[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1879 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
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116th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 1879
To call on the Secretary of Homeland Security to lead a task force to
address the threat of foreign government influence and threats to
academic research integrity on college campuses, and for other
purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
June 18, 2019
Mr. Hawley introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To call on the Secretary of Homeland Security to lead a task force to
address the threat of foreign government influence and threats to
academic research integrity on college campuses, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Protect Our Universities Act of
2019''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The United States enjoys one of the most vibrant and
open education systems in the world. The free flow of ideas has
led to the development of innovative technologies and new modes
of thinking. The openness of the system also puts it at risk.
Adversaries of the United States take advantage of access to
federally funded sensitive research that takes place on the
campuses of institutions of higher education.
(2) According to Alex Joske of the Australian Strategic
Policy Institute, there are thousands of scientists with links
to China's People's Liberation Army who have traveled to
American universities over the last several years. In his
report, Joske described the Chinese military's tactic as
``picking flowers in foreign lands to make honey in China''.
(3) As stated in the January 2018 China's Technology
Transfer Strategy report by the Defense Innovation Unit,
``Academia is an opportune environment for learning about
science and technology since the cultural values of U.S.
educational institutions reflect an open and free exchange of
ideas. As a result, Chinese science and engineering students
frequently master technologies that later become critical to
key military systems, amounting over time to unintentional
violations of U.S. export control laws.''.
(4) In Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director
Wray's view, Chinese nontraditional intelligence collectors
``are exploiting the very open research and development
environment that we have, which we all revere. But they're
taking advantage of it, so one of the things we're trying to do
is view the China threat as not just the whole-of-government
threat, but a whole-of-society threat on their end, and I think
it's going to take a whole-of-society response by us.''.
(5) Russia has also attempted to exploit the openness of
our university system for intelligence purposes. In 2012, for
instance, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) tasked
an undercover officer at Columbia University with recruiting
classmates or professors who might have access to sensitive
information.
(6) Iran poses a similar threat. In 2012, President Barack
Obama signed into law the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human
Rights Act of 2012 (Public Law 112-158), which prohibited
issuance of a student visa to any Iranian who wished to pursue
coursework in preparation for a career in the Iranian energy,
nuclear science, or nuclear engineering sectors, or related
fields.
(7) The United States recognizes the great value of
appropriate openness and the security need of striking a
balance with asset protection.
(8) However, technology and information that could be
deemed sensitive to the national security interests of the
United States should be given increased scrutiny to determine
if access should be restricted in a research environment.
(9) An open federally funded research environment exposes
the United States to the possibility of exchanging research
affiliated with current or future critical military
technological systems.
(10) This Act preserves the openness of America's higher
education system, while preventing adversaries from exploiting
that very system in furtherance of their own repressive
agendas.
SEC. 3. TASK FORCE AND SENSITIVE RESEARCH PROJECT DESIGNATION.
(a) Task Force Established.--Not later than one year after the date
of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National
Intelligence, shall establish the National Security Technology Task
Force (hereinafter referred to as the ``Task Force'') to address the
threat of espionage, targeting research and development at institutions
of higher education that is funded in part or whole by any member
agency of the Task Force.
(b) Membership.--
(1) Designation.--
(A) Participation.--The Task Force shall include
not more than 30 members as follows:
(i) At least 1 representative shall be from
the Department of Homeland Security, designated
by the Secretary of Homeland Security.
(ii) The Secretary of Homeland Security
shall coordinate with the following in order to
secure their participation on the Task Force:
(I) The Director of National
Intelligence for at least 1
representative from the intelligence
community.
(II) The United States Attorney
General for at least 1 representative
from the Department of Justice.
(III) The Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation for at least 1
representative from the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.
(IV) The Secretary of Energy for at
least 1 representative from the
Department of Energy.
(V) The Secretary of Education for
at least 1 representative from each of
the following offices of the Department
of Education:
(aa) The Office of
Postsecondary Education.
(bb) The Office of the
General Counsel.
(cc) Any other office the
Secretary of Homeland Security
determines to be appropriate.
(VI) The Secretary of State for at
least 1 representative from the
Department of State.
(VII) The Secretary of Defense for
at least 1 representative from the
Department of Defense.
(VIII) The Director of the National
Institutes of Health for at least 1
representative from the National
Institutes of Health.
(IX) The Director of the Office of
Science and Technology Policy.
(B) Equal representation.--Each agency represented
on the Task Force shall maintain equal representation
with the other agencies on the Task Force.
(2) Membership list.--Not later than 10 days after the
first meeting of the Task Force, the Task Force shall submit to
Congress a list identifying each member agency of the Task
Force.
(c) Sensitive Research Topics List.--The Task Force shall maintain
a list of topics determined sensitive by one or more Task Force member
agencies. Such list shall be referred to as the ``Sensitive Research
Topics List'' and be populated and maintained in accordance with the
following:
(1) Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of
this Act, each Task Force member agency shall generate an
initial list of research topics determined sensitive for
national security reasons and submit such list to the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) Each Task Force member agency shall update their
respective list of sensitive research topics on a 6-month basis
and submit changes to the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
(3) Task Force member agency inputs described in paragraphs
(1) and (2) shall be added to--
(A) any item listed on the Commerce Control List
(CCL) maintained by the Department of Commerce; and
(B) any item listed on the United States Munitions
List maintained by the Department of State.
(4) Not later than 90 days after receipt of Task Force
member agency inputs described in paragraphs (1) and (2), the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence shall compile
the inputs and issue the first Sensitive Research Topics List
to all Task Force member agencies. Thereafter, the Office of
Directory of National Intelligence shall maintain an updated
list of the research topics based on Task Force member agency
inputs and any changes to the Commerce Control List and the
United States Munitions List, and ensure an updated version of
the Sensitive Research Topic Lists is available to all of the
Task Force member agencies.
(d) Sensitive Research Projects List.--The Task Force shall
maintain a list of projects funded by Task Force member agencies and
addressing sensitive research topics. Such list shall be referred to as
the ``Sensitive Research Projects List'' and be populated and
maintained in accordance with the following:
(1) Not later than 90 days after the first issuance of the
Sensitive Research Topics List, each Task Force member agency
shall identify any ongoing or scheduled projects that--
(A) receive or are scheduled to receive funding
from said agency;
(B) involve personnel from an institution of higher
education; and
(C) address one or more topics found on the
Sensitive Research Topics List.
(2) The Task Force shall collect the following information
relevant to each project identified in paragraph (1):
(A) The Task Force member agency that is funding
the project.
(B) Which topic on the Sensitive Research Topics
List is addressed by the project.
(C) Contact information for the principal
investigator on the project.
(3) The Task Force shall submit the Sensitive Research
Projects List, with the required information, to the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence, who shall maintain the
Sensitive Research Projects List.
(4) The Sensitive Research Projects List shall be updated
in response to any changes to the Sensitive Research Topics
List, and--
(A) the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence shall issue notification to all Task Force
member agencies of any changes to the Sensitive
Research Topics List resulting from updated inputs from
Task Force member agencies or the Commerce Control
Lists or United States Munitions List; and
(B) each Task Force member agency shall--
(i) reinitiate the process detailed in
paragraph (1); and
(ii) provide an updated list of agency-
funded sensitive research projects to the
Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
(e) Consultation With OIG.--The Task Force shall periodically, but
not less frequently than annually, consult with the Office of the
Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security, which shall
include annual reports to the Office of the Inspector General on the
activities of the Task Force, with an opportunity for the Office of the
Inspector General to provide active feedback related to such
activities.
(f) Instruction to Institutions of Higher Education.--Not less
frequently than annually, the Task Force shall provide relevant
instruction to institutions of higher education at which research
projects on the Sensitive Research Projects List are being carried out.
Such instruction shall provide the institutions of higher education
with information related to the threat posed by espionage, best
practices identified by the Task Force, and, to the extent possible,
any specific risks that the intelligence community, the qualified
funding agency, or law enforcement entities determine appropriate to
share with the institutions.
(g) Report to Congress.--Not later than one year after the date of
enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter, the Task Force
shall provide a report to the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate and to the Committee on Homeland Security,
the Committee on Education and Labor, the Committee on Armed Services,
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives, regarding the threat of espionage at institutions of
higher education. In each such briefing, the Task Force shall identify
actions that may be taken to reduce espionage carried out through
student participation in sensitive research projects. The Task Force
shall also include in this report an assessment of whether the current
licensing regulations relating to the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations and the Export Administration Regulations are sufficient to
protect the security of the projects listed on the Sensitive Research
Projects List.
SEC. 4. FOREIGN STUDENT PARTICIPATION IN SENSITIVE RESEARCH PROJECTS.
(a) Approval of Foreign Student Participation Required.--
(1) In general.--Beginning on the date that is one year
after the date of enactment of this Act, for each project on
the Sensitive Research Projects List that is open to student
participation, the head of such project at the institution of
higher education at which the project is being carried out
shall--
(A) obtain proof of citizenship from any student
participating or expected to participate in such
project before the student is permitted to participate
in such project; and
(B) for any student who is a citizen of a country
identified in subsection (b), submit the required
information, to be defined in coordination with the
office designated by the Task Force to perform the
background screening, to their grantmaking agency, who
shall transmit that information in a standardized
format, to be stipulated in coordination with the
office designated by the Task Force to perform the
background screening, to the office designated by the
Task Force to perform the background screening.
(2) Background screening.--An office designated by the Task
Force shall perform a background screening of a student
described in paragraph (1) and approve or deny the student's
participation in the relevant project within 90 days of initial
receipt of the information described in paragraph (1)(B), and--
(A) the scope of any such screening shall be
determined by the designated office in consultation
with the Task Force, with reference to the specific
project and the requirements of the grantmaking agency;
(B) the Secretary of Homeland Security, as head of
the Task Force, shall retain authority to delay
approval or denial of a student's participation in a
sensitive research project in 30-day increments, as
needed in coordination with Task Force member agencies;
and
(C) institutions of higher education shall maintain
the right to petition findings and contest the outcome
of a screening.
(b) List of Citizenship Requiring Approval.--Approval under
subsection (a) shall be required for any student who is a citizen of a
country that is one of the following:
(1) The People's Republic of China.
(2) The Russian Federation.
(3) The Islamic Republic of Iran.
SEC. 5. FOREIGN ENTITIES.
(a) List of Foreign Entities That Pose an Intelligence Threat.--Not
later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Homeland Security shall coordinate with the Director of
National Intelligence to identify foreign entities, including
governments, corporations, nonprofit and for-profit organizations, and
any subsidiary or affiliate of such an entity, that the Director
determines pose a threat of espionage with respect to sensitive
research projects, and shall develop and maintain a list of such
entities. The Director may add or remove entities from such list at any
time. The initial list developed by the Director shall include the
following entities (including any subsidiary or affiliate):
(1) Huawei Technologies Company.
(2) ZTE Corporation.
(3) Hytera Communications Corporation.
(4) Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company.
(5) Dahua Technology Company.
(6) Kaspersky Lab.
(7) Any entity that is owned or controlled by, or otherwise
has demonstrated financial ties to, the government of a country
identified under section 4(b).
(b) Notice to Institutions of Higher Education.--The Secretary of
Homeland Security shall make the initial list required under subsection
(a) in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, and any
changes to such list, available to the Task Force and the head of each
qualified funding agency as soon as practicable. The Secretary of
Homeland Security shall provide such initial list and subsequent
amendments to each institution of higher education at which a project
on the Sensitive Research Projects List is being carried out.
(c) Prohibition on Use of Certain Technologies.--Beginning on the
date that is one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
head of each sensitive research project shall, as a condition of
receipt of funds from the Department of Homeland Security, certify to
the Secretary of Homeland Security, beginning on the date that is 2
years after the date of the enactment of this Act, any technology
developed by an entity included on the list maintained under subsection
(a) shall not be utilized in carrying out the sensitive research
project.
SEC. 6. ENFORCEMENT.
The Secretary of Homeland Security shall take such steps as may be
necessary to enforce the provisions of sections 4 and 5 of this Act.
Upon determination that the head of a sensitive research project has
failed to meet the requirements of either section 4 or section 5, the
Secretary of Homeland Security may determine the appropriate
enforcement action, including--
(1) imposing a probationary period, not to exceed 6 months,
on the head of such project, or on the project;
(2) reducing or otherwise limiting the funding for such
project until the violation has been remedied;
(3) permanently cancelling the funding for such project; or
(4) any other action the head of the qualified funding
agency determines to be appropriate.
SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Citizen of a country.--The term ``citizen of a
country,'' with respect to a student, includes all countries in
which the student has held or holds citizenship or holds
permanent residency.
(2) Institution of higher education.--The term
``institution of higher education'' means an institution
described in section 102 of the Higher Education Act of 1965
(20 U.S.C. 1002) that receives Federal funds in any amount and
for any purpose.
(3) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
(4) Qualified funding agency.--The term ``qualified funding
agency'', with respect to a sensitive research project, means--
(A) the Department of Defense, if the sensitive
research project is funded in whole or in part by the
Department of Defense;
(B) the Department of Energy, if the sensitive
research project is funded in whole or in part by the
Department of Energy; or
(C) an element of the intelligence community, if
the sensitive research project is funded in whole or in
part by the element of the intelligence community.
(5) Sensitive research project.--The term ``sensitive
research project'' means a research project at an institution
of higher education that is funded by a Task Force member
agency, except that such term shall not include any research
project that is classified or that requires the participants in
such project to obtain a security clearance.
(6) Student participation.--The term ``student
participation'' means any student activity of a student with
access to sensitive research project-specific information for
any reason.
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