[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1102 Reported in Senate (RS)]

<DOC>





                                                       Calendar No. 142
116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1102

      To promote security and energy partnerships in the Eastern 
                 Mediterranean, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 10, 2019

 Mr. Menendez (for himself, Mr. Rubio, Mr. Van Hollen, Mr. Peters, Mr. 
 Coons, Mr. Cruz, and Mr. Cramer) introduced the following bill; which 
   was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

                             July 10, 2019

                Reported by Mr. Risch, with an amendment
 [Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed 
                               in italic]

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
      To promote security and energy partnerships in the Eastern 
                 Mediterranean, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

<DELETED>SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    This Act may be cited as the ``Eastern Mediterranean 
Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019''.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 2. FINDINGS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    Congress makes the following findings:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) The security of partners and allies in the 
        Eastern Mediterranean region is critical to the security of the 
        United States and Europe.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Greece is a valuable member of the North 
        Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and a key pillar of 
        stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) Israel is a steadfast ally of the United 
        States and has been designated a ``major non-NATO ally'' and 
        ``major strategic partner''.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) Cyprus is a key strategic partner and signed a 
        Statement of Intent with the United States on November 6, 2018, 
        to enhance bilateral security cooperation.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) The countries of Greece, Cyprus, and Israel 
        have participated in critical trilateral summits to improve 
        cooperation on energy and security issues.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) Secretary of State Mike Pompeo participated in 
        the trilateral summit among Israel, Greece, and Cyprus on March 
        20, 2019.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) All four countries oppose any action in the 
        Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea that could challenge 
        stability, violate international law, or undermine good 
        neighborly relations, and in a joint declaration on March 21, 
        2019, agreed to ``defend against external malign influences in 
        the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader Middle 
        East''.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) The recent discovery of potentially the 
        region's largest natural gas field off the Egyptian coast and 
        the newest discoveries of natural gas off the Cypriot coast 
        could represent a significant positive development for the 
        Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, enhancing the 
        region's strategic energy significance.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (9) Turkish government officials have expressed an 
        intent to purchase the S-400 system from the Russian 
        Federation, which could trigger the imposition of mandatory 
        sanctions under the Countering America's Adversaries Through 
        Sanctions Act (Public Law 115-44).</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (10) It is in the national security interests of 
        the United States to promote, achieve, and maintain energy 
        security among, and through cooperation with, allies.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (11) Natural gas developments in the Eastern 
        Mediterranean have the potential to provide economic gains and 
        contribute to energy security in the region and Europe, as well 
        as support European efforts to diversify away from natural gas 
        supplied by the Russian Federation.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (12) The soon to be completed Trans Adriatic 
        Pipeline is a critical component of the Southern Gas Corridor 
        and the European Union's efforts to diversify energy 
        resources.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (13) The proposed Eastern Mediterranean pipeline 
        if commercially viable would provide for energy diversification 
        in accordance with the European Union's third energy package of 
        reforms.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (14) The United States acknowledges the 
        achievements and importance of the Binational Industrial 
        Research and Development Foundation (BIRD) and the United 
        States-Israel Binational Science Foundation (BSF) and supports 
        continued multiyear funding to ensure the continuity of the 
        programs of the Foundations.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (15) The United States has welcomed Greece's 
        allocation of 2 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) to 
        defense in accordance with commitments made at the 2014 NATO 
        Summit in Wales.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (16) Energy exploration in the Eastern 
        Mediterranean region must be safeguarded against threats posed 
        by terrorist and extremist groups, including Hezbollah and any 
        other actor in the region.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (17) The energy exploration in the Republic of 
        Cyprus's Exclusive Economic Zone and territorial waters--
        </DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) furthers United States interests by 
                providing a potential alternative to Russian gas for 
                United States allies and partners; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) should not be impeded by other 
                sovereign states.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (18) The United States Government cooperates 
        closely with the Government of the Republic of Cyprus through 
        information sharing agreements.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (19) United States officials have assisted the 
        Government of the Republic of Cyprus with crafting that 
        nation's national security strategy.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (20) The United States Government provides 
        training to Cypriot officials in areas such as cybersecurity, 
        counterterrorism, and explosive ordnance disposal and stockpile 
        management.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (21) The Republic of Cyprus is a valued member of 
        the Proliferation Security Initiative to combat the trafficking 
        of weapons of mass destruction.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (22) The Republic of Cyprus continues to work 
        closely with the United Nations and regional partners in Europe 
        to combat terrorism and violent extremism.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (23) Despite robust economic and security 
        relations with the United States, the Republic of Cyprus has 
        been subject to a United States prohibition on the export of 
        defense articles and services since 1987.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (24) The 1987 arms prohibition was designed to 
        restrict United States arms sales and transfer to the Republic 
        of Cyprus and the occupied part of Cyprus to avoid hindering 
        reunification efforts.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (25) At least 40,000 Turkish troops are stationed 
        in the occupied part of Cyprus with some weapons procured from 
        the United States through mainland Turkey.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (26) While the United States has, as a matter of 
        policy, avoided the provision of defense articles and services 
        to the Republic of Cyprus, the Government of Cyprus has, in the 
        past, sought to obtain defense articles from other countries, 
        including countries, such as Russia, that pose challenges to 
        United States interests around the world.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It is the policy of the United States--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) to continue to actively participate in the 
        trilateral dialogue on energy, maritime security, cyber 
        security and protection of critical infrastructure conducted 
        among Israel, Greece and Cyprus;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) to support diplomatic efforts with partners 
        and allies to deepen energy security cooperation among Greece, 
        Cyprus, and Israel and to encourage the private sector to make 
        investments in energy infrastructure in the Eastern 
        Mediterranean region;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) to strongly support the completion of the 
        Trans Adriatic and Eastern Mediterranean Pipelines and the 
        establishment of liquified natural gas (LNG) terminals across 
        the Eastern Mediterranean as a means of diversifying regional 
        energy needs away from the Russian Federation;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) to maintain a robust United States naval 
        presence and investments in the naval facility at Souda Bay, 
        Greece and develop deeper security cooperation with the latter 
        to include the recent MQ-9 deployments to the Larissa Air Force 
        Base and United States Army helicopter training in central 
        Greece;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) to welcome Greece's commitment to move forward 
        with the Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB pipeline) and 
        additional LNG terminals that will help facilitate delivery of 
        non-Russian gas to the Balkans and central Europe;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) to support deepened security cooperation with 
        the Republic of Cyprus through the removal of the arms embargo 
        on the country;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) to support robust International Military 
        Education and Training (IMET) programming with Greece and the 
        Republic of Cyprus;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) to leverage relationships within the European 
        Union to encourage investments in Cypriot border and maritime 
        security;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (9) to support efforts to counter Russian 
        Federation Government interference and influence in the Eastern 
        Mediterranean through increased security cooperation with 
        Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, to include intelligence sharing, 
        cyber, and maritime domain awareness;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (10) to support the Republic of Cyprus efforts to 
        regulate its banking industry to ensure that it is not used as 
        a source of international money laundering and encourages 
        additional measures toward that end;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (11) to strongly oppose any actions that would 
        trigger mandatory sanctions pursuant to section 231 of the 
        Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) 
        (Public Law 115-44), to include the purchase by Turkey of an S-
        400 system from the Russian Federation;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (12) to continue robust official strategic 
        engagement with Israel, Greece, and Cyprus;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (13) to urge countries in the region to deny port 
        services to the Russian Federation vessels deployed to support 
        the government of Bashar Al-Assad in Syria;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (14) to support joint military exercises among 
        Israel, Greece, and Cyprus;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (15) to fully implement relevant CAATSA provisions 
        to prevent interference by the Government of the Russian 
        Federation in the region;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (16) to support efforts by countries in the region 
        to demobilize military equipment supplied by the Government of 
        the Russian Federation in favor of equipment provided by NATO 
        and NATO-allied member countries; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (17) to strongly support the active and robust 
        participation of Israel, Cyprus, and Greece in the Combating 
        Terrorism Fellowship Program.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 4. UNITED STATES-EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN ENERGY 
              COOPERATION.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Energy, may enter into cooperative agreements 
supporting and enhancing dialogue and planning involving international 
partnerships between the United States and Israel, Greece, and 
Cyprus.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Annual Reports.--If the Secretary of State, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Energy, enters into agreements 
authorized under subsection (a), the Secretary shall submit an annual 
report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) actions taken to implement such agreements; 
        and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) any projects undertaken pursuant to such 
        agreements.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) United States-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center.--
The Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Secretary of State, 
may establish a joint United States-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center 
in the United States leveraging the experience, knowledge, and 
expertise of institutions of higher education and entities in the 
private sector, among others, in offshore energy development to further 
dialogue and collaboration to develop more robust academic cooperation 
in energy innovation technology and engineering, water science, 
technology transfer, and analysis of emerging geopolitical 
implications, which include opportunities as well as crises and threats 
from foreign natural resource and energy acquisitions.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 5. REPEAL OF PROHIBITION ON TRANSFER OF ARTICLES ON THE 
              UNITED STATES MUNITIONS LIST TO THE REPUBLIC OF 
              CYPRUS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Sense of the Senate on Cyprus.--It is the sense of the 
Senate that--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the direct sale or transfer of arms by the 
        United States to the Republic of Cyprus would advance United 
        States security interests in Europe by helping to reduce the 
        dependence of the Government of Cyprus on other countries for 
        defense-related materiel, including countries that pose 
        challenges to United States interests around the world; 
        and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) it is in the interest of the United States--
        </DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) to continue to support United Nations-
                facilitated efforts toward a comprehensive solution to 
                the division of Cyprus; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) for the Republic of Cyprus to join 
                NATO's Partnership for Peace program.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Modification of Prohibition.--Section 620C(e) of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2373(e)) is amended by adding 
at the end the following new paragraph:</DELETED>
<DELETED>    ``(3) The requirement under paragraph (1) shall not apply 
to any sale or other provision of any defense article or service to 
Cyprus if the end-user of such defense article or service is the 
Republic of Cyprus.''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Exclusion of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus 
From Certain Related Regulations.--Beginning on the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall not apply a policy 
of denial for exports, re-exports, or transfers of defense articles and 
defense services destined for the Republic of Cyprus if--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the request is made by or on behalf of the 
        Republic of Cyprus; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the end-user of such defense articles or 
        defense services is the Republic of Cyprus.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 6. IMET COOPERATION WITH GREECE AND CYPRUS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    There is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 
2020 $2,000,000 for International Military Education and Training 
(IMET) assistance for Greece and $2,000,000 for such assistance for 
Cyprus. The assistance shall be made available for the following 
purposes:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Training of future leaders.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Fostering a better understanding of the United 
        States.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) Establishing a rapport between the United 
        States military and the country's military to build alliances 
        for the future.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) Enhancement of interoperability and 
        capabilities for joint operations.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) Focusing on professional military 
        education.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) Enabling countries to use their national funds 
        to receive a reduced cost for other Department of Defense 
        education and training.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) Provision of English Language Training 
        assistance.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 7. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    There is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 
2020 $3,000,000 for Foreign Military Financing (FMF) assistance for 
Greece to assist the country in meeting its commitment as a member of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to dedicate 20 percent of 
its defense budget to enhance research and development.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 8. LIMITATION ON TRANSFER OF F-35 AIRCRAFT TO 
              TURKEY.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--Except as provided under subsection (b), 
no funds may be obligated or expended--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) to transfer, facilitate the transfer, or 
        authorize the transfer of, an F-35 aircraft to the Republic of 
        Turkey;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) to transfer intellectual property or technical 
        data necessary for or related to any maintenance or support of 
        the F-35 aircraft; or</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) to construct a storage facility for, or 
        otherwise facilitate the storage in Turkey of, an F-35 aircraft 
        transferred to Turkey.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Exception.--The President may waive the limitation 
under subsection (a) upon a written certification to Congress that the 
Government of Turkey does not plan or intend to accept delivery of the 
S-400 air defense system.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Transfer Defined.--In this section, the term 
``transfer'' includes the physical relocation outside of the 
continental United States.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Applicability.--The limitation under subsection (a) 
does not apply to F-35 aircraft operated by the United States Armed 
Forces.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 9. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON PURCHASE BY TURKEY OF S-400 AIR 
              DEFENSE SYSTEM.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It is the sense of the Senate that, if the Government of 
Turkey purchases the S-400 air defense system from the Russian 
Federation--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) such a purchase would constitute a significant 
        transaction within the meaning of section 231(a) of the 
        Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 
        (22 U.S.C. 9525(a));</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) such a purchase would endanger the integrity 
        of the NATO alliance;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) such a purchase would adversely affect ongoing 
        operations of the United States Armed Forces, including 
        coalition operations in which the United States Armed Forces 
        participate;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) such a purchase would result in a significant 
        impact to defense cooperation between the United States and 
        Turkey;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) such a purchase would significantly increase 
        the risk of compromising United States defense systems and 
        operational capabilities; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) the President should faithfully execute the 
        Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 
        by imposing and applying sanctions under section 235 of that 
        Act (22 U.S.C. 9529) with respect to any individual or entity 
        determined to have engaged in such a significant 
        transaction.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 10. STRATEGY ON UNITED STATES SECURITY AND ENERGY 
              COOPERATION IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with 
the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to 
the appropriate congressional committees a strategy on enhanced 
security and energy cooperation with countries in the Eastern 
Mediterranean region, including Israel, Cyprus, and Greece.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) 
shall include the following elements:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) A description of United States participation 
        in and support for the Eastern Mediterranean Natural Gas 
        Forum.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) An evaluation of all possible delivery 
        mechanisms into Europe for natural gas discoveries in the 
        Eastern Mediterranean region.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) An evaluation of efforts to protect energy 
        exploration infrastructure in the region, including United 
        States companies.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) An assessment of the capacity of Cyprus to 
        host an Energy Crisis Center in the region which could provide 
        basing facilities in support search and rescue efforts in the 
        event of an accident.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) An assessment of the timing of natural gas 
        delivery in the region as well as assessment of the ultimate 
        destination countries for the natural gas delivery from the 
        region.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) A plan to work with United States businesses 
        seeking to invest in Eastern Mediterranean energy exploration, 
        development, and cooperation.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified 
annex.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 11. REPORT ON RUSSIAN FEDERATION MALIGN INFLUENCE IN THE 
              EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report on Russian Federation 
malign influence in Cyprus, Greece, and Israel since January 1, 
2017.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) 
shall include the following elements:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) An assessment of security, political, and 
        energy goals of the Government of the Russian Federation in the 
        Eastern Mediterranean.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) A description of energy projects of the 
        Government of the Russian Federation in the Eastern 
        Mediterranean.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) A listing of Russian national ownership of 
        media outlets in these countries, including the name of the 
        media outlet, approximate viewership, and assessment of whether 
        the outlet promotes pro-Kremlin views.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) An assessment of military engagement by the 
        Government of the Russian Federation in the security sector, 
        including engagement by military equipment and personnel 
        contractors.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) An assessment of efforts supported by the 
        Government of the Russian Federation to influence elections in 
        the three countries, through the use of cyber attacks, social 
        media campaigns, or other malign influence 
        techniques.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) An assessment of efforts by the Government of 
        the Russian Federation to intimidate and influence the decision 
        by His All Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, leader of 
        300,000,000 Orthodox Christians worldwide, to grant autocephaly 
        to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified 
annex.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 12. REPORT ON INTERFERENCE BY OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE 
              EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE OF CYPRUS AND AIRSPACE OF 
              GREECE.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with 
the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to 
the appropriate congressional committees a report listing incidents of 
interference in efforts by the Republic of Cyprus to explore and 
exploit natural resources in its Exclusive Economic Zone and violations 
of the airspace of the sovereign territory of Greece.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) 
shall include the following elements:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) A listing of incidents since January 1, 2017, 
        determined by the Secretary of State to interfere in efforts by 
        the Republic of Cyprus to explore and exploit natural resources 
        in its Exclusive Economic Zone.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) A listing of incidents since January 1, 2017, 
        determined by the Secretary of State to be violations of the 
        airspace of Greece by its neighbors.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified 
annex.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 13. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    In this Act, the term ``appropriate congressional 
committees means'' the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives.</DELETED>

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Eastern Mediterranean Security and 
Energy Partnership Act of 2019''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The security of partners and allies in the Eastern 
        Mediterranean region is critical to the security of the United 
        States and Europe.
            (2) Greece is a valuable member of the North Atlantic 
        Treaty Organization (NATO) and a key pillar of stability in the 
        Eastern Mediterranean.
            (3) Israel is a steadfast ally of the United States and has 
        been designated a ``major non-NATO ally'' and ``major strategic 
        partner''.
            (4) Cyprus is a key strategic partner and signed a 
        Statement of Intent with the United States on November 6, 2018, 
        to enhance bilateral security cooperation.
            (5) The countries of Greece, Cyprus, and Israel have 
        participated in critical trilateral summits to improve 
        cooperation on energy and security issues.
            (6) Secretary of State Mike Pompeo participated in the 
        trilateral summit among Israel, Greece, and Cyprus on March 20, 
        2019.
            (7) The United States, Israel, Greece, and Cyprus oppose 
        any action in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea that 
        could challenge stability, violate international law, or 
        undermine good neighborly relations, and in a joint declaration 
        on March 21, 2019, agreed to ``defend against external malign 
        influences in the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader Middle 
        East''.
            (8) The recent discovery of what may be the region's 
        largest natural gas field off the Egyptian coast and the newest 
        discoveries of natural gas off the coast of Cyprus could 
        represent a significant and positive development for the 
        Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, enhancing the 
        region's strategic energy significance.
            (9) Turkish government officials have expressed an intent 
        to purchase the S-400 system from the Russian Federation, which 
        is subject to mandatory sanctions under the Countering 
        America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Public Law 115-
        44).
            (10) It is in the national security interest of the United 
        States to promote, achieve, and maintain energy security among, 
        and through cooperation with, allies.
            (11) Natural gas developments in the Eastern Mediterranean 
        have the potential to provide economic gains and contribute to 
        energy security in the region and Europe, as well as support 
        European efforts to diversify away from natural gas supplied by 
        the Russian Federation.
            (12) The soon to be completed Trans Adriatic Pipeline is a 
        critical component of the Southern Gas Corridor and the 
        European Union's efforts to diversify energy resources.
            (13) The proposed Eastern Mediterranean pipeline, if 
        commercially viable, would provide for energy diversification 
        in accordance with the European Union's third energy package of 
        reforms.
            (14) The United States acknowledges the achievements and 
        importance of the Binational Industrial Research and 
        Development Foundation (BIRD) and the United States-Israel 
        Binational Science Foundation (BSF) and supports continued 
        multiyear funding to ensure the continuity of the programs of 
        the Foundations.
            (15) The United States has welcomed Greece's allocation of 
        2 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) to defense in 
        accordance with commitments made at the 2014 NATO Summit in 
        Wales.
            (16) Energy exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean region 
        must be safeguarded against threats posed by terrorist and 
        extremist groups, including Hezbollah and any other actor in 
        the region.
            (17) The energy exploration in the Republic of Cyprus's 
        Exclusive Economic Zone and territorial waters--
                    (A) furthers United States interests by providing a 
                potential alternative to Russian gas for United States 
                allies and partners; and
                    (B) should not be impeded by other sovereign 
                states.
            (18) The United States Government cooperates closely with 
        Cyprus, Greece, and Israel through information sharing 
        agreements.
            (19) United States officials have assisted the Government 
        of the Republic of Cyprus with crafting that nation's national 
        security strategy.
            (20) The United States Government provides training to 
        Cypriot officials in areas such as cybersecurity, 
        counterterrorism, and explosive ordnance disposal and stockpile 
        management.
            (21) Israel, Greece, and Cyprus are valued members of the 
        Proliferation Security Initiative to combat the trafficking of 
        weapons of mass destruction.
            (22) The Republic of Cyprus continues to work closely with 
        the United Nations and regional partners in Europe to combat 
        terrorism and violent extremism.
            (23) Despite robust economic and security relations with 
        the United States, the Republic of Cyprus has been subject to a 
        United States prohibition on the export of defense articles and 
        services since 1987.
            (24) The 1987 arms prohibition was designed to restrict 
        United States arms sales and transfers to the Republic of 
        Cyprus and the occupied part of Cyprus to avoid hindering 
        reunification efforts.
            (25) At least 40,000 Turkish troops are stationed in the 
        occupied part of Cyprus with some weapons procured from the 
        United States through mainland Turkey.
            (26) While the United States has, as a matter of policy, 
        avoided the provision of defense articles and services to the 
        Republic of Cyprus, the Government of Cyprus has, in the past, 
        sought to obtain defense articles from other countries, 
        including countries, such as Russia, that pose challenges to 
        United States interests around the world.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to continue to actively participate in the trilateral 
        dialogue on energy, maritime security, cybersecurity and 
        protection of critical infrastructure conducted among Israel, 
        Greece, and Cyprus;
            (2) to support diplomatic efforts with partners and allies 
        to deepen energy security cooperation among Greece, Cyprus, and 
        Israel and to encourage the private sector to make investments 
        in energy infrastructure in the Eastern Mediterranean region;
            (3) to strongly support the completion of the Trans 
        Adriatic and Eastern Mediterranean Pipelines and the 
        establishment of liquified natural gas (LNG) terminals across 
        the Eastern Mediterranean as a means of diversifying regional 
        energy needs away from the Russian Federation;
            (4) to maintain a robust United States naval presence and 
        investments in the naval facility at Souda Bay, Greece and 
        develop deeper security cooperation with Greece to include the 
        recent MQ-9 deployments to the Larissa Air Force Base and 
        United States Army helicopter training in central Greece;
            (5) to welcome Greece's commitment to move forward with the 
        Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB pipeline) and additional 
        LNG terminals that will help facilitate delivery of non-Russian 
        gas to the Balkans and central Europe;
            (6) to support deepened security cooperation with the 
        Republic of Cyprus through the removal of the arms embargo on 
        the country;
            (7) to support robust International Military Education and 
        Training (IMET) programming with Greece and the Republic of 
        Cyprus;
            (8) to leverage relationships within the European Union to 
        encourage investments in Cypriot border and maritime security;
            (9) to support efforts to counter Russian Federation 
        interference and influence in the Eastern Mediterranean through 
        increased security cooperation with Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, 
        to include intelligence sharing, cyber, and maritime domain 
        awareness;
            (10) to support the Republic of Cyprus' efforts to regulate 
        its banking industry to ensure that it is not used as a source 
        of international money laundering and encourage additional 
        measures toward that end;
            (11) to strongly oppose any actions that would trigger 
        mandatory sanctions pursuant to section 231 of the Countering 
        America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) (Public 
        Law 115-44), to include the purchase by Turkey of an S-400 
        system from the Russian Federation;
            (12) to continue robust official strategic engagement with 
        Israel, Greece, and Cyprus;
            (13) to urge countries in the region to deny port services 
        to Russian Federation vessels deployed to support the 
        government of Bashar Al-Assad in Syria;
            (14) to support joint military exercises among Israel, 
        Greece, and Cyprus;
            (15) to fully implement relevant CAATSA provisions to 
        prevent interference by the Russian Federation in the region;
            (16) to support efforts by countries in the region to 
        demobilize military equipment supplied by the Russian 
        Federation in favor of equipment provided by NATO and NATO-
        allied member countries; and
            (17) to strongly support the active and robust 
        participation of Israel, Cyprus, and Greece in the Combating 
        Terrorism Fellowship Program.

SEC. 4. UNITED STATES-EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN ENERGY COOPERATION.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
Secretary of Energy, may enter into cooperative agreements supporting 
and enhancing dialogue and planning involving international 
partnerships between the United States and Israel, Greece, and the 
Republic of Cyprus.
    (b) Annual Reports.--If the Secretary of State, in coordination 
with the Secretary of Energy, enters into agreements authorized under 
subsection (a), the Secretary shall submit an annual report to the 
appropriate congressional committees that describes--
            (1) actions taken to implement such agreements; and
            (2) any projects undertaken pursuant to such agreements.
    (c) United States-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center.--The 
Secretary of Energy, in coordination with the Secretary of State, may 
establish a joint United States-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center in 
the United States leveraging the experience, knowledge, and expertise 
of institutions of higher education and entities in the private sector, 
among others, in offshore energy development to further dialogue and 
collaboration to develop more robust academic cooperation in energy 
innovation technology and engineering, water science, technology 
transfer, and analysis of emerging geopolitical implications, which 
include opportunities as well as crises and threats from foreign 
natural resource and energy acquisitions.

SEC. 5. REPEAL OF PROHIBITION ON TRANSFER OF ARTICLES ON THE UNITED 
              STATES MUNITIONS LIST TO THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS.

    (a) Sense of Congress on Cyprus.--It is the sense of Congress 
that--
            (1) allowing for the export, re-export or transfer of arms 
        subject to the United States Munitions List (part 121 of title 
        22, Code of Federal Regulations) to the Republic of Cyprus 
        would advance United States security interests in Europe by 
        helping to reduce the dependence of the Government of the 
        Republic of Cyprus on other countries, including countries that 
        pose challenges to United States interests around the world, 
        for defense-related materiel; and
            (2) it is in the interest of the United States--
                    (A) to continue to support United Nations-
                facilitated efforts toward a comprehensive solution to 
                the division of Cyprus; and
                    (B) for the Republic of Cyprus to join NATO's 
                Partnership for Peace program.
    (b) Modification of Prohibition.--Section 620C(e) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2373(e)) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``Any agreement'' and 
        inserting ``Except as provided in paragraph (3), any 
        agreement''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
            ``(3) The requirement under paragraph (1) shall not apply 
        to any sale or other provision of any defense article or 
        defense service to Cyprus if the end-user of such defense 
        article or defense service is the Government of the Republic of 
        Cyprus.''.
    (c) Exclusion of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus From 
Certain Related Regulations.--
            (1) In general.--Subject to subsection (d) and except as 
        provided in paragraph (2), beginning on the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall not apply a 
        policy of denial for exports, re-exports, or transfers of 
        defense articles and defense services destined for or 
        originating in the Republic of Cyprus if--
                    (A) the request is made by or on behalf of the 
                Government of the Republic of Cyprus; and
                    (B) the end-user of such defense articles or 
                defense services is the Government of the Republic of 
                Cyprus.
            (2) Exception.--This exclusion shall not apply to any 
        denial based upon credible human rights concerns.
    (d) Limitations on the Transfer of Articles on the United States 
Munitions List to the Republic of Cyprus.--
            (1) In general.--The policy of denial for exports, re-
        exports, or transfers of defense articles on the United States 
        Munitions List to the Republic of Cyprus shall remain in place 
        unless the President determines and certifies to the 
        appropriate congressional committees not less than annually 
        that--
                    (A) the Government of the Republic of Cyprus is 
                continuing to cooperate with the United States 
                Government in efforts to implement reforms on anti-
                money laundering regulations and financial regulatory 
                oversight; and
                    (B) the Government of the Republic of Cyprus has 
                made and is continuing to take the steps necessary to 
                deny Russian military vessels access to ports for 
                refueling and servicing.
            (2) Waiver.--The President may waive the limitations 
        contained in this subsection for one fiscal year if the 
        President determines that it is essential to the national 
        security interests of the United States to do so.
            (3) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this 
        section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
        means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
                Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
                Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
                Representatives.

SEC. 6. IMET COOPERATION WITH GREECE AND THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS.

    There is authorized to be appropriated $1,300,000 for fiscal year 
2020, $1,500,000 for fiscal year 2021, and $1,800,000 for fiscal year 
2022 for International Military Education and Training (IMET) 
assistance for Greece and $200,000 for fiscal year 2020, $500,000 for 
fiscal year 2021, and $750,000 for fiscal year 2022 for such assistance 
for the Republic of Cyprus. The assistance shall be made available for 
the following purposes:
            (1) Training of future leaders.
            (2) Fostering a better understanding of the United States.
            (3) Establishing a rapport between the United States 
        military and the country's military to build alliances for the 
        future.
            (4) Enhancement of interoperability and capabilities for 
        joint operations.
            (5) Focusing on professional military education.
            (6) Enabling countries to use their national funds to 
        receive a reduced cost for other Department of Defense 
        education and training.

SEC. 7. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING.

    (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated for fiscal year 2020 $3,000,000 for Foreign Military 
Financing (FMF) assistance for Greece to assist the country in meeting 
its commitment as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) to dedicate 20 percent of its defense budget to enhance research 
and development.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that Greece 
should receive robust support under the European Recapitalization 
Incentive Program implemented by the Department of Defense.

SEC. 8. LIMITATION ON TRANSFER OF F-35 AIRCRAFT TO TURKEY.

    (a) In General.--Except as provided under subsection (b), no funds 
may be obligated or expended--
            (1) to transfer, facilitate the transfer, or authorize the 
        transfer of an F-35 aircraft to the Republic of Turkey;
            (2) to transfer intellectual property or technical data 
        necessary for or related to any maintenance or support of the 
        F-35 aircraft; or
            (3) to construct a storage facility for, or otherwise 
        facilitate the storage in Turkey of, an F-35 aircraft 
        transferred to Turkey.
    (b) Exception.--The President may waive the limitation under 
subsection (a) upon a written certification to Congress that the 
Government of Turkey does not plan or intend to accept delivery of the 
S-400 air defense system.
    (c) Transfer Defined.--In this section, the term ``transfer'' 
includes the physical relocation outside of the continental United 
States.
    (d) Applicability.--The limitation under subsection (a) does not 
apply to F-35 aircraft operated by the United States Armed Forces.

SEC. 9. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PURCHASE BY TURKEY OF S-400 AIR DEFENSE 
              SYSTEM.

    It is the sense of Congress that, if the Government of Turkey 
purchases the S-400 air defense system from the Russian Federation--
            (1) such a purchase would constitute a significant 
        transaction within the meaning of section 231(a) of the 
        Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 
        (22 U.S.C. 9525(a));
            (2) such a purchase would endanger the integrity and 
        interoperability of the NATO alliance;
            (3) such a purchase would adversely affect ongoing 
        operations of the United States Armed Forces, including 
        coalition operations in which the United States Armed Forces 
        participate;
            (4) such a purchase would result in a significant impact to 
        defense cooperation between the United States and Turkey;
            (5) such a purchase would significantly increase the risk 
        of compromising United States defense systems and operational 
        capabilities; and
            (6) the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia 
        Act of 2017 mandates the imposition of sanctions under section 
        235 of that Act (22 U.S.C. 9529) with respect to any individual 
        or entity determined to have engaged in such a significant 
        transaction.

SEC. 10. STRATEGY ON UNITED STATES SECURITY AND ENERGY COOPERATION IN 
              THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a strategy on enhanced security 
and energy cooperation with countries in the Eastern Mediterranean 
region, including Israel, the Republic of Cyprus, and Greece.
    (b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
include the following elements:
            (1) A description of United States participation in and 
        support for the Eastern Mediterranean Natural Gas Forum.
            (2) An evaluation of all possible delivery mechanisms into 
        Europe for natural gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean 
        region.
            (3) An evaluation of efforts to protect energy exploration 
        infrastructure in the region, including infrastructure owned or 
        operated by United States companies.
            (4) An assessment of the capacity of the Republic of Cyprus 
        to host an Energy Crisis Center in the region which could 
        provide basing facilities in support of search and rescue 
        efforts in the event of an accident.
            (5) An assessment of the timing of potential natural gas 
        delivery in the region as well as an assessment of the ultimate 
        destination countries for the natural gas delivery from the 
        region.
            (6) A plan to work with United States businesses seeking to 
        invest in Eastern Mediterranean energy exploration, 
        development, and cooperation.
    (c) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

SEC. 11. REPORT ON RUSSIAN FEDERATION MALIGN INFLUENCE IN THE EASTERN 
              MEDITERRANEAN.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report on Russian Federation 
malign influence in the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, and Israel since 
January 1, 2017.
    (b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
include the following elements:
            (1) An assessment of security, political, and energy goals 
        of the Russian Federation in the Eastern Mediterranean.
            (2) A description of energy projects of the Government of 
        the Russian Federation in the Eastern Mediterranean.
            (3) A listing of Russian national ownership of media 
        outlets in these countries, including the name of the media 
        outlet, approximate viewership, and assessment of whether the 
        outlet promotes pro-Kremlin views.
            (4) An assessment of military engagement by the Government 
        of the Russian Federation in the security sector, including 
        engagement by military equipment and personnel contractors.
            (5) An assessment of efforts supported by the Government of 
        the Russian Federation to influence elections in the three 
        countries, through the use of cyber attacks, social media 
        campaigns, or other malign influence techniques.
            (6) An assessment of efforts by the Government of the 
        Russian Federation to intimidate and influence the decision by 
        His All Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, leader of 
        300,000,000 Orthodox Christians worldwide, to grant autocephaly 
        to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.
    (c) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

SEC. 12. REPORT ON INTERFERENCE BY OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE EXCLUSIVE 
              ECONOMIC ZONE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report listing incidents since 
January 1, 2017, determined by the Secretary of State to interfere in 
efforts by the Republic of Cyprus to explore and exploit natural 
resources in its Exclusive Economic Zone.
    (b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

SEC. 13. REPORT ON INTERFERENCE BY OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE AIRSPACE OF 
              GREECE.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report listing incidents since January 1, 2017, determined 
by the Secretary of State to be violations of the airspace of the 
sovereign territory of Greece by its neighbors.
    (b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

SEC. 14. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.

    In this Act, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
                                                       Calendar No. 142

116th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                                S. 1102

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

      To promote security and energy partnerships in the Eastern 
                 Mediterranean, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                             July 10, 2019

                       Reported with an amendment