[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 8495 Introduced in House (IH)]

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116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 8495

    To prohibit United States persons from engaging in transactions 
                  relating to Russian sovereign debt.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            October 1, 2020

 Mr. Sherman (for himself, Ms. Waters, Mrs. Carolyn B. Maloney of New 
York, Mr. Green of Texas, and Mr. San Nicolas) introduced the following 
bill; which was referred to the Committee on Financial Services, and in 
addition to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Intelligence (Permanent 
 Select), and Rules, for a period to be subsequently determined by the 
  Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
           within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
    To prohibit United States persons from engaging in transactions 
                  relating to Russian sovereign debt.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Safeguarding Elections by Countering 
Unchallenged Russian Efforts Act'' or ``SECURE Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) The intelligence community's assessment of ``Russia's 
        Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016 US Presidential 
        Election'', produced by the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
        Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the National Security 
        Agency and published by the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence on January 6, 2017, found that the following:
                    (A) Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an 
                influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the United States 
                presidential election.
                    (B) Russian operations to influence the 2016 United 
                States presidential election demonstrated a significant 
                escalation in directness, level of activity, and scope 
                of effort compared to previous operations aimed at 
                undermining United States democratic institutions and 
                order.
                    (C) Russia will apply lessons learned from its 
                Putin-ordered campaign aimed at the United States 
                presidential election to future influence efforts 
                worldwide, including against the United States and its 
                allies and their election processes.
            (2) In July 2018, Director of the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation Christopher Wray publicly stated, ``My view has 
        not changed, which is that Russia attempted to interfere with 
        the last election and that it continues to engage in malign 
        influence operations to this day.'' Director Wray also stated 
        that Russia's malign influence operations represent ``a threat 
        that we need to take extremely seriously and respond to with 
        fierce determination and focus''.
            (3) In August 2018, Director of National Intelligence Dan 
        Coates publicly stated that ``We continue to see a pervasive 
        messaging campaign by Russia to try to weaken and divide the 
        United States.''. In December 2018, Director Coates submitted 
        the report of the intelligence community on foreign 
        interference in the 2018 midterm elections, which found that 
        Russia continued to conduct influence activities and messaging 
        campaigns targeted at the United States to promote its 
        strategic interests.
            (4) Special Counsel Robert Mueller's report, released in 
        April 2019, concluded that, ``The Russian government interfered 
        in the 2016 presidential election in a sweeping and systemic 
        fashion.'' On July 24, 2019, during congressional testimony, 
        Mueller noted that Russia's malign efforts to interfere in 
        United States elections were continuing ``as we sit here''.
            (5) On August 7, 2020, in an ``Election Threat Update for 
        the American Public'', National Counterintelligence and 
        Security Center Director William Evanina included Russia among 
        foreign states of primary concern that continue to use covert 
        and overt influence measures in its ``attempts to sway U.S. 
        voters' preferences and perspectives, shift U.S. policies, 
        increase discord in the United States, and undermine the 
        American people's confidence in our democratic process''.
            (6) On September 10, 2020, the Department of the Treasury 
        issued sanctions targeting a Russian agent and other Russia-
        linked individuals for interference in United States elections, 
        including efforts to influence the 2020 United States 
        presidential election.
            (7) On September 17, 2020, during congressional testimony, 
        FBI Director Wray stated that the intelligence community has 
        observed ``very active, very active, efforts by the Russians to 
        influence our election in 2020'', and that this has been done 
        ``to primarily to denigrate Vice President Biden in what the 
        Russians see as a kind of an anti-Russian establishment''.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN UNITED STATES 
              ELECTIONS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Government of Russia has continued to interfere in 
        the 2020 United States presidential election;
            (2) to date the United States has not subjected the 
        Government of Russia to meaningful consequences for its 
        interference in United States elections; and
            (3) the imposition of significant economic sanctions 
        against the Government of Russia is appropriate to deter 
        continued Russian interference in United States elections.

SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON UNITED STATES PERSONS FROM ENGAGING IN 
              TRANSACTIONS RELATING TO RUSSIAN SOVEREIGN DEBT.

    (a) Prohibition.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the President shall issue 
        regulations to prohibit United States persons from engaging in 
        transactions with, providing financing for, or in any other way 
        dealing in Russian sovereign debt that is issued on or after 
        the date that is 60 days after such date of enactment.
            (2) Russian sovereign debt defined.--In this subsection, 
        the term ``Russian sovereign debt'' means--
                    (A) bonds issued by the Russian Central Bank, the 
                Russian National Wealth Fund, the Russian Federal 
                Treasury, or agents or affiliates of any such 
                institution, regardless of the currency in which they 
                are denominated and with a maturity of more than 14 
                days;
                    (B) foreign exchange swap agreements with the 
                Russian Central Bank, the Russian National Wealth Fund, 
                or the Russian Federal Treasury, regardless of the 
                currency in which they are denominated and with a 
                duration of more than 14 days; and
                    (C) any other financial instrument, the maturity or 
                duration of which is more than 14 days, that the 
                President determines represents the sovereign debt of 
                Russia.
            (3) Requirement to publish guidance.--The President shall 
        publish guidance on the implementation of the regulations 
        issued pursuant to paragraph (1) concurrently with the 
        publication of such regulations.
    (b) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the regularly 
        scheduled general election for Federal office in 2022, and each 
        regularly scheduled general election for Federal office 
        thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
        consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation, the Director of the National Security Agency, 
        and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, shall 
        submit to the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary 
        of the Treasury, and the appropriate congressional committees 
        and leadership a report on whether there is or is not 
        significant evidence available for the Director to determine 
        that the Government of Russia, or any person acting as an agent 
        of or on behalf of that government, knowingly engaged in 
        interference in such general election or any other election for 
        Federal office held since the most recent prior regularly 
        scheduled general election for Federal office, including an 
        identification of any officials of that government, or persons 
        acting as agents of or on behalf of that government, that 
        knowingly engaged in interference in any such election.
            (2) Additional report.--If the Director of Intelligence--
                    (A) determines in a report submitted under 
                paragraph (1) that there is not significant evidence 
                available for the Director to determine that the 
                Government of Russia, or any person acting as an agent 
                of or on behalf of that government, knowingly engaged 
                in interference in any election described in paragraph 
                (1); and
                    (B) subsequently determines that there is 
                significant evidence available for the Director to make 
                such a determination,
        the Director shall submit to the President, the Secretary of 
        State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the appropriate 
        congressional committees and leadership a report on such 
        subsequent determination not later than 30 days after making 
        that determination.
            (3) Form.--Each report required by this subsection shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.
    (c) Suspension Authority.--
            (1) In general.--The President may, for the period of time 
        described in paragraph (3), suspend the application of any 
        prohibition on United States persons from engaging in 
        transactions described in subsection (a) if, not later than 30 
        days after the date on which a report described in subsection 
        (b) is submitted to the officials described in subsection (b) 
        and the appropriate congressional committees and leadership 
        with respect to a regularly scheduled general election for 
        Federal office, the President--
                    (A) determines that there is not significant 
                evidence available for the President to determine that 
                the Government of Russia, or any person acting as an 
                agent of or on behalf of that government, knowingly 
                engaged in interference in such general election or any 
                other election for Federal office held since the most 
                recent prior regularly scheduled general election for 
                Federal office; and
                    (B) submits to the appropriate congressional 
                committees and leadership a report that contains the 
                determination of the President under subparagraph (A) 
                and a justification for the determination.
            (2) Clarification regarding suspension.--If--
                    (A) the President suspends the application of any 
                prohibition on United States persons from engaging in 
                transactions described in subsection (a);
                    (B) such United States persons engage in 
                transactions described in subsection (a) involving 
                Russian sovereign debt that is issued during the period 
                of time in which the suspension is in effect; and
                    (C) such United States persons are subject to the 
                application of any prohibition on United States persons 
                from engaging in transactions described in subsection 
                (a) after such period of time in which the suspension 
                is in effect,
        such United States persons may not be subject to any 
        prohibition on United States persons from engaging in 
        transactions described in subsection (a) with respect to 
        engaging in transactions involving Russian sovereign debt 
        described in subparagraph (B).
            (3) Time period described.--The period of time described in 
        this paragraph is the period--
                    (A) beginning after the 60-day period described in 
                paragraph (1)(B); and
                    (B) ending on or before the date that is 60 days 
                after the date of the next regularly scheduled general 
                election for Federal office.
    (d) Waiver Authority.--The President may waive the application of 
any prohibition on United States persons from engaging in transactions 
described in subsection (a) if--
            (1) the President--
                    (A) determines that the waiver is in the vital 
                national security interests of the United States; and
                    (B) submits to the appropriate congressional 
                committees and leadership a report that contains the 
                determination of the President under subparagraph (A); 
                and
            (2) in the case of such waiver authority exercised on or 
        before February 1, 2021, a joint resolution of approval with 
        respect to such determination is enacted into law pursuant to 
        subsection (e).
    (e) Expedited Procedures for Joint Resolution of Approval.--
            (1) Definition.--The term ``joint resolution of approval'' 
        means only a joint resolution of either House of Congress, the 
        matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: 
        ``That Congress approves the determination of the President 
        under subparagraph (A) of section 4(d)(1)(A) of the Election 
        Protection and Russian Sanctions Act on __.'', with the blank 
        space being filled with the appropriate date.
            (2) Expedited procedures.--A joint resolution of approval 
        introduced in either House of Congress shall be considered in 
        accordance with the procedures of section 601(b) of the 
        International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act 
        of 1976. If such a joint resolution should be vetoed by the 
        President, the time for debate in consideration of the veto 
        message on such measure shall be limited to twenty hours in the 
        Senate and in the House shall be determined in accordance with 
        the Rules of the House.
            (3) Rules of house of representatives and senate.--This 
        subsection is enacted by Congress--
                    (A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the 
                Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, and 
                as such it is deemed a part of the rules of each House, 
                respectively, but applicable only with respect to the 
                procedure to be followed in that House in the case of a 
                joint resolution, and it supersedes other rules only to 
                the extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and
                    (B) with full recognition of the constitutional 
                right of either House to change the rules (so far as 
                relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, 
                in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the 
                case of any other rule of that House.
    (f) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
                Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
                Committee on Finance, the Select Committee on 
                Intelligence, and the Committee on Rules and 
                Administration of the Senate; and
                    (B) the Committee on Financial Services, the 
                Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Ways and 
                Means, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                and the Committee on House Administration of the House 
                of Representatives.
            (2) Appropriate congressional committees and leadership.--
        The term ``appropriate congressional committees and 
        leadership'' means--
                    (A) the appropriate congressional committees;
                    (B) the majority leader and minority leader of the 
                Senate; and
                    (C) the Speaker, the majority leader, and the 
                minority leader of the House of Representatives.
            (3) Elections for federal office.--The term ``elections for 
        Federal office'' has the meaning given such term in the Federal 
        Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101 et seq.), except 
        that such term does not include a special election.
            (4) Interference in elections for federal office.--The term 
        ``interference'', with respect to an election for Federal 
        office:
                    (A) Means any of the following actions of the 
                government of a foreign country, or any person acting 
                as an agent of or on behalf of such a government, 
                undertaken with the intent to influence the election:
                            (i) Obtaining unauthorized access to 
                        election and campaign infrastructure or related 
                        systems or data and releasing such data or 
                        modifying such infrastructure, systems, or 
                        data.
                            (ii) Blocking or degrading otherwise 
                        legitimate and authorized access to election 
                        and campaign infrastructure or related systems 
                        or data.
                            (iii) Contributions or expenditures for 
                        advertising, including on the internet.
                            (iv) Using social or traditional media to 
                        spread significant amounts of false information 
                        to individuals in the United States.
                    (B) Does not include communications clearly 
                attributable to news and media outlets which are 
                publicly and explicitly either controlled or in large 
                part funded by the government of a foreign country.
            (5) Knowingly.--The term ``knowingly'', with respect to 
        conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has 
        actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the 
        circumstance, or the result.
            (6) Person.--The term ``person'' means an individual or 
        entity.
            (7) United states person.--The term ``United States 
        person'' means--
                    (A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully 
                admitted for permanent residence to the United States; 
                or
                    (B) an entity organized under the laws of the 
                United States or of any jurisdiction within the United 
                States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.
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