

116TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. 3759

To close high risk wildlife markets and prevent wildlife disease transmission
globally, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 19, 2020

Mr. COONS (for himself and Mr. GRAHAM) introduced the following bill; which
was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To close high risk wildlife markets and prevent wildlife
disease transmission globally, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the
5 “Global Wildlife Health and Pandemic Prevention Act”.

6 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for
7 this Act is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
- Sec. 2. Definitions.
- Sec. 3. Findings.
- Sec. 4. Sense of Congress.
- Sec. 5. Closing high risk wildlife markets.
- Sec. 6. Preventing outbreaks of diseases of wildlife origin.
- Sec. 7. Authorization of appropriations.

1 **SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.**

2 In this Act:

3 (1) **EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE.**—The
4 term “emerging infectious disease” means an infec-
5 tious disease whose incidence in humans has in-
6 creased in the past two decades or threatens to in-
7 crease in the near future.

8 (2) **HIGH RISK WILDLIFE MARKETS.**—The term
9 “high risk wildlife markets” means any commercial
10 market that sells or processes wildlife for human
11 consumption, whether the animals originated in the
12 wild or in a captive situation, and where—

13 (A) the species of wildlife or regulation of
14 the market is determined under section 6(a)(1)
15 to be a risk factor for zoonotic disease spread
16 to humans or is linked with the global illegal
17 trade in wildlife; or

18 (B) the manner of processing the wildlife
19 is determined under section 6(a)(1) to be a risk
20 factor for zoonotic disease spread to humans.

21 (3) **ONE HEALTH.**—The term “One Health”
22 means a collaborative and transdisciplinary approach
23 to achieving optimal health outcomes that recognizes
24 the interconnection between people, animals, plants,
25 and their shared environment.

1 (4) SPILLOVER EVENT.—The term “spillover
2 event” means the transmission of a pathogen from
3 one species to another that was not previously a host
4 for that pathogen.

5 (5) ZOONOTIC DISEASE.—The term “zoonotic
6 disease” means any disease that is naturally trans-
7 missible from vertebrate animals to humans.

8 **SEC. 3. FINDINGS.**

9 Congress makes the following findings:

10 (1) According to the Centers for Disease Con-
11 trol and Prevention, the majority of emerging infec-
12 tious diseases in recent years have originated in
13 wildlife, and the rate of outbreaks of these diseases
14 is increasing.

15 (2) Zoonotic disease spillover events can occur
16 from unnatural interaction between human and wild-
17 life populations or between wildlife populations with-
18 out human presence.

19 (3) The collection, production, trade, and sale
20 of wildlife for human consumption can be a serious
21 risk factor for spillover events, particularly if it in-
22 volves animal species not typically in close proximity
23 to humans or to each other, living under poorly reg-
24 ulated and stressful conditions that exacerbate the
25 shedding of zoonotic pathogens.

1 (4) Changing land use practices and human ex-
2 pansion into wildlife habitat also increase opportuni-
3 ties for contact between wildlife and humans that
4 can lead to disease transmission.

5 (5) Markets where wildlife is sold for human
6 consumption are found in many countries through-
7 out the world, and in some cases these products rep-
8 resent the only accessible source of protein for com-
9 munities; therefore, sustainable production of alter-
10 native protein should be supported in such commu-
11 nities in order to reduce need or demand for wildlife
12 as a food source.

13 (6) The human, economic, and security costs of
14 global pandemics and regional epidemics of zoonotic
15 diseases and emerging infectious diseases is over-
16 whelming. It is believed that the COVID–19 pan-
17 demic will result in tens of thousands of deaths and
18 trillions of dollars in economic damage to the United
19 States alone.

20 **SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

21 It is the sense of Congress that—

22 (1) the United States Government should
23 prioritize actions that lead to the immediate and
24 permanent closure of high risk wildlife markets
25 around the world; and

10 SEC. 5. CLOSING HIGH RISK WILDLIFE MARKETS.

11 (a) CLOSURE OF MARKETS.—The Department of
12 State, the United States Agency for International Develop-
13 opment, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, and
14 the Department of Agriculture, in collaboration with other
15 relevant United States agencies, shall—

19 (2) provide support for other governments
20 around the world in their efforts to close high risk
21 wildlife markets;

22 (3) work with other governments and multilateral
23 organizations, through appropriate existing
24 treaties and conventions, to develop agreements or

1 protocols around closing high risk wildlife markets;
2 and

3 (4) coordinate these activities with existing
4 United States Government efforts to combat wildlife
5 trafficking, including—

6 (A) providing assistance to combat corruption,
7 strengthen governance, and build law enforcement capacity abroad;

9 (B) aiding countries in detecting and deterring illegal import, transit, and export of
10 wildlife;

12 (C) improving information sharing in order to halt wildlife trade that may spread zoonotic disease and emerging infectious disease; and

15 (D) reducing demand for wildlife and wildlife products, including by increasing access to alternative protein sources for food insecure communities.

19 (b) NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEASURES.—The
20 National Security Council, in consultation with the United
21 States Agency for International Development, the Centers
22 for Disease Control and Prevention, the United States
23 Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Department of Agriculture, shall develop policies and mechanisms to support

1 the closure of high risk wildlife markets and associated
2 activities globally.

3 (c) SANCTIONS.—

4 (1) FINDINGS WARRANTING SANCTIONS.—If the
5 Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Interior, or
6 the Secretary of Agriculture finds that a country is
7 continuing to willfully harbor high risk wildlife mar-
8 kets, including a failure to enforce relevant laws and
9 regulations, the Secretary making such finding shall
10 certify such finding to the President and shall report
11 this certification within 15 days to Congress.

12 (2) ACTIONS.—Upon the receipt of any certifi-
13 cation made under subsection (c), the President
14 may—

15 (A) prohibit the import of any products
16 from the offending country, to the extent that
17 such prohibition is permitted under current
18 trade agreements;

19 (B) freeze assets of any government offi-
20 cials from the offending country; or

21 (C) impose travel bans and visa restric-
22 tions on any government officials from the of-
23 fending country.

24 (d) EXCEPTIONS.—In carrying out this section, lim-
25 ited exceptions shall be considered if necessary to meet

1 the nutritional, subsistence, or cultural needs and rights
2 of indigenous peoples or communities dependent on wild-
3 life for food security.

4 **SEC. 6. PREVENTING OUTBREAKS OF DISEASES OF WILD-**
5 **LIFE ORIGIN.**

6 (a) INTEGRATING HUMAN, ANIMAL, AND ENVIRON-
7 MENTAL HEALTH.—The Department of State, the United
8 States Agency for International Development, the Centers
9 for Disease Control and Prevention, the United States
10 Fish and Wildlife Service, the United States Geological
11 Survey, and the Department of Agriculture, in collabora-
12 tion with other relevant United States agencies as appro-
13 priate, shall leverage public health, animal health, and en-
14 vironmental health expertise to—

- 15 (1) identify high risk wildlife markets for the
16 purposes of carrying out section 5;
- 17 (2) coordinate an integrated, Federal govern-
18 ment-wide approach to global zoonotic disease pre-
19 paredness, surveillance, and response;
- 20 (3) support efforts to better understand the
21 connection between human and wildlife health;
- 22 (4) promote a multi-sectoral approach that co-
23 ordinates global health, food security, and biodiver-
24 sity activities;

(5) strengthen global capacity for detection of zoonotic diseases with pandemic potential by—

(A) supporting institutions that can prevent and provide early detection of zoonotic outbreaks;

(B) investing in laboratory diagnostic capability and workforce training;

(C) supporting surveillance at locations at
high risk of spillover events; and

(D) preventing biodiversity loss and ecosystem degradation that can lead to zoonotic disease transmission;

13 (6) invest in food security efforts that aim to—

14 (A) eliminate public health threats from
15 zoonotic disease spillover events;

18 (C) protect food insecure communities
19 from loss of access to protein that may result
20 from closure of high risk wildlife markets and
21 efforts to reduce demand for wildlife as a food
22 source; and

23 (7) take action to minimize the human-wildlife
24 interface in the wild, including by—

- (A) preventing the degradation and fragmentation of intact ecosystems;
- (B) restoring the integrity of degraded and fragmented ecosystems;
- (C) supporting effective indigenous and local stewardship of traditional territories;
- (D) supporting national and subnational governments in effectively managing their protected areas;
- (E) helping enforce current laws that protect wildlife; and
- (F) investing in risk reduction and community education programs that reduce demand for wildlife as a food source and increase access to alternative protein sources.

16 (b) IDENTIFICATION OF HIGH RISK WILDLIFE MAR-
17 KETS.—In carrying out subsection (a)(1), the following
18 factors shall be considered:

19 (1) Wildlife markets that are regulated under
20 national and international veterinary standards for
21 slaughter shall not be considered high risk wildlife
22 markets.

1 the purposes of identifying high risk wildlife mar-
2 kets.

3 (c) GLOBAL HEALTH FUNDING PLAN.—The Sec-
4 retary of State and the Administrator of the United States
5 Agency for International Development shall include infor-
6 mation about zoonotic disease preparedness and surveil-
7 lance in the reports required under section 406(b) of the
8 Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental
9 Appropriations Act, 2020 (Public Law 116–123).

10 **SEC. 7. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

11 The following amounts are authorized to be appro-
12 priated for fiscal year 2021 to carry out the activities out-
13 lined in this Act:

14 (1) \$100,000,000 for State International Nar-
15 cotics Control and Law Enforcement.

16 (2) \$50,000,000 for the Fish and Wildlife Serv-
17 ice Office of Law Enforcement.

18 (3) \$20,000,000 for the Fish and Wildlife Serv-
19 ice Office of International Affairs.

20 (4) \$40,000,000 for the United States Geologi-
21 cal Survey National Wildlife Health Center.

22 (5) \$30,000,000 for the USDA National Ani-
23 mal Health Laboratory Network.

24 (6) \$200,000,000 for USAID Global Health Se-
25 curity Programs.

1 (7) \$125,000,000 for USAID Food Security
2 Programs.

3 (8) \$500,000,000 for USAID Biodiversity Pro-
4 grams.

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