[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 845 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
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116th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 845
To establish as United States policy that, pending confirmation of the
Russian Federation's continued compliance with the New START Treaty,
the United States should extend the Treaty through 2026.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
March 14, 2019
Mr. Menendez (for himself, Mr. Reed, and Mr. Warner) introduced the
following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on
Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To establish as United States policy that, pending confirmation of the
Russian Federation's continued compliance with the New START Treaty,
the United States should extend the Treaty through 2026.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``New START Policy Act of 2019''.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee
on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(2) New start, treaty.--The terms ``New START'' and
``Treaty'' mean the Treaty between the United States of America
and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed
April 8, 2010, and entered into force February 5, 2011
(commonly known as the ``New START Treaty'').
SEC. 3. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Since the end of World War II, the United States has
relied on a robust and effective nuclear deterrent as part of
our national defense, particularly against the Soviet Union and
its successor state, the Russian Federation.
(2) In tandem with our nuclear deterrent, the United States
pursued a number of arms control, disarmament, and
nonproliferation agreements with the Soviet Union as a means of
ensuring strategic stability and United States defense of the
homeland, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.
(3) The Nuclear Posture Review issued in February 2018
states that arms control agreements during the Cold War
``increased transparency, moderated competition, codified rough
parity in strategic nuclear areas, and closed off areas of
competition''.
(4) In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, the
United States continues to rely on a combination of nuclear
deterrence and strategic arms control to protect the United
States from nuclear attack.
(5) On April 8, 2010, the United States and the Russian
Federation signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New
START).
(6) In an op-ed to the Washington Post dated December 2,
2010, former Secretaries of State Henry A. Kissinger, George P.
Shultz, James A. Baker III, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, and Colin
L. Powell all urged the Senate to ratify New START, stating
that it was in ``the national interest to ratify''.
(7) During the ratification process, New START garnered
bipartisan support, and the United States Senate approved New
START on December 22, 2010, by a 71-26 vote.
(8) New START entered into force on February 5, 2011,
placing limitations on United States and Russian strategic
systems, including intercontinental ballistic missiles,
submarine launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers, as
well as warheads that threatened the United States.
(9) On February 5, 2018, the central limits on United
States and Russia strategic nuclear arsenals took effect.
(10) In March 2018, the United States and the Russian
Federation exchanged data on their respective strategic nuclear
arsenals in accordance with the Treaty.
(11) Through the Treaty's verification regime, which
includes short-notice, on-site inspections at military bases
and facilities, the United States is able to verify the data
provided by the Russian Federation regarding its strategic
nuclear arsenal. The verification regime provides both
countries insight into each other's strategic nuclear delivery
systems, warheads, and facilities, as well as data exchanges to
track the status and makeup of nuclear weapons systems.
(12) During a February 26, 2019, hearing of the Committee
on Armed Services of the Senate on nuclear deterrence
requirements, Commander of the United States Strategic Command
(STRATCOM) and Air Force General John Hyten voiced his
enthusiastic support for the Treaty, saying he was ``a big
supporter of the New START agreement'' stating, ``The New START
treaty'' provides ``insights into the Russians capabilities.
Those are hugely beneficial to me.''.
(13) During a March 2017 hearing of the Committee on Armed
Services of the House of Representatives on nuclear deterrence
requirements, Air Force General Paul Selva, the Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also endorsed the treaty, saying
New START is ``a bilateral, verifiable agreement that gives us
some degree of predictability on what our potential adversaries
look like''.
(14) Lieutenant General Jack Weinstein, the Air Force
Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear
Integration, asserted that New START was of ``huge value'' to
United States security.
(15) The Nuclear Posture Review states that arms control
agreements can ``foster transparency, understanding, and
predictability in adversary relations, thereby reducing the
risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation''.
(16) New START strengthens United States nuclear security
and strategic stability by reducing the number of strategic
systems in Russia's nuclear arsenal and provides the United
States with the inspection and monitoring tools necessary to
confidently verify Russian compliance with New START.
(17) New START does not restrict United States nuclear
modernization programs or limit United States missile defense
efforts.
(18) During a September 2018 hearing before the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate, Deputy Secretary of Defense
for Policy David Trachtenberg stated that ``the transparency
and verification requirements of the New START Treaty are a
benefit'' to United States security and, in response to a
question regarding missile defense, asserted that New START had
``no'' effect on limiting our missile defense capabilities.
(19) In a March 2017 hearing of the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives, Retired Air Force General and former commander
of U.S. Strategic Command Robert Kehler stated ``I think that
we have gotten tremendous benefit out of those kinds of
agreements with the Russians over the years, provided that the
Russians comply'' regarding the importance of New START.
SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States to extend New START from its
initial termination date in February 2021 to February 2026, as allowed
in the Treaty, unless the President determines and so informs Congress
that Russia is in material breach of New START.
SEC. 5. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.
(a) Director of National Intelligence.--Not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit a report and provide a briefing to the
appropriate congressional committees that includes the following
elements:
(1) A description of the Russian Federation's current
nuclear forces and predicted force levels in 2026.
(2) An analysis of the impact New START has had on the size
and posture of the Russian Federation's nuclear forces and
strategic delivery systems.
(3) An assessment of how the Russian Federation's nuclear
and missile arsenals would change if the New START is not
extended or if a follow-on agreement to New START is not
concluded.
(4) An assessment of how strategic stability would be
impacted if New START is not extended or if a follow-on
agreement to New START is not concluded.
(5) A description of the strategic security ramifications
for the United States and our allies if New START is not
extended or a follow-on agreement to New START is not
concluded.
(6) An assessment of how our allies will respond if the
limitations on the Russian Federation's nuclear arsenal are
dissolved because of New START not being extended or a follow-
on agreement to New START not being concluded.
(7) An assessment of the impact on the United States
intelligence community's ability to accurately assess the
Russian Federation's strategic nuclear arsenal and future
nuclear force levels if New START is not extended or if a
follow-on agreement to New START is not concluded.
(b) Secretary of Defense.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit a
report and provide a briefing to appropriate congressional committees
that includes the following elements:
(1) An assessment by the Secretary of Defense on the impact
on the United States nuclear arsenal and posture if New START
is not extended or a follow-on agreement is not concluded.
(2) A description of the options that the United States has
to respond to potential changes in the Russian Federation's
nuclear posture if the limitations contained in the New START
treaty are removed.
(3) A description of the adjustments to the Department of
Defense budget that will be necessary if New START is not
extended or a follow-on agreement is not concluded.
(4) A description of the impact on strategic stability if
New START is not extended or a follow-on agreement is not
concluded.
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