[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 480 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
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116th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 480
To require an unclassified interagency report on the political
influence operations of the Government of China and the Communist Party
of China with respect to the United States, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
February 13, 2019
Mr. Rubio (for himself, Ms. Cortez Masto, Mr. Gardner, Mr. Markey, Mr.
Cornyn, and Mr. Cotton) introduced the following bill; which was read
twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To require an unclassified interagency report on the political
influence operations of the Government of China and the Communist Party
of China with respect to the United States, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Countering the Chinese Government
and Communist Party's Political Influence Operations Act''.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate;
(D) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions of the Senate;
(E) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
(F) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate;
(G) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs of the Senate;
(H) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives;
(I) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives;
(J) the Committee on Education and Labor of the
House of Representatives;
(K) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives;
(L) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives;
(M) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
of the House of Representatives; and
(N) the Committee on Financial Services of the
House of Representatives.
(2) Political influence operations.--The term ``political
influence operations'' means the coordinated and often
concealed application of disinformation, press manipulation,
economic coercion, targeted investments, corruption, or
academic censorship. Such efforts are often intended--
(A) to coerce and corrupt United States interests,
values, institutions, or individuals; and
(B) to foster attitudes, behavior, decisions, or
outcomes in the United States that support the
interests of the Government of the People's Republic of
China or the Communist Party of China.
SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The Government of China and the Communist Party of
China employ a wide range of political, informational, and
economic measures to influence, coerce, intimidate, or
undermine the United States interests or the interests of
United States partners and allies.
(2) The December 2017 National Security Strategy of the
United States of America states, ``Although the United States
seeks to continue to cooperate with China, China is using
economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and
implied military threats to persuade other states to heed its
political and security agenda.''.
(3) The political influence operations efforts of the
Government of China and the Communist Party of China have
received less scrutiny than similar efforts of the Government
of the Russian Federation, but given China's economic strength
and the growing apparatus being used to spread its influence
globally, efforts to promote its authoritarian ideal pose
significant and consequential long-term challenges to United
States interests and values.
(4) The Government of China and the Communist Party of
China use overt and covert means to target the political and
economic elite, the media and public opinion, civil society and
academia, and members of the Chinese diaspora.
(5) The Government of China and the Communist Party of
China employ an array of government entities, friendship and
exchange organizations, private entities and businesspeople,
and government-funded foundations, think tanks, educational and
other projects to carry out political influence operations,
which is often referred to as united front work.
(6) These political influence operations violate national
sovereignty, and as such, are fundamentally different from
traditional efforts by states to shape international policy
debates and improve their public image through public diplomacy
and strategic communications campaigns.
(7) The aims of the political influence operations of the
Government of China and the Communist Party of China are--
(A) to protect the political security of the
Chinese Communist Party, both within China and
globally;
(B) to domestically and globally promote the idea
that the Chinese Communist Party's political and
economic model is superior to the governments of
Western democracies;
(C) to promote the interests of the regime
globally; and
(D) to weaken Western alliances and partnerships.
(8) The political influence operations of the Government of
China and the Communist Party of China take advantage of the
open and democratic nature of the United States, including--
(A) constitutional protections for free speech and
a free press; and
(B) the desire of some individuals or institutions
to attract Chinese investment, gain access to Chinese
markets, or attain greater global influence.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the political influence operations of the Government of
China and the Communist Party of China are not ``soft power''
intended to persuade, but ``sharp power'' intended--
(A) to penetrate or corrupt democratic countries
and undermine democratic institutions and freedoms;
(B) to foster attitudes, behavior, laws, and
policies favorable to the Government of China's
interest through disinformation, coercion, corruption,
and other means;
(C) to widen the scope of Chinese authoritarian
influence around the world, including--
(i) to suppress political opposition to the
Chinese Communist Party; and
(ii) to violate the internationally
recognized human and civil rights of Chinese
citizens living in nations around the world;
and
(D) to undermine the strength of American alliances
around the world; and
(2) the American people need reliable and current
information--
(A) to identify the key institutions, individuals,
entities, and ministries that carry out such
operations; and
(B) to distinguish between malign political
influence operations intended to undermine core
American freedoms, democratic institutions, and
cultural, educational, business, and people-to-people
exchanges that may benefit the United States and China.
(c) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to clearly differentiate between the Chinese people and
culture and the Government of China and the Communist Party of
China in official statements, media, and messaging;
(2) to clearly differentiate between legal, internationally
accepted public diplomacy and strategic communications
campaigns and illicit activities to undermine democratic
institutions or freedoms;
(3) to protect United States citizens and legal residents
from malign or coercive political influence operations;
(4) to enhance cooperation and coordination with Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, and Taiwan (officially known as the
``Republic of China''), whose governments and institutions have
faced acute pressure from the political influence operations of
the Government of China and the Communist Party of China, and
with other allies throughout the world;
(5) to create strategies to ensure that countries in
Africa, the Western Hemisphere, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere
are aware of China's ``sharp power'' and provide needed
capacity to counter them effectively;
(6) to implement more advanced transparency requirements
concerning collaboration with Chinese actors for media
agencies, universities, think tanks, and government officials;
(7) to use various forums to raise awareness about--
(A) the goals and methods of the political
influence operations of the Government of China and the
Communist Party of China; and
(B) common patterns and approaches used by Chinese
intelligence agencies or related actors;
(8) to require greater transparency for Confucius
Institutes, think tanks, academic programs, and nongovernmental
organizations funded primarily by the Government of China, the
Communist Party of China, or by individuals or public or
private organizations with a demonstrable affiliation with the
Government of China or the Communist Party of China that are
operating in the United States to register through the Foreign
Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611 et seq.) or a
comparable mechanism;
(9) to seek ways to increase Chinese language proficiency
among mid-career professionals that do not rely on funding
linked to the Government of China;
(10) to ensure that existing tools are sufficiently
screening for the risk of Chinese influence operations; and
(11) to create more flexible tools, as needed, with the
goals of--
(A) screening investments from the Government of
China or sources backed by the Government of China to
protect against the takeover of United States companies
by Chinese state-owned or state-driven entities; and
(B) protecting institutions or business sectors
critically important to United States national security
and the viability of democratic institutions.
SEC. 4. STRATEGY TO COUNTER ``SHARP POWER'' POLITICAL INFLUENCE
OPERATIONS AND TO PROTECT UNITED STATES CITIZENS.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Homeland Security, in coordination with all relevant Federal agencies
shall develop a long-term strategy--
(1) to carry out the policy statements set forth in section
3(c);
(2) to effectively counter the ``sharp power'' political
influence operations of the Chinese Communist Party globally
and in the United States;
(3) to ensure that United States citizens, particularly
Chinese Americans and members of the Chinese, Uyghur, and
Tibetan diaspora who are often the victims and primary targets
of malign political influence operations, are protected;
(4) to ensure that--
(A) the United States Government strategy to
protect the communities described in paragraph (3) is
clearly communicated by relevant Federal officials; and
(B) secure outlets are created for reporting on
intimidation and surveillance;
(5) to ensure that Chinese nationals who are legally
studying, living, or working temporarily in the United States
know that intimidation or surveillance by the Government of
China and the Communist Party of China is an unacceptable
invasion of their rights while they reside in the United
States; and
(6) to provide secure outlets for reporting on intimidation
and surveillance.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, or an appropriate high-
ranking official, shall--
(1) submit an unclassified report containing the strategy
required under subsection (a) to the appropriate congressional
committees; or
(2) describe the strategy required under subsection (a)
through unclassified testimony before the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate or the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
the House of Representatives.
SEC. 5. REPORT ON THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF CHINA AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA.
(a) In General.--Because it is important for American policymakers
and the American people to be informed about the influence operations
described in section 3, not later than 270 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Director of National Intelligence, and in consultation with the heads
of relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall submit an
unclassified report to the appropriate congressional committees that
describes the political influence operations of the Government of China
and the Communist Party of China affecting the United States and not
more than 5 allies and partners most impacted by the Government of
China's influence operations in their countries (as determined by the
Director of National Intelligence), including efforts--
(1) to exert influence over United States governmental or
nongovernmental institutions or individuals, or government
officials among United States allies and partners;
(2) to coerce or threaten United States citizens or legal
permanent residents or their families and associates living in
China or elsewhere;
(3) to undermine democratic institutions and the freedoms
of speech, expression, the press, association, assembly,
religion, or academic thought;
(4) to otherwise suppress information in public fora, in
the United States and abroad; or
(5) to develop or obtain property, facilities,
infrastructure, business entities, or other assets for use in
facilitating the activities described in paragraphs (1) through
(4).
(b) Contents.--The report required under subsection (a) shall also
include recommendations for the President and Congress relating to--
(1) the need for additional resources or authorities to
counter political influence operations in the United States
directed by the Government of China or the Communist Party of
China, including operations carried out in concert with allies;
(2) whether a permanent office to monitor and respond to
political influence operations of the Government of China and
the Communist Party of China should be established within the
Department of State or the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence; and
(3) whether regular public reports on the political
influence operations of the Government of China and the
Communist Party of China are needed to inform Congress and the
American people of the scale and scope of such operations.
SEC. 6. ASIA REASSURANCE INITIATIVE ACT OF 2018 IMPLEMENTATION.
The Secretary of State, in consultation with relevant United States
Government agencies and the appropriate congressional committees, is
encouraged to fully implement section 201(c) of the Asia Reassurance
Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-409) with regard to United
States Government efforts to counter the strategic influence of the
People's Republic of China.
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