[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3673 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>






116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 3673

  To investigate the role of the Chinese Communist Party in the novel 
coronavirus global pandemic and to secure damages on behalf of victims 
                    in the United States and abroad.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 11, 2020

  Mr. Hawley introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
             referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
  To investigate the role of the Chinese Communist Party in the novel 
coronavirus global pandemic and to secure damages on behalf of victims 
                    in the United States and abroad.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Justice for Victims of Coronavirus 
Around the World Act''.

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) beginning in December 2019, if not earlier, the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China concealed the 
        emergence and spread of the novel coronavirus (referred to in 
        this Act as ``COVID-19'') by, among other things--
                    (A) silencing medical professionals, journalists, 
                and academic researchers;
                    (B) halting research and destroying or otherwise 
                denying access by Chinese and international public 
                health authorities to COVID-19 viral samples and 
                relevant medical information and research;
                    (C) obstructing access by international public 
                health authorities to parts of the COVID-19 outbreak 
                epicenter;
                    (D) releasing partial or incorrect data about the 
                number of COVID-19 cases and deaths in the People's 
                Republic of China and COVID-19 modes of transmission;
                    (E) using the World Health Organization to amplify 
                its false messaging; and
                    (F) waging a global propaganda offensive to deflect 
                attention away from its mishandling of the COVID-19 
                outbreak and create unfounded accounts of the origins 
                of the virus;
            (2) since December 2019, COVID-19 has transformed from a 
        local disease outbreak in Wuhan, China, into a global pandemic, 
        as declared by the World Health Organization on March 11, 2020, 
        that is infecting millions, killing hundreds of thousands, and 
        imposing severe economic hardship on billions of people 
        worldwide;
            (3) initial actions or omissions by the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China to conceal the emergence and spread 
        of COVID-19 facilitated the transformation of COVID-19 from a 
        local disease outbreak into a global pandemic by obstructing 
        the timely and effective containment of the virus within the 
        Chinese mainland and limiting the availability of information 
        that other nations needed to prevent or control the spread of 
        the virus into their territories;
            (4) the failure by the Government of the People's Republic 
        of China to fully disclose information on the COVID-19 outbreak 
        in a timely manner to the World Health Organization and other 
        nations appears to constitute a violation of the International 
        Health Regulations (2005), a legally binding agreement among 
        196 countries, including the People's Republic of China;
            (5) the Government of the People's Republic of China should 
        be held accountable for the harm inflicted upon the lives and 
        livelihoods of the people of the United States and other 
        nations due to its efforts to conceal the emergence and spread 
        of COVID-19;
            (6) the United States Government should therefore establish 
        and lead an international commission to determine fully how 
        actions or omissions by the Government of the People's Republic 
        of China to conceal the emergence and spread of COVID-19 
        contributed to the transformation of COVID-19 from a local 
        disease outbreak into a global pandemic; and
            (7) if the international investigation establishes that 
        actions or omissions by the Government of the People's Republic 
        of China to conceal the emergence and spread of COVID-19 caused 
        or substantially aggravated the transformation of COVID-19 from 
        a local disease outbreak into a global pandemic, or if the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China refuses to 
        cooperate fully with the international investigation, then the 
        United States Government should lead international efforts--
                    (A) to quantify the harm caused or substantially 
                aggravated by actions or omissions by the Government of 
                the People's Republic of China to conceal the emergence 
                and spread of COVID-19 to the health and economic well-
                being of the people of the United States and other 
                nations; and
                    (B) to secure damages from the Government of the 
                People's Republic of China, especially by identifying 
                ways to compel the Government of the People's Republic 
                of China to pay damages.

SEC. 3. JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS OF CORONAVIRUS TASK FORCE.

    (a) Establishment.--The President shall establish the Justice for 
Victims of Coronavirus Task Force (referred to in this Act as the 
``Task Force'') to investigate and secure damages from the Government 
of the People's Republic of China.
    (b) Leadership.--The President shall appoint the Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs, or a designee serving at the 
level of Deputy Assistant to the President or higher, to oversee and 
coordinate activities by Task Force members.
    (c) Membership.--The Task Force shall consist of the heads of the 
following Federal agencies, who may act through their respective 
designees at or above the level of Under Secretary or equivalent rank:
            (1) The Department of State.
            (2) The Department of Health and Human Services.
            (3) The Department of Justice.
            (4) The Department of Commerce.
            (5) The Department of the Treasury.
            (6) The Department of Agriculture.
            (7) The Office of the United States Trade Representative.
            (8) The Office of Science and Technology Policy.
            (9) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
            (10) Any other Federal agency that the Assistant to the 
        President for National Security Affairs, or his or her 
        designee, determines to be appropriate.
    (d) Responsibilities.--Task Force members shall ensure relevant 
offices in their respective Federal agencies take all appropriate 
measures to support--
            (1) the Delegation established under section 4(a);
            (2) the Working Group to Quantify Harm established under 
        section 5(a); and
            (3) the Working Group to Secure Damages established under 
        section 6(a).
    (e) Meetings.--Task Force members shall meet at least quarterly--
            (1) to update the Assistant to the President for National 
        Security Affairs, or his or her designee, on contributions by 
        their respective Federal agencies to the activities of the 
        organizations listed under paragraphs (1) through (3) of 
        subsection (d);
            (2) to notify the Assistant to the President for National 
        Security Affairs, or his or her designee, of any disputes 
        requiring resolution to ensure the ability of the organizations 
        listed under paragraphs (1) through (3) of subsection (d) to 
        perform the duties assigned to them under this Act; and
            (3) to provide the Assistant to the President for National 
        Security Affairs, or his or her designee, and other Task Force 
        members with recommendations to strengthen coordination between 
        or otherwise improve the effectiveness of the organizations 
        listed under paragraphs (1) through (3) of subsection (d).
    (f) Termination.--The Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs, or his or her designee, shall terminate and disband 
the Task Force following the termination and disbandment of--
            (1) the Delegation established under section 4(a);
            (2) the Working Group to Quantify Harm established under 
        section 5(a); and
            (3) the Working Group to Secure Damages established under 
        section 6(a).

SEC. 4. UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION TO 
              INVESTIGATE THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S 
              REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE COVID-19 GLOBAL PANDEMIC.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after the establishment of 
the Task Force, the Secretary of State shall form the United States 
Delegation to the International Commission to Investigate the Role of 
the Government of the People's Republic of China in the COVID-19 Global 
Pandemic (referred to in this Act as the ``Delegation'').
    (b) Leadership.--The Secretary of State, acting through the United 
States Special Representative for Global Health Diplomacy, shall direct 
and coordinate the activities of the Delegation.
    (c) Membership.--The Delegation shall include representatives, at 
the level of Deputy Assistant Secretary or equivalent rank, from the 
following Task Force member agencies:
            (1) The Department of State.
            (2) The Department of Health and Human Services.
            (3) The Department of Justice.
            (4) The Department of Agriculture.
            (5) The Office of Science and Technology Policy.
            (6) Any other Task Force member agency that the Assistant 
        to the President for National Security Affairs, or his or her 
        designee, determines to be appropriate.
    (d) Duties.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the formation 
        of the Delegation, the Delegation shall undertake to establish 
        and lead the International Commission to Investigate the Role 
        of the Government of the People's Republic of China in the 
        COVID-19 Global Pandemic (referred to in this Act as the 
        ``International Commission'') in accordance with this 
        subsection.
            (2) Membership.--The Delegation shall establish the 
        International Commission in cooperation with--
                    (A) allies and partners of the United States; and
                    (B) other similar nations, if their membership in 
                the International Commission would not adversely affect 
                the ability of the International Commission to fulfill 
                the purpose described in paragraph (3).
            (3) Purpose.--The International Commission shall allow the 
        United States Government and other members of the International 
        Commission (referred to in this Act as ``International 
        Commission Members'') to work together to gather, share, and 
        analyze data in order--
                    (A) to understand how COVID-19 grew from a local 
                disease outbreak into a global pandemic; and
                    (B) to prevent similar tragedies in the future.
            (4) Functions.--The International Commission shall enable 
        the United States Government and other International Commission 
        Members--
                    (A) to share and coordinate the collection of 
                information related to the emergence and spread of 
                COVID-19;
                    (B) to leverage unique expertise or other 
                capabilities resident in individual International 
                Commission Members to advance the understanding of all 
                International Commission Members of the emergence and 
                spread of COVID-19;
                    (C) to apply multilateral pressure to the 
                Government of the People's Republic of China or other 
                parties, as necessary, in order to encourage their 
                cooperation with the international investigation; and
                    (D) to develop ways to generate actionable findings 
                irrespective of the cooperation of the Government of 
                the People's Republic of China.
            (5) Administration.--The Delegation, in negotiation with 
        other International Commission Members, shall determine--
                    (A) the organizational structure of the 
                International Commission;
                    (B) the rules and procedures governing activities 
                by the International Commission;
                    (C) whether the International Commission will issue 
                reports on findings and recommendations or defer to 
                International Commission Members to issue their own 
                reports on findings and recommendations; and
                    (D) other items related to the administration of 
                the International Commission, as the Delegation 
                determines to be appropriate.
    (e) Triannual Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the 
        formation of the Delegation, and every 4 months thereafter 
        until the Delegation is disbanded, the Delegation shall submit 
        a report to the appropriate congressional committees and to the 
        public that describes the activities undertaken and the 
        information produced by the International Commission.
            (2) Matters to be included.--Each report under paragraph 
        (1) shall include--
                    (A) procedural updates regarding--
                            (i) changes in International Commission 
                        membership;
                            (ii) changes related to the administration 
                        of the International Commission;
                            (iii) investigative or other official 
                        actions taken by the International Commission; 
                        and
                            (iv) responses by the Government of the 
                        People's Republic of China to actions taken by 
                        the International Commission; and
                    (B) the latest information available relating to--
                            (i) the emergence and spread of COVID-19 in 
                        the People's Republic of China, including--
                                    (I) the source of COVID-19;
                                    (II) the date and circumstances of 
                                initial transmission of COVID-19 to a 
                                human;
                                    (III) the number of COVID-19 cases, 
                                by date and location, before January 
                                23, 2020 (the date on which the 
                                Government of the People's Republic of 
                                China began implementing quarantine 
                                measures in Wuhan, China, and other 
                                locations);
                                    (IV) the number of deaths as a 
                                result of COVID-19 infection, by date 
                                and location, before January 23, 2020; 
                                and
                                    (V) evidence of human-to-human 
                                transmission of COVID-19 before January 
                                20, 2020 (the date on which the 
                                Government of the People's Republic of 
                                China first publicly acknowledged that 
                                COVID-19 was capable of human-to-human 
                                transmission);
                            (ii) knowledge by the Government of the 
                        People's Republic of China of the information 
                        referenced under clause (i), including details 
                        about when the Government of the People's 
                        Republic of China first became aware of said 
                        information;
                            (iii) methods used by the Government of the 
                        People's Republic of China to conceal 
                        information listed under clause (i), 
                        including--
                                    (I) silencing medical 
                                professionals, journalists, and 
                                academic researchers;
                                    (II) halting, destroying, or 
                                otherwise denying access by Chinese and 
                                international public health authorities 
                                to COVID-19 viral samples and relevant 
                                medical information and research;
                                    (III) obstructing access by 
                                international public health experts to 
                                parts of the COVID-19 outbreak 
                                epicenter; and
                                    (IV) releasing partial or incorrect 
                                data about the number of COVID-19 cases 
                                and deaths in the People's Republic of 
                                China and COVID-19 modes of 
                                transmission;
                            (iv) methods used by the Government of the 
                        People's Republic of China to gain influence in 
                        the World Health Organization and use that 
                        influence to persuade, compel, or otherwise 
                        cause leaders of the World Health 
                        Organization--
                                    (I) to spread false, incomplete, or 
                                misleading information provided by the 
                                Government of the People's Republic of 
                                China; and
                                    (II) to praise the Government of 
                                the People's Republic of China for its 
                                handling of the COVID-19 outbreak, 
                                despite ample reporting to show that 
                                the Government of the People's Republic 
                                of China was suppressing or distorting 
                                information about the COVID-19 outbreak 
                                by December 2019, if not earlier, in 
                                order to protect its own political 
                                fortunes;
                            (v) the impact of actions or omissions by 
                        the Government of the People's Republic of 
                        China to conceal the emergence and spread of 
                        COVID-19 on the transformation of COVID-19 from 
                        a local disease outbreak into a global 
                        pandemic;
                            (vi) actions the Government of the People's 
                        Republic of China could have taken--
                                    (I) to control the outbreak of 
                                COVID-19;
                                    (II) to prevent the spread of 
                                COVID-19 outside of Wuhan, China, and 
                                into other parts of the People's 
                                Republic of China; and
                                    (III) to prevent the spread of 
                                COVID-19 outside the People's Republic 
                                of China;
                            (vii) actions or omissions by the 
                        Government of the People's Republic of China 
                        that contravened the legal obligations set 
                        forth in the International Health Regulations; 
                        and
                            (viii) any other information that the 
                        Delegation determines to be appropriate.
            (3) Form.--Each report under paragraph (1)--
                    (A) shall be submitted to the appropriate 
                congressional committees in unclassified form, but may 
                include a classified annex; and
                    (B) shall be posted on a publicly available website 
                of the Department of State, with the exception of any 
                classified annex.
            (4) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this 
        section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
        means--
                    (A) the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and 
                Forestry of the Senate;
                    (B) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
                Pensions of the Senate;
                    (C) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
                    (D) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate;
                    (E) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
                Senate;
                    (F) the Committee on Agriculture of the House of 
                Representatives;
                    (G) the Committee on Education and Labor of the 
                House of Representatives;
                    (H) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
                Representatives;
                    (I) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives;
                    (J) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
                of the House of Representatives; and
                    (K) any congressional committee not listed in 
                subparagraphs (A) through (J) that provides oversight 
                for any of the Federal agencies assigned to the 
                Delegation by the Assistant to the President for 
                National Security Affairs, or his or her designee, 
                pursuant to subsection (c)(6).
    (f) Termination.--The Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs, or his or her designee, shall terminate and disband 
the Delegation at such time as the United States Special Representative 
for Global Health Diplomacy, with the concurrence of the Secretary of 
State, certifies that--
            (1) the International Commission has fulfilled its purpose 
        by rendering a full and impartial account of the facts 
        associated with actions or omissions by the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China to conceal the emergence and spread 
        of COVID-19 and the impact thereof on the transformation of 
        COVID-19 from a local disease outbreak to a global pandemic; or
            (2) the International Commission is unable to fulfill its 
        purpose due to obstruction by the Government of the People's 
        Republic of China.

SEC. 5. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP TO QUANTIFY HARM CAUSED BY THE 
              GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) In General.--The Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs, or his or her designee, shall establish the 
Interagency Working Group to Quantify Harm Caused by the Government of 
the People's Republic of China (referred to in this Act as ``Working 
Group to Quantify Harm'') not later than 30 days after either of the 
following conditions is met:
            (1) The international investigation establishes that 
        actions or omissions by the Government of the People's Republic 
        of China to conceal the emergence and spread of COVID-19 caused 
        or substantially aggravated the transformation of COVID-19 from 
        a local disease outbreak into a global pandemic.
            (2) The United States Special Representative for Global 
        Health Diplomacy, with the concurrence of the Secretary of 
        State, certifies that the International Commission is unable to 
        fulfill its purpose.
    (b) Duties.--The Working Group to Quantify Harm shall--
            (1) encourage other International Commission Members to 
        form their own interagency working groups or equivalent bodies; 
        and
            (2) use information or findings produced by the 
        International Commission and data from other sources--
                    (A) to quantify the harm caused or substantially 
                aggravated by actions or omissions by the Government of 
                the People's Republic of China to conceal the emergence 
                and spread of COVID-19 to the health and economic well-
                being of the people of the United States and other 
                nations; and
                    (B) to provide data, technical support, and other 
                support to International Commission Members and other 
                similar nations seeking to quantify the harm caused or 
                substantially aggravated by actions or omissions by the 
                Government of the People's Republic of China to the 
                health and economic well-being of their respective 
                nations.
    (c) Leadership.--
            (1) Quantifying harm to human health.--The Secretary of 
        Health and Human Services, acting through a designee at the 
        level of Assistant Secretary or above, shall direct and 
        coordinate efforts by the Working Group to Quantify Harm to 
        quantify the harm caused or substantially aggravated by actions 
        or omissions by the Government of the People's Republic of 
        China to the health of the people of the United States and 
        other nations.
            (2) Quantifying economic harm.--The Secretary of Commerce, 
        acting through a designee at the level of Assistant Secretary 
        or above, shall direct and coordinate efforts by the Working 
        Group to Quantify Harm to quantify the harm caused or 
        substantially aggravated by actions or omissions by the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China to the economic 
        well-being of the people of the United States and other 
        nations.
    (d) Membership.--The Working Group to Quantify Harm shall include 
representatives, at the level of Deputy Assistant Secretary or 
equivalent rank, from the following Task Force Member agencies:
            (1) The Department of Health and Human Services.
            (2) The Department of Commerce.
            (3) The Department of State.
            (4) The Department of the Treasury.
            (5) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
            (6) The Office of Science and Technology Policy.
            (7) Any other Task Force Member agency that the Assistant 
        to the President for National Security Affairs, or his or her 
        designee, determines to be appropriate.
    (e) Foreign Engagement.--The Secretary of Health and Human Services 
and Secretary of Commerce, acting through their respective designees, 
shall coordinate with the United States Special Representative for 
Global Health Diplomacy when providing support to other nations seeking 
to quantify the harm caused by the Government of the People's Republic 
of China.
    (f) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the 
        establishment of the Working Group, and every 6 months 
        thereafter until the Working Group to Quantify Harm is 
        disbanded, the Working Group to Quantify Harm shall submit a 
        report to the appropriate congressional committees and to the 
        public that describes the activities undertaken and the 
        information produced by the Working Group to Quantify Harm.
            (2) Matters to be included.--Each report under paragraph 
        (1) shall include--
                    (A) the latest assessments of the harm caused or 
                substantially aggravated by actions or omissions by the 
                Government of the People's Republic of China to conceal 
                the emergence and spread of COVID-19 to the health and 
                economic well-being of the people of the United States;
                    (B) the latest assessments of the harm caused or 
                substantially aggravated by actions or omissions by the 
                Government of the People's Republic of China to conceal 
                the emergence and spread of COVID-19 to the health and 
                economic well-being of other nations; and
                    (C) an update on support provided by the Working 
                Group to Quantify Harm to other nations seeking to 
                quantify the harm suffered by their respective nations 
                on account of actions or omissions by the Government of 
                the People's Republic of China to conceal the emergence 
                and spread of COVID-19.
            (3) Form.--Each report under paragraph (1)--
                    (A) shall be submitted to the appropriate 
                congressional committees in unclassified form, but may 
                include a classified annex; and
                    (B) shall be posted on a publicly available website 
                of the Department of State, with the exception of any 
                classified annex.
            (4) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this 
        section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
        means--
                    (A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
                Affairs of the Senate;
                    (B) the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
                    (C) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
                Pensions of the Senate;
                    (D) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate;
                    (E) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
                Senate;
                    (F) the Committee on Financial Services of the 
                House of Representatives;
                    (G) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
                Representatives;
                    (H) the Committee on Education and Labor of the 
                House of Representatives;
                    (I) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives;
                    (J) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
                of the House of Representatives; and
                    (K) any congressional committee not listed in 
                subparagraphs (A) through (J) that provides oversight 
                for any of the Federal agencies assigned to the Working 
                Group by the Assistant to the President for National 
                Security Affairs, or his or her designee, pursuant to 
                subsection (d)(7).
    (g) Termination.--The Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs, or his or her designee, shall terminate and disband 
the Working Group to Quantify Harm on the later of the date--
            (1) on which the Task Force determines, by consensus, that 
        the Working Group to Quantify Harm has completed its duties; or
            (2) that is 2 years after the establishment of the Working 
        Group to Quantify Harm.

SEC. 6. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP TO SECURE DAMAGES FROM THE GOVERNMENT 
              OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) In General.--The Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs, or his or her designee, shall establish the 
Interagency Working Group to Secure Damages from the Government of the 
People's Republic of China (referred to in this Act as ``Working Group 
to Secure Damages'') not later than 30 days after either of the 
following conditions is met:
            (1) The international investigation establishes that 
        actions or omissions by the Government of the People's Republic 
        of China to conceal the emergence and spread of COVID-19 caused 
        or substantially aggravated the transformation of COVID-19 from 
        a local disease outbreak into a global pandemic.
            (2) The United States Special Representative for Global 
        Health Diplomacy, with the concurrence of the Secretary of 
        State, certifies that the International Commission is unable to 
        fulfill its purpose.
    (b) Duties.--The Working Group to Secure Damages, in consultation 
with the Working Group to Quantify Harm, shall--
            (1) identify ways for the United States Government to 
        compel the Government of the People's Republic of China to pay 
        damages--
                    (A) to ease the pain suffered by individual 
                citizens and residents of the United States for actions 
                or omissions by the Government of the People's Republic 
                of China to conceal the emergence and spread of COVID-
                19; and
                    (B) to reimburse expenses incurred by the United 
                States Government to provide relief and economic 
                recovery to the people of the United States for actions 
                or omissions by the Government of the People's Republic 
                of China; and
            (2) encourage other International Commission Members to 
        form their own interagency working groups or equivalent bodies 
        to secure damages from the Government of the People's Republic 
        of China and provide technical and other support to such 
        working groups.
    (c) Leadership.--The Secretary of State, acting through a designee 
at or above the level of Assistant Secretary, shall direct and 
coordinate activities by the Working Group to Secure Damages.
    (d) Membership.--The Working Group to Secure Damages shall include 
representatives, at the level of Deputy Assistant Secretary or 
equivalent rank, from the following Task Force Member agencies:
            (1) The Department of State.
            (2) The Department of Justice.
            (3) The Department of Commerce.
            (4) The Department of the Treasury.
            (5) The Office of the United States Trade Representative.
            (6) The Department of Health and Human Services.
            (7) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
            (8) Any other Task Force Member agency that the Assistant 
        to the President for National Security Affairs, or his or her 
        designee, determines to be appropriate.
    (e) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the 
        establishment of the Working Group to Secure Damages, and every 
        6 months thereafter until the Working Group to Secure Damages 
        is disbanded, the Working Group to Secure Damages shall submit 
        a report to the appropriate congressional committees that 
        describes the activities undertaken and the information 
        produced by the Working Group to Secure Damages.
            (2) Matters to be included.--Each report under paragraph 
        (1) shall include--
                    (A) descriptions of unilateral measures that may be 
                taken by the United States Government to compel the 
                Government of the People's Republic of China to pay 
                damages, such as--
                            (i) seizure of assets owned by the 
                        Government of the People's Republic of China in 
                        the United States and its territories, 
                        including assets owned by Chinese state-owned 
                        enterprises or otherwise tied to the Government 
                        of the People's Republic of China;
                            (ii) suspension by the United States 
                        Government of legal obligations owed by the 
                        United States Government to the Government of 
                        the People's Republic of China; or
                            (iii) employment of other countermeasures 
                        as deemed necessary by the United States 
                        Government to secure damages from the 
                        Government of the People's Republic of China;
                    (B) descriptions of multilateral action that may be 
                taken by the United States Government to compel the 
                Government of the People's Republic of China to pay 
                damages, such as--
                            (i) using the vote and influence of the 
                        United States, in cooperation with 
                        International Commission Members and other 
                        allies and partners, to seek--
                                    (I) the expulsion or temporary 
                                suspension of the Government of the 
                                People's Republic of China from 
                                international institutions whose 
                                mandates, rules, or guiding principles 
                                the Government of People's Republic of 
                                China undermined in its attempt to 
                                conceal the emergence and spread of 
                                COVID-19;
                                    (II) to downgrade the status of the 
                                Government of the People's Republic of 
                                China, such as through the suspension 
                                of voting rights or disqualification 
                                from serving in certain roles, in 
                                international institutions whose 
                                mandates, rules, or guiding principles 
                                the Government of People's Republic of 
                                China undermined in its attempt to 
                                conceal the emergence and spread of 
                                COVID-19; or
                                    (III) the removal of 
                                representatives of the Government of 
                                the People's Republic of China from 
                                leadership, senior, and other 
                                influential positions in international 
                                institutions whose mandates, rules, or 
                                guiding principles the Government of 
                                People's Republic of China undermined 
                                in its attempt to conceal the emergence 
                                and spread of COVID-19;
                            (ii) collaborating with International 
                        Commission Members and other allies and 
                        partners to compel the Government of the 
                        People's Republic of China--
                                    (I) to cease operations at its 
                                Biosafety Level-4 laboratory at the 
                                Wuhan Institute of Virology and halt 
                                research related to bat coronavirus at 
                                other biosafety laboratories, including 
                                by restricting or terminating 
                                international assistance to these or 
                                other Chinese institutions; or
                                    (II) to provide timely and 
                                sufficient access for international 
                                monitors, including representatives 
                                from the United States Government, to 
                                ensure the Government of the People's 
                                Republic of China has taken all 
                                measures necessary to prevent other 
                                outbreaks within the territory of the 
                                People's Republic of China that may 
                                cause another global pandemic;
                    (C) recommendations for--
                            (i) the establishment of a victim's fund or 
                        another vehicle to deliver damages secured by 
                        the United States Government from the 
                        Government of the People's Republic of China to 
                        the people of the United States; and
                            (ii) any additional authorities required to 
                        enable the United States Government to secure 
                        damages from the Government of the People's 
                        Republic of China; and
                    (D) an update on support provided by the Working 
                Group to Secure Damages to other nations seeking--
                            (i) to compel the Government of the 
                        People's Republic of China to pay damages, 
                        including through unilateral and multilateral 
                        actions such as the actions described in 
                        subparagraphs (A) through (C); and
                            (ii) to design vehicles by which to deliver 
                        such damages to their respective populations or 
                        governments.
            (3) Form.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted to the appropriate congressional committees in 
        unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
            (4) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
                Affairs of the Senate;
                    (B) the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
                    (C) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
                Pensions of the Senate;
                    (D) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
                    (E) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate;
                    (F) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
                Senate;
                    (G) the Committee on Financial Services of the 
                House of Representatives;
                    (H) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
                Representatives;
                    (I) the Committee on Education and Labor of the 
                House of Representatives;
                    (J) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
                Representatives;
                    (K) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives;
                    (L) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
                of the House of Representatives; and
                    (M) any congressional committee not listed in 
                subparagraphs (A) through (L) that provides oversight 
                for any of the Federal agencies assigned to the Working 
                Group to Secure Damages by the Assistant to the 
                President for National Security Affairs, or his or her 
                designee, pursuant to subsection (d)(8).
    (f) Termination.--The Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs, or his or her designee, shall terminate and disband 
the Working Group to Secure Damages on the later of the date--
            (1) on which the Task Force determines, by consensus, that 
        the Working Group to Secure Damages has completed its duties; 
        or
            (2) that is 2 years after the establishment of the Working 
        Group to Secure Damages.

SEC. 7. AUTHORITIES AND APPROPRIATIONS.

    (a) Authorities.--Task Force members shall--
            (1) coordinate use of the programs and authorities resident 
        in their respective Federal agencies to perform the duties 
        assigned to them under this Act; and
            (2) notify Congress upon the discovery of any lack of 
        authority that might impede the ability of their respective 
        Federal agencies to perform the duties assigned to them under 
        this Act.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated such sums as may be necessary for Task Force members to 
perform the duties assigned to them under this Act.
                                 <all>