

116TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

# S. 3314

To seek a diplomatic resolution to Iran’s nuclear program, and for other purposes.

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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

FEBRUARY 13, 2020

Mr. MARKEY (for himself, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Mr. VAN HOLLEN, Ms. DUCKWORTH, and Mr. SANDERS) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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## A BILL

To seek a diplomatic resolution to Iran’s nuclear program,  
and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Iran Diplomacy Act  
5 of 2020”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress makes the following findings:

8 (1) The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action  
9 (JCPOA) was agreed to on July 14, 2015, by China,

1 France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the  
2 United States, the European Union, and Iran.

3 (2) When it was fully implemented by all par-  
4 ties, the JCPOA had increased the amount of time  
5 it would take Iran to acquire enough fissile material  
6 for one nuclear weapon, provided a political decision  
7 to do so, from approximately two to three months to  
8 at least one year.

9 (3) The JCPOA blocked Iran's uranium, pluto-  
10 nium, and covert pathways to a nuclear weapon, in  
11 the period when all sides had fully implemented their  
12 commitments, in part by—

13 (A) imposing verifiable limits on Iran's  
14 uranium enrichment and plutonium production  
15 capabilities;

16 (B) reducing the number of Iran's installed  
17 centrifuges by two-thirds; and

18 (C) permitting the International Atomic  
19 Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor and verify of  
20 all stages of Iran's nuclear fuel cycle to include  
21 requesting short-notice access to “verify the  
22 non-diversion of declared material” and “ab-  
23 sence of undeclared nuclear material and activi-  
24 ties” in Iran, consistent with its provisional im-

1           plementation of the Additional Protocol to its  
2           IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

3           (4) The 2018 Department of State Compliance  
4           Report concluded, “Tehran’s adherence to these  
5           commitments will hinder its ability to produce a nu-  
6           clear weapon even after the time-bound provisions of  
7           the deal expire, helping to ensure that its nuclear  
8           program remains exclusively peaceful in nature”.

9           (5) On January 29, 2019, Director of the Cen-  
10          tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) Gina Haspel, testified  
11          before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the  
12          Senate that “at the moment, technically they [Iran]  
13          are in compliance,” with the JCPOA.

14          (6) On January 29, 2019, a worldwide threat  
15          assessment issued by Director of National Intel-  
16          ligence Dan Coats, observed that the United States  
17          “[does] not believe that Iran is currently under-  
18          taking the key activities we judge necessary to  
19          produce a nuclear device” and “Iran’s continued im-  
20          plementation of the JCPOA has extended the  
21          amount of time Iran would need to produce enough  
22          fissile material for a nuclear weapon from a few  
23          months to about one year”.

24          (7) On May 8, 2018, President Donald J.  
25          Trump announced the unilateral abrogation of the

1 United States from the JCPOA, and announced that  
2 the United States would re-impose all United States  
3 sanctions that had been lifted after Iran verifiably  
4 met its nuclear-related commitments under the  
5 agreement on the agreement's implementation day of  
6 January 16, 2016.

7 (8) Whereas the United States move to abro-  
8 gate the JCPOA is a violation of its commitments  
9 under the agreement and is inconsistent with the  
10 United States reputation of honoring agreements to  
11 which it is a party, making the future conclusion of  
12 such agreements more difficult.

13 (9) Prior to Iran's first breach of the JCPOA  
14 on May 8, 2019, quarterly reports from the IAEA  
15 Board of Governors Reports found that since "im-  
16 plementation day," on January 16, 2016, Iran's nu-  
17 clear program was consistent with the restrictions  
18 under the JCPOA.

19 (10) Following the removal of nearly all re-  
20 maining waivers to United States nuclear-related  
21 sanctions on May 2, 2019, the Government of Iran  
22 has committed a series of reversible but concerning  
23 breaches of the JCPOA, including by exceeding: the  
24 allowable stock of low-enriched uranium and heavy  
25 water; the number of installed centrifuges at its pilot

1 enrichment facility; and the permitted Low Enriched  
2 Uranium (LEU) enrichment level of 3.67 percent of  
3 the Uranium U-235 isotope.

4 (11) Since the full re-imposition of United  
5 States nuclear-related sanctions, the Government of  
6 Iran has also engaged in a series of escalatory ac-  
7 tions outside its nuclear program that have put the  
8 United States Armed Forces, diplomats, and stra-  
9 tegic partners at risk and have heightened the threat  
10 of an armed conflict with Iran, including the fol-  
11 lowing events:

12 (A) May 12–13, 2019, the Department of  
13 Defense faulted Iran for an attack on four oil  
14 tankers belonging to Saudi Arabia, the United  
15 Arab Emirates, and Norway.

16 (B) On June 13, 2019, Secretary Mike  
17 Pompeo stated that it was the United States  
18 assessment that Iran was responsible for the at-  
19 tack on two Saudi oil tankers.

20 (C) On June 20, 2019, the Government of  
21 Iran shot down a United States Unmanned  
22 Aerial Vehicle (UAV). Reportedly, President  
23 Trump authorized retaliatory strikes against  
24 targets in Iran before rescinding the order for

1           fear that the Iranian loss of life in such a strike  
2           would be “disproportionate”.

3           (D) On July 24, 2019, the Government of  
4           Iran announced the seizure of a British-flagged  
5           tanker in the Strait of Hormuz.

6           (E) On September 14, 2019, the United  
7           States Government concluded that the Govern-  
8           ment of Iran was responsible for UAV and  
9           cruise missile strikes at Saudi Arabia’s energy  
10          infrastructure at Khurais and Abqaiq, which  
11          caused significant damage to Saudi Arabia’s oil  
12          energy production.

13          (F) On November 19, 2019, the Govern-  
14          ment of Israel concluded that Iranian forces in  
15          Syria fired four rockets intended for the Golan  
16          Heights.

17          (12) Following the unauthorized United States  
18          strike resulting in the death of General Qassem  
19          Soleimani on January 3, 2020, Iran announced as  
20          was anticipated that it would no longer be bound by  
21          the limits of the JCPOA, while also noting that it  
22          would remain as a party to the Treaty on the Non-  
23          Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Wash-  
24          ington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (NPT),

1 and would fully cooperate with IAEA monitoring  
2 and verification activities.

3 (13) Iran has made no meaningful progress on  
4 the 12 conditions Secretary of State Pompeo out-  
5 lined as preconditions for the United States to enter  
6 into an agreement with Iran, clearly demonstrating  
7 that the administration’s policy of “maximum pres-  
8 sure” has not favorably changed Iran’s behavior.  
9 Further, Department of Defense officials have been  
10 warning for more than a year that the Trump Ad-  
11 ministration’s “maximum pressure” campaign raised  
12 the risk of retaliation against United States troops  
13 and diplomatic personnel.

14 (14) On January 14, 2020, the foreign min-  
15 isters of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom  
16 issued a joint statement that refers the issue of  
17 Iran’s non-compliance to the Dispute Resolution  
18 Mechanism of the Joint Commission, while noting  
19 both their “determination to work with all partici-  
20 pants to preserve (the agreement)” and “and that  
21 they remain convinced that this landmark multilat-  
22 eral international agreement and its nonproliferation  
23 benefits enhance our shared security interests and  
24 strengthen the rules-based international order”.

1           (15) On February 13, 2020, a bipartisan ma-  
2           jority in the United States Senate directed the  
3           President to remove United States Armed Forces  
4           from hostilities against Iran or any part of its gov-  
5           ernment or military, unless otherwise explicitly au-  
6           thorized by Congress. This direction, which followed  
7           passage of a similar measure in the House of Rep-  
8           resentatives on January 9, 2020, provides an oppor-  
9           tunity for de-escalation of tensions and renewed dip-  
10          lomatic engagement between the United States and  
11          Iran.

12 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

13          It is the policy of the United States as follows:

14           (1) Achieving a diplomatic resolution to Iran's  
15          nuclear program, one that the United States had in  
16          place prior to President Trump's unilateral abroga-  
17          tion from the JCPOA, would represent a meaningful  
18          step to preventing a future armed conflict between  
19          the United States and Iran, one which would result  
20          in the untold loss of life and treasure.

21           (2) While the United States no longer has  
22          standing in the Joint Commission or the Dispute  
23          Resolution mechanism triggered by France, Ger-  
24          many, and the United Kingdom on January 14,



1       2020, it should support good-faith efforts to achieve  
2       one or both of the following:

3               (A) Returning all sides to not less than full  
4               compliance with its commitments under the  
5               JCPOA and refraining from imposing or  
6               threatening to impose economic penalties on  
7               France, Germany, or the United Kingdom.

8               (B) Negotiating an interim agreement that  
9               provides Iran with tailored, temporary economic  
10              relief in exchange for verifiable measures by  
11              Iran that reverses steps taken since May 2019  
12              with respect to its nuclear program.

13             (3) Provided that all sides verifiably return to  
14             compliance with no less than its commitments under  
15             the JCPOA, or to build upon the progress of an in-  
16             terim agreement described in paragraph (2)(B), the  
17             United States and the other P5+1 parties should  
18             seek out negotiations with Iran, prior to 2023, to-  
19             wards a new comprehensive agreement that closes  
20             off all Iranian paths to a nuclear weapon by—

21                     (A) addressing the sunset of certain provi-  
22                     sions of the JCPOA in 2026; and

23                     (B) advancing any other measures that ad-  
24                     vance United States and international security.

1           (4) Parallel to one or more of the actions de-  
2       scribed in paragraph (2), the United States and its  
3       international partners should seek to address other  
4       aspects of Iran’s destabilizing actions in the region  
5       and work to bring Iran back to compliance with its  
6       human rights obligations.

7           (5) No JCPOA Participating State should issue  
8       a claim of “significant nonperformance” by Iran to  
9       the United Nations Security Council outside of the  
10      Dispute Resolution mechanism detailed in para-  
11      graphs 36 and 37 of the JCPOA.

12          (6) The United States should, consistent with  
13      its JCPOA commitments, issue waivers for coopera-  
14      tive projects specified in the JCPOA, all of which  
15      make it more difficult for Iran to reconstitute activi-  
16      ties that pose a proliferation risk, thereby advancing  
17      United States and international security.

18          (7) The United States should create an environ-  
19      ment in which financial institutions and entities can  
20      make practical use of existing exemptions and mech-  
21      anisms “allowing for the sale of agricultural com-  
22      modities, food, medicine, and medical devices to  
23      Iran,” as well as other humanitarian trade.

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