[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 914 Introduced in House (IH)]
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116th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 914
To limit the use of funds to reduce the total number of members of the
Armed Forces serving on active duty who are deployed to Syria, and for
other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
January 30, 2019
Mr. Malinowski (for himself, Mr. Taylor, Mr. Panetta, Mr. Gallagher,
Mr. Kim, Ms. Stefanik, Mr. Rose of New York, and Mr. Hurd of Texas)
introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on
Armed Services
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To limit the use of funds to reduce the total number of members of the
Armed Forces serving on active duty who are deployed to Syria, and for
other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Responsible Withdrawal from Syria
Act''.
SEC. 2. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS TO REDUCE THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES SERVING ON ACTIVE DUTY WHO
ARE DEPLOYED TO SYRIA.
(a) Limitation.--None of the funds made available to the Department
of Defense for fiscal year 2019 may be used to reduce the total number
of members of the United States Armed Forces serving on active duty who
are deployed to Syria below 1,500, unless and until the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Director of National
Intelligence submit to the relevant congressional committees a report
that addresses the following:
(1) The current strength and regenerative capacity of the
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), including an assessment
of how many fighters ISIS fields in Syria and Iraq, the threat
it continues to pose to the United States and its allies, its
likely reaction to the withdrawal of United States and
coalition forces, and of the operational risks involved with
conducting counter-ISIS operations following a withdrawal.
(2) The Administration's military and political strategy
for meeting any remaining threat from ISIS.
(3) The viability of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to
remain a viable fighting force in the absence of a United
States military presence in Syria.
(4) Whether the Euphrates will remain the aerial and land
deconfliction line between United States-backed forces and
Assad regime forces and their allies, and if so, how will the
Administration ensure it will be respected.
(5) Actions the Administration plans to take to ensure the
safety of Syrian nationals who took part in or provided support
to the coalition to defeat ISIS, including members of the SDF,
and the form and amount of assistance the Administration plans
to provide to the SDF following a withdrawal of United States
and coalition forces.
(6) The likelihood that the Assad regime and its allies,
including Hezbollah and Iranian forces, will retake areas where
United States personnel and Syrian allies have operated or
created demilitarized zones, and the actions the Administration
plans to take to ensure the safety, and prevent the exodus, of
civilians living in those areas.
(7) The actions the Administration plans to take to ensure
the safety of civilians living in refugee camps that may fall
under the control of the Assad regime following withdrawal of
United States forces, including Rubkan Camp, and to ensure
access by humanitarian organizations to areas being vacated by
United States forces and Syrian allies.
(8) The expected windfall in oil revenue the Assad regime
is likely to gain if the regime or its allies retake areas
currently held by United States-allied groups.
(9) The impact a withdrawal from Syria would have on
Iranian power and influence in the Middle East, including an
assessment of the current status of Iranian backed forces in
Syria, whether withdrawal is likely to make easier Iranian
advanced weapon transfers to Syria and Lebanon, the impact on
the security of Israel, the prospect of large scale conflict
between Israel and Iran in Syria and Lebanon, and a strategy to
counter any such threats.
(10) The impact any United States withdrawal from Syria
would have on Russian power and influence in the Middle East.
(11) The impact any United States withdrawal from Syria
would have on diplomatic efforts to end the Syrian conflict,
and on United States influence on those efforts, including a
statement of the Administration's current diplomatic objectives
in that process.
(12) The commitments, if any, Turkey has extended with
respect to fighting ISIS and refraining from military action
against the Kurds following a withdrawal of United States
forces.
(13) The commitments, if any, Saudi Arabia or any coalition
partners have made to assist in Syria's reconstruction,
including any plans to ensure that funding of these efforts are
transparent and accountable.
(14) Any efforts the Administration plans to undertake to
support legitimate, effective and democratic local governance
in areas from which United States and coalition forces are
withdrawing, to diminish the likelihood that extremist forces
will return.
(15) Any consultations that have taken place with coalition
allies in Operation Inherent Resolve about withdrawal of forces
from Syria, including how the governments of Israel, Jordan,
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Russia, Iran, the
United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Turkey and the Kurdistan
Regional Government are likely to respond to any withdrawal.
(16) The assurances, if any, that religious and ethnic
minority communities will be secure from ISIS threats.
(b) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted
in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
(c) Waiver.--The Secretary of Defense may waive the limitation
under subsection (a) if, upon advice of the relevant military
commanders, the Secretary determines that the waiver is necessary due
to an imminent and extraordinary threat to members of the United States
Armed Forces in Syria.
(d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act may be construed to
obstruct or prevent the normal rotation of United States Armed Forces
into and out of Syria.
(e) Relevant Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``relevant congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Armed Services of the Senate.
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