[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2953 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
116th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 2953
To provide congressional oversight of United States talks with Taliban
officials and Afghanistan's comprehensive peace process.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
November 21, 2019
Mr. Menendez (for himself and Mr. Young) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To provide congressional oversight of United States talks with Taliban
officials and Afghanistan's comprehensive peace process.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Ensuring a Durable Afghanistan Peace
Act of 2019''.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee
on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations
of the House of Representatives.
(2) United states special representative for afghan
reconciliation.--The term ``United States Special
Representative for Afghan Reconciliation'' or ``SRAR'' refers
to the United States Department of State office charged with
conducting peace talks with the Taliban.
(3) Government of afghanistan.--The term ``Government of
Afghanistan'' means the Government of Afghanistan and its
agencies, instrumentalities, and controlled entities.
(4) National security committees.--The term ``national
security committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee
on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(5) Taliban officials.--The term ``Taliban officials''
refers to the leader and members of the Afghan Taliban, and its
officials constituting the Taliban peace delegation, including
the head of the peace delegation based in Qatar.
(6) The taliban.--The term ``the Taliban'' refers to the
organization led by Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada.
SEC. 3. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) After al-Qaeda attacked the United States on September
11, 2001, the United States Government sought to eliminate al-
Qaeda's safe havens and training camps in Afghanistan.
(2) While in power, the Taliban government, led by Mullah
Omar, granted al-Qaeda sanctuary in Afghanistan. The Taliban
government fell in 2001 following the United States-led
Operation Enduring Freedom.
(3) The United States Armed Forces, international partners,
and the Afghan National Security and Defense Forces have fought
with valor, honor, and effectiveness to eliminate terrorist
threats, including threats against the United States. Since
September 11, 2001, there have been no attacks on United States
soil emanating from Afghanistan. The United States has made
significant progress towards its original counterterrorism
objectives in Afghanistan by decimating the leadership of al-
Qaeda.
(4) The United States military mission in Afghanistan
(Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Freedom Sentinel) has
been the longest military operation in United States history.
More than 2,200 United States service men and women have been
killed in Afghanistan, with more than 20,000 service members
wounded. United States forces continue to disrupt and degrade
the Taliban's combat operations, the Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) and al-Qaeda activities
in Afghanistan, through partnered operations with Afghan
forces, as well as unilateral operations.
(5) Responding to the only Article V invocation in NATO's
history, 17,000 service members from 39 countries currently
operate in Afghanistan, including approximately 12,000 United
States forces.
(6) Afghan security forces have reportedly lost more than
45,000 soldiers in battle since 2014.
(7) In September 2018, the Department of State appointed
former Ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad as the United
States Special Representative for Afghan Reconciliation (SRAR).
(8) The NATO Mission Commander, United States Army General
Austin ``Scott'' Miller stated in October 2018, ``This [war in
Afghanistan] is not going to be won militarily . . . This is
going to be a political solution.''
(9) In October 2018, the Government of Pakistan released
Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, one of the co-founders of the
Taliban, whom Pakistani authorities had arrested in Karachi in
2010. In January 2019, Mr. Baradar was appointed as the head of
the Taliban's political office in Qatar to lead peace talks
with the United States.
(10) SRAR Khalilzad announced on Twitter on March 12, 2019,
after peace talks with Taliban officials, a four-pronged
framework for peace in Afghanistan: counter-terrorism
assurances, troop withdrawal, intra-Afghan dialogue, and a
comprehensive ceasefire. He noted that in January 2019, he and
the Taliban ``agreed in principle'' on the four elements, and
that the two sides had ``agreed in draft'' on the first two
elements during the March 2019 talks. He stated, ``When the
agreement in draft about a withdrawal timeline and effective
counterterrorism measures is finalized, the Taliban and other
Afghans, including the government, will begin intra-Afghan
negotiations on a political settlement and comprehensive
ceasefire . . . and there is no final agreement until
everything is agreed''.
(11) On April 26, 2019, the United States Department of
State issued a media note on the Joint Statement on Trilateral
Meeting on Afghan Peace Process following a meeting in Moscow
between representatives from the United States, China, and
Russia stating, ``They [the three country representatives] take
note of the Afghan Taliban's commitment to: fight ISIS and cut
ties with al-Qaeda, ETIM, and other international terrorists
groups; ensure the areas they control will not be used to
threaten any other country, and call on them to prevent
terrorist recruiting, training, and fundraising, and expel any
known terrorists.''
(12) In an interview with the New York Times in January
2019, SRAR Khalilzad stated, ``The Taliban [officials] have
committed, to our satisfaction, to do what is necessary that
would prevent Afghanistan from ever becoming a platform for
international terrorist groups or individuals.''
(13) Al Qaeda considers Afghanistan a continuing safe haven
for its leadership, relying on its long-standing and strong
relationship with the Taliban leadership. Top leaders of al
Qaeda remain loyal to the leader of the Taliban, Mawlawi
Hibatullah Akhundzada. Osama bin Laden's successor Ayman al-
Zawahiri publicly declared his allegiance to Akhundzada in
2016.
(14) The Haqqani Network is subsumed under the larger
Taliban umbrella network, but maintains distinct command,
control, and lines of operations. The Haqqani Network leader is
Sirajuddin Haqqani, who is also the deputy leader of the
Taliban and oversees armed combat against United States and
coalition forces.
(15) ISIS-K has claimed presence in Afghanistan since 2015,
and suffered from territorial losses in 2018 due to immense
pressure from sustained operations by United States and Afghan
forces. The Department of Defense's June 2019 report,
``Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan'', submitted
to Congress in accordance with section 1225 of the Carl Levin
and Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113-291; 128 Stat. 3550),
noted that the ISIS-K had made territorial gain during the
reporting period. The report stated, ``ISIS-K poses a threat
not only to Afghanistan, but also to the West, which it
continuously seeks to target for terrorist activity.''
(16) On June 25, 2019, Secretary Mike Pompeo announced
during a visit to Kabul that--
(A) the United States Government and Taliban
officials were nearly ready to conclude a draft text
outlining the Taliban's counterterrorism assurances;
(B) discussions had begun with the Taliban
regarding foreign military presence, which remains
conditions-based, and that there is no agreed timeline
for withdrawal;
(C) the United States Government was laying the
groundwork for inter-Afghan negotiations on a timeline
and political roadmap for reaching a comprehensive
peace agreement; and
(D) the success or failure of Afghanistan's
relationship with the United States and donor community
will rest in part on ``maintain[ing] the civil rights
of women and minorities and preserv[ing] the gains of
the last 18 years''.
(17) The Government of Afghanistan has not been included in
the direct negotiations between SRAR and Taliban officials.
Taliban officials continue to refuse to recognize the
legitimacy of the Government of Afghanistan.
(18) Afghan women and minorities were included in the July
7-8, 2019, intra-Afghan dialogue with Taliban officials in
Doha, but they have not been included in the direct
negotiations between SRAR and Taliban officials.
(19) Examples of gains in democratic development and human
rights in Afghanistan include the following:
(A) A vibrant civil society, including independent
media.
(B) The right of women and ethnic minorities to
vote in local and national elections.
(C) The Afghan Constitution gives full recognition
to various minority groups in Afghanistan, including
ethnic Hazaras. One parliamentary seat is reserved for
the Sikh and Hindu communities and 10 seats are
reserved for representatives of the nomadic Kuchi
peoples.
(D) Afghanistan's Lower House of Parliament (Wolesi
Jirga) reserves 68 seats out of 250 for women.
(E) There are four female ambassadors in the
current Afghan government.
(F) There are approximately 6,395 women in the
Afghan National Defense Security Forces (ANDSF).
(G) The 2009 passage of the Elimination of Violence
Against Women law and the 2018 passage of the revised
Penal Code in Afghanistan reinforce protections for
women.
(H) More than 60 percent of the population in
Afghanistan is under the age of 25, half of whom are
under the age of 15 and have only lived in a post-2001
Afghanistan that has enjoyed freedoms such as music and
sports, which were banned under the Taliban rule.
(20) On September 7, 2019, President Donald J. Trump
revealed in a series of tweets that he had invited ``major
Taliban leaders'' and Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to meet
with him separately at Camp David on the following day. He
wrote that, because a Taliban attack killed several people,
including a United States soldier, in Kabul on September 5,
2019, he had immediately cancelled the meeting and called off
peace negotiations.
(21) The Afghan constitution provides the people of
Afghanistan the ability to directly elect their President and
Members of Parliament. The constitution protects human rights
and has resulted in gains for women, minorities, independent
press and media, and democratic governance since the Taliban
were removed from power in 2001.
SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON UNITED STATES POLICY.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) it is in the vital national security interests of the
United States that Afghanistan never again serves as a platform
or sanctuary for terrorist attacks against the United States,
our allies, or partners;
(2) the Government of Afghanistan remains an important
partner of the United States in the fight against terrorism,
working with the United States Government to eliminate al-
Qaeda, ISIS-K, and their affiliates in Afghanistan;
(3) Afghanistan's neighbors play a pivotal role in securing
a durable peace in Afghanistan to include facilitating peace
discussions, eliminating Taliban and Haqqani Network
sanctuaries, and eliminating support for proxies that threaten
United States objectives in the region;
(4) a secure and stable Afghanistan is in United States
national security interests and contributes to regional
stability in South Asia;
(5) the United States Government pursues negotiations with
Taliban officials for the purposes of achieving--
(A) verifiable and sustainable counterterrorism
assurances that ensure that the Taliban privately and
publicly break ties with al-Qaeda and its affiliates,
and it never again provides safe haven to al-Qaeda and
its affiliates in Afghanistan;
(B) a conditions-based United States troop drawdown
based on verifiable and sustainable counterterrorism
assurances;
(C) an intra-Afghan peace settlement ratified
through an inclusive and transparent process that
includes the participation of Afghan women and
minorities; and
(D) a comprehensive ceasefire;
(6) any action to curtail or remove United States military
forces from Afghanistan must include regular consultation with
Congress;
(7) the United States Government should consult, and if
appropriate, include relevant international actors, including
Afghanistan's neighbors, and NATO allies in the Afghanistan
peace process;
(8) the United States Government should ensure that the
Afghan Taliban are not able to secure safe haven in countries
neighboring Afghanistan;
(9) the United States Government should safeguard the
social, economic, and political progress the Government and
people of Afghanistan have achieved since 2001, including
progress on access to universally recognized human rights,
education, justice, and jobs, including in government
institutions for all Afghans, including women and girls and
minorities, democratic governance and rule of law, and freedoms
of press and media; and
(10) the United States Government should ensure members of
the international community will have unfettered access to
Afghanistan and its institutions to monitor the status of human
rights, including women's rights, in Afghanistan.
SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS AND BRIEFINGS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) regular congressional oversight through briefings by
the Department of State for members and staff of the United
States Congress is important while peace talks between the
United States and Taliban officials continue; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives should, as appropriate, hold hearings on United
States policy in Afghanistan, including with the participation
of official witnesses, and otherwise obtain information in
order to fully review the negotiations.
SEC. 6. OVERSIGHT OF PEACE PROCESS AND RELEVANT AGREEMENTS.
(a) Transmission to Congress of Agreements.--
(1) Transmission of agreements.--Not later than 30 days
after finalizing an agreement with Taliban officials, the
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of
Defense, shall transmit to the chairmen and ranking members of
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives,
the majority and minority leader of the Senate, and the
Speaker, majority leader, and minority leader of the House of
Representatives the agreement, including all related materials
and annexes, to include details related to counterterrorism
assurances by the Taliban, United States troop withdrawals from
Afghanistan, and the status of intra-Afghan negotiations and a
comprehensive ceasefire.
(2) Initial verification assessment report.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 60 days after
finalizing an agreement with Taliban officials, the
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary
of Defense, shall prepare, with respect to such
agreement, a report assessing--
(i) the extent to which the Secretary will
be able to verify that Taliban officials are
complying with obligations and commitments
under the peace agreement, including how
Taliban officials will ensure counterterrorism
assurances and guarantee Afghanistan will not
be a safe haven for terrorist organizations,
such as al-Qaeda;
(ii) whether Taliban officials have made a
complete, transparent, public, and verifiable
declaration of the Taliban breaking all ties
with al-Qaeda, including a rejection of al-
Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri's loyalty pledge
to Taliban leader Mawlawi Haibatullah
Akhunzada;
(iii) whether the Haqqani Network has
broken ties with al-Qaeda, and the Haqqani
Network's leader Sirajuddin Haqqani remains
part of the leadership structure of the
Taliban;
(iv) the viability of the intra-Afghan
governing agreement; and
(v) whether the terms of ceasefire are
being met by all sides in the conflict.
(B) Classified annex.--The report required under
subparagraph (A) shall be transmitted in unclassified
form, but shall include a classified annex, prepared in
consultation with the Department of Defense, that
provides relevant classified information, including
information on any other matter that the Secretary
deems relevant.
(b) Sense of Congress on Afghanistan Peace Final Agreement.--It is
the sense of Congress that any binding agreement between the United
States and Taliban officials should be submitted to Congress.
(c) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act shall prejudice
whether an agreement concluded with the Taliban constitutes a treaty
for purposes of Article II of the Constitution of the United States.
SEC. 7. ENSURING A DURABLE PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN; SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON
VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after entering into an
agreement with Taliban officials, and not less frequently than once
every 180 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report assessing whether key
tenets of the peace deal with Taliban officials are preserved and
honored.
(b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
include--
(1) an assessment of whether Taliban officials are
complying with obligations and commitments under the peace
agreement, including whether Taliban officials are ensuring
counterterrorism assurances and guaranteeing Afghanistan is not
a safe haven for terrorist organizations, such as al Qaeda;
(2) an assessment of terrorist activity in Afghanistan and
Taliban actions with respect to counterterrorism guarantees,
and an assessment of threats against the United States
homeland;
(3) an updated assessment of the viability of the intra-
Afghan governing agreement;
(4) an assessment as to whether the terms of ceasefire are
being met by all sides in the conflict;
(5) an overview and assessment of any action that breaches
the agreement or puts Taliban officials in noncompliance with
the terms of the agreement;
(6) a description of the status of human rights, including
the rights of women and minorities, as well as their access to
education, justice, and economic opportunities, in Afghanistan
following a peace deal with Taliban officials;
(7) a description of the constitution of Afghanistan's
guaranteed rights and protections; and
(8) a description of the status of the rule of law, and
governance structures at the central, provincial, and district
levels of government, freedoms of media and press, and civil
society's operating space.
<all>