[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 879 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>






116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
H. RES. 879

  Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that Congress 
  should continue to support the A-10 Thunderbolt II attack aircraft, 
        also known as the Warthog and A-10C or OA-10C, program.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 2, 2020

 Mrs. Kirkpatrick (for herself, Mr. Simpson, Mr. Gallego, Mr. Fulcher, 
   Mr. Ruppersberger, Mrs. Hartzler, and Mr. Mitchell) submitted the 
  following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Armed 
                                Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION


 
  Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that Congress 
  should continue to support the A-10 Thunderbolt II attack aircraft, 
        also known as the Warthog and A-10C or OA-10C, program.

Whereas the A-10 Thunderbolt II attack aircraft (hereinafter referred to as the 
        ``A-10'') has seen action in every major United States conflict since 
        the first production A-10 was delivered to Davis-Monthan Air Force Base 
        in October, 1975, and has received several upgrades for the 281 A-10s 
        remaining in service;
Whereas since Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the A-10 has become a preferred 
        close air support platform for ground troops;
Whereas the A-10 has been the backbone of the close air support mission for more 
        than 40 years and has proven to be a highly accurate and durable 
        weapons-delivery platform that can be used against all ground targets;
Whereas the A-10 supports close air support with a variety of forward-firing, 
        free-fall, and precision-guided munitions, and performs combat search 
        and rescue, air interdiction, armed reconnaissance, suppression of enemy 
        air defenses, special operations forces support, and countersea 
        operations in either low- or high-threat environments, day or night;
Whereas the A-10 provides the Air Force an extensive ability to survey the 
        battlefield and then fix, engage, target, and destroy a wide range of 
        both mobile and fixed targets, including tanks and other armored 
        vehicles in quantity, as an arsenal aircraft;
Whereas the A-10 gets pilots back to base despite heavy damage from ground fire;
Whereas the A-10 has the lowest rate of friendly fire incidents of any combat 
        fighter or bomber;
Whereas the close air support as provided by the A-10 has proven invaluable on 
        the battlefield, and it is better than any other fighter aircraft for 
        close air support as it is simple, effective, and has excellent 
        maneuverability at low air speeds and altitude;
Whereas the A-10 is the least expensive combat plane in the United States 
        arsenal to operate and buy;
Whereas while the A-10 flew only 30 percent of the United States Air Force's 
        total sorties during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, these aircraft 
        achieved more than half of the confirmed Iraqi equipment losses and 
        fired 90 percent of the precision-guided Maverick missiles;
Whereas during Operation Allied Force in 1999, A-10s destroyed more field-
        deployed Serbian weaponry than any other allied weapon system, and 
        combat search and rescue support from the A-10 was 100 percent 
        effective, successfully rescuing one F-117 pilot and one F-16CG pilot;
Whereas during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 and Operation Enduring Freedom in 
        2001, the A-10 flew 32 percent of the combat sorties in both theaters, 
        and from 2006 to late 2013, flew 19 percent of close air operations in 
        Iraq and Afghanistan;
Whereas the A-10 is an effective close air support platform to counter violent 
        extremist organizations such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, 
        having flown 11 percent of Air Force sorties against that organization;
Whereas the demands for close air support in Iraq and Afghanistan keep the A-10 
        a relevant platform that requires upgrades;
Whereas if the A-10 is removed from service, certain gaps in responsive close 
        air support, forward air controller, air interdiction, strike control 
        and reconnaissance, and combat search and rescue support could widen;
Whereas the A-10 can be serviced and operated with high sortie rates from 
        austere bases with limited facilities near battle areas, including 
        unprepared dirt, grass, and narrow road runways, and from airfields that 
        are too short or rough to handle fast jets;
Whereas to continue providing unmatched airpower, gain and maintain air 
        superiority, and extend global reach, global power is essential to 
        preserving global security and stability;
Whereas the A-10 program will support the Air Force, including the Air National 
        Guard and Air Force Reserve;
Whereas the A-10 is currently flying in operational combat squadrons at Gowen 
        Field Air National Guard Base, Idaho, Selfridge Air National Guard Base, 
        Michigan, Warfield Air National Guard Base, Maryland, Fort Wayne Air 
        National Guard Station, Indiana, Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, 
        Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, 
        Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, and Osan 
        Air Base, South Korea; and
Whereas the 355th Wing at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, with the inventory of 84 
        A-10s, is responsible for training and deploying A-10 pilots, whose 
        primary role is to support troops on the ground: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That the House of Representatives--
            (1) finds that the continued support for the A-10 
        Thunderbolt II program is imperative to national security; and
            (2) affirms that Congress should continue to support the A-
        10 Thunderbolt II program in future fiscal years because the 
        United States cannot afford to risk its security or the 
        security of its allies by allowing that program to fall short 
        of its mission.
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