[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 914 Introduced in House (IH)]

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116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 914

To limit the use of funds to reduce the total number of members of the 
Armed Forces serving on active duty who are deployed to Syria, and for 
                            other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 30, 2019

 Mr. Malinowski (for himself, Mr. Taylor, Mr. Panetta, Mr. Gallagher, 
  Mr. Kim, Ms. Stefanik, Mr. Rose of New York, and Mr. Hurd of Texas) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
                             Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
To limit the use of funds to reduce the total number of members of the 
Armed Forces serving on active duty who are deployed to Syria, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Responsible Withdrawal from Syria 
Act''.

SEC. 2. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS TO REDUCE THE TOTAL NUMBER OF 
              MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES SERVING ON ACTIVE DUTY WHO 
              ARE DEPLOYED TO SYRIA.

    (a) Limitation.--None of the funds made available to the Department 
of Defense for fiscal year 2019 may be used to reduce the total number 
of members of the United States Armed Forces serving on active duty who 
are deployed to Syria below 1,500, unless and until the Secretary of 
Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Director of National 
Intelligence submit to the relevant congressional committees a report 
that addresses the following:
            (1) The current strength and regenerative capacity of the 
        Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), including an assessment 
        of how many fighters ISIS fields in Syria and Iraq, the threat 
        it continues to pose to the United States and its allies, its 
        likely reaction to the withdrawal of United States and 
        coalition forces, and of the operational risks involved with 
        conducting counter-ISIS operations following a withdrawal.
            (2) The Administration's military and political strategy 
        for meeting any remaining threat from ISIS.
            (3) The viability of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to 
        remain a viable fighting force in the absence of a United 
        States military presence in Syria.
            (4) Whether the Euphrates will remain the aerial and land 
        deconfliction line between United States-backed forces and 
        Assad regime forces and their allies, and if so, how will the 
        Administration ensure it will be respected.
            (5) Actions the Administration plans to take to ensure the 
        safety of Syrian nationals who took part in or provided support 
        to the coalition to defeat ISIS, including members of the SDF, 
        and the form and amount of assistance the Administration plans 
        to provide to the SDF following a withdrawal of United States 
        and coalition forces.
            (6) The likelihood that the Assad regime and its allies, 
        including Hezbollah and Iranian forces, will retake areas where 
        United States personnel and Syrian allies have operated or 
        created demilitarized zones, and the actions the Administration 
        plans to take to ensure the safety, and prevent the exodus, of 
        civilians living in those areas.
            (7) The actions the Administration plans to take to ensure 
        the safety of civilians living in refugee camps that may fall 
        under the control of the Assad regime following withdrawal of 
        United States forces, including Rubkan Camp, and to ensure 
        access by humanitarian organizations to areas being vacated by 
        United States forces and Syrian allies.
            (8) The expected windfall in oil revenue the Assad regime 
        is likely to gain if the regime or its allies retake areas 
        currently held by United States-allied groups.
            (9) The impact a withdrawal from Syria would have on 
        Iranian power and influence in the Middle East, including an 
        assessment of the current status of Iranian backed forces in 
        Syria, whether withdrawal is likely to make easier Iranian 
        advanced weapon transfers to Syria and Lebanon, the impact on 
        the security of Israel, the prospect of large scale conflict 
        between Israel and Iran in Syria and Lebanon, and a strategy to 
        counter any such threats.
            (10) The impact any United States withdrawal from Syria 
        would have on Russian power and influence in the Middle East.
            (11) The impact any United States withdrawal from Syria 
        would have on diplomatic efforts to end the Syrian conflict, 
        and on United States influence on those efforts, including a 
        statement of the Administration's current diplomatic objectives 
        in that process.
            (12) The commitments, if any, Turkey has extended with 
        respect to fighting ISIS and refraining from military action 
        against the Kurds following a withdrawal of United States 
        forces.
            (13) The commitments, if any, Saudi Arabia or any coalition 
        partners have made to assist in Syria's reconstruction, 
        including any plans to ensure that funding of these efforts are 
        transparent and accountable.
            (14) Any efforts the Administration plans to undertake to 
        support legitimate, effective and democratic local governance 
        in areas from which United States and coalition forces are 
        withdrawing, to diminish the likelihood that extremist forces 
        will return.
            (15) Any consultations that have taken place with coalition 
        allies in Operation Inherent Resolve about withdrawal of forces 
        from Syria, including how the governments of Israel, Jordan, 
        Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Russia, Iran, the 
        United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Turkey and the Kurdistan 
        Regional Government are likely to respond to any withdrawal.
            (16) The assurances, if any, that religious and ethnic 
        minority communities will be secure from ISIS threats.
    (b) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted 
in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
    (c) Waiver.--The Secretary of Defense may waive the limitation 
under subsection (a) if, upon advice of the relevant military 
commanders, the Secretary determines that the waiver is necessary due 
to an imminent and extraordinary threat to members of the United States 
Armed Forces in Syria.
    (d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act may be construed to 
obstruct or prevent the normal rotation of United States Armed Forces 
into and out of Syria.
    (e) Relevant Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``relevant congressional committees'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
        Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        Armed Services of the Senate.
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