[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4392 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
116th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 4392
To provide security assistance and strategic support to Ukraine, and
for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
July 30, 2020
Mr. Risch (for himself, Mr. Menendez, Mr. Portman, Mr. Murphy, Mr.
Barrasso, and Mrs. Shaheen) introduced the following bill; which was
read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To provide security assistance and strategic support to Ukraine, and
for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Ukraine Security Partnership Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Throughout its history, Ukraine has experienced long
periods of occupation.
(2) Between 1919 and 1991, Ukraine was brutally ruled by
the Soviet Union, whose ruthless policy of agricultural
collectivization caused the Holodomor of 1932-1933, a man-made
famine that resulted in the death of at least 3,000,000
Ukrainians by starvation.
(3) During the violent Nazi occupation of Ukraine
accompanying World War II--
(A) approximately 3,500,000 Ukrainian civilians and
3,000,000 soldiers were killed; and
(B) approximately 1,500,000 Jews were massacred.
(4) Ukraine declared its independence from Moscow in 1991,
after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
(5) In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the Russian
Federation, the United States, and the United Kingdom pledged
to ``respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing
borders of Ukraine'' and ``refrain from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of Ukraine'' in exchange for Ukraine's surrender
of its nuclear arsenal.
(6) From November 2004 through January 2005, thousands of
Ukrainians took to the streets to peacefully protest electoral
fraud and widespread corruption by the ruling elite in the 2004
Presidential election, successfully triggering a re-vote, in
what became known as the Orange Revolution.
(7) During Ukraine's 2014 Revolution of Dignity, or
Euromaidan, the pro-Russian government of President Viktor
Yanukovych was forced to resign after thousands of Ukrainians
peacefully protested Yanukovych's decision to reject a closer
relationship with the European Union and his continued systemic
corruption, and over 100 of those protestors were killed by
violent government suppression.
(8) Fearful of Ukraine's strengthened pro-Western
orientation after the Revolution of Dignity, the Government of
the Russian Federation, in violation of international law and
in contravention of its commitments in the Budapest
Memorandum--
(A) sent undisclosed military personnel into
Ukraine's Autonomous Republic of Crimea in February
2014 and has illegally occupied the Crimean Peninsula
for the past six years;
(B) sent covert military personnel into the
Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk in April 2014,
instigating and supporting a still-ongoing separatist
war that has cost nearly 14,000 lives; and
(C) provided the Buk missile system used by those
Russian-backed separatists to shoot down Malaysian
Airlines Flight 17 over eastern Ukraine in July 2014,
killing all 298 passengers and crew on board.
(9) Under Russian control, Crimean authorities have
kidnapped, imprisoned, and tortured Crimean Tatars, opposition
figures, activists, and other minority populations, and have
persecuted religious minorities by pressing false charges of
terrorism and deregistering religious centers.
(10) In September 2014, in an attempt to stop the fighting
that the Russian Federation had initiated in eastern Ukraine,
France, Germany, Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the
Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE), and Russian-
backed rebel leaders from eastern Ukraine signed the Minsk
Protocol.
(11) In February 2015, after the failure of the initial
Minsk Protocol, the Russian Federation committed to the Minsk
II Agreement, the roadmap for resolving the conflict in eastern
Ukraine, signed by the Governments of Ukraine, Russia, France,
and Germany.
(12) Despite these agreements, the Government of the
Russian Federation continues to violate Ukrainian sovereignty
through--
(A) manipulation of Ukraine's dependence on Russian
natural gas, including cutting off access in 2014,
which deprived Ukraine of its energy supply and transit
fees;
(B) espionage and clandestine assassinations on
Ukrainian territory;
(C) continuous cyber warfare against the Government
of Ukraine and Ukrainian businesses, such as the
NotPetya hack in 2017; and
(D) seizure of Ukrainian property and citizens,
including the November 2018 seizure in the Kerch Strait
of three Ukrainian naval vessels and 24 Ukrainian
officers on board those vessels.
(13) In July 2018, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo
issued the Crimea Declaration and reiterated in February 2020
on the sixth anniversary of Russia's occupation that ``Crimea
is Ukraine''.
(14) Since April 2014, at least 4,100 Ukrainian soldiers
have died fighting for their country against the Russian
Federation and Russian-backed rebels, while no less than 3,361
civilians have perished as a result of that fighting.
(15) Despite Ukraine's tumultuous history and neighborhood,
in under 30 years it has risen from the collapse of the Soviet
Union to become a developing democracy, steadily working to
overcome its Soviet legacy of oppression, oligarchic control,
and corruption.
(16) Running on a strong anti-corruption platform,
Volodymyr Zelenskyy won the 2019 presidential election with 73
percent of the vote, and his political party, Servant of the
People, won a parliamentary majority in the Ukrainian
parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, marking the first time since
independence that one party has controlled the Parliament, the
Cabinet of Ministers, and the Presidency.
(17) The OSCE confirmed the 2019 elections were
``competitive and fundamental freedoms were generally
respected''.
(18) Since 2014, the Government of Ukraine has made
difficult and substantial reforms in an effort to address
corruption and more closely align with the West, such as
slimming and decentralizing its bureaucracy, removing immunity
from prosecution for Members of Parliament, reforming its gas,
pension, and procurement systems, and working to adapt its
military to the standards of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO).
(19) Despite progress in reforming many areas of Ukrainian
governance, serious issues still remain, particularly in the
areas of corruption and rule of law.
(20) The United States Government has consistently
supported Ukraine's democratic transition and its fight against
Russian-backed separatists by assisting its governance reform
efforts, maintaining robust and coordinated sanctions against
the Russian Federation alongside the European Union, and
providing the Ukrainian military with training and equipment,
including lethal defensive weaponry.
(21) In addition to the United States, the European Union,
European countries, and Canada have provided substantial
diplomatic, monetary, and military support for Ukraine's
democratic transition and its fight against Russian-led
separatists in eastern Ukraine, and also have implemented and
maintained robust sanctions regimes against the Russian
Federation for its illegal occupation of Crimea and its active
destabilization of Ukraine.
(22) the Government of Ukraine has steadfastly supported
the United States and European allies by deploying troops to
Iraq, Afghanistan, and NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR), allowing
United States military planes to refuel on Ukrainian soil, and
trading billions of dollars' worth of goods and services with
the United States.
(23) NATO has recently decided to include Ukraine in its
Enhanced Opportunities Partnership in recognition of Ukraine's
contributions to NATO missions and efforts to reform its
military in line with NATO standards.
(24) Since the Russian Federation's 2014 invasion of
Ukraine, the United States Congress has demonstrated its
support for Ukraine through the passage of legislation,
including the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity,
Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014
(Public Law 113-95; 22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.), the Ukraine
Freedom Support Act (Public Law 113-272; 22 U.S.C. 8921 et
seq.), the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative established
under section 1250 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92; 129 Stat. 1068), the
Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Public
Law 115-44), and the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act of
2019 (Public Law 116-92, title LXXV), and the United States
Congress continues to demonstrate strong support for assisting
Ukraine in defending itself and deterring Russia.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) Ukraine stands as a bulwark against the malign
influence of the Russian Federation in Europe, and robust
United States support for Ukraine is vital to United States
national security and demonstrates the commitment of the United
States to upholding a free and open international order;
(2) since Ukraine's independence in 1991, the Government
and people of Ukraine have made significant strides towards
improved governance, rule of law, anti-corruption measures, and
economic reforms;
(3) Ukraine's long-term viability is directly connected to
efforts to reduce corruption and build strong democratic
institutions that are able to defend against internal and
external corrupt actors;
(4) the efforts and sacrifices of Ukrainian citizens to
determine their own fate after centuries of oppression, through
democratic representation and governance reforms, is evidence
of that country's dedication to a free, independent, and
democratic future;
(5) Ukraine has proven itself to be a valuable security
partner of the United States, not simply a recipient of
assistance;
(6) it is in the national security interests of the United
States to continue and deepen its security cooperation with
Ukraine;
(7) the United States should continue to place policy-based
conditions on Ukraine's receipt of financial and military
assistance, as that mechanism has proven effective in
incentivizing reforms in Ukraine;
(8) the United States should continue to strongly support
the provision of both lethal and non-lethal security assistance
to the Government of Ukraine;
(9) the United States should use its voice and vote at NATO
to encourage the adoption of a policy by the Alliance that all
of its member states will refuse to recognize the illegal
annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation;
(10) the United States should continue to bolster the
capacity of the Ukrainian Navy as it strives to fulfill the
goals it set out in its ``Strategy of the Naval Forces of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine 2035'';
(11) the military-focused technical, training, maintenance,
and logistical assistance provided by the United States to
Ukraine is as essential as the military hardware provided to
the country;
(12) all security assistance provided to Ukraine should
continue to be subject to rigorous vetting requirements under
section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2378d) and section 362 of title 10, United States Code,
including assistance provided to units in the National Guard of
Ukraine as well as all units falling under the authority of the
Ministry of Defense;
(13) the Office of Defense Cooperation at the United States
Embassy in Ukraine should be fully staffed with officers who
serve three-year terms in order to administer the security
assistance being provided to the country;
(14) the Secretary of Defense should conduct an assessment
of the staffing resources of the Office of Defense Cooperation
and strongly consider providing additional staff to the Office
of Defense Cooperation in Ukraine;
(15) the enduring partnership between the United States and
Ukraine, including bipartisan support for a sovereign,
democratic, and whole Ukraine through political, monetary, and
military assistance, remains strong and must continue to be
reaffirmed; and
(16) the United States should continue to strongly support
Ukraine's ambitions to join the Euro-Atlantic community of
democracies.
SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to refuse to recognize the illegal annexation of Crimea
by the Russian Federation, an action that was taken in
contravention of international law;
(2) to utilize existing sanctions and other authorities to
deter malign actions by the Russian Federation in Ukraine,
including the mandates and authorities codified by the
Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Public
Law 115-44); and
(3) to work with our European allies to coordinate
strategies to curtail Russian malign influence in Ukraine.
SEC. 5. STRATEGY ON UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report with a strategy on how
the United States will work to diplomatically support Ukraine during
fiscal years 2021 through 2025.
(b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
include the following elements:
(1) A description of how relevant departments and agencies
of the United States Government will work together to
collectively support efforts by the Government of Ukraine to
deter Russian aggression in the form of military incursions,
cyber attacks, the coercive use of energy resources, use of
passportization, and efforts to corrupt the Ukrainian political
and economic systems.
(2) A description of the United States current efforts and
strategy to support Ukrainian diplomatic initiatives when they
align with United States interests.
(3) A strategy on how the United States will use its voice
and vote at the United Nations, OSCE, Council of Europe, NATO,
and other relevant international bodies to support Ukraine and
its reform efforts.
(4) A strategy on how the United States will assist Ukraine
in bolstering its diplomatic and maritime relationships with
key Black Sea countries, including Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey,
and Georgia.
(5) A strategy on how the United States will engage with
Germany, France, Ukraine, and Russia to advance the Normandy
Format and Minsk Agreements.
(c) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
SEC. 6. UNITED STATES-EUROPE WORKING GROUP ON UKRAINE.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall seek to establish a
United States-Europe Working Group on Ukraine.
(b) Representation.--The United States-Europe Working Group on
Ukraine should include high-level representatives from relevant
European governments, as appropriate, to jointly prioritize, evaluate
and coordinate economic and policy reform assistance and support for
Ukraine.
(c) Regular Meetings.--The working group should meet not less than
twice per year.
(d) Termination.--The authorities under this section shall
terminate on September 30 of the fifth fiscal year beginning after the
date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 7. SPECIAL ENVOY FOR UKRAINE.
(a) Establishment.--The President shall appoint, by and with the
consent of the Senate, a Special Envoy for Ukraine, who shall report to
the Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia.
(b) Rank.--The Special Envoy for Ukraine shall have the rank and
status of ambassador.
(c) Responsibilities.--The Special Envoy for Ukraine shall--
(1) serve as the United States liaison to the Normandy
Format, tasked with leading the peace process between Ukraine
and the Russian Federation;
(2) facilitate diplomatic outreach to and dialogue with
countries in the Black Sea region;
(3) coordinate closely with the Chief of Mission in
Ukraine;
(4) coordinate with the United States-Europe Working Group
on Ukraine established pursuant to section 6; and
(5) provide the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives regular updates and briefings on the state of
reforms in Ukraine and the status of peace negotiations.
(d) Termination.--The Special Envoy for Ukraine position
established under subsection (a) shall terminate 5 years after the date
of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 8. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for the Department of State for each of fiscal years 2021
through 2025 $300,000,000 for Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
assistance to Ukraine to assist the country in meeting its defense
needs.
(b) Availability of Funds.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount appropriated for each fiscal
year pursuant to subsection (a), not more than $150,000,000
shall be made available until the Secretary of State makes the
certification described in paragraph (2) for such fiscal year,
including a detailed explanation justifying the certification
with respect to each of the categories listed in subparagraphs
(A) through (G) of such paragraph. The certification shall be
submitted to the appropriate congressional committees in
unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
(2) Certification.--The certification described in this
paragraph is a certification by the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, that the Government
of Ukraine has taken substantial actions to--
(A) make defense institutional reforms, in
accordance with NATO standards;
(B) further strengthen civilian control of the
military;
(C) reform its state-owned arms production sector;
(D) increase transparency and accountability in
defense procurement;
(E) promote military officers based on merit;
(F) respect Verkhovna Rada efforts to exercise
oversight of the Ministry of Defense and military
forces; and
(G) promote respect for the observation of human
rights within the security forces of Ukraine so that
such forces meet the requirements enshrined in section
620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2378d).
(c) Notice to Congress.--Not later than 15 days before providing
assistance or support under pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary
of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
notification containing the following:
(1) A detailed description of the assistance or support to
be provided, including--
(A) the objectives of such assistance or support;
(B) the budget for such assistance or support; and
(C) the expected or estimated timeline for delivery
of such assistance or support.
(2) A description of such other matters as the Secretary
considers appropriate.
(d) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that assistance
provided under this section should--
(1) prioritize the procurement of vessels for the Ukrainian
Navy and other articles that bolster the capacity of the
Ukrainian Navy to counter Russian maritime aggression and
maintain the freedom of innocent passage throughout the Black
Sea; and
(2) ensure adequate planning for maintenance for any
equipment provided.
(e) Authority To Provide Lethal Assistance.--The Secretary of State
is authorized to provide lethal assistance under this section,
including anti-armor weapon systems, mortars, crew-served weapons and
ammunition, grenade launchers and ammunition, anti-tank weapons
systems, anti-ship weapons systems, anti-aircraft weapons systems, and
small arms and ammunition.
(f) Transfer Authority.--The Secretary of Defense may transfer
amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for assistance under
section 333 of title 10, United States Code, to the Department of State
to be made available for Foreign Military Finance assistance to
Ukraine.
SEC. 9. REPORT ON CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS OF MILITARY
FORCES OF UKRAINE AND RESOURCE PLAN FOR SECURITY
ASSISTANCE.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of
State shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a
report on the capability and capacity requirements of the military
forces of Ukraine, which shall include the following:
(1) An analysis of the capability gaps and capacity
shortfalls of the military forces of Ukraine that includes--
(A) an assessment of the requirements of the navy
of Ukraine to accomplish its assigned missions; and
(B) an assessment of the requirements of the air
force of Ukraine to accomplish its assigned missions.
(2) An assessment of the relative priority as signed by the
Government of Ukraine to addressing such capability gaps and
capacity shortfalls.
(3) An assessment of the capability gaps and five capacity
shortfalls that--
(A) could be addressed in a sufficient and timely
manner by unilateral efforts of the Government of
Ukraine; and
(B) are unlikely to be addressed in a sufficient
and timely manner solely through unilateral efforts.
(4) An assessment of the capability gaps and capacity
shortfalls described in paragraph (3)(B) that could be
addressed in a sufficient and timely manner by--
(A) the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative of
the Department of Defense;
(B) Department of Defense security assistance
authorized by section 333 of title 10, United States
Code;
(C) the Foreign Military Financing and Foreign
Military Sales programs of the Department of State; or
(D) the provision of excess defense articles.
(5) An assessment of the human resources requirements of
the Office of Defense Cooperation at the United States Embassy
in Kyiv and any gaps in the capacity of such Office of Defense
Cooperation to provide security assistance to Ukraine.
(6) Any recommendations the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of State consider appropriate concerning the
coordination of security assistance efforts of the Department
of Defense and the Department of State with respect to Ukraine.
(b) Resource Plan.--Not later than February 15, 2022, the Secretary
of Defense and the Secretary of State shall jointly submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a resource plan for United States
security assistance with respect to Ukraine, which shall include the
following:
(1) A plan to resource the following initiatives and
programs with respect to Ukraine in fiscal year 2023 and the
four succeeding fiscal years to meet the most critical
capability gaps and capacity short falls of the military forces
of Ukraine:
(A) The Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative of
the Department of Defense.
(B) Department of Defense security assistance
authorized by section 333 of title 10, United States
Code.
(C) The Foreign Military Financing and Foreign
Military Sales programs of the Department of State.
(D) The provision of excess defense articles.
(2) With respect to the Ukrainian Navy, the following:
(A) A capability development plan, with milestones,
detailing the manner in which the United States will
assist the Government of Ukraine in meeting the
requirements referred to in subsection (a)(1)(A).
(B) A plan for United States cooperation with third
countries and international organizations that have the
resources and ability to provide immediate assistance
to the navy of Ukraine while maintaining
interoperability with United States platforms to the
extent feasible.
(C) A plan to prioritize the provision of excess
defense articles for the Ukrainian Navy to the extent
practicable during fiscal year 2023 and the four
succeeding fiscal years.
(D) An assessment of the manner in which United
States security assistance to the Ukrainian Navy is in
the national security interests of the United States.
(3) With respect to the Ukrainian Air Force, the following:
(A) A capability development plan, with milestones,
detailing the manner in which the United States will
assist the Government of Ukraine in meeting the
requirements referred to in subsection (a)(1)(B).
(B) A plan for United States cooperation with third
countries and international organizations that have the
resources and ability to provide immediate assistance
to the Ukrainian Air Force while maintaining
interoperability with United States platforms to the
extent feasible.
(C) A plan to prioritize the provision of excess
defense articles for the Ukrainian Air Force to the
extent practicable during fiscal year 2023 and the four
succeeding fiscal years.
(D) An assessment of the manner in which United
States security assistance to the Ukrainian Air Force
is in the national security interests of the United
States.
(4) An assessment of progress on defense institutional
reforms in Ukraine, including with respect to the navy and air
force of Ukraine, during fiscal year 2023 and the four
succeeding fiscal years that will be essential for--
(A) enabling effective use and sustainment of
capabilities developed under security assistance
authorities described in this section;
(B) enhancing the defense of the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Ukraine;
(C) achieving the stated goal of the Government of
Ukraine of meeting North Atlantic Treaty Organization
standards; and
(D) allowing Ukraine to achieve its full potential
as a strategic partner of the United States.
(c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) and the resource
plan required by subsection (b) shall each be submitted in a classified
form with an unclassified summary.
(d) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives.
SEC. 10. EXPEDITED EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES TRANSFER PROGRAM.
During fiscal years 2021 through 2025, the delivery of excess
defense articles to Ukraine shall be given the same priority as that
given other countries and regions under section 516(c)(2) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)).
SEC. 11. STRATEGY ON EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES FROM ALLIES.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a classified strategy on how the United States will
encourage third countries to donate excess defense equipment to
Ukraine.
(b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
include the following elements:
(1) A listing of all friendly and allied nations that have
excess defense material that may be compatible with the needs
and systems utilized by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
(2) A description of the diplomatic efforts undertaken by
the United States Government to encourage allied nations to
donate their excess defense articles to Ukraine on an expedited
basis.
SEC. 12. IMET COOPERATION WITH UKRAINE.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated to the Department of State $4,000,000 for each of fiscal
years 2021 through 2025 for International Military Education and
Training (IMET) assistance for Ukraine. The assistance shall be made
available for the following purposes:
(1) Training of future leaders.
(2) Fostering a better understanding of the United States.
(3) Establishing a rapport between the United States Armed
Forces and Ukraine's military to build partnerships for the
future.
(4) Enhancement of interoperability and capabilities for
joint operations.
(5) Focusing on professional military education, civilian
control of the military, and human rights.
(b) Availability of Funds.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount appropriated for each fiscal
year pursuant to subsection (a), not more than $3,000,000 may
be made available until the Secretary of State, in consultation
with the Secretary of Defense, makes the certification
described in paragraph (2) to the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Foreign Affairs Committee of
the House of Representatives, including a detailed explanation
justifying the certification with respect to each of the
categories listed in subparagraphs (A) through (G) of such
paragraph. The certification shall be submitted to the
appropriate congressional committees in unclassified form, but
may contain a classified annex.
(2) Certification.--The certification described in this
paragraph is a certification by the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, that the Government
of Ukraine has taken substantial actions to--
(A) make defense institutional reforms, in
accordance with NATO standards;
(B) further strengthen civilian control of the
military;
(C) reform its state-owned arms production sector;
(D) increase transparency and accountability in
defense procurement;
(E) promote military officers based on merit;
(F) respect Verkhovna Rada efforts to exercise
oversight of the Ministry of Defense and military
forces; and
(G) promote respect for the observation of human
rights within the security forces of Ukraine so that
such forces meet the requirements enshrined in section
620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2378d).
(c) Notice to Congress.--Not later than 15 days before providing
assistance or support pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary of
State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a
notification containing the following elements:
(1) A detailed description of the assistance or support to
be provided, including--
(A) the objectives of such assistance or support;
(B) the budget for such assistance or support; and
(C) the expected or estimated timeline for delivery
of such assistance or support.
(2) A description of such other matters as the Secretary
considers appropriate.
SEC. 13. STRATEGY ON IMET PROGRAMMING IN UKRAINE.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the
Government of Ukraine should fully utilize the United States IMET
program, encourage eligible officers to participate in the training,
and promote successful graduates to positions of prominence in the
Ukrainian Armed Forces.
(b) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a strategy for the implementation
of the IMET program in Ukraine authorized under section 12.
(c) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall
include the following elements:
(1) A clear plan, developed in close consultation with the
Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, for how the IMET program will be
used by the United States Government and the Government of
Ukraine to propel program graduates to positions of prominence
in support of the Ukrainian military's reform efforts in line
with NATO standards.
(2) An assessment of the education and training
requirements of the Ukrainian military and clear
recommendations for how IMET graduates should be assigned by
the Ukrainian military upon completion of education or
training.
(3) An accounting of the current combat requirements of the
Ukrainian military and an assessment of the viability of
alternative mobile training teams, distributed learning, and
other flexible solutions to reach such students.
(4) An identification of opportunities to influence the
next generation of leaders through attendance at United States
service academies, staff and war colleges, junior leader
development programs, and technical schools.
(d) Form.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
SEC. 14. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON LOAN PROGRAM.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) as appropriate, the United States Government should
provide direct loans to Ukraine for the procurement of defense
articles, defense services, and design and construction
services pursuant to the authority of section 23 of the Arms
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) to support the further
development of Ukraine's military forces; and
(2) such loans should be considered an additive security
assistance tool, and not a substitute for Foreign Military
Financing for grant assistance or Ukraine Security Assistance
Initiative programming.
SEC. 15. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.
In this Act, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
<all>