactment of this Act; and
(iii) has been designated by the Secretary
of State or Secretary of Homeland Security as
having met the requirements of this
subparagraph, in accordance with the procedures
described in subsection (f) of this Act; or
(B) the spouse of a person described in
subparagraph (A), or the child of such person as such
term is defined in section 101(b)(1) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1)), except that
a child shall be an unmarried person under twenty-seven
years of age.
(3) Hong kong national security law.--The term ``Hong Kong
National Security Law'' means the Law of the People's Republic
of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region that was passed unanimously by
the National People's Congress and signed by President Xi
Jinping on June 30, 2020, and promulgated in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region (referred to in this Act as
``Hong Kong SAR'') on July 1, 2020.
(4) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate.
(b) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The Hong Kong National Security Law promulgated on July
1, 2020--
(A) contravenes the Basic Law of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region (referred to in this Act
as ``the Basic Law'') that provides in Article 23 that
the Legislative Council of Hong Kong shall enact
legislation related to national security;
(B) violates the PRC's commitments under
international law, as defined by the Joint Declaration;
and
(C) causes severe and irreparable damage to the
``one country, two systems'' principle and further
erodes global confidence in the PRC's commitment to
international law.
(2) On July 14, 2020, in response to the promulgation of
the Hong Kong National Security Law, President Trump signed an
Executive order on Hong Kong normalization that, among other
policy actions, suspended the special treatment of Hong Kong
persons under U.S. law with respect to the issuance of
immigrant and nonimmigrant visas.
(3) The United States has a long and proud history as a
destination for refugees and asylees fleeing persecution based
on race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or
membership in a particular social group.
(4) The United States also shares deep social, cultural,
and economic ties with the people of Hong Kong, including a
shared commitment to democracy, to the rule of law, and to the
protection of human rights.
(5) The United States has sheltered, protected, and
welcomed individuals who have fled authoritarian regimes,
including citizens from the PRC following the violent June 4,
1989, crackdown in Tiananmen Square, deepening ties between the
people of the United States and those individuals seeking to
contribute to a free, open society founded on democracy, human
rights, and the respect for the rule of law.
(6) The United States has reaped enormous economic,
cultural, and strategic benefits from welcoming successive
generations of scientists, doctors, entrepreneurs, artists,
intellectuals, and other freedom-loving people fleeing fascism,
communism, violent Islamist extremism, and other repressive
ideologies, including in the cases of Nazi Germany, the Soviet
Union, and Soviet-controlled Central Europe, Cuba, Vietnam, and
Iran.
(7) A major asymmetric advantage of the United States in
its long-term strategic competition with the Communist Party of
China is the ability of people from every country in the world,
irrespective of their race, ethnicity, or religion, to
immigrate to the United States and become American citizens.
(c) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to reaffirm the principles and objectives set forth in
the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-
383), namely that--
(A) the United States has ``a strong interest in
the continued vitality, prosperity, and stability of
Hong Kong'';
(B) ``support for democratization is a fundamental
principle of United States foreign policy'' and
therefore ``naturally applies to United States policy
toward Hong Kong'';
(C) ``the human rights of the people of Hong Kong
are of great importance to the United States and are
directly relevant to United States interests in Hong
Kong and serve as a basis for Hong Kong's continued
economic prosperity''; and
(D) Hong Kong must remain sufficiently autonomous
from the PRC to ``justify treatment under a particular
law of the United States, or any provision thereof,
different from that accorded the People's Republic of
China'';
(2) to continue to support the high degree of autonomy and
fundamental rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong, as
enumerated by--
(A) the Joint Declaration;
(B) the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, done at New York December 19, 1966;
and
(C) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, done
at Paris December 10, 1948;
(3) to continue to support the democratic aspirations of
the people of Hong Kong, including the ``ultimate aim'' of the
selection of the Chief Executive and all members of the
Legislative Council by universal suffrage, as articulated in
the Basic Law;
(4) to urge the Government of the PRC, despite its recent
actions, to uphold its commitments to Hong Kong, including
allowing the people of Hong Kong to govern Hong Kong with a
high degree of autonomy and without undue interference, and
ensuring that Hong Kong voters freely enjoy the right to elect
the Chief Executive and all members of the Hong Kong
Legislative Council by universal suffrage;
(5) to support the establishment of a genuine democratic
option to freely and fairly nominate and elect the Chief
Executive of Hong Kong, and the establishment of open and
direct democratic elections for all members of the Hong Kong
Legislative Council;
(6) to support the robust exercise by residents of Hong
Kong of the rights to free speech, the press, and other
fundamental freedoms, as provided by the Basic Law, the Joint
Declaration, and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights;
(7) to support freedom from arbitrary or unlawful arrest,
detention, or imprisonment for all Hong Kong residents, as
provided by the Basic Law, the Joint Declaration, and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
(8) to draw international attention to any violations by
the Government of the PRC of the fundamental rights of the
people of Hong Kong, as provided by the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, and any encroachment upon the
autonomy guaranteed to Hong Kong by the Basic Law and the Joint
Declaration;
(9) to protect United States citizens and long-term
permanent residents living in Hong Kong, as well as people
visiting and transiting through Hong Kong;
(10) to maintain the economic and cultural ties that
provide significant benefits to both the United States and Hong
Kong, including the reinstatement of the Fulbright exchange
program with regard to Hong Kong at the earliest opportunity;
(11) to coordinate with allies, including the United
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea,
to promote democracy and human rights in Hong Kong; and
(12) to welcome and protect in the United States residents
of Hong Kong fleeing persecution or otherwise seeking a safe
haven from violations by the Government of the PRC of the
fundamental rights of the people of Hong Kong.
(d) Temporary Protected Status for Hong Kong Residents in the
United States.--
(1) Designation.--
(A) In general.--For purposes of section 244 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a), Hong
Kong shall be treated as if it had been designated
under subsection (b)(1)(C) of that section, subject to
the provisions of this section.
(B) Period of designation.--The initial period of
the designation referred to in subparagraph (A) shall
be for the 18-month period beginning on the date of
enactment of this Act.
(2) Aliens eligible.--As a result of the designation made
under subsection (a), an alien is deemed to satisfy the
requirements under paragraph (1) of section 244(c) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a(c)), subject to
paragraph (3) of such section, if the alien--
(A) was a permanent resident of Hong Kong at the
time such individual arrived into the United States and
is a national of the PRC (or in the case of an
individual having no nationality, is a person who last
habitually resided in Hong Kong);
(B) has been continuously physically present in the
United States since the date of the enactment of this
Act;
(C) is admissible as an immigrant, except as
otherwise provided in paragraph (2)(A) of such section,
and is not ineligible for temporary protected status
under paragraph (2)(B) of such section; and
(D) registers for temporary protected status in a
manner established by the Secretary of Homeland
Security.
(3) Consent to travel abroad.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security
shall give prior consent to travel abroad, in
accordance with section 244(f)(3) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a(f)(3)), to an alien
who is granted temporary protected status pursuant to
the designation made under paragraph (1) if the alien
establishes to the satisfaction of the Secretary of
Homeland Security that emergency and extenuating
circumstances beyond the control of the alien require
the alien to depart for a brief, temporary trip abroad.
(B) Treatment upon return.--An alien returning to
the United States in accordance with an authorization
described in subparagraph (A) shall be treated as any
other returning alien provided temporary protected
status under section 244 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a).
(4) Fee.--
(A) In general.--In addition to any other fee
authorized by law, the Secretary of Homeland Security
is authorized to charge and collect a fee of $360 for
each application for temporary protected status under
section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act by a
person who is only eligible for such status by reason
of paragraph (1).
(B) Waiver.--The Secretary of Homeland Security
shall permit aliens to apply for a waiver of any fees
associated with filing an application referred to in
subparagraph (A).
(e) Treatment of Hong Kong Residents for Immigration Purposes.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, during the 5 fiscal year
period beginning on the first day of the first full fiscal year after
the date of enactment of this Act, Hong Kong shall continue to be
considered a foreign state separate and apart from the PRC as mandated
under section 103 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990
(Public Law 101-649) for purposes of the numerical limitations on
immigrant visas under sections 201, 202, and 203 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1151, 1152, and 1153).
(f) Verification of Priority Hong Kong Residents.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall
publish in the Federal Register, an interim final rule
establishing procedures for designation of Priority Hong Kong
Residents. Notwithstanding section 553 of title 5, United
States Code, the rule shall be effective, on an interim basis,
immediately upon publication, but may be subject to change and
revision after public notice and opportunity for comment. The
Secretary of State shall finalize such rule not later than 1
year after the date of the enactment of this Act. Such rule
shall establish procedures--
(A) for individuals to register with any United
States embassy or consulate outside of the United
States, or with the Department of Homeland Security in
the United States, and request designation as a
Priority Hong Kong Resident; and
(B) for the appropriate Secretary to verify the
residency of registered individuals and designate those
who qualify as Priority Hong Kong Residents.
(2) Documentation.--The procedures described in paragraph
(1) shall include the collection of--
(A) biometric data;
(B) copies of birth certificates, residency cards,
and other documentation establishing residency; and
(C) other personal information, data, and records
deemed appropriate by the Secretary.
(3) Guidance.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall issue
guidance outlining actions to enhance the ability of the
Secretary to efficiently send and receive information to and
from the United Kingdom and other like-minded allies and
partners for purposes of rapid verification of permanent
residency in Hong Kong and designation of individuals as
Priority Hong Kong Residents.
(4) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a
report to the House Committees on Foreign Affairs and the
Judiciary and the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and
the Judiciary detailing plans to implement the requirements
described in this subsection.
(5) Protection for refugees.--Nothing in this section shall
be construed to prevent a Priority Hong Kong Resident from
seeking refugee status under section 207 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157) or requesting asylum under
section 208 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1158).
(g) Reporting Requirements.--
(1) In general.--On an annual basis, the Secretary of State
and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with
other Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall submit a report
to the appropriate congressional committees, detailing for the
previous fiscal year--
(A) the number of Hong Kong SAR residents who have
applied for U.S. visas or immigration benefits,
disaggregated by visa type or immigration benefit,
including asylum, refugee status, temporary protected
status, and lawful permanent residence;
(B) the number of approvals, denials, or rejections
of applicants for visas or immigration benefits
described in subparagraph (A), disaggregated by visa
type or immigration benefit and basis for denial;
(C) the number of pending refugee and asylum
applications for Hong Kong SAR residents, and the
length of time and reason for which such applications
have been pending; and
(D) other matters deemed relevant by the
Secretaries relating to efforts to protect and
facilitate the resettlement of refugees and victims of
persecution in Hong Kong.
(2) Form.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form and published on a text-
searchable, publicly available website of the Department of
State and the Department of Homeland Security.
(h) Strategy for International Cooperation on Hong Kong.--
(1) In general.--It is the policy of the United States--
(A) to support the people of Hong Kong by providing
safe haven to Hong Kong SAR residents who are nationals
of the PRC following the enactment of the Hong Kong
National Security Law that places certain Hong Kong
persons at risk of persecution; and
(B) to encourage like-minded nations to make
similar accommodations for Hong Kong people fleeing
persecution by the Government of the PRC.
(2) Plan.--The Secretary of State, in consultation with the
heads of other Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall develop
a plan to engage with other nations, including the United
Kingdom, on cooperative efforts to--
(A) provide refugee and asylum protections for
victims of, and individuals with a fear of, persecution
in Hong Kong, either by Hong Kong authorities or other
authorities acting on behalf of the PRC;
(B) enhance protocols to facilitate the
resettlement of refugees and displaced persons from
Hong Kong;
(C) identify and prevent the exploitation of
immigration and visa policies and procedures by corrupt
officials; and
(D) expedite the sharing of information, as
appropriate, related to the refusal of individual
applications for visas or other travel documents
submitted by residents of the Hong Kong SAR based on--
(i) national security or related grounds
under section 212(a)(3) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)); or
(ii) fraud or misrepresentation under
section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)).
(3) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation
with the heads of other Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall
submit a report on the plan described in paragraph (2) to the
appropriate congressional committees.
(i) Refugee Status for Certain Residents of Hong Kong.--
(1) In general.--Aliens described in paragraph (2) may
establish, for purposes of admission as a refugee under
sections 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1157) or asylum under section 208 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1158),
that such alien has a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion by asserting such
a fear and a credible basis for concern about the possibility
of such persecution.
(2) Aliens described.--
(A) In general.--An alien is described in this
subsection if such alien--
(i) is a Priority Hong Kong Resident and--
(I) had a significant role in a
civil society organization supportive
of the protests in 2019 and 2020
related to the Hong Kong National
Security Law and the encroachment on
the autonomy of Hong Kong by the PRC;
(II) was arrested, charged,
detained, or convicted of an offense
arising from their participation in an
action as described in section
206(b)(2) of the United States-Hong
Kong Policy Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C.
5726(b)(2)) that was not violent in
nature; or
(III) has had their citizenship,
nationality, or residency revoked for
having submitted to any United States
Government agency a nonfrivolous
application for refugee status, asylum,
or any other immigration benefit under
the immigration laws (as defined in
section 101(a) of that Act (8 U.S.C.
1101(a)));
(ii) is a Priority Hong Kong Resident
spouse or child of an alien described in clause
(i); or
(iii) is the parent of an alien described
in clause (i), if such parent is a citizen of
the PRC and no other foreign state.
(B) Other categories.--The Secretary of Homeland
Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State,
may designate other categories of aliens for purposes
of establishing a well-founded fear of persecution
under paragraph (1) if such aliens share common
characteristics that identify them as targets of
persecution in the PRC on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion.
(C) Significant role.--For purposes of subclause
(I) of paragraph (2)(A)(i), a significant role shall
include, with respect to the protests described in such
clause--
(i) an organizing role;
(ii) a first aid responder;
(iii) a journalist or member of the media
covering or offering public commentary;
(iv) a provider of legal services to one or
more individuals arrested for participating in
such protests; or
(v) a participant who during the period
beginning on June 9, 2019, and ending on June
30, 2020, was arrested, charged, detained, or
convicted as a result of such participation.
(3) Age out protections.--For purposes of this subsection,
a determination of whether an alien is a child shall be made
using the age of the alien on the date an application for
refugee or asylum status in which the alien is a named
beneficiary is filed with the Secretary of Homeland Security.
(4) Exclusion from numerical limitations.--Aliens provided
refugee status under this subsection shall not be counted
against the numerical limitation on refugees established in
accordance with the procedures described in section 207 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157).
(5) Reporting requirements.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days
thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Homeland Security shall submit a report on the matters
described in subparagraph (B) to--
(i) the Committee on the Judiciary and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
and
(ii) the Committee on the Judiciary and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
(B) Matters to be included.--Each report required
by subparagraph (A) shall include, with respect to
applications submitted under this section--
(i) the total number of refugee and asylum
applications that are pending at the end of the
reporting period;
(ii) the average wait-times for all
applicants for refugee status or asylum
pending--
(I) a prescreening interview with a
resettlement support center;
(II) an interview with U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services;
and
(III) the completion of security
checks;
(iii) the number of approvals, referrals
including the source of the referral, denials
of applications for refugee status or asylum,
disaggregated by the reason for each such
denial; and
(iv) the number of refugee circuit rides to
interview populations that would include Hong
Kong SAR completed in the last 90 days, and the
number planned for the subsequent 90-day
period.
(C) Form.--Each report required by subparagraph (A)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
include a classified annex.
(D) Public reports.--The Secretary of State shall
make each report submitted under this paragraph
available to the public on the internet website of the
Department of State.
(j) Admission for Certain Highly Skilled Hong Kong Residents.--
(1) In general.--Subject to subsection (c), the Secretary
of Homeland Security, or, notwithstanding any other provision
of law, the Secretary of State in consultation with the
Secretary of Homeland Security, may provide an alien described
in subsection (b) with the status of a special immigrant under
section 101(a)(27) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)), if the alien--
(A) or an agent acting on behalf of the alien,
submits a petition for classification under section
203(b)(4) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(4));
(B) is otherwise eligible to receive an immigrant
visa;
(C) is otherwise admissible to the United States
for permanent residence (excluding the grounds for
inadmissibility specified in section 212(a)(4) of such
Act (8 U.S.C. (a)(4)); and
(D) clears a background check and appropriate
screening, as determined by the Secretary of Homeland
Security.
(2) Aliens described.--
(A) Principal aliens.--An alien is described in
this subsection if--
(i) the alien--
(I) is a Priority Hong Kong
Resident; and
(II) has earned a bachelor's or
higher degree from an institution of
higher education; and
(ii) the Secretary of Homeland Security
determines that such alien's relocation to the
United States would provide a significant
benefit to the United States.
(B) Spouses and children.--An alien is described in
this subsection if the alien is the spouse or child of
a principal alien described in paragraph (1).
(3) Numerical limitations.--
(A) In general.--The total number of principal
aliens who may be provided special immigrant status
under this section may not exceed 5,000 per year for
each of the 5 fiscal years beginning after the date of
the enactment of this Act. The Secretary of Homeland
Security may, in consultation with the Secretary of
State, prioritize the issuance of visas to individuals
with a bachelor's or higher degree in science,
technology, engineering, mathematics, medicine, or
health care.
(B) Exclusion from numerical limitations.--Aliens
provided immigrant status under this section shall not
be counted against any numerical limitation under
section 201, 202, 203, or 207 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1151, 1152, 1153, and 1157).
(4) Eligibility for admission under other classification.--
No alien shall be denied the opportunity to apply for admission
under this section solely because such alien qualifies as an
immediate relative or is eligible for any other immigrant
classification.
(5) Timeline for processing applications.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Homeland Security shall ensure that all
steps under the control of the United States Government
incidental to the approval of such applications,
including required screenings and background checks,
are completed not later than 1 year after the date on
which an eligible applicant submits an application
under subsection (a).
(B) Exception.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the
relevant Federal agencies may take additional time to
process applications described in paragraph (1) if
satisfaction of national security concerns requires
such additional time, provided that the Secretary of
Homeland Security, or the designee of the Secretary,
has determined that the applicant meets the
requirements for status as a special immigrant under
this section and has so notified the applicant.
(k) Termination.--Except as provided in section 6 of this Act, this
Act shall cease to have effect on the date that is 5 years after the
date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 304. EXPORT PROHIBITION OF MUNITIONS ITEMS TO THE HONG KONG POLICE
FORCE.
Section 3 of the Act entitled ``An Act to prohibit the commercial
export of covered munitions items to the Hong Kong Police Force'',
approved November 27, 2019 (Public Law 116-77; 133 Stat. 1173), is
amended by striking ``on December 31, 2021.'' and inserting the
following: ``on the date on which the President certifies to the
appropriate congressional committees that--
``(1) the Secretary of State has, on or after the date of
the enactment of this paragraph, certified under section 205 of
the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 that Hong Kong
warrants treatment under United States law in the same manner
as United States laws were applied to Hong Kong before July 1,
1997;
``(2) the Hong Kong Police have not engaged in gross
violations of human rights during the 1-year period ending on
the date of such certification; and
``(3) there has been an independent examination of human
rights concerns related to the crowd control tactics of the
Hong Kong Police and the Government of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region has adequately addressed those
concerns.''.
SEC. 305. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING THE ONGOING GENOCIDE AND CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY AGAINST UYGHURS AND OTHER MINORITY
GROUPS.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) On December 9, 1948, the United Nations General
Assembly unanimously adopted the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the Genocide
Convention) signifying a commitment in response to the
Holocaust and other crimes against humanity committed in the
first half of the twentieth century.
(2) The Genocide Convention entered into force on January
12, 1951, and declares that all state parties ``confirm that
genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war,
is a crime under international law which they undertake to
prevent and to punish''.
(3) The Genocide Convention defines genocide as ``any of
the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d)
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group''.
(4) The United States ratified the Genocide Convention with
the understanding that the commission of genocide requires
``the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in substantial
part, a [protected] group as such''.
(5) The People's Republic of China (PRC) is a state party
to the Genocide Convention.
(6) Since 2017, the PRC Government, under the direction and
control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), has detained and
sought to indoctrinate more than one million Uyghurs and
members of other ethnic and religious minority groups.
(7) Recent data indicate a significant drop in birth rates
among Uyghurs due to enforced sterilization, enforced abortion,
and more onerous birth quotas for Uyghurs compared to Han.
(8) There are credible reports of PRC Government campaigns
to promote marriages between Uyghurs and Han and to reduce
birth rates among Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims.
(9) Many Uyghurs reportedly have been assigned to factory
employment under conditions that indicate forced labor, and
some former detainees have reported food deprivation, beatings,
suppression of religious practices, family separation, and
sexual abuse.
(10) This is indicative of a systematic effort to eradicate
the ethnic and cultural identity and religious beliefs, and
prevent the births of, Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, and
members of religious minority groups.
(11) The birth rate in the Xinjiang region fell by 24
percent in 2019 compared to a 4.2 percent decline nationwide.
(12) On January 19, 2021, the Department of State
determined the PRC Government, under the direction and control
of the CCP, has committed crimes against humanity and genocide
against Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups
in Xinjiang.
(13) Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Former Secretary
of State Michael Pompeo have both stated that what has taken
place in Xinjiang is genocide and constitutes crimes against
humanity.
(14) Article VIII of the Genocide Convention provides,
``Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of
the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the
United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention
and suppression of acts of genocide''.
(15) The International Court of Justice has stated that it
is the obligation of all state parties to the Genocide
Convention to ``employ all means reasonably available to them,
so as to prevent genocide so far as possible''.
(16) The United States is a Permanent Member of the United
Nations Security Council.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that Congress--
(1) finds that the ongoing abuses against Uyghurs and
members of other ethnic and religious minority groups
constitute genocide as defined in the Genocide Convention and
crimes against humanity as understood under customary
international law;
(2) attributes these atrocity crimes against Uyghurs and
members of other ethnic and religious minority groups to the
People's Republic of China, under the direction and control of
the Chinese Communist Party;
(3) condemns this genocide and these crimes against
humanity in the strongest terms; and
(4) calls upon the President to direct the United States
Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the
voice, vote, and influence of the United States to--
(A) refer the People's Republic of China's genocide
and crimes against humanity against Uyghurs and members
of other ethnic and religious minority groups to the
competent organs of the United Nations for
investigation;
(B) seize the United Nations Security Council of
the circumstances of this genocide and crimes against
humanity and lead efforts to invoke multilateral
sanctions in response to these ongoing atrocities; and
(C) take all possible actions to bring this
genocide and these crimes against humanity to an end
and hold the perpetrators of these atrocities
accountable under international law.
SEC. 306. PREVENTION OF UYGHUR FORCED LABOR.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to prohibit the import of all goods, wares, articles,
or merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured, wholly or in
part, by forced labor from the People's Republic of China and
particularly any such goods, wares, articles, or merchandise
produced in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China;
(2) to encourage the international community to reduce the
import of any goods made with forced labor from the People's
Republic of China, particularly those goods mined,
manufactured, or produced in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region;
(3) to coordinate with Mexico and Canada to effectively
implement Article 23.6 of the United States-Mexico-Canada
Agreement to prohibit the importation of goods produced in
whole or in part by forced or compulsory labor, which includes
goods produced in whole or in part by forced or compulsory
labor in the People's Republic of China;
(4) to actively work to prevent, publicly denounce, and end
human trafficking as a horrific assault on human dignity and to
restore the lives of those affected by human trafficking, a
modern form of slavery;
(5) to regard the prevention of atrocities as in its
national interest, including efforts to prevent torture,
enforced disappearances, severe deprivation of liberty,
including mass internment, arbitrary detention, and widespread
and systematic use of forced labor, and persecution targeting
any identifiable ethnic or religious group; and
(6) to address gross violations of human rights in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region through bilateral diplomatic
channels and multilateral institutions where both the United
States and the People's Republic of China are members and with
all the authorities available to the United States Government,
including visa and financial sanctions, export restrictions,
and import controls.
(b) Prohibition on Importation of Goods Made in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), all
goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or
manufactured wholly or in part in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region of China, or by persons working with the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region government for purposes of
the ``poverty alleviation'' program or the ``pairing-
assistance'' program which subsidizes the establishment of
manufacturing facilities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region, shall be deemed to be goods, wares, articles, and
merchandise described in section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930
(19 U.S.C. 1307) and shall not be entitled to entry at any of
the ports of the United States.
(2) Exception.--The prohibition described in paragraph (1)
shall not apply if the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection--
(A) determines, by clear and convincing evidence,
that any specific goods, wares, articles, or
merchandise described in paragraph (1) were not
produced wholly or in part by convict labor, forced
labor, or indentured labor under penal sanctions; and
(B) submits to the appropriate congressional
committees and makes available to the public a report
that contains such determination.
(3) Effective date.--This section shall take effect on the
date that is 120 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
(c) Enforcement Strategy To Address Forced Labor in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Forced Labor Enforcement Task
Force, established under section 741 of the United States-
Mexico-Canada Agreement Implementation Act (19 U.S.C. 4681),
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report that contains an enforcement strategy to effectively
address forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
of China or products made by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz,
Tibetans, or members of other persecuted groups through forced
labor in any other part of the People's Republic of China. The
enforcement strategy shall describe the specific enforcement
plans of the United States Government regarding--
(A) goods, wares, articles, and merchandise
described in subsection (b)(1) that are imported into
the United States directly from the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region or made by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz,
Tibetans, or members of other persecuted groups in any
other part of the People's Republic of China;
(B) goods, wares, articles, and merchandise
described in subsection (b)(1) that are imported into
the United States from the People's Republic of China
and are mined, produced, or manufactured in part in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or by persons working
with the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region government
or the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps for
purposes of the ``poverty alleviation'' program or the
``pairing-assistance'' program; and
(C) goods, wares, articles, and merchandise
described in subsection (b)(1) that are imported into
the United States from third countries and are mined,
produced, or manufactured in part in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region or by persons working with the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region government or the
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps for purposes
of the ``poverty alleviation'' program or the
``pairing-assistance'' program.
(2) Matters to be included.--The strategy required by
paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) A description of the actions taken by the
United States Government to address forced labor in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region under section 307 of
the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307), including a
description of all Withhold Release Orders issued,
goods detained, and fines issued.
(B) A list of products made wholly or in part by
forced or involuntary labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region or made by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz,
Tibetans, or members of other persecuted groups in any
other part of the People's Republic of China, and a
list of businesses that sold products in the United
States made wholly or in part by forced or involuntary
labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or made
by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans, or members of
other persecuted groups in any other part of the
People's Republic of China.
(C) A list of facilities and entities, including
the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, that
source material from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region or by persons working with the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region government or the Xinjiang Production
and Construction Corps for purposes of the ``poverty
alleviation'' program or the ``pairing-assistance''
program, a plan for identifying additional such
facilities and entities, and facility- and entity-
specific enforcement plans, including issuing specific
Withhold Release Orders to support enforcement of
subsection (b), with regard to each listed facility or
entity.
(D) A list of high-priority sectors for
enforcement, which shall include cotton, tomatoes,
polysilicon, and a sector-specific enforcement plan for
each high-priority sector.
(E) A description of the additional resources
necessary for U.S. Customs and Border Protection to
effectively implement the enforcement strategy.
(F) A plan to coordinate and collaborate with
appropriate nongovernmental organizations and private
sector entities to discuss the enforcement strategy for
products made in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
(3) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex, if necessary.
(4) Updates.--The Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force shall
provide briefings to the appropriate congressional committees
on a quarterly basis and, as applicable, on any updates to the
strategy required by paragraph (1) or any additional actions
taken to address forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region, including actions described in this Act.
(5) Sunset.--This section shall cease to have effect on the
earlier of--
(A) the date that is 8 years after the date of the
enactment of this Act; or
(B) the date on which the President submits to the
appropriate congressional committees a determination
that the Government of the People's Republic of China
has ended mass internment, forced labor, and any other
gross violations of human rights experienced by
Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim
minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region.
(d) Determination Relating to Crimes Against Humanity or Genocide
in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall--
(A) determine if the practice of forced labor or
other crimes against Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and
members of other Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region of China can be considered
systematic and widespread and therefore constitutes
crimes against humanity or constitutes genocide as
defined in subsection (a) of section 1091 of title 18,
United States Code; and
(B) submit to the appropriate congressional
committees and make available to the public a report
that contains such determination.
(2) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1)--
(A) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may
include a classified annex, if necessary; and
(B) may be included in the report required by
subsection (e).
(e) Diplomatic Strategy To Address Forced Labor in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the heads of other appropriate Federal
departments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report that contains a United States
strategy to promote initiatives to enhance international
awareness of and to address forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region of China.
(2) Matters to be included.--The strategy required by
paragraph (1) shall include--
(A) a plan to enhance bilateral and multilateral
coordination, including sustained engagement with the
governments of United States partners and allies, to
end forced labor of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and
members of other Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region;
(B) public affairs, public diplomacy, and counter-
messaging efforts to promote awareness of the human
rights situation, including forced labor in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; and
(C) opportunities to coordinate and collaborate
with appropriate nongovernmental organizations and
private sector entities to raise awareness about forced
labor made products from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region and to provide assistance to Uyghurs, Kazakhs,
Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups,
including those formerly detained in mass internment
camps in the region.
(3) Additional matters to be included.--The report required
by paragraph (1) shall also include--
(A) to the extent practicable, a list of--
(i) entities in the People's Republic of
China or affiliates of such entities that
directly or indirectly use forced or
involuntary labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region; and
(ii) Foreign persons that acted as agents
of the entities or affiliates of entities
described in clause (i) to import goods into
the United States; and
(B) a description of actions taken by the United
States Government to address forced labor in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region under existing
authorities, including--
(i) the Trafficking Victims Protection Act
of 2000 (Public Law 106-386; 22 U.S.C. 7101 et
seq.);
(ii) the Elie Wiesel Genocide and
Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public Law
115-441; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note); and
(iii) the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note).
(4) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex, if necessary.
(5) Updates.--The Secretary of State shall include any
updates to the strategy required by paragraph (1) in the annual
Trafficking in Persons report required by section 110(b) of the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107(b)).
(6) Sunset.--This section shall cease to have effect the
earlier of--
(A) the date that is 8 years after the date of the
enactment of this Act; or
(B) the date on which the President submits to the
appropriate congressional committees a determination
that the Government of the People's Republic of China
has ended mass internment, forced labor, and any other
gross violations of human rights experienced by
Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim
minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region.
(f) Imposition of Sanctions Relating to Forced Labor in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.--
(1) Report required.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and not less
frequently than annually thereafter, the President
shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report that identifies each foreign
person, including any official of the Government of the
People's Republic of China, that the President
determines--
(i) knowingly engages in, is responsible
for, or facilitates the forced labor of
Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other
Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region of China; and
(ii) knowingly engages in, contributes to,
assists, or provides financial, material or
technological support for efforts to contravene
United States law regarding the importation of
forced labor goods from the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region.
(B) Form.--The report required under subparagraph
(A) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
contain a classified annex.
(2) Imposition of sanctions.--The President shall impose
the sanctions described in paragraph (3) with respect to each
foreign person identified in the report required under
paragraph (1)(A).
(3) Sanctions described.--The sanctions described in this
subsection are the following:
(A) Asset blocking.--The President shall exercise
all of the powers granted to the President under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and
prohibit all transactions in property and interests in
property of a foreign person identified in the report
required under paragraph (1)(A) if such property and
interests in property--
(i) are in the United States;
(ii) come within the United States; or
(iii) come within the possession or control
of a United States person.
(B) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or
parole.--
(i) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien
described in paragraph (1)(A) is--
(I) inadmissible to the United
States;
(II) ineligible to receive a visa
or other documentation to enter the
United States; and
(III) otherwise ineligible to be
admitted or paroled into the United
States or to receive any other benefit
under the Immigration and Nationality
Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
(ii) Current visas revoked.--
(I) In general.--An alien described
in paragraph (1)(A) is subject to
revocation of any visa or other entry
documentation regardless of when the
visa or other entry documentation is or
was issued.
(II) Immediate effect.--A
revocation under subclause (I) shall--
(aa) take effect
immediately; and
(bb) automatically cancel
any other valid visa or entry
documentation that is in the
alien's possession.
(4) Implementation; penalties.--
(A) Implementation.--The President may exercise all
authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1702 and 1704) to carry out this section.
(B) Penalties.--The penalties provided for in
subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1705) shall apply to a foreign person that violates,
attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a
violation of paragraph (1) to the same extent that such
penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful
act described in subsection (a) of such section 206.
(5) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of
sanctions under this section with respect to a foreign person
identified in the report required under paragraph (1)(A) if the
President determines and certifies to the appropriate
congressional committees that such a waiver is in the national
interest of the United States.
(6) Exceptions.--
(A) Exception for intelligence activities.--
Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any
activity subject to the reporting requirements under
title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3091 et seq.) or any authorized intelligence activities
of the United States.
(B) Exception to comply with international
obligations and for law enforcement activities.--
Sanctions under paragraph (3)(B) shall not apply with
respect to an alien if admitting or paroling the alien
into the United States is necessary--
(i) to permit the United States to comply
with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters
of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success
June 26, 1947, and entered into force November
21, 1947, between the United Nations and the
United States, or other applicable
international obligations; or
(ii) to carry out or assist law enforcement
activity in the United States.
(7) Termination of sanctions.--The President may terminate
the application of sanctions under this section with respect to
a foreign person if the President determines and reports to the
appropriate congressional committees not less than 15 days
before the termination takes effect that--
(A) information exists that the person did not
engage in the activity for which sanctions were
imposed;
(B) the person has been prosecuted appropriately
for the activity for which sanctions were imposed;
(C) the person has credibly demonstrated a
significant change in behavior, has paid an appropriate
consequence for the activity for which sanctions were
imposed, and has credibly committed to not engage in an
activity described in paragraph (1)(A) in the future;
or
(D) the termination of the sanctions is in the
national security interests of the United States.
(8) Sunset.--This section, and any sanctions imposed under
this section, shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after
the date of the enactment of this Act.
(9) Definitions of admission; admitted; alien.--In this
section, the terms ``admission'', ``admitted'', and ``alien''
have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).
(g) Disclosures to the Securities and Exchange Commission of
Certain Activities Related to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.--
(1) Policy statement.--It is the policy of the United
States to protect American investors, through stronger
disclosure requirements, alerting them to the presence of
Chinese and other companies complicit in gross violations of
human rights in United States capital markets, including
American and foreign companies listed on United States
exchanges that enable the mass internment and population
surveillance of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslim
minorities and source products made with forced labor in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China. Such involvements
represent clear, material risks to the share values and
corporate reputations of certain of these companies and hence
to prospective American investors, particularly given that the
United States Government has employed sanctions and export
restrictions to target individuals and entities contributing to
human rights abuses in the People's Republic of China.
(2) Disclosure of certain activities relating to the
xinjiang uyghur autonomous region.--
(A) In general.--Section 13 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m) is amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(s) Disclosure of Certain Activities Relating to the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region.--
``(1) In general.--Each issuer required to file an annual
or quarterly report under subsection (a) shall disclose in that
report the information required by paragraph (2) if, during the
period covered by the report, the issuer or any affiliate of
the issuer--
``(A) knowingly engaged in an activity with an
entity or the affiliate of an entity engaged in
creating or providing technology or other assistance to
create mass population surveillance systems in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China, including
any entity included on the Department of Commerce's
`Entity List' in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region;
``(B) knowingly engaged in an activity with an
entity or an affiliate of an entity building and
running detention facilities for Uyghurs, Kazakhs,
Kyrgyz, and other members of Muslim minority groups in
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region;
``(C) knowingly engaged in an activity with an
entity or an affiliate of an entity described in
section 7(c)(1) of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention
Act, including--
``(i) any entity engaged in the `pairing-
assistance' program which subsidizes the
establishment of manufacturing facilities in
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; or
``(ii) any entity for which the Department
of Homeland Security has issued a `Withhold
Release Order' under section 307 of the Tariff
Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307); or
``(D) knowingly conducted any transaction or had
dealings with--
``(i) any person the property and interests
in property of which were sanctioned by the
Secretary of State for the detention or abuse
of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, or other members
of Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region;
``(ii) any person the property and
interests in property of which are sanctioned
pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note); or
``(iii) any person or entity responsible
for, or complicit in, committing atrocities in
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
``(2) Information required.--
``(A) In general.--If an issuer described under
paragraph (1) or an affiliate of the issuer has engaged
in any activity described in paragraph (1), the
information required by this paragraph is a detailed
description of each such activity, including--
``(i) the nature and extent of the
activity;
``(ii) the gross revenues and net profits,
if any, attributable to the activity; and
``(iii) whether the issuer or the affiliate
of the issuer (as the case may be) intends to
continue the activity.
``(B) Exception.--The requirement to disclose
information under this paragraph shall not include
information on activities of the issuer or any
affiliate of the issuer activities relating to--
``(i) the import of manufactured goods,
including electronics, food products, textiles,
shoes, and teas, that originated in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; or
``(ii) manufactured goods containing
materials that originated or are sourced in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
``(3) Notice of disclosures.--If an issuer reports under
paragraph (1) that the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer has
knowingly engaged in any activity described in that paragraph,
the issuer shall separately file with the Commission,
concurrently with the annual or quarterly report under
subsection (a), a notice that the disclosure of that activity
has been included in that annual or quarterly report that
identifies the issuer and contains the information required by
paragraph (2).
``(4) Public disclosure of information.--Upon receiving a
notice under paragraph (3) that an annual or quarterly report
includes a disclosure of an activity described in paragraph
(1), the Commission shall promptly--
``(A) transmit the report to--
``(i) the President;
``(ii) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
the Committee on Financial Services of the
House of Representatives; and
``(iii) the Committee on Foreign Relations
and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs of the Senate; and
``(B) make the information provided in the
disclosure and the notice available to the public by
posting the information on the Internet website of the
Commission.
``(5) Investigations.--Upon receiving a report under
paragraph (4) that includes a disclosure of an activity
described in paragraph (1), the President shall--
``(A) make a determination with respect to whether
any investigation is needed into the possible
imposition of sanctions under the Global Magnitsky
Human Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note)
or section 8 of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act
or whether criminal investigations are warranted under
statutes intended to hold accountable individuals or
entities involved in the importation of goods produced
by forced labor, including under section 545, 1589, or
1761 of title 18, United States Code; and
``(B) not later than 180 days after initiating any
such investigation, make a determination with respect
to whether a sanction should be imposed or criminal
investigations initiated with respect to the issuer or
the affiliate of the issuer (as the case may be).
``(6) Atrocities defined.--In this subsection, the term
`atrocities' has the meaning given the term in section 6(2) of
the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018
(Public Law 115-441; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note).''.
(3) Sunset.--Section 13(s) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, as added by paragraph (2), is repealed on the earlier
of--
(A) the date that is 8 years after the date of the
enactment of this Act; or
(B) the date on which the President submits to the
appropriate congressional committees a determination
that the Government of the People's Republic of China
has ended mass internment, forced labor, and any other
gross violations of human rights experienced by
Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim
minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region.
(4) Effective date.--The amendment made by paragraph (2)
shall take effect with respect to reports required to be filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission after the date that
is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(h) Definitions.--In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee
on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and
Means of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and
the Committee on Finance of the Senate.
(2) Atrocities.--The term ``atrocities'' has the meaning
given the term in section 6(2) of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and
Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-441; 22
U.S.C. 2656 note).
(3) Crimes against humanity.--The term ``crimes against
humanity'' includes, when committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population,
with knowledge of the attack--
(A) murder;
(B) deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(C) torture;
(D) extermination;
(E) enslavement;
(F) rape, sexual slavery, or any other form of
sexual violence of comparable severity;
(G) persecution against any identifiable group or
collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic,
cultural, religious, gender, or other grounds that are
universally recognized as impermissible under
international law; and
(H) enforced disappearance of persons.
(4) Forced labor.--The term ``forced labor'' has the
meaning given the term in section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930
(19 U.S.C. 1307).
(5) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means a
person that is not a United States person.
(6) Person.--The term ``person'' means an individual or
entity.
(7) Mass population surveillance system.--The term ``mass
population surveillance system'' means installation and
integration of facial recognition cameras, biometric data
collection, cell phone surveillance, and artificial
intelligence technology with the ``Sharp Eyes'' and
``Integrated Joint Operations Platform'' or other technologies
that are used by Chinese security forces for surveillance and
big-data predictive policing.
(8) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence to the United States;
or
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the
United States or any jurisdiction within the United
States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.
SEC. 307. UYGHUR HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION.
(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Uyghur Human
Rights Protection Act''.
(b) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC)
has a long history of repressing Turkic Muslims and other
Muslim minority groups, particularly Uyghurs, in Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region (``Xinjiang'' or ``XUAR''), also known
as East Turkestan. Central and regional PRC government policies
have systematically discriminated against these minority groups
by denying them a range of civil and political rights,
particularly freedom of religion. Senior Chinese Communist
Party officials bear direct responsibility for these gross
human rights violations.
(2) PRC government abuses include the arbitrary detention
of more than 1,000,000 Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and
members of other Muslim minority groups, separation of working
age adults from their children and elderly parents, and the
integration of forced labor into supply chains. Those held in
detention facilities and internment camps in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region have described forced political
indoctrination, torture, beatings, food deprivation, sexual
assault, coordinated campaigns to reduce birth rates among
Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims through forced sterilization,
and denial of religious, cultural, and linguistic freedoms.
Recent media reports indicate that since 2019, the PRC
government has newly constructed, expanded, or fortified at
least 60 detention facilities with higher security or prison-
like features in Xinjiang.
(3) The Government of the People's Republic of China's
actions against Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of
other Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang violate international
human rights laws and norms, including--
(A) the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, to which the
People's Republic of China has acceded;
(B) the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which the
People's Republic of China has signed and ratified;
(C) The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, which the People's Republic
of China has signed and ratified;
(D) the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which the People's Republic of China
has signed; and
(E) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the International Labor Organization's Force Labor
Convention (no. 29) and the Abolition of Forced Labor
Convention (no. 105).
(c) Refugee Protections for Certain Residents of the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region.--
(1) Populations of special humanitarian concern.--The
Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of
Homeland Security, shall designate, as Priority 2 refugees of
special humanitarian concern--
(A) aliens who were nationals of the People's
Republic of China and residents of the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region on January 1, 2021;
(B) aliens who fled the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region after June 30, 2009, and reside in other
provinces of China or in a third country where such
alien is not firmly resettled; and
(C) the spouses, children, and parents (as such
terms are defined in subsections (a) and (b) of section
101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1101)) of individuals described in subparagraphs (A)
and (B), except that a child shall be an unmarried
person under 27 years of age.
(2) Processing of xinjiang uyghur autonomous region
refugees.--The processing of individuals described in paragraph
(1) for classification as refugees may occur in China or a
third country.
(3) Eligibility for admission as a refugee.--
(A) In general.--Aliens described in subparagraph
(B) may establish, for purposes of admission as a
refugee under section 207 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157) or asylum under section
208 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1158), that such alien has a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion by asserting such a
fear and asserting a credible basis for concern about
the possibility of such persecution.
(B) Aliens described.--An alien is described in
this subsection if such alien has been identified as a
person of special humanitarian concern pursuant to
paragraph (1) and--
(i) has experienced persecution in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region by the
Government of the People's Republic of China
including--
(I) forced and arbitrary detention
including in an internment or re-
education camp;
(II) forced political
indoctrination, torture, beatings, food
deprivation, and denial of religious,
cultural, and linguistic freedoms;
(III) forced labor;
(IV) forced separation from family
members;
(V) other forms of systemic
threats, harassment, and gross human
rights violations; or
(VI) has been formally charged,
detained, or convicted on account of
their peaceful actions as described in
the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of
2020 (Public Law 116-145); and
(ii) is currently a national of the
People's Republic of China whose residency in
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, or any
other area within the jurisdiction of the
People's Republic of China, was revoked for
having submitted to any United States
Government agency a nonfrivolous application
for refugee status, asylum, or any other
immigration benefit under United States law.
(C) Eligibility for admission under other
classification.--An alien may not be denied the
opportunity to apply for admission as a refugee or
asylum under this section solely because such alien
qualifies as an immediate relative of a national of the
United States or is eligible for admission to the
United States under any other immigrant classification.
(4) Priority.--The Secretary of State shall prioritize
bilateral diplomacy with third countries hosting former
residents of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and who face
significant diplomatic pressures from the Government of the
People's Republic of China.
(5) Reporting requirements.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days
thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Homeland Security shall submit a report on the matters
described in subparagraph (B) to--
(i) the Committee on the Judiciary and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
and
(ii) the Committee on the Judiciary and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
(B) Matters to be included.--Each report required
by subparagraph (A) shall include, with respect to
applications submitted under this section--
(i) the total number of applications that
are pending at the end of the reporting period;
(ii) the average wait-times and number of
applicants who are currently pending--
(I) a pre-screening interview with
a resettlement support center;
(II) an interview with U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services;
(III) the completion of security
checks; and
(IV) receipt of a final decision
after completion of an interview with
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services; and
(iii) the number of denials of applications
for refugee status, disaggregated by the reason
for each such denial.
(C) Form.--Each report required by paragraph (1)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
include a classified annex.
(D) Public reports.--The Secretary of State shall
make each report submitted under this subsection
available to the public on the internet website of the
Department of State.
(d) Statement of Policy on Encouraging Allies and Partners To Make
Similar Accommodations.--It is the policy of the United States to
encourage allies and partners of the United States to make
accommodations similar to the accommodations made in this Act for
residents of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region who are fleeing
oppression by the Government of the People's Republic of China.
(e) Termination.--This Act, and the amendments made by this Act,
shall cease to have effect on the date that is 10 years after the date
of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 308. REMOVAL OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
THAT COMMIT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.
The President shall direct the Permanent Representative of the
United States to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States to--
(1) reform the process for removing members of the United
Nations Human Rights Council that commit gross and systemic
violations of human rights, including--
(A) lowering the threshold vote at the United
Nations General Assembly for removal to a simple
majority;
(B) ensuring information detailing the member
country's human rights record is publicly available
before the vote on removal; and
(C) making the vote of each country on the removal
from the United Nations Human Rights Council publicly
available;
(2) reform the rules on electing members to the United
Nations Human Rights Council to ensure United Nations members
that have committed gross and systemic violations of human
rights are not elected to the Human Rights Council; and
(3) oppose the election to the Human Rights Council of any
United Nations member--
(A) currently designated as a country engaged in a
consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights pursuant to
section 116 or section 502B of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n, 2304);
(B) currently designated as a state sponsor of
terrorism;
(C) currently designated as a Tier 3 country under
the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22
U.S.C. 7101 et seq.);
(D) the government of which is identified on the
list published by the Secretary of State pursuant to
section 404(b) of the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of
2008 (22 U.S.C. 2370c-1(b)) as a government that
recruits and uses child soldiers; or
(E) the government of which the United States
determines to have committed genocide or crimes against
humanity.
SEC. 309. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO TIBET.
(a) Rank of United States Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues.--
Section 621 of the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is
amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), and (d), as
subsections (c), (d), and (e), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
``(b) Rank.--The Special Coordinator shall either be appointed by
the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, or shall be
an individual holding the rank of Under Secretary of State or
higher.''.
(b) Tibet Unit at United States Embassy in Beijing.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall establish a
Tibet Unit in the Political Section of the United States
Embassy in Beijing, People's Republic of China.
(2) Operation.--The Tibet Unit established under paragraph
(1) shall operate until such time as the Government of the
People's Republic of China permits--
(A) the United States Consulate General in Chengdu,
People's Republic of China, to reopen; or
(B) a United States Consulate General in Lhasa,
Tibet, to open.
(3) Staff.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary shall--
(i) assign not fewer than 2 United States
direct-hire personnel to the Tibet Unit
established under paragraph (1); and
(ii) hire not fewer than 1 locally engaged
staff member for such unit.
(B) Language training.--The Secretary shall make
Tibetan language training available to the personnel
assigned under subparagraph (A), consistent with the
Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note).
SEC. 310. UNITED STATES POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT ON THE
SUCCESSION OR REINCARNATION OF THE DALAI LAMA AND
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM OF TIBETAN BUDDHISTS.
(a) Reaffirmation of Policy.--It is the policy of the United
States, as provided under section 342(b) of division FF of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (Public Law 116-260), that any
``interference by the Government of the People's Republic of China or
any other government in the process of recognizing a successor or
reincarnation of the 14th Dalai Lama and any future Dalai Lamas would
represent a clear abuse of the right to religious freedom of Tibetan
Buddhists and the Tibetan people''.
(b) International Efforts To Protect Religious Freedom of Tibetan
Buddhists.--The Secretary of State should engage with United States
allies and partners to--
(1) support Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders' sole
religious authority to identify and install the 15th Dalai
Lama;
(2) oppose claims by the Government of the People's
Republic of China that the PRC has the authority to decide for
Tibetan Buddhists the 15th Dalai Lama; and
(3) reject interference by the Government of the People's
Republic of China in the religious freedom of Tibetan
Buddhists.
SEC. 311. DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNET FREEDOM AND GREAT
FIREWALL CIRCUMVENTION TOOLS FOR THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The People's Republic of China has repeatedly violated
its obligations under the Joint Declaration by suppressing the
basic rights and freedoms of Hong Kongers.
(2) On June 30, 2020, the National People's Congress passed
a ``National Security Law'' that further erodes Hong Kong's
autonomy and enables authorities to suppress dissent.
(3) The Government of the People's Republic of China
continues to utilize the National Security Law to undermine the
fundamental rights of the Hong Kong people through suppression
of the freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and the press.
(4) Article 9 of the National Security Law authorizes
unprecedented regulation and supervision of internet activity
in Hong Kong, including expanded police powers to force
internet service providers to censor content, hand over user
information, and block access to platforms.
(5) On January 13, 2021, the Hong Kong Broadband Network
blocked public access to HK Chronicles, a website promoting
pro-democracy viewpoints, under the authorities of the National
Security Law.
(6) On February 12, 2021, internet service providers
blocked access to the Taiwan Transitional Justice Commission
website in Hong Kong.
(7) Major tech companies including Facebook, Twitter,
WhatsApp and Google have stopped reviewing requests for user
data from Hong Kong authorities.
(8) On February 28, 2021, 47 pro-democracy activists in
Hong Kong were arrested and charged under the National Security
Law on the charge of ``conspiracy to commit subversion''.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should--
(1) support the ability of the people of Hong Kong to
maintain their freedom to access information online; and
(2) focus on investments in technologies that facilitate
the unhindered exchange of information in Hong Kong in advance
of any future efforts by the Chinese Communist Party--
(A) to suppress internet access;
(B) to increase online censorship; or
(C) to inhibit online communication and content-
sharing by the people of Hong Kong.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate;
(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate;
(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives;
(E) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives; and
(F) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
of the House of Representatives.
(2) Working group.--The term ``working group'' means--
(A) the Under Secretary of State for Civilian
Security, Democracy, and Human Rights;
(B) the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs;
(C) the Chief Executive Officer of the United
States Agency for Global Media and the President of the
Open Technology Fund; and
(D) the Administrator of the United States Agency
for International Development.
(3) Joint declaration.--The term ``Joint Declaration''
means the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of
Hong Kong, done at Beijing on December 19, 1984.
(d) Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State is authorized to
establish a working group to develop a strategy to bolster
internet resiliency and online access in Hong Kong. The
Secretary shall establish a Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program
in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor at the
Department of State. Additionally, the President of the
Technology Fund is authorized to establish a Hong Kong Internet
Freedom Program. These programs shall operate independently,
but in strategic coordination with other entities in the
working group. The Open Technology Fund shall remain
independent from Department of State direction in its
implementation of this, and any other Internet Freedom
Programs.
(2) Independence.--During the period beginning on the date
of the enactment of this Act and ending on September 30, 2023,
the Program shall be carried out independent from the mainland
China internet freedom portfolios in order to focus on
supporting liberties presently enjoyed by the people of Hong
Kong.
(3) Consolidation of department of state program.--
Beginning on October 1, 2023, the Secretary of State may--
(A) consolidate the Program with the mainland China
initiatives in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor; or
(B) continue to carry out the Program in accordance
with paragraph (2).
(4) Consolidation of open technology fund program.--
Beginning on October 1, 2023, the President of the Open
Technology Fund may--
(A) consolidate the Program with the mainland China
initiatives in the Open Technology Fund; or
(B) continue to carry out the Program in accordance
with paragraph (2).
(e) Support for Internet Freedom Technology Programs.--
(1) Grants authorized.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary of State, working
through the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor, and the Open Technology Fund, separately and
independently from the Secretary of State, are
authorized to award grants and contracts to private
organizations to support and develop programs in Hong
Kong that promote or expand--
(i) open, interoperable, reliable and
secure internet; and
(ii) the online exercise of human rights
and fundamental freedoms of individual
citizens, activists, human rights defenders,
independent journalists, civil society
organizations, and marginalized populations in
Hong Kong.
(B) Goals.--The goals of the programs developed
with grants authorized under subparagraph (A) should
be--
(i) to make the internet available in Hong
Kong;
(ii) to increase the number of the tools in
the technology portfolio;
(iii) to promote the availability of such
technologies and tools in Hong Kong;
(iv) to encourage the adoption of such
technologies and tools by the people of Hong
Kong;
(v) to scale up the distribution of such
technologies and tools throughout Hong Kong;
(vi) to prioritize the development of
tools, components, code, and technologies that
are fully open-source, to the extent
practicable;
(vii) to conduct research on repressive
tactics that undermine internet freedom in Hong
Kong;
(viii) to ensure digital safety guidance
and support is available to repressed
individual citizens, human rights defenders,
independent journalists, civil society
organizations and marginalized populations in
Hong Kong; and
(ix) to engage American private industry,
including e-commerce firms and social
networking companies, on the importance of
preserving internet access in Hong Kong.
(C) Grant recipients.--Grants authorized under this
paragraph shall be distributed to multiple vendors and
suppliers through an open, fair, competitive, and
evidence-based decision process--
(i) to diversify the technical base; and
(ii) to reduce the risk of misuse by bad
actors.
(D) Security audits.--New technologies developed
using grants from this paragraph shall undergo
comprehensive security audits to ensure that such
technologies are secure and have not been compromised
in a manner detrimental to the interests of the United
States or to individuals or organizations benefitting
from programs supported by the Open Technology Fund.
(2) Funding source.--The Secretary of State is authorized
to expend funds from the Human Rights and Democracy Fund of the
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the Department
of State during fiscal year 2020 for grants authorized under
paragraph (1) at any entity in the working group.
(3) Authorization of appropriations.--
(A) Open technology fund.--In addition to the funds
authorized to be expended pursuant to paragraph (2),
there are authorized to be appropriated to the Open
Technology Fund $5,000,000 for each of fiscal years
2022 and 2023 to carry out this subsection. This
funding is in addition to the funds authorized for the
Open Technology Fund through the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-
92).
(B) Bureau of democracy, human rights, and labor.--
In addition to the funds authorized to be expended
pursuant to paragraph (2), there are authorized to be
appropriated to the Office of Internet Freedom Programs
in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of
the Department of State $10,000,000 for each of fiscal
years 2022 and 2023 to carry out this section.
(C) Availability.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to
subparagraphs (A) and (B) shall remain available until
expended.
(f) Strategic Planning Report.--Not later than 120 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the
working group shall submit a classified report to the appropriate
committees of Congress that--
(1) describes the Federal Government's plan to bolster and
increase the availability of Great Firewall circumvention and
internet freedom technology in Hong Kong during fiscal year
2022;
(2) outlines a plan for--
(A) supporting the preservation of an open,
interoperable, reliable, and secure internet in Hong
Kong;
(B) increasing the supply of the technology
referred to in paragraph (1);
(C) accelerating the dissemination of such
technology;
(D) promoting the availability of internet freedom
in Hong Kong;
(E) utilizing presently-available tools in the
existing relevant portfolios for further use in the
unique context of Hong Kong;
(F) expanding the portfolio of tools in order to
diversify and strengthen the effectiveness and
resiliency of the circumvention efforts;
(G) providing training for high-risk groups and
individuals in Hong Kong; and
(H) detecting analyzing, and responding to new and
evolving censorship threats;
(3) includes a detailed description of the technical and
fiscal steps necessary to safely implement the plans referred
to in paragraphs (1) and (2), including an analysis of the
market conditions in Hong Kong;
(4) describes the Federal Government's plans for awarding
grants to private organizations for the purposes described in
subsection (e)(1)(A);
(5) outlines the working group's consultations regarding
the implementation of this section to ensure that all Federal
efforts are aligned and well coordinated; and
(6) outlines the Department of State's strategy to
influence global internet legal standards at international
organizations and multilateral fora.
SEC. 312. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) In General.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise
made available to carry out section 409 of the Asia Reassurance
Initiative (Public Law 115-409) include programs that prioritize the
protection and advancement of the freedoms of association, assembly,
religion, and expression for women, human rights activists, and ethnic
and religious minorities in the People's Republic of China.
(b) Use of Funds.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a)
may be used to fund nongovernmental agencies within the Indo-Pacific
region that are focused on the issues described in subsection (a).
(c) Consultation Requirement.--In carrying out this section, the
Assistant Secretary of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor shall consult
with the appropriate congressional committees and representatives of
civil society regarding--
(1) strengthening the capacity of the organizations
referred to in subsection (b);
(2) protecting members of the groups referred to in
subsection (a) who have been targeted for arrest, harassment,
forced sterilizations, coercive abortions, forced labor, or
intimidation, including members residing outside of the
People's Republic of China; and
(3) messaging efforts to reach the broadest possible
audiences within the People's Republic of China about United
States Government efforts to protect freedom of association,
expression, assembly, and the rights of ethnic minorities.
SEC. 313. REPEAL OF SUNSET APPLICABLE TO AUTHORITY UNDER GLOBAL
MAGNITSKY HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY ACT.
Section 1265 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability
Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656
note) is repealed.
SEC. 314. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING ANTI-ASIAN RACISM AND
DISCRIMINATION.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, crimes and
discrimination against Asians and those of Asian descent have
risen dramatically worldwide. In May 2020, United Nations
Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said ``the pandemic
continues to unleash a tsunami of hate and xenophobia,
scapegoating and scare-mongering'' and urged governments to
``act now to strengthen the immunity of our societies against
the virus of hate''.
(2) Asian American and Pacific Island (AAPI) workers make
up a large portion of the essential workers on the frontlines
of the COVID-19 pandemic, making up 8.5 percent of all
essential healthcare workers in the United States. AAPI workers
also make up a large share--between 6 percent and 12 percent
based on sector--of the biomedical field.
(3) The United States Census notes that Americans of Asian
descent alone made up nearly 5.9 percent of the United States
population in 2019, and that Asian Americans are the fastest-
growing racial group in the United States, projected to
represent 14 percent of the United States population by 2065.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the reprehensible attacks on people of Asian descent
and concerning increase in anti-Asian sentiment and racism in
the United States and around the world have no place in a
peaceful, civilized, and tolerant world;
(2) the United States is a diverse nation with a proud
tradition of immigration, and the strength and vibrancy of the
United States is enhanced by the diverse ethnic backgrounds and
tolerance of its citizens, including Asian Americans and
Pacific Islanders;
(3) the United States Government should encourage other
foreign governments to use the official and scientific names
for the COVID-19 pandemic, as recommended by the World Health
Organization and the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention; and
(4) the United States Government and other governments
around the world must actively oppose racism and intolerance,
and use all available and appropriate tools to combat the
spread of anti-Asian racism and discrimination.
SEC. 315. ANNUAL REPORTING ON CENSORSHIP OF FREE SPEECH WITH RESPECT TO
INTERNATIONAL ABUSES OF HUMAN RIGHTS.
Section 116(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act (227 U.S.C. 2151n(d))
is amended--
(1) in paragraph (11)(C), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (12)(C)(ii), by striking the period at the
end and inserting a semicolon; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(13) wherever applicable, instances in which the
government of each country has attempted to extraterritorially
intimidate or pressure a company or entity to censor or self-
censor the speech of its employees, contractors, customers, or
associated staff with regards to the abuse of human rights in
such country, or sought retaliation against such employees or
contractors for the same, including any instance in which the
government of China has sought to extraterritorially censor or
punish speech that is otherwise legal in the United States on
the topics of--
``(A) repression and violation of fundamental
freedoms in Hong Kong;
``(B) repression and persecution of religious and
ethnic minorities in China, including in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region and the Tibet Autonomous
Region;
``(C) efforts to proliferate and use surveillance
technologies to surveil activists, journalists,
opposition politicians, or to profile persons of
different ethnicities; and
``(D) other gross violations of human rights; and
``(14) wherever applicable, instances which a company or
entity located in or based in a third country has censored or
self-censored the speech of its employees, contractors,
customers, or associated staff on the topic of abuse of human
rights in each country or sought to retaliate against such
employees for the same, due to intimidation or pressure from or
the fear of intimidation by the foreign government.''.
TITLE IV--INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT
SEC. 401. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE PRC'S INDUSTRIAL POLICY.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the challenges presented by a nonmarket economy like
the PRC's economy, which has captured such a large share of
global economic exchange, are in many ways unprecedented and
require sufficiently elevated and sustained long-term focus and
engagement;
(2) in order to truly address the most detrimental aspects
of CCP-directed mercantilist economic strategy, the United
States must adopt policies that--
(A) expose the full scope and scale of intellectual
property theft and mass subsidization of Chinese firms,
and the resulting harm to the United States, foreign
markets, and the global economy;
(B) ensure that PRC companies face costs and
consequences for anticompetitive behavior;
(C) provide options for affected United States
persons to address and respond to unreasonable and
discriminatory CCP-directed industrial policies; and
(D) strengthen the protection of critical
technology and sensitive data, while still fostering an
environment that provides incentives for secure but
open investment, innovation, and competition;
(3) the United States must work with its allies and
partners and multilateral venues and fora--
(A) to reinforce long-standing generally accepted
principles of fair competition and market behavior and
address the PRC's anticompetitive economic and
industrial policies that undermine decades of global
growth and innovation;
(B) to ensure that the PRC is not granted the same
treatment as that of a free-market economy until it
ceases the implementation of laws, regulations,
policies, and practices that provide unfair advantage
to PRC firms in furtherance of national objectives and
impose unreasonable, discriminatory, and illegal
burdens on market-based international commerce; and
(C) to align policies with respect to curbing
state-directed subsidization of the private sector,
such as advocating for global rules related to
transparency and adherence to notification
requirements, including through the efforts currently
being advanced by the United States, Japan, and the
European Union;
(4) the United States and its allies and partners must
collaborate to provide incentives to their respective companies
to cooperate in areas such as--
(5) the United States should develop policies that--
(A) insulate United States entities from PRC
pressure against complying with United States laws;
(B) together with the work of allies and partners
and multilateral institutions, counter the potential
impact of the blocking regime of the PRC established by
the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC on January 9, 2021,
when it issued Order No. 1 of 2021, entitled ``Rules on
Counteracting Unjustified Extraterritorial Application
of Foreign Legislation and other Measures''; and
(C) plan for future actions that the Government of
the PRC may take to undermine the lawful application of
United States legal authorities, including with respect
to the use of sanctions.
SEC. 402. ECONOMIC DEFENSE RESPONSE TEAMS.
(a) Pilot Program.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall develop and implement a
pilot program for the creation of deployable economic defense response
teams to help provide emergency technical assistance and support to a
country subjected to the threat or use of coercive economic measures
and to play a liaison role between the legitimate government of that
country and the United States Government. Such assistance and support
may include the following activities:
(1) Reducing the partner country's vulnerability to
coercive economic measures.
(2) Minimizing the damage that such measures by an
adversary could cause to that country.
(3) Implementing any bilateral or multilateral contingency
plans that may exist for responding to the threat or use of
such measures.
(4) In coordination with the partner country, developing or
improving plans and strategies by the country for reducing
vulnerabilities and improving responses to such measures in the
future.
(5) Assisting the partner country in dealing with foreign
sovereign investment in infrastructure or related projects that
may undermine the partner country's sovereignty.
(6) Assisting the partner country in responding to specific
efforts from an adversary attempting to employ economic
coercion that undermines the partner country's sovereignty,
including efforts in the cyber domain, such as efforts that
undermine cybersecurity or digital security of the partner
country or initiatives that introduce digital technologies in a
manner that undermines freedom, security, and sovereignty of
the partner country.
(7) Otherwise providing direct and relevant short-to-medium
term economic or other assistance from the United States and
marshalling other resources in support of effective responses
to such measures.
(b) Reports Required.--
(1) Report on establishment.--Upon establishment of the
pilot program required by subsection (a), the Secretary of
State shall provide the appropriate committees of Congress with
a detailed report and briefing describing the pilot program,
the major elements of the program, the personnel and
institutions involved, and the degree to which the program
incorporates the elements described in subsection (a).
(2) Follow-up report.--Not later than one year after the
report required by paragraph (1), the Secretary of State shall
provide the appropriate committees of Congress with a detailed
report and briefing describing the operations over the previous
year of the pilot program established pursuant to subsection
(a), as well as the Secretary's assessment of its performance
and suitability for becoming a permanent program.
(3) Form.--Each report required under this subsection shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(c) Declaration of an Economic Crisis Required.--
(1) Notification.--The President may activate an economic
defense response team for a period of 180 days under the
authorities of this section to assist a partner country in
responding to an unusual and extraordinary economic coercive
threat by an adversary of the United States upon the
declaration of a coercive economic emergency, together with
notification to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Extension authority.--The President may activate the
response team for an additional 180 days upon the submission of
a detailed analysis to the committees described in paragraph
(1) justifying why the continued deployment of the economic
defense response team in response to the economic emergency is
in the national security interest of the United States.
(d) Sunset.--The authorities provided under this section shall
expire on December 31, 2026.
(e) Rule of Construction.--Neither the authority to declare an
economic crisis provided for in subsection (d), nor the declaration of
an economic crisis pursuant to subsection (d), shall confer or be
construed to confer any authority, power, duty, or responsibility to
the President other than the authority to activate an economic defense
response team as described in this section.
(f) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources, the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and
Forestry, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Financial Services, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the
Committee on Agriculture, and the Committee on Ways and Means
of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 403. COUNTERING OVERSEAS KLEPTOCRACY.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Authoritarian leaders in foreign countries abuse their
power to steal assets from state institutions, enrich
themselves at the expense of their countries' economic
development, and use corruption as a strategic tool both to
solidify their grip on power and to undermine democratic
institutions abroad.
(2) Global corruption harms the competitiveness of United
States businesses, weakens democratic governance, feeds
terrorist recruitment and transnational organized crime,
enables drug smuggling and human trafficking, and stymies
economic growth.
(3) Illicit financial flows often penetrate countries
through what appear to be legitimate financial transactions, as
kleptocrats launder money, use shell companies, amass offshore
wealth, and participate in a global shadow economy.
(4) The Government of the Russian Federation is a leading
model of this type of kleptocratic system, using state-
sanctioned corruption to both erode democratic governance from
within and discredit democracy abroad, thereby strengthening
the authoritarian rule of Vladimir Putin.
(5) Corrupt individuals and entities in the Russian
Federation, often with the backing and encouragement of
political leadership, use stolen money--
(A) to purchase key assets in other countries,
often with a goal of attaining monopolistic control of
a sector;
(B) to gain access to and influence the policies of
other countries; and
(C) to advance Russian interests in other
countries, particularly those that undermine confidence
and trust in democratic systems.
(6) Systemic corruption in the People's Republic of China,
often tied to, directed by, or backed by the leadership of the
Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Government is used--
(A) to provide unfair advantage to certain People's
Republic of China economic entities;
(B) to increase other countries' economic
dependence on the People's Republic of China to secure
greater deference to the People's Republic of China's
diplomatic and strategic goals; and
(C) to exploit corruption in foreign governments
and among other political elites to enable People's
Republic of China state-backed firms to pursue
predatory and exploitative economic practices.
(7) Thwarting these tactics by Russian, Chinese, and other
kleptocratic actors requires the international community to
strengthen democratic governance and the rule of law.
International cooperation in combating corruption and illicit
finance is vital to such efforts, especially by empowering
reformers in foreign countries during historic political
openings for the establishment of the rule of law in those
countries.
(8) Technical assistance programs that combat corruption
and strengthen the rule of law, including through assistance
provided by the Department of State's Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the United States
Agency for International Development, and through programs like
the Department of Justice's Office of Overseas Prosecutorial
Development, Assistance and Training and the International
Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, can have
lasting and significant impacts for both foreign and United
States interests.
(9) There currently exist numerous international
instruments to combat corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit
finance, including--
(A) the Inter-American Convention against
Corruption of the Organization of American States, done
at Caracas March 29, 1996;
(B) the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions
of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and
Development, done at Paris December 21, 1997 (commonly
referred to as the ``Anti-Bribery Convention'');
(C) the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, done at New York
November 15, 2000;
(D) the United Nations Convention against
Corruption, done at New York October 31, 2003;
(E) Recommendation of the Council for Further
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, adopted November
26, 2009; and
(F) recommendations of the Financial Action Task
Force comprising the International Standards on
Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of
Terrorism and Proliferation.
(b) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate;
(B) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
(D) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
(E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives;
(F) the Committee on Financial Services of the
House of Representatives;
(G) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives; and
(H) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Foreign assistance.--The term ``foreign assistance''
means foreign assistance authorized under the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2251 et seq.).
(3) Foreign state.--The term ``foreign state'' has the
meaning given such term in section 1603(a) of title 28, United
States Code.
(4) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given such term in section 3(4) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).
(5) Public corruption.--The term ``public corruption''
includes the unlawful exercise of entrusted public power for
private gain, such as through bribery, nepotism, fraud,
extortion, or embezzlement.
(6) Rule of law.--The term ``rule of law'' means the
principle of governance in which all persons, institutions, and
entities, whether public or private, including the state, are
accountable to laws that are--
(A) publicly promulgated;
(B) equally enforced;
(C) independently adjudicated; and
(D) consistent with international human rights
norms and standards.
(c) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to leverage United States diplomatic engagement and
foreign assistance to promote the rule of law;
(2)(A) to promote international instruments to combat
corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit finance, including
instruments referred to in subsection (a)(9), and other
relevant international standards and best practices, as such
standards and practices develop; and
(B) to promote the adoption and implementation of such
laws, standards, and practices by foreign states;
(3) to support foreign states in promoting good governance
and combating public corruption;
(4) to encourage and assist foreign partner countries to
identify and close loopholes in their legal and financial
architecture, including the misuse of anonymous shell
companies, free trade zones, and other legal structures, that
are enabling illicit finance to penetrate their financial
systems;
(5) to help foreign partner countries to investigate,
prosecute, adjudicate, and more generally combat the use of
corruption by malign actors, including authoritarian
governments, particularly the Government of the Russian
Federation and the Government of the People's Republic of
China, as a tool of malign influence worldwide;
(6) to assist in the recovery of kleptocracy-related stolen
assets for victims, including through the use of appropriate
bilateral arrangements and international agreements, such as
the United Nations Convention against Corruption, done at New
York October 31, 2003, and the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime, done at New York
November 15, 2000;
(7) to use sanctions authorities, such as the Global
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (subtitle F of title
XII of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2017 (Public Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note)) and section
7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2020 (division G of Public
Law 116-94), to identify and take action against corrupt
foreign actors;
(8) to ensure coordination between relevant Federal
departments and agencies with jurisdiction over the advancement
of good governance in foreign states; and
(9) to lead the creation of a formal grouping of like-
minded states--
(A) to coordinate efforts to counter corruption,
kleptocracy, and illicit finance; and
(B) to strengthen collective financial defense.
(d) Anti-Corruption Action Fund.--
(1) Establishment.--There is established in the United
States Treasury a fund, to be known as the ``Anti-Corruption
Action Fund'', only for the purposes of--
(A) strengthening the capacity of foreign states to
prevent and fight public corruption;
(B) assisting foreign states to develop rule of
law-based governance structures, including accountable
civilian police, prosecutorial, and judicial
institutions;
(C) supporting foreign states to strengthen
domestic legal and regulatory frameworks to combat
public corruption, including the adoption of best
practices under international law; and
(D) supplementing existing foreign assistance and
diplomacy with respect to efforts described in
subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C).
(2) Funding.--
(A) Transfers.--Beginning on or after the date of
the enactment of this Act, if total criminal fines and
penalties in excess of $50,000,000 are imposed against
a person under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977 (Public Law 95-213) or section 13, 30A, or 32 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m,
78dd-1, and 78ff), whether pursuant to a criminal
prosecution, enforcement proceeding, deferred
prosecution agreement, nonprosecution agreement, a
declination to prosecute or enforce, or any other
resolution, the court (in the case of a conviction) or
the Attorney General shall impose an additional
prevention payment equal to $5,000,000 against such
person, which shall be deposited in the Anti-Corruption
Action Fund established under paragraph (1).
(B) Availability of funds.--Amounts deposited into
the Anti-Corruption Action Fund pursuant to
subparagraph (A) shall be available to the Secretary of
State only for the purposes described in paragraph (1),
without fiscal year limitation or need for subsequent
appropriation.
(C) Limitation.--None of the amounts made available
to the Secretary of State from the Anti-Corruption
Action Fund may be used inside the United States,
except for administrative costs related to overseas
program implementation pursuant to paragraph (1).
(3) Support.--The Anti-Corruption Action Fund--
(A) may support governmental and nongovernmental
parties in advancing the purposes described in
paragraph (1); and
(B) shall be allocated in a manner complementary to
existing United States foreign assistance, diplomacy,
and anti-corruption activities.
(4) Allocation and prioritization.--In programming foreign
assistance made available through the Anti-Corruption Action
Fund, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Attorney
General, shall prioritize projects that--
(A) assist countries that are undergoing historic
opportunities for democratic transition, combating
corruption, and the establishment of the rule of law;
and
(B) are important to United States national
interests.
(5) Technical assistance providers.--For any technical
assistance to a foreign governmental party under this section,
the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Attorney
General, shall prioritize United States Government technical
assistance providers as implementers, in particular the Office
of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training
and the International Criminal Investigative Training
Assistance Program at the Department of Justice.
(6) Public diplomacy.--The Secretary of State shall
announce that funds deposited in the Anti-Corruption Action
Fund are derived from actions brought under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act to demonstrate that the use of such funds are--
(A) contributing to international anti-corruption
work; and
(B) reducing the pressure that United States
businesses face to pay bribes overseas, thereby
contributing to greater competitiveness of United
States companies.
(7) Reporting.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act and not less frequently than annually
thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the
appropriate congressional committees that contains--
(A) the balance of the funding remaining in the
Anti-Corruption Action Fund;
(B) the amount of funds that have been deposited
into the Anti-Corruption Action Fund; and
(C) a summary of the obligation and expenditure of
such funds.
(8) Notification requirements.--None of the amounts made
available to the Secretary of State from the Anti-Corruption
Action Fund pursuant to this section shall be available for
obligation, or for transfer to other departments, agencies, or
entities, unless the Secretary of State notifies the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives, not later than
15 days in advance of such obligation or transfer.
(e) Interagency Anti-corruption Task Force.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State, in cooperation
with the Interagency Anti-Corruption Task Force established
pursuant to paragraph (2), shall manage a whole-of-government
effort to improve coordination among Federal departments and
agencies and donor organizations with a role in--
(A) promoting good governance in foreign states;
and
(B) enhancing the ability of foreign states to
combat public corruption.
(2) Interagency anti-corruption task force.--Not later than
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of State shall establish and convene the Interagency
Anti-Corruption Task Force (referred to in this section as the
``Task Force''), which shall be composed of representatives
appointed by the President from appropriate departments and
agencies, including the Department of State, the United States
Agency for International Development, the Department of
Justice, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of
Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, the Department of
Commerce, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the
intelligence community.
(3) Additional meetings.--The Task Force shall meet not
less frequently than twice per year.
(4) Duties.--The Task Force shall--
(A) evaluate, on a general basis, the effectiveness
of existing foreign assistance programs, including
programs funded by the Anti-Corruption Action Fund,
that have an impact on--
(i) promoting good governance in foreign
states; and
(ii) enhancing the ability of foreign
states to combat public corruption;
(B) assist the Secretary of State in managing the
whole-of-government effort described in paragraph (1);
(C) identify general areas in which such whole-of-
government effort could be enhanced; and
(D) recommend specific programs for foreign states
that may be used to enhance such whole-of-government
effort.
(5) Briefing requirement.--Not later than 1 year after the
date of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently than
annually thereafter through the end of fiscal year 2026, the
Secretary of State shall provide a briefing to the appropriate
congressional committees regarding the ongoing work of the Task
Force. Each briefing shall include the participation of a
representative of each of the departments and agencies
described in paragraph (2), to the extent feasible.
(f) Designation of Embassy Anti-Corruption Points of Contact.--
(1) Embassy anti-corruption point of contact.--The chief of
mission of each United States embassy shall designate an anti-
corruption point of contact for each such embassy.
(2) Duties.--The designated anti-corruption points of
contact designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall--
(A) coordinate, in accordance with guidance from
the Interagency Anti-Corruption Task Force established
pursuant to subsection (e)(2), an interagency approach
within United States embassies to combat public
corruption in the foreign states in which such
embassies are located that is tailored to the needs of
such foreign states, including all relevant Federal
departments and agencies with a presence in such
foreign states, such as the Department of State, the
United States Agency for International Development, the
Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury,
the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of
Defense, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the
intelligence community;
(B) make recommendations regarding the use of the
Anti-Corruption Action Fund and other foreign
assistance funding related to anti-corruption efforts
in their respective countries of responsibility that
aligns with United States diplomatic engagement; and
(C) ensure that anti-corruption activities carried
out within their respective countries of responsibility
are included in regular reporting to the Secretary of
State and the Interagency Anti-Corruption Task Force,
including United States embassy strategic planning
documents and foreign assistance-related reporting, as
appropriate.
(3) Training.--The Secretary of State shall develop and
implement appropriate training for the designated anti-
corruption points of contact.
(g) Reporting Requirements.--
(1) Report or briefing on progress toward implementation.--
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, and annually thereafter for the following 3 years, the
Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of
the United States Agency for International Development, the
Attorney General, and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall
submit a report or provide a briefing to the appropriate
congressional committees that summarizes progress made in
combating public corruption and in implementing this Act,
including--
(A) identifying opportunities and priorities for
outreach with respect to promoting the adoption and
implementation of relevant international law and
standards in combating public corruption, kleptocracy,
and illicit finance;
(B) describing--
(i) the bureaucratic structure of the
offices within the Department of State and the
United States Agency for International
Development that are engaged in activities to
combat public corruption, kleptocracy, and
illicit finance; and
(ii) how such offices coordinate their
efforts with each other and with other relevant
Federal departments and agencies;
(C) providing a description of how the provisions
under paragraphs (4) and (5) of subsection (d) have
been applied to each project funded by the Anti-
Corruption Action Fund;
(D) providing an explanation as to why a United
States Government technical assistance provider was not
used if technical assistance to a foreign governmental
entity is not implemented by a United States Government
technical assistance provider;
(E) describing the activities of the Interagency
Anti-Corruption Task Force established pursuant to
subsection (e)(2);
(F) identifying--
(i) the designated anti-corruption points
of contact for foreign states; and
(ii) any training provided to such points
of contact; and
(G) recommending additional measures that would
enhance the ability of the United States Government to
combat public corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit
finance overseas.
(2) Online platform.--The Secretary of State, in
conjunction with the Administrator of the United States Agency
for International Development, should consolidate existing
reports with anti-corruption components into a single online,
public platform that includes--
(A) the Annual Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices required under section 116 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n);
(B) the Fiscal Transparency Report required under
section 7031(b) of the Department of State, Foreign
Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
2019 (division F of Public Law 116-6);
(C) the Investment Climate Statement reports;
(D) the International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report;
(E) any other relevant public reports; and
(F) links to third-party indicators and compliance
mechanisms used by the United States Government to
inform policy and programming, as appropriate, such
as--
(i) the International Finance Corporation's
Doing Business surveys;
(ii) the International Budget Partnership's
Open Budget Index; and
(iii) multilateral peer review anti-
corruption compliance mechanisms, such as--
(I) the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development's Working
Group on Bribery in International
Business Transactions;
(II) the Follow-Up Mechanism for
the Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption; and
(III) the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption, done at New York
October 31, 2003.
TITLE V--ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY
SEC. 501. COOPERATION ON A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DIALOGUE.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to pursue, in coordination with United States allies,
arms control negotiations and sustained and regular engagement
with the PRC--
(A) to enhance understanding of each other's
respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and
capabilities;
(B) to improve transparency; and
(C) to help manage the risks of miscalculation and
misperception;
(2) to formulate a strategy to engage the Government of the
People's Republic of China on relevant issues that lays the
groundwork for a constructive arms control framework,
including--
(A) fostering dialogue on arms control leading to
the convening of strategic security talks;
(B) negotiating norms for outer space;
(C) developing pre-launch notification regimes
aimed at reducing nuclear miscalculation; and
(D) expanding lines of communication between both
governments for the purposes of reducing the risks of
conventional war and increasing transparency;
(3) to pursue relevant negotiations in coordination with
our allies and partners to ensure the security of United States
and allied interests to slow the PRC's military modernization
and expansion, including on--
(A) ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles;
(B) integrated air and missile defense;
(C) hypersonic missiles;
(D) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
(E) space-based capabilities;
(F) cyber capabilities; and
(G) command, control, and communications; and
(4) to ensure that the United States policy continues to
reassure allies.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) it is in the interest of both nations to cooperate in
reducing risks of conventional and nuclear escalation;
(2) a physical, cyber, electronic, or any other PLA attack
on United States early warning satellites, other portions of
the nuclear command and control enterprise, or critical
infrastructure poses a high risk to inadvertent but rapid
escalation;
(3) the United States and its allies should promote
international norms on military operations in space, the
employment of cyber capabilities, and the military use of
artificial intelligence, as an element of risk reduction
regarding nuclear command and control; and
(4) United States allies and partners should share the
burden of promoting and protecting norms regarding the
weaponization of space, highlighting unsafe behavior that
violates international norms, such as in rendezvous and
proximity operations, and promoting responsible behavior in
space and all other domains.
SEC. 502. REPORT ON UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO ENGAGE THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON NUCLEAR ISSUES AND BALLISTIC MISSILE
ISSUES.
(a) Report on the Future of United States-China Arms Control.--Not
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and
the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a report, and if necessary a separate classified annex, that
outlines the approaches and strategies they will pursue to engage the
Government of the People's Republic of China on arms control and risk
reduction, including--
(1) areas of potential dialogue between the Governments of
the United States and the People's Republic of China, including
on ballistic, hypersonic glide, and cruise missiles,
conventional forces, nuclear, space, and cyberspace issues, as
well as other new strategic domains, which could reduce the
likelihood of war, limit escalation if a conflict were to
occur, and constrain a destabilizing arms race in the Indo-
Pacific;
(2) how the United States Government can engage the
Government of the People's Republic of China in a constructive
arms control dialogue;
(3) identifying strategic military capabilities of the
People's Republic of China that the United States Government is
most concerned about and how limiting these capabilities may
benefit United States and allied security interests;
(4) mechanisms to avoid, manage, or control nuclear,
conventional, and unconventional military escalation between
the United States and the People's Republic of China;
(5) the personnel and expertise required to effectively
engage the People's Republic of China in strategic stability
and arms control dialogues; and
(6) opportunities and methods to encourage transparency
from the People's Republic of China.
(b) Report on Arms Control Talks With the People's Republic of
China.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of
Defense and the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a report that describes--
(1) a concrete plan for arms control talks with the
People's Republic of China;
(2) if a bilateral arms control dialogue does not arise,
what alternative plans the Department of State envisages for
ensuring the security of the United States and its allies
through international arms control negotiations;
(3) effects on the credibility of United States extended
deterrence assurances to allies and partners if arms control
negotiations do not materialize and the implications for
regional security architectures;
(4) efforts at engaging the People's Republic of China to
join arms control talks, whether on a bilateral or
international basis; and
(5) the interest level of the Government of China in
joining arms control talks, whether on a bilateral or
international basis, including through--
(A) a formal invitation to appropriate officials
from the People's Republic of China, and to each of the
permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council, to observe a United States-Russian Federation
New START Treaty on-site inspection to demonstrate the
security benefits of transparency into strategic
nuclear forces;
(B) discussions on how to advance international
negotiations on the fissile material cut-off;
(C) an agreement with the People's Republic of
China that allows for advance notifications of
ballistic missile launches, through the Hague Code of
Conduct or other data exchanges or doctrine discussions
related to strategic nuclear forces;
(D) an agreement not to target or interfere in
nuclear command, control, and communications (commonly
referred to as ``NC3'') infrastructure; or
(E) any other cooperative measure that benefits
United States-People's Republic of China strategic
stability.
(c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the
House of Representatives.
SEC. 503. COUNTERING CHINA'S PROLIFERATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES AND
NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TO THE MIDDLE EAST.
(a) MTCR Transfers.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a written determination, and any documentation
to support that determination detailing--
(1) whether any foreign person in China knowingly exported,
transferred, or engaged in trade of any item designated under
Category I of the MTCR Annex to any foreign person in the
previous three fiscal years; and
(2) the sanctions the President has imposed or intends to
impose pursuant to section 11B(b) of the Export Administration
Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4612(b)) against any foreign person who
knowingly engaged in the export, transfer, or trade of that
item or items.
(b) China's Nuclear Fuel Cycle Cooperation.--Not later than 30 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit
to the appropriate committees of Congress a report detailing--
(1) whether any foreign person in China engaged in
cooperation with any other foreign person in the previous three
fiscal years in the construction of any nuclear-related fuel
cycle facility or activity that has not been notified to the
IAEA and would be subject to complementary access if an
Additional Protocol was in force; and
(2) the policy options required to prevent and respond to
any future effort by China to export to any foreign person an
item classified as ``plants for the separation of isotopes of
uranium'' or ``plants for the reprocessing of irradiated
nuclear reactor fuel elements'' under Part 110 of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission export licensing authority.
(c) Form of Report.--The determination required under subsection
(b) and the report required under subsection (c) shall be unclassified
with a classified annex.
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate;
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate;
(C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives.
(2) Foreign person; person.--The terms ``foreign person''
and ``person'' mean--
(A) a natural person that is an alien;
(B) a corporation, business association,
partnership, society, trust, or any other
nongovernmental entity, organization, or group, that is
organized under the laws of a foreign country or has
its principal place of business in a foreign country;
(C) any foreign governmental entity operating as a
business enterprise; and
(D) any successor, subunit, or subsidiary of any
entity described in subparagraph (B) or (C).
TITLE VI--INVESTING IN A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE
SEC. 601. ENSURING NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC PRIORITIES WITH CHINA
AND OTHER COUNTRIES ACCOUNT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND
CLIMATE CHANGE.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5C, published
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change on October 8,
2018, and the Fourth National Climate Assessment, first
published by the United States Global Change Research Program
in 2018, concluded that--
(A) the release of greenhouse gas emissions, most
notably the combustion of fossil fuels and the
degradation of natural resources that absorb
atmospheric carbon from human activity, are the
dominant causes of climate change during the past
century; and
(B) changes in the Earth's climate are--
(i) causing sea levels to rise;
(ii) increasing the global average
temperature of the Earth;
(iii) increasing the incidence and severity
of wildfires; and
(iv) intensifying the severity of extreme
weather, including hurricanes, cyclones,
typhoons, flooding, droughts, and other
disasters that threaten human life, healthy
communities, and critical infrastructure.
(2) An increase in the global average temperature of 2
degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrialized levels would
cause--
(A) the displacement, and the forced internal
migration, of an estimated 143,000,000 people in Latin
America, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa by 2050 if
insufficient action is taken (according to the World
Bank);
(B) the displacement of an average of 17,800,000
people worldwide by floods every year (according to the
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre) because of the
exacerbating effects of climate change;
(C) more than $500,000,000,000 in lost annual
economic output in the United States (a 10 percent
contraction from 2018 levels) by 2100 (according to the
Fourth National Climate Assessment);
(D) an additional 100,000,000 people worldwide to
be driven into poverty by 2030 (according to the World
Bank);
(E) greater food insecurity and decreased
agricultural production due to climate change's effects
on the increased frequency and intensity of extreme
weather events;
(F) the proliferation of agricultural pests and
crop diseases, loss of biodiversity, degrading
ecosystems, and water scarcity; and
(G) more than 350,000,000 additional people
worldwide to be exposed to deadly heat stress by 2050.
(3) According to the International Energy Agency, the
United States, China, India, and the European Union (including
the United Kingdom) account for more than 58 percent of global
greenhouse gas emissions. China, which is the world's top
greenhouse gases emitter and has an outsized impact on the
United States core interest in climate stability--
(A) is likely to achieve its carbon emissions
mitigation pledge to the Paris Agreement, contained in
its 2015 nationally determined contribution, to
``peak'' emissions around 2030 ahead of schedule;
(B) announced, on September 22, 2020, and restated
on April 22, 2021, a pledge to achieve carbon
neutrality by 2060;
(C) announced on April 22, 2021, its intent to
strictly control coal fired power generation projects,
as well as strictly limit the increase in coal
consumption over the 14th five year plan period and
phase it down in the 15th five year plan period; and
(D) however, remains uncommitted to internationally
recognized metrics for achieving these goals.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) to address the climate crisis, the United States must
leverage the full weight of its diplomatic engagement and
foreign assistance to promote our national security and
economic interests related to climate change;
(2) in the absence of United States leadership on global
issues driving international climate-related policymaking, it
would lead to a substantial and harmful decline in the Nation's
global competitiveness;
(3) promoting international instruments on climate action
and other relevant international standards and best practices,
as such standards and practices develop, serve the interests of
the American people and protect United States environmental
resources and the planet;
(4) promoting the adoption and implementation of
international climate-related agreements, standards, and
practices by foreign states ensures a level playing field for
United States businesses and other stakeholders;
(5) working with international allies and partners to
promote environmental justice and climate justice serves the
American people's interests;
(6) finding common ground with China on climate action
where possible is important, but the United States must also
continue to hold China accountable where its actions undermine
the interests of the United States, its allies, and partners;
and
(7) in furtherance of the previous clauses, the United
States should--
(A) explore opportunities for constructive
cooperation on climate action initiatives with China
and other countries while ensuring the United States
maintains its competitive advantage in climate-related
fields of expertise and industry, including--
(i) support for international cooperative
policies, measures, and technologies to
decarbonize industry and power, including
through circular economy, energy storage and
grid reliability, carbon capture, and green
hydrogen; and
(ii) increased deployment of clean energy,
including renewable and advanced nuclear power;
green and climate resilient agriculture; energy
efficient buildings; green, and low-carbon
transportation;
(B) cooperate on addressing emissions of methane
and other non-CO<INF>2</INF> greenhouse gases;
(C) cooperate on addressing emissions from
international civil aviation and maritime activities;
(D) reduce emissions from coal, oil, and gas;
(E) implement the Paris Agreement that
significantly advances global climate ambition on
mitigation, adaptation, and support;
(F) coordinate among relevant federal, state, and
local departments and agencies on climate action
related initiatives;
(G) provide resources, authorities and support for
enhancing United States ambition and commitment to
solving the climate crisis including climate action
specific assistance and multilateral fund
contributions; and
(H) integrate considerations for climate change
into broader United States foreign policy decision
making and the United States national security
apparatus.
(c) Purpose.--The purpose of this Act is to provide authorities,
resources, policies, and recommended administrative actions--
(1) to restore United States global leadership on
addressing the climate crisis and make United States climate
action and climate diplomacy a more central tenet of United
States foreign policy;
(2) to improve the United States commitment to taking more
ambitious action to help mitigate global greenhouse gas
emission and improve developing countries' resilience and
adaptation capacities to the effects of climate change;
(3) to ensure the United States maintains competitive
advantage over global strategic competitors in diplomacy and
new technological development;
(4) to encourage the pursuit of new bilateral cooperation
agreements with other world powers on initiatives to advance
global clean energy innovation and other measures to mitigate
global greenhouse gas emissions and improve climate change
adaptation capacities;
(5) to ensure that the United States national security
apparatus integrates critically important data on the
compounding effects that climate change is having on global
security risks by enhancing our understanding of how, where,
and when such effects are destabilizing countries and regions
in ways that may motivate conflict, displacement, and other
drivers of insecurity; and
(6) to authorize funding and programs to support a
reaffirmation of the United States commitments to international
cooperation and support for developing and vulnerable countries
to take climate action.
(d) Definitions.--In this Act:
(1) Clean energy.--The term ``clean energy'' means--
(A) renewable energy and related systems;
(B) energy production processes that emit zero
greenhouse gas emissions, including nuclear power;
(C) systems and processes that capture and
permanently store greenhouse gas emissions from fossil
fuel production and electricity generation units; and
(D) products, processes, facilities, or systems
designed to retrofit and improve the energy efficiency
and electricity generated from electrical generation
units, while using less fuel, less or fewer power
production resources, or less feedstocks.
(2) Climate action.--The term ``climate action'' means
enhanced efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and
strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-induced
impacts, including--
(A) climate-related hazards in all countries;
(B) integrating climate change measures into
national policies, strategies and planning; and
(C) improving education, awareness-raising, and
human and institutional capacity with respect to
climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact
reduction, and early warning.
(3) Climate crisis.--The term ``climate crisis'' means the
social, economic, health, safety, and security impacts on
people, and the threats to biodiversity and natural ecosystem
health, which are attributable to the wide-variety of effects
on global environmental and atmospheric conditions as a result
of disruptions to the Earth's climate from anthropogenic
activities that generate greenhouse gas emissions or reduce
natural resource capacities to absorb and regulate atmospheric
carbon.
(4) Climate diplomacy.--The term ``climate diplomacy''
means methods of influencing the decisions and behavior of
foreign governments and peoples through dialogue, negotiation,
cooperation, and other peaceful measures on or about issues
related to addressing global climate change, including--
(A) the mitigation of global greenhouse gas
emissions;
(B) discussion, analysis, and sharing of scientific
data and information on the cause and effects of
climate change;
(C) the security, social, economic, and political
instability risks associated with the effects of
climate change;
(D) economic cooperation efforts and trade matters
that are related to or associated with climate change
and greenhouse gas mitigation from the global economy;
(E) building resilience capacities and adapting to
the effects of change;
(F) sustainable land use and natural resource
conservation;
(G) accounting for loss and damage attributed to
the effects of climate change;
(H) just transition of carbon intense economies to
low or zero carbon economies and accounting for
laborers within affected economies;
(I) technological innovations that reduce or
eliminate carbon emissions; and
(J) clean energy and energy systems.
(5) Climate security.--The term ``climate security'' means
the effects of climate change on--
(A) United States national security concerns and
subnational, national, and regional political
stability; and
(B) overseas security and conflict situations that
are potentially exacerbated by dynamic environmental
factors and events, including--
(i) the intensification and frequency of
droughts, floods, wildfires, tropical storms,
and other extreme weather events;
(ii) changes in historical severe weather,
drought, and wildfire patterns;
(iii) the expansion of geographical ranges
of droughts, floods, and wildfires into regions
that had not regularly experienced such
phenomena;
(iv) global sea level rise patterns and the
expansion of geographical ranges affected by
drought; and
(v) changes in marine environments that
effect critical geostrategic waterways, such as
the Arctic Ocean, the South China Sea, the
South Pacific Ocean, the Barents Sea, and the
Beaufort Sea.
(6) Resilience.--The term ``resilience'' means the ability
of human made and natural systems (including their component
parts) to anticipate, absorb, cope, accommodate, or recover
from the effects of a hazardous event in a timely and efficient
manner, including through ensuring the preservation,
restoration, or improvement of its essential basic structures
and functions. It is not preparedness or response.
SEC. 602. ENHANCING SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR GLOBAL CLIMATE
DISRUPTIONS.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in consultation with other
relevant agencies, shall conduct biennial comprehensive evaluations of
present and ongoing disruptions to the global climate system,
including--
(1) the intensity, frequency, and range of natural
disasters;
(2) the scarcity of global natural resources, including
fresh water;
(3) global food, health, and energy insecurities;
(4) conditions that contribute to--
(A) intrastate and interstate conflicts;
(B) foreign political and economic instability;
(C) international migration of vulnerable and
underserved populations;
(D) the failure of national governments; and
(E) gender-based violence; and
(5) United States and allied military readiness,
operations, and strategy.
(b) Purposes.--The purposes of the evaluations conducted under
subsection (a) are--
(1) to support the practical application of scientific data
and research on climate change's dynamic effects around the
world to improve resilience, adaptability, security, and
stability despite growing global environmental risks and
changes;
(2) to ensure that the strategic planning and mission
execution of United States international development and
diplomatic missions adequately account for heightened and
dynamic risks and challenges associated with the effects of
climate change;
(3) to improve coordination between United States science
agencies conducting research and forecasts on the causes and
effects of climate change and United States national security
agencies;
(4) to better understand the disproportionate effects of
global climate disruptions on women, girls, indigenous
communities, and other historically marginalized populations;
and
(5) to inform the development of the climate security
strategy described in subsection (d).
(c) Scope.--The evaluations conducted under subsection (a) shall--
(1) examine developing countries' vulnerabilities and risks
associated with global, regional, and localized effects of
climate change; and
(2) assess and make recommendations on necessary measures
to mitigate risks and reduce vulnerabilities associated with
effects, including--
(A) sea level rise;
(B) freshwater resource scarcity;
(C) wildfires; and
(D) increased intensity and frequency of extreme
weather conditions and events, such as flooding,
drought, and extreme storm events, including tropical
cyclones.
(d) Climate Security Strategy.--The Secretary shall use the
evaluations required under subsection (a)--
(1) to inform the development and implementation of a
climate security strategy for the Bureau of Conflict and
Stabilization Operations, the Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs, embassies, consulates, regional bureaus, and other
offices and programs operating chief of mission authority,
including those with roles in conflict avoidance, prevention
and security assistance, or humanitarian disaster response,
prevention, and assistance; and
(2) in furtherance of such strategy, to assess, develop,
budget for, and (upon approval) implement plans, policies, and
actions--
(A) to account for the impacts of climate change to
global human health, safety, governance, oceans, food
production, fresh water and other critical natural
resources, settlements, infrastructure, marginalized
groups, and economic activity;
(B) to evaluate the climate change vulnerability,
security, susceptibility, and resiliency of United
States interests and non-defense assets abroad;
(C) to coordinate the integration of climate change
risk and vulnerability assessments into all foreign
policy and security decision-making processes,
including awarding foreign assistance;
(D) to evaluate specific risks to certain regions
and countries that are--
(i) vulnerable to the effects of climate
change; and
(ii) strategically significant to the
United States;
(E) to enhance the resilience capacities of foreign
countries to the effects of climate change as a means
of reducing the risks of conflict and instability;
(F) to advance principles of good governance by
encouraging foreign governments, particularly nations
that are least capable of coping with the effects of
climate change--
(i) to conduct climate security
evaluations; and
(ii) to facilitate the development of
climate security action plans to ensure
stability and public safety in disaster
situations in a humane and responsible fashion;
(G) to evaluate the vulnerability, security,
susceptibility, and resiliency of United States
interests and nondefense assets abroad;
(H) to build international institutional capacity
to address climate security implications and to advance
United States interests, regional stability, and global
security; and
(I) other activities that advance--
(i) the utilization and integration of
climate science in national security planning;
and
(ii) the clear understanding of how the
effects of climate change can exacerbate
security risks and threats.
(e) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and every two years thereafter for the following
20 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with other
departments and agencies shall submit to the Committee on Foreign
Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives an unclassified report, with a classified
annex if necessary, that includes--
(1) a review of the efforts, initiatives, and programs in
support of the strategy in subsection (c), as well as--
(A) an assessment of the funding expended by
relevant Federal departments and agencies on emerging
events exacerbated by climate change and the legal,
procedural, and resource constraints faced by the
Department of State and the United States Agency for
International Development throughout respective
budgeting, strategic planning, and management cycles to
support the prevention of and response to emerging
events exacerbated by climate change;
(B) current annual global assessments of emerging
events exacerbated by climate change;
(C) recommendations to further strengthen United
States capabilities described in this section; and
(D) consideration of analysis, reporting, and
policy recommendations by civil society, academic, and
nongovernmental organizations and institutions, and
partner countries to prevent and respond to emerging
events exacerbated by climate change;
(2) recommendations to ensure shared responsibility by--
(A) enhancing multilateral mechanisms for
preventing, mitigating, and responding to emerging
events exacerbated by climate change; and
(B) strengthening regional organizations; and
(3) the implementation status of the recommendations
included in the review under paragraph (1).
(f) Report by the Director of National Intelligence.--The Director
of National Intelligence is encouraged to include, in his or her annual
(or more often as appropriate) unclassified testimony, accompanied by a
classified annex, if necessary, to Congress on threats to United States
national security--
(1) a review of countries and regions at risk of emerging
events exacerbated by climate change; and
(2) whenever possible, specific identification of countries
and regions at immediate risk of emerging events exacerbated by
climate change.
SEC. 603. BALANCING ACCOUNTABILITY AND COOPERATION WITH CHINA.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) successful mitigation of global greenhouse gas
emissions and changes to the environment require global
cooperation and coordination of efforts, as well as holding
other countries like the People's Republic of China accountable
for their actions and commitments to ensure a level playing
field with the United States, its allies, and partners;
(2) other countries look towards the United States and
China, as the world's largest emitters and largest economies,
for leadership by example to effectively mitigate greenhouse
gas emissions, develop and deploy energy generation
technologies, and integrate sustainable adaptation solutions to
the inevitable effects of climate change;
(3) given the volume of China's greenhouse gas emissions
and the scientific imperative to swiftly reduce global
greenhouse gas emissions to net-zero emissions around 2050,
China should--
(A) revise its long-term pledge;
(B) seek to immediately peak its emissions;
(C) begin reducing its greenhouse gas emissions
significantly to meet a more ambitious long-term 2050
reductions target; and
(D) update its nationally determined contribution
along a trajectory that aligns with achieving a more
ambitious net-zero by 2050 emissions target;
(4) it is in the United States national interest to
emphasize the environment and climate change in its bilateral
engagement with China, as global climate risks cannot be
mitigated without a significant reduction in Chinese domestic
and overseas emissions;
(5) the United States and China, to the extent practicable,
should coordinate on making and delivering ambitious pledges to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with aspirations towards
achieving net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050;
(6) the United States and its allies should work together,
using diplomatic and economic tools, to hold China accountable
for any failure by China--
(A) to increase ambition in its 2030 nationally
determined contribution, in line with net zero
greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 before the 26th
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC scheduled for
November 2021 and meeting a more ambitious nationally
determined contribution;
(B) to work faithfully to uphold the principles,
goals, and rules of the Paris Agreement;
(C) to avoid and prohibit efforts to undermine or
devolve the Paris Agreement's rule or underlying
framework, particularly within areas of accountability
transparency, and shared responsibility among all
parties;
(D) to eliminate greenhouse gas intensive projects
from China's Belt and Road Initiative and other
overseas investments, including--
(i) working with allies and partners of the
United States to eliminate support for coal
power production projects in China's Belt and
Road Initiative;
(ii) providing financing and project
support for cleaner and less risky
alternatives; and
(iii) undertaking ``parallel initiatives''
to enhance capacity building programs and
overseas sustainable investment criteria,
including in areas such as integrated energy
planning, power sector reform, just transition,
distributed generation, procurement,
transparency, and standards to support low-
emissions growth in developing countries; and
(E) to phase out existing coal power plants and
reduce net coal power production;
(7) the United States should pursue confidence-building
opportunities for the United States and China to undertake
``parallel initiatives'' on clean energy research, development,
finance, and deployment, including through economic and
stimulus measures with clear, mutually agreed upon rules and
policies to protect intellectual property, ensure equitable,
nonpunitive provision of support, and verify implementation,
which would provide catalytic progress towards delivering a
global clean energy transformation that benefits all people;
(8) the United States should pursue cooperative initiatives
to reduce global deforestation; and
(9) the United States should pursue appropriate scientific
cooperative exchanges and research that align with United
States interests and those of its international partners and
allies, provide reciprocity of access, protect intellectual
property rights, and preserve the values and human rights
interests of the American people.
SEC. 604. PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES TO THE BELT
AND ROAD INITIATIVE.
(a) In General.--The President should seek opportunities to partner
with multilateral development finance institutions to develop financing
tools based on shared development finance criteria and mechanisms to
support investments in developing countries that--
(1) support low carbon economic development; and
(2) promote resiliency and adaptation to environmental
changes and natural disasters.
(b) Partnership Agreement.--The Chief Executive Officer of the
United States International Development Finance Corporation should seek
to partner with other multilateral development finance institutions and
development finance institutions to leverage the respective available
funds to support low carbon economic development, which may include
clean energy including renewable and nuclear energy projects,
environmental adaptation, and resilience activities in countries.
(c) Co-Financing of Infrastructure Projects.--
(1) Authorization.--Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary
of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development and other relevant agency heads are
authorized to co-finance infrastructure, resilience, and
environmental adaptation projects that advance the development
objectives of the United States overseas and provide viable
alternatives to projects that would otherwise be included
within China's Belt and Road Initiative.
(2) Conditions.--Co-financing arrangements authorized
pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be approved unless--
(A) the projects to be financed--
(i) promote the public good;
(ii) promote United States national
security or economic interests;
(iii) promote low carbon emissions,
including clean energy renewable and nuclear
energy projects; and
(iv) will have substantially lower
environmental impact than the proposed Belt and
Road Initiative alternative; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives are notified not later than 15
days in advance of entering into such co-financing
arrangements.
SEC. 605. USING CLIMATE DIPLOMACY TO BETTER SERVE NATIONAL SECURITY AND
ECONOMIC INTERESTS.
(a) In General.--The President and the Secretary of State shall
prioritize climate action and climate diplomacy in United States
foreign policy by--
(1) ensuring diplomacy, support, and interagency
coordination for bilateral and multilateral actions to address
the climate crisis; and
(2) improving coordination and integration of climate
action across all bureaus and United States missions abroad.
(b) Climate Action Integration.--The Secretary of State, through
the Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the
Environment and any other designees, shall--
(1) prioritize climate action and clean energy within the
bureaus and offices under the leadership of the Under Secretary
for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment;
(2) ensure that such bureaus and offices are coordinating
with other bureaus of the Department of State regarding the
integration of climate action and climate diplomacy as a cross-
cutting imperative across the Department of State;
(3) encourage all Under Secretaries of State--
(A) to assess how issues related to climate change
and United States climate action are integrated into
their operations and programs;
(B) to coordinate crosscutting actions and
diplomatic efforts that relate to climate action; and
(C) to make available the technical assistance and
resources of the bureaus and offices with relevant
expertise to provide technical assistance and expert
support to other bureaus within the Department of State
regarding climate action, clean energy development, and
climate diplomacy;
(4) manage the integration of scientific data on the
current and anticipated effects of climate change into applied
strategies and diplomatic engagements across programmatic and
regional bureaus of the Department of State and into the
Department of State's decision making processes;
(5) ensure that the relevant bureaus and offices provide
appropriate technical support and resources--
(A) to the President, the Secretary of State, and
their respective designees charged with addressing
climate change and associated issues;
(B) to United States diplomats advancing United
States foreign policy related to climate action; and
(C) for the appropriate engagement and integration
of relevant domestic agencies in international climate
change affairs, including United States participation
in multilateral fora; and
(6) carry out other activities, as directed by the
Secretary of State, that advance United States climate-related
foreign policy objectives, including global greenhouse gas
mitigation, climate change adaptation activities, and global
climate security.
(c) Responsibilities of the Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs.--The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs shall
ensure that all foreign missions are--
(1) advancing United States bilateral climate diplomacy;
(2) engaging strategically on opportunities for bilateral
climate action cooperation with foreign governments; and
(3) utilizing the technical resources and coordinating
adequately with the bureaus reporting to the Under Secretary of
State for Economic Growth, Energy and the Environment.
(d) Report.--Not later than 200 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of State for Economic
Growth, Energy, and the Environment, in cooperation with the Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, shall submit a report to the
appropriate congressional committees that--
(1) assesses how climate action and United States climate
diplomacy is integrated across the Bureaus of the Department of
State; and
(2) includes recommendations on strategies to improve cross
bureau coordination and understanding of United States climate
action and climate diplomacy.
(e) Effect of Elimination of Positions.--If the positions of Under
Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment and
the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs are eliminated or
undergo name changes, the responsibilities of such Under Secretaries
under this section shall be reassigned to other Under Secretaries of
State, as appropriate.
(f) Climate Change Officers.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall establish and
staff Climate Change Officer positions. Such Officers shall
serve under the supervision of the appropriate chief of mission
or the Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the
Environment of the Department of State, as the case may be. The
Secretary shall ensure each embassy, consulate, and diplomatic
mission to which such Officers are assigned pursuant to
paragraph (2) has sufficient additional and appropriate staff
to support such Officers.
(2) Assignment.--Climate Change Officers shall be assigned
to the following posts:
(A) United States embassies, or, if appropriate,
consulates.
(B) United States diplomatic missions to, or
liaisons with, regional and multilateral organizations,
including the United States diplomatic missions to the
European Union, African Union, Organization of American
States, Arctic Council, and any other appropriate
regional organization, and the United Nations and its
relevant specialized agencies.
(C) Other posts as designated by the Secretary.
(3) Responsibilities.--Each Climate Change Officer shall--
(A) provide expertise on effective approaches to--
(i) mitigate the emission of gases which
contribute to global climate change and
formulate national and global plans for
reducing such gross and net emissions; and
(ii) reduce the detrimental impacts
attributable to global climate change, and
adapt to such impacts;
(B) engage and convene, in a manner that is
equitable, inclusive, and just, with individuals and
organizations which represent a government office, a
nongovernmental organization, a social or political
movement, a private sector entity, an educational or
scientific institution, or any other entity concerned
with--
(i) global climate change; the emission of
gases which contribute to global climate
change; or
(ii) reducing the detrimental impacts
attributable to global climate change;
(C) facilitate engagement by United States entities
in bilateral and multilateral cooperation on climate
change; and
(D) carry out such other responsibilities as the
Secretary may assign.
(4) Responsibilities of under secretary.--The Under
Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment of
the Department of State shall, including by acting through the
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs of the Department of State--
(A) provide policy guidance to Climate Change
Officers established under subsection (a);
(B) develop relations with, consult with, and
provide assistance to relevant individuals and
organizations concerned with studying, mitigating, and
adapting to global climate change, or reducing the
emission of gases which contribute to global climate
change; and
(C) assist officers and employees of regional
bureaus of the Department of State to develop
strategies and programs to promote studying,
mitigating, and adapting to global climate change, or
reducing the emission of gases which contribute to
global climate change.
(g) Actions by Chiefs of Mission.--Each chief of mission in a
foreign country shall--
(1) develop, as part of annual joint strategic plans or
equivalent program and policy planning, a strategy to promote
actions to improve and increase studying, mitigating, and
adapting to global climate change, or reducing the emission of
gases which contribute to global climate change by--
(A) consulting and coordinating with and providing
support to relevant individuals and organizations,
including experts and other professionals and
stakeholders on issues related to climate change; and
(B) holding periodic meetings with such relevant
individuals and organizations relating to such
strategy;
(2) hold ongoing discussions with the officials and leaders
of such country regarding progress to improve and increase
studying, mitigating, and adapting to global climate change, or
reducing the emission of gases which contribute to global
climate change in a manner that is equitable, inclusive, and
just in such country; and
(3) certify annually to the Secretary of State that to the
maximum extent practicable, considerations related to climate
change adaptation and mitigation, sustainability, and the
environment were incorporated in activities, management, and
operations of the United States embassy or other diplomatic
post under the director of the chief of mission.
(h) Training.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall establish
curriculum at the Department of State's Foreign Service Institute that
supplements political and economic reporting tradecraft courses in
order to provide employees of the Department with specialized training
with respect to studying, mitigating, and adapting to global climate
change, or reducing the emission of gases which contribute to global
climate change. Such training shall include the following:
(1) Awareness of the full range of national and subnational
agencies, offices, personnel, statutory authorities, funds, and
programs involved in the international commitments of the
United States regarding global climate change and the emission
of gases which contribute to global climate change, the science
of global climate change, and methods for mitigating and
adapting to global climate change.
(2) Awareness of methods for mitigating and adapting to
global climate change and reducing the emission of gases which
contribute to global climate change that are equitable,
inclusive, and just.
(3) Familiarity with United States agencies, multilateral
agencies, international financial institutions, and the network
of donors providing assistance to mitigate and adapt to global
climate change.
(4) Awareness of the most frequently announced goals and
methods of the entities specified in subsection (a)(3)(B).
(i) Contracting.--Contracting and agreements officers of the
Department of State, and other United States embassy personnel
responsible for contracts, grants, or acquisitions, shall receive
training on evaluating proposals, solicitations, and bids, for
considerations related to sustainability and adapting to or mitigating
impacts from climate change.
(j) Reporting.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and biennially thereafter, the Secretary of State
shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a
report that includes a detailed breakdown of posts at which staff are
assigned the role of Climate Change Officer, the responsibilities to
which they have been assigned, and the strategies developed by the
chief of mission, as applicable.
(k) Climate Change Support and Financing.--The Secretary of State
shall facilitate the coordination among the Department of State and
other relevant departments and agencies toward contributing technical
cooperation, engagement, development finance, or foreign assistance
relevant to United States international climate action and in support
of United States climate diplomacy.
(l) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that climate
diplomacy tools as described in this section are critical for
demonstrating the commitment to include climate changes issues as core
tenets of foreign policy priorities, as well as preserving the United
States role as a global leader on climate change action.
SEC. 606. DRIVING A GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESILIENCE STRATEGY.
(a) Amendment.--Section 117 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(22 U.S.C. 2151p) is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)--
(A) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(b)''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(2)(A) The President is authorized to furnish assistance
to programs and initiatives that--
``(i) promote resilience among communities facing
harmful impacts from climate change; and
``(ii) reduce the vulnerability of persons affected
by climate change.
``(B) There shall be, in the Department of State, a
Coordinator of Climate Change Resilience.''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(d)(1) The Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, shall establish a comprehensive, integrated, 10-year
strategy, which shall be referred to as the `Global Climate Change
Resilience Strategy', to mitigate the impacts of climate change on
displacement and humanitarian emergencies.
``(2) The Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy shall--
``(A) focus on addressing slow-onset and rapid-onset
effects of events caused by climate change, consider the
effects of events caused by climate change, and describe the
key features of successful strategies to prevent such
conditions;
``(B) include specific objectives and multisectoral
approaches to the effects of events caused by climate change;
``(C) promote our national security and economic interests
while leading international climate-related policymaking
efforts, on which the absence of United States leadership would
lead to a substantial and harmful decline in the nation's
global competitiveness;
``(D) promote international instruments on climate action
and other relevant international standards and best practices,
as such standards and practices develop, that serve the
interests of the American people and protect United States
environmental resources and the planet;
``(E) promote the adoption and implementation of such
international climate-related agreements, standards, and
practices by foreign states;
``(F) work with our allies and partners to ensure a level
playing field exists when it comes to climate action; to
encourage and assist foreign countries to make similar or even
greater commitments than the United States;
``(G) describe approaches that ensure national leadership,
as appropriate, and substantively engage with civil society,
local partners, and the affected communities, including
marginalized populations and underserved populations, in the
design, implementation, and monitoring of climate change
programs to best safeguard the future of those subject to
displacement;
``(H) assign roles for relevant Federal agencies to avoid
duplication of efforts, while ensuring that--
``(i) the Department of State is responsible for--
``(I) leading the Global Climate Change
Resilience Strategy;
``(II) establishing United States foreign
policy;
``(III) advancing diplomatic and political
efforts; and
``(IV) guiding security assistance and
related civilian security efforts to mitigate
climate change threats;
``(ii) the United States Agency for International
Development is--
``(I) responsible for overseeing programs
to prevent the effects of events caused by
climate change;
``(II) the lead implementing agency for
development and related nonsecurity program
policy related to building resilience and
achieving recovery; and
``(III) responsible for providing overseas
humanitarian assistance to respond to
international and internal displacement caused
by climate change and to coordinate the pursuit
of durable solutions for climate-displaced
persons; and
``(iii) other Federal agencies support the
activities of the Department of State and the United
States Agency for International Development, as
appropriate, with the concurrence of the Secretary of
State and the Administrator of the United States Agency
for International Development;
``(I) describe programs that agencies will undertake to
achieve the stated objectives, including descriptions of
existing programs and funding by fiscal year and account;
``(J) identify mechanisms to improve coordination between
the United States, foreign governments, and international
organizations, including the World Bank, the United Nations,
regional organizations, and private sector organizations;
``(K) address efforts to expand public-private partnerships
and leverage private sector resources;
``(L) describe the criteria, metrics, and mechanisms for
monitoring and evaluation of programs and objectives in the
Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy;
``(M) describe how the Global Climate Change Resilience
Strategy will ensure that programs are country-led and context-
specific;
``(N) establish a program to monitor climate and social
conditions to anticipate and prevent climate and environmental
stressors from evolving into national security risks;
``(O) include an assessment of climate risks in the
Department of State's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development
Review; and
``(P) prioritize foreign aid, to the extent practicable,
for international climate resilience in support of this Global
Climate Change Resilience Strategy.
``(3) Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of
this subsection, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit a
report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, based in
part on the information collected pursuant to this section, that
details the Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy. The report shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex,
if necessary.
``(4) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this subsection, the Secretary of State and the Coordinator of Global
Climate Change Resilience shall brief the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives regarding the progress made by the Federal
Government in implementing the Global Climate Change Resilience
Strategy.
``(5)(A) Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of
this subsection, and annually thereafter, the Comptroller General of
the United States, in cooperation and consultation with the Secretary
of State, shall produce a report evaluating the progress that the
Federal Government has made toward incorporating climate change into
department and agency policies, including the resources that have been
allocated for such purpose.
``(B) The report required under subparagraph (A) shall assess--
``(i) the degree to which the Department of State and the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
are--
``(I) developing climate change risk assessments;
and
``(II) providing guidance to missions on how to
include climate change risks in their integrated
country strategies;
``(ii) whether the Department of State and USAID have
sufficient resources to fulfill the requirements described in
paragraph (2); and
``(iii) any areas in which the Department of State and
USAID may lack sufficient resources to fulfill such
requirements.''.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this Global
Climate Change Resilience Strategy.
SEC. 607. ADDRESSING INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION,
ADAPTATION, AND SECURITY.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Convention.--The term ``Convention'' means the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, done at New
York May 9, 1992, and entered into force March 21, 1994.
(2) Most vulnerable communities and populations.--The term
``most vulnerable communities and populations'' means
communities and populations that are at risk of substantial
adverse effects of climate change and have limited capacity to
respond to such effects, including women, impoverished
communities, children, indigenous peoples, and informal
workers.
(3) Most vulnerable developing countries.--The term ``most
vulnerable developing countries'' means, as determined by the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, developing countries that are at risk of
substantial adverse effects of climate change and have limited
capacity to respond to such effects, considering the approaches
included in any international treaties and agreements.
(4) Program.--The term ``Program'' means the International
Climate Change Adaptation, Mitigation, and Security Program
established pursuant to subsection (c).
(b) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to provide authorities
for additional, new, current, and ongoing bilateral and regional
international development assistance, and, as appropriate, to leverage
private resources, in support of host country driven projects,
planning, policies, and initiatives designed to improve the ability of
host countries--
(1) to primarily produce reliable renewable energy and
reduce or mitigate carbon emissions from the power sector while
facilitating the transition in key global markets from
electricity generated from fossil fuel power to low-cost clean
energy sources, in a manner that is equitable for workers and
communities;
(2) to adapt and become more resilient to current and
forecasted effects of climate change; and
(3) to employ--
(A) sustainable land use practices that mitigate
desertification and reduce greenhouse gas emissions
from deforestation and forest degradation; and
(B) agricultural production practices that reduce
poverty while improving soil health, protecting water
quality, and increasing food security and nutrition.
(c) Establishment of Program.--The Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Administrator
of the United States Agency for International Development, shall
establish a program, to be known as the ``International Climate Change
Adaptation, Mitigation, and Security Program'', to provide bilateral
and regional assistance to developing countries for programs, projects,
and activities described in subsection (e).
(d) Supplement Not Supplant.--Assistance provided under this
section shall be used to supplement, and not to supplant, any other
Federal, State, or local resources available to carry out activities
that fit the characteristics of the Program.
(e) Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United States to ensure
that the Program provides resources to developing countries,
particularly the most vulnerable communities and populations in such
countries, to support the development and implementation of programs,
projects, and activities that--
(1) reduce greenhouse gas emissions through the integration
and deployment of clean energy, including transmission,
distribution, and interconnections to renewable energy, while
facilitating the transition from electricity generated from
fossil fuel power to low-cost renewable energy sources, in a
manner that is equitable for workers and communities;
(2) address financial or other barriers to the widespread
deployment of clean energy technologies that reduce, sequester,
or avoid greenhouse gas emissions;
(3) improve the availability, viability, and accessibility
of zero emission vehicles, including support for design and
development of transportation networks and land use practices
that mitigate carbon emissions in the transportation sector;
(4) support building capacities that may include--
(A) developing and implementing methodologies and
programs for measuring greenhouse gas emissions and
verifying emissions mitigation, including building
capacities to conduct emissions inventories and meet
reporting requirements under the Paris Agreement;
(B) assessing, developing, and implementing
technology and policy options for greenhouse gas
emissions mitigation and avoidance of future emissions,
including sector-based and cross-sector mitigation
strategies;
(C) enhancing the technical capacity of regulatory
authorities, planning agencies, and related
institutions in developing countries to improve the
deployment of clean energy technologies and practices,
including through increased transparency;
(D) training and instruction regarding the
installation and maintenance of renewable energy
technologies; and
(E) activities that support the development and
implementation of frameworks for intellectual property
rights in developing countries;
(5) improve resilience, sustainable economic growth, and
adaptation capacities in response to the effects of climate
change;
(6) promote appropriate job training and access to new job
opportunities in new economic sectors and industries that
emerge due to the transition from fossil fuel energy to clean
energy;
(7) reduce the vulnerability and increase the resilience
capacities of communities to the effects of climate change,
including effects on--
(A) water availability;
(B) agricultural productivity and food security;
(C) flood risk;
(D) coastal resources;
(E) biodiversity;
(F) economic livelihoods;
(G) health and diseases;
(H) housing and shelter; and
(I) human migration;
(8) help countries and communities adapt to changes in the
environment through enhanced community planning, preparedness,
and growth strategies that take into account current and
forecasted regional and localized effects of climate change;
(9) conserve and restore natural resources, ecosystems, and
biodiversity threatened by the effects of climate change to
ensure such resources, ecosystems, and biodiversity are healthy
and continue to provide natural protections from the effects of
climate change such as extreme weather;
(10) provide resources, information, scientific data and
modeling, innovative best practices, and technical assistance
to support vulnerable developing countries to adapt to the
effects of climate change;
(11) promote sustainable and climate-resilient societies,
including through improvements to make critical infrastructure
less vulnerable to the effects of climate change;
(12) encourage the adoption of policies and measures,
including sector-based and cross-sector policies and measures,
that substantially reduce, sequester, or avoid greenhouse gas
emissions from the domestic energy and transportation sectors
of developing countries;
(13) reduce deforestation and land degradation to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions and implement sustainable forestry
practices;
(14) promote sustainable land use activities, including
supporting development planning, design, and construction with
respect to transportation systems and land use;
(15) promote sustainable agricultural practices that
mitigate carbon emissions, conserve soil, and improve food and
water security of communities;
(16) foster partnerships with private sector entities and
nongovernmental international development organizations to
assist with developing solutions and economic opportunities
that support projects, planning, policies, and initiatives
described in subsection (b);
(17) provide technical assistance and strengthen capacities
of developing countries to meet the goals of the conditional
nationally determined contributions of those countries;
(18) establish investment channels designed to leverage
private sector financing in--
(A) clean energy;
(B) sustainable agriculture and natural resource
management; and
(C) the transportation sector as described in
paragraph (3); and
(19) provide technical assistance and support for non-
extractive activities that provide alternative economic growth
opportunities while preserving critical habitats and natural
carbon sinks.
(f) Provision of Assistance.--
(1) In general.--The Administrator of the United States
Agency for International Development, in consultation with
other departments and agencies, shall provide assistance under
the Program--
(A) in the form of bilateral assistance pursuant to
the requirements under subsection (g);
(B) to multilateral funds or international
institutions with programs for climate mitigation or
adaptation in developing countries consistent with the
policy described in subsection (e); or
(C) through a combination of the mechanisms
specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B).
(2) Limitation.--
(A) Conditional distribution to multilateral funds
or international institutions.--In any fiscal year, the
Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development may provide up to 40 percent
of the assistance available to carry out the Program to
1 or more multilateral funds or international
institutions that meet the requirements of subparagraph
(B).
(B) Multilateral fund or international institution
eligibility.--A multilateral fund or international
institution is eligible to receive assistance under
subparagraph (A)--
(i) if--
(I) such fund or institution is
established pursuant to--
(aa) the Convention; or
(bb) an agreement
negotiated under the
Convention; or
(II) the assistance is directed to
1 or more multilateral funds or
international development institutions,
pursuant to an agreement negotiated
under the Convention; and
(ii) if such fund or institution--
(I) specifies the terms and
conditions under which the United
States is to provide assistance to the
fund or institution, and under which
the fund or institution is to provide
assistance to recipient countries; and
(II) ensures that assistance from
the United States to the fund or
institution and the principal and
income of the fund or institution are
disbursed only--
(aa) to support projects,
planning, policies, and
initiatives described in
subsection (b);
(bb) consistent with the
policy described in subsection
(e); and
(cc) in regular
consultation with relevant
governing bodies of the fund or
institution that--
(AA) include
representation from
countries among the
most vulnerable
developing countries;
and
(BB) provide public
access.
(C) Congressional notification.--The Secretary of
State, the Administrator of the United States Agency
for International Development, or the Secretary of the
Treasury shall notify the appropriate congressional
committees not later than 15 days before providing
assistance to a multilateral fund or international
institution under this subsection.
(3) Local consultations.--Programs, projects, and
activities supported by assistance provided under this
subsection shall require consultations with local communities,
particularly the most vulnerable communities and populations in
such communities, and indigenous peoples in areas in which any
programs, projects, or activities are planned to engage such
communities and peoples through adequate disclosure of
information, public participation, and consultation, including
full consideration of the interdependence of vulnerable
communities and ecosystems to promote the resilience of local
communities.
(g) Bilateral Assistance.--
(1) In general.--Except to the extent inconsistent with
this subsection, the administrative authorities under the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) shall
apply to the implementation of this subsection to the same
extent and in the same manner as such authorities apply to the
implementation of such Act in order to provide the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development with the authority to provide assistance to
countries, including the most vulnerable developing countries,
for programs, projects, and activities consistent with the
purposes described in subsection (b) and the policy described
in subsection (e).
(2) Considerations.--In carrying out this subsection, the
Administrator shall ensure that--
(A) the environmental impact of proposed programs,
projects, and activities is considered through adequate
consultation, public participation, and public
disclosure of relevant information; and
(B) programs, projects, and activities under this
subsection--
(i) avoid environmental degradation, to the
maximum extent practicable; and
(ii) are aligned, to the maximum extent
practicable, with broader development, poverty
alleviation, or natural resource management
objectives and initiatives in the recipient
country.
(3) Community engagement.--The Administrator shall seek to
ensure that--
(A) local communities, particularly the most
vulnerable communities and populations in areas in
which any programs, projects, or activities are carried
out under this subsection, are engaged in the design,
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of such
programs, projects, and activities through disclosure
of information, public participation, and consultation;
and
(B) the needs and interests of the most vulnerable
communities and populations are addressed in national
or regional climate change adaptation plans developed
with USAID support.
(4) Consultation and disclosure.--For each country
receiving assistance under this subsection, the Administrator
shall establish a process for consultation with, and disclosure
of information to, local, national, and international
stakeholders regarding any programs, projects, or activities
carried out under this subsection.
(h) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated to carry out this section $2,000,000,000 for fiscal year
2022 and each fiscal year thereafter.
SEC. 608. REDUCING THE NEGATIVE IMPACTS FROM BLACK CARBON, METHANE, AND
HIGH-GWP HYDROFLUOROCARBONS.
(a) Definition.--The term ``high-GWP HFC'' means newly manufactured
hydrofluorocarbons with a global warming potential calculated over a
100-year period of greater than 150, as described in the Fifth
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
(b) In General.--The President shall direct the United States
representatives to appropriate international bodies and conferences to
use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States, consistent
with the broad foreign policy goals of the United States, to advocate
that each such body or conference--
(1) commit to significantly increasing efforts to reduce
black carbon, methane, and high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons;
(2) invest in and develop alternative energy sources,
industrial and agricultural processes, appliances, and products
to replace sources of black carbon, methane, and high-GWP
hydrofluorocarbons;
(3) enhance coordination with the private sector--
(A) to increase production and distribution of
clean energy alternatives, industrial processes, and
products that will replace sources of black carbon,
methane, and high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons;
(B) to develop action plans to mitigate black
carbon, methane, and high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons from
various private sector operations;
(C) to encourage best technology, methods, and
management practices for reducing black carbon,
methane, and high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons;
(D) to craft specific financing mechanisms for the
incremental costs associated with mitigating short-live
climate pollutants; and
(E) to grow economic opportunities and develop
markets, as appropriate, for reducing black carbon,
methane, tropospheric ozone, and hydrofluorocarbons;
(4) provide technical assistance to foreign regulatory
authorities and governments to remove unnecessary barriers to
investment in short-lived climate mitigation solutions,
including--
(A) the use of safe and affordable clean energy;
(B) the implementation of policies requiring
industrial and agricultural best practices for
capturing or mitigating the release of methane from
extractive, agricultural, and industrial processes; and
(C) climate assessment, scientific research,
monitoring, and technological development activities;
(5) develop and implement clear, accountable, and metric-
based targets to measure the effectiveness of projects
described in paragraph (4); and
(6) engage international partners in an existing
multilateral forum (or, if necessary, establish through an
international agreement a new multilateral forum) to improve
global cooperation for--
(A) creating tangible metrics for evaluating
efforts to reduce black carbon, methane, and high-GWP
hydrofluorocarbons;
(B) developing and implementing best practices for
phasing out sources of black carbon, methane, and high-
GWP hydrofluorocarbons, including expanding capacity
for innovative instruments to mitigate black carbon,
methane, and high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons at the
national and subnational levels of foreign countries,
particularly countries with little capacity to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions and deploy clean energy
facilities, and countries that lack sufficient policies
to advance such development;
(C) encouraging the development of standards and
practices, and increasing transparency and
accountability efforts for the reduction of black
carbon, methane, and high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons;
(D) integrating tracking and monitoring systems
into industrial processes;
(E) fostering research to improve scientific
understanding of--
(i) how high concentrations of black
carbon, methane, and high-GWP
hydrofluorocarbons affect human health, safety,
and our climate;
(ii) changes in the amount and regional
concentrations of black carbon and methane
emissions, based on scientific modeling and
forecasting;
(iii) effective means to sequester black
carbon, methane, and high-GWP
hydrofluorocarbons; and
(iv) other related areas of research the
United States representatives deem necessary;
(F) encouraging the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, and other international finance
organizations--
(i) to prioritize efforts to combat black
carbon, methane, and high-GWP
hydrofluorocarbons; and
(ii) to enhance transparency by providing
sufficient and adequate information to
facilitate independent verification of their
climate finance reporting;
(G) encouraging observers of the Arctic Council
(including India and China) to adopt mitigation plans
consistent with the findings and recommendations of the
Arctic Council's Framework for Action on Black Carbon
and Methane;
(H) collaborating on technological advances in
short-lived climate pollutant mitigation, sequestration
and reduction technologies; and
(I) advising foreign countries, at both the
national and subnational levels, regarding the
development and execution of regulatory policies,
services, and laws pertaining to reducing the creation
and the collection and safe management of black carbon,
methane, and high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons.
(c) Enhancing International Outreach and Partnership of United
States Agencies Involved in Greenhouse Gas Reductions.--
(1) Finding.--Congress recognizes the success of the United
States Climate Alliance and the greenhouse gas reduction
programs and strategies established by the Environmental
Protection Agency's Center for Corporate Climate Leadership.
(2) Authorization of efforts to build foreign
partnerships.--The Secretary of State shall work with the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to build
partnerships, as appropriate, with the governments of foreign
countries and to support international efforts to reduce black
carbon, methane, and high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons and combat
climate change.
(d) Negotiation of New International Agreements and Reassertion of
Targets in Existing Agreements.--Not later than 1 year after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a
report to Congress that--
(1) assesses the potential for negotiating new
international agreements, new targets within existing
international agreements or cooperative bodies, and the
creation of a new international forum to mitigate globally
black carbon, methane, and high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons to
support the efforts described in subsection (b);
(2) describes the provisions that could be included in such
agreements;
(3) assesses potential parties to such agreements;
(4) describes a process for reengaging with Canada and
Mexico regarding the methane targets agreed to at the 2016
North American Leaders' Summit; and
(5) describes a process for reengaging with the countries
of the Arctic Council regarding the methane and black carbon
targets that were negotiated in 2015 through the Framework for
Action.
(e) Consideration of Black Carbon, Methane, and High-GWP
Hydrofluorocarbons in Negotiating International Agreements.--In
negotiating any relevant international agreement with any country or
countries after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
shall--
(1) consider the impact black carbon, methane, and high-GWP
hydrofluorocarbons are having on the increase in global average
temperatures and the resulting global climate change;
(2) consider the effects that climate change is having on
the environment; and
(3) ensure that the agreement strengthens efforts to
eliminate black carbon, methane, and high-GWP
hydrofluorocarbons from such country or countries.
(f) Plan To Reduce Black Carbon Emissions From Ships.--Consistent
with strategies adopted by the International Maritime Organization to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions from ships, the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of
Commerce, the Administrator, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard,
shall develop a comprehensive plan to reduce black carbon emissions
from ships based on appropriate emissions data from oceangoing vessels.
The plan shall provide for such reduction through--
(1) a clean freight partnership;
(2) limits on black carbon emissions; and
(3) efforts that include protection of access to critical
fuel shipments and emergency needs of coastal communities.
(g) Establishment of Interagency Working Group on Short-Lived
Climate Pollutant Mitigation.--
(1) Establishment.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of enactment of this Act, the President shall establish a task
force, to be known as the Interagency Working Group on Short-
Lived Climate Pollutant Mitigation.
(2) Membership.--The members of the Working Group shall
include the head (or a designee thereof) of each relevant
Federal agency.
(3) Duties.--The Working Group shall--
(A) not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report that includes
specific plans of each relevant Federal agency;
(B) look for opportunities with other countries to
promote alternatives to high-GWP HFC, and transition
over time to equipment that uses safer and more
sustainable alternatives to high-GWP HFC;
(C) review the policy recommendations made by--
(i) the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change;
(ii) the United States Climate Alliance;
(iii) the Interagency Strategy to Reduce
Methane Emissions;
(iv) the Council on Climate Preparedness
and Resilience;
(v) the Clean Cooking Alliance;
(vi) the International Maritime
Organization; and
(vii) other relevant organizations and
institutions; and
(D) develop an action plan to reduce black carbon,
methane, and high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons that
incorporates any appropriate proposals or
recommendations made by the entities referred to in
subparagraph (C).
SEC. 609. BUILDING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION THROUGH THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND.
(a) Green Climate Fund.--
(1) Congress finds that--
(A) climate change most severely impacts vulnerable
and disadvantaged communities in the United States and
around the world;
(B) it is the responsibility of the United States
Government to work with and press other countries to
address environmental justice and climate justice;
(C) the report of the United Nations Environment
Programme entitled ``Climate Change and the Cost of
Capital in Developing Countries'', dated May 2018,
found that, in the 10 years prior to the publication of
the report, climate vulnerability has cost the 20
nations most affected by catastrophes rooted in climate
change an additional $62,000,000,000 in interest
payments alone;
(D) individuals and families, particularly
communities of color, indigenous communities, and low-
income communities, that are on the frontlines of
climate change across the globe are often in close
proximity to environmental stressors or sources of
pollution;
(E) the communities described in subparagraph (D)--
(i) are often the first exposed to the
causes and impacts of climate change; and
(ii) have the fewest resources with which
to mitigate those impacts or to relocate;
(F) all efforts to adapt to and mitigate climate
change must include specific protections for and
acknowledgment of the harm of climate change to
communities of color, indigenous peoples, women, and
other frontline communities and marginalized peoples
around the world;
(G) in Paris, on December 12, 2015, the parties to
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change adopted the Paris Agreement, a benchmark
agreement--
(i) to combat climate change;
(ii) to accelerate and intensify the
actions and investments needed for a
sustainable low carbon future; and
(iii) that acknowledges, ``Parties should,
when taking action to address climate change,
respect, promote and consider their respective
obligations on human rights, the right to
health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local
communities, migrants, children, persons with
disabilities and people in vulnerable
situations and the right to development, as
well as gender equality, empowerment of women
and intergenerational equity'';
(H) the Paris Agreement--
(i) notes the importance of ``climate
justice'' when mitigating and adapting to
climate change; and
(ii) recognizes ``the need for an effective
and progressive response to the urgent threat
of climate change'';
(I) it is imperative for all countries to undertake
mitigation activities to rapidly meet the goal of
limiting global warming to not more than 1.5 degrees
Celsius;
(J) developed countries have the greatest capacity
to mitigate their greenhouse gas emissions, while--
(i) developing countries have the least
capacity to engage in mitigation activities;
and
(ii) the capacity of developing countries
to engage in mitigation activities is less than
the national mitigation potential of those
developing countries;
(K) the determination for the fair share of
mitigation and adaptation activities for each country
must take into account--
(i) the historic greenhouse gas emissions
of each country; and
(ii) the current capacity of each country
to both mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and
adapt to climate impacts;
(L) developed countries that have historically
emitted a disproportionately high share of greenhouse
gas emissions, and reaped the economic benefits of
those polluting activities, have a corresponding
disproportionately greater responsibility to engage in
global mitigation and adaptation activities, as
compared to less industrialized countries that have
historically polluted far less;
(M) the only realistic way for less industrialized
countries to meet their full mitigation potential is
through international climate financing by more
developed countries;
(N) in the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, developed
countries committed to jointly mobilize, starting in
2020, $100,000,000,000 per year in public climate
financing (as well as private investment and other
alternative forms of finance), for developing
countries, a commitment reaffirmed in 2015 in Decision
1/CP.21 of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement;
(O) the $100,000,000,000 commitment described in
subparagraph (N) was a political compromise that falls
short of the actual financing needs for climate action
in developing countries;
(P) Bloomberg New Energy Finance has estimated that
the transition to renewable energy sources in
developing countries will require hundreds of billions
of dollars annually;
(Q) the United Nations Environment Programme has
estimated that adaptation needs relating to climate
change in developing countries may be as much as
$300,000,000,000 annually by 2030;
(R) the Green Climate Fund was created in 2010 by
194 countries to serve as a crucial financing mechanism
to help developing countries limit or reduce greenhouse
gas emissions and adapt to climate change;
(S) in 2015, the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change agreed that the Green
Climate Fund should serve the goals of the Paris
Agreement, which states that ``developed country
Parties shall provide financial resources to assist
developing country Parties with respect to both
mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their
existing obligations under the Convention'';
(T) the Green Climate Fund is an essential
institution for climate financing, as the Green Climate
Fund ensures--
(i) balanced governance between developed
and developing countries;
(ii) stakeholder engagement and discourse;
(iii) a balanced approach between
mitigation and adaptation;
(iv) fair and equal labor and working
conditions;
(v) conservation of biodiversity and
critical habitats; and
(vi) strong environmental, social, and
gender protections;
(U) the Green Climate Fund--
(i) promotes and protects human rights and
the rights of marginalized groups, including
indigenous peoples, women, children, and people
with disabilities;
(ii) continues to take steps to strengthen
protection for marginalized groups; and
(iii) the United States committed
$3,000,000,000 of the first $10,000,000,000
raised for the initial resource mobilization
period of the Green Climate Fund, though only
\1/3\ of this pledge was fulfilled, leaving the
United States the only country to fall
substantially short of a commitment of a
country to the Green Climate Fund; and
(V) the Green Climate Fund is a fully operational
and proven institution supporting well over 100
projects and programs in developing countries around
the world.
(2) It is the policy of the United States to provide
climate financing--
(A) as an essential part of the global effort to
combat climate change; and
(B) that--
(i) upholds the principles of environmental
justice and climate justice;
(ii) supports programs and projects
developed by recipient countries and
communities;
(iii) is designed and implemented with the
free, prior, and informed consent of indigenous
peoples and other impacted communities;
(iv) promotes gender equality as essential
in all of the projects and programs supported
by climate financing;
(v) includes best practices for
environmental and social safeguards to ensure
that projects and programs supported by climate
financing respect fundamental human rights; and
(vi) addresses both mitigation and
adaptation as essential aspects of responding
to climate change.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated for contributions to the Green Climate Fund $1,400,000,000
for fiscal year 2022; $2,600,000,000 for fiscal year 2023; and
$4,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2024.
(c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the
climate financing needs to achieve the greenhouse gas emissions
reductions required to keep the planet at or below 1.5 degrees Celsius
of global warming are significantly greater than the amount of funds
authorized to be appropriated under subsection (a).
(d) Definitions.--In this Act:
(1) Climate financing.--The term ``climate financing''
means the transfer of new and additional public funds from
developed countries to developing countries for projects and
programs that--
(A) reduce or eliminate greenhouse gas emissions;
(B) enhance and restore natural carbon
sequestration; and
(C) promote adaptation to climate change.
(2) Green climate fund.--The term ``Green Climate Fund''
means the independent, multilateral fund--
(A) established by parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change; and
(B) adopted by decision as part of the financial
mechanism of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change.
(3) Paris agreement.--The term ``Paris Agreement'' means
the annex to Decision 1/CP.21 adopted by the 21st Conference of
Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change in Paris, France, on December 12, 2015.
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