

116TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

# H. R. 7484

To direct the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress a report on efforts by the People’s Republic of China to exploit the COVID–19 pandemic to advance the national security and foreign policy interests of China.

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## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 2, 2020

Ms. KENDRA S. HORN of Oklahoma (for herself, Mrs. MURPHY of Florida, Mr. ROSE of New York, Mr. O’HALLERAN, Mr. CASE, Mr. MCADAMS, Mr. CORREA, Mr. GOLDEN, Mr. BRINDISI, Mr. CRIST, and Mr. CUNNINGHAM) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

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## A BILL

To direct the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress a report on efforts by the People’s Republic of China to exploit the COVID–19 pandemic to advance the national security and foreign policy interests of China.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Preventing China from  
5 Exploiting COVID–19 Act”.

1 **SEC. 2. REPORT ON EFFORTS BY CHINA TO EXPLOIT**  
2 **COVID-19 PANDEMIC TO ADVANCE NATIONAL**  
3 **SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS**  
4 **OF CHINA.**

5 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date  
6 of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National In-  
7 telligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the  
8 Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Se-  
9 curity, shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-  
10 mittees, and make publicly available on the internet  
11 website of the Director, a report on efforts by the People’s  
12 Republic of China to exploit the COVID-19 pandemic to  
13 advance the national security and foreign policy interests  
14 of China in ways that undermine the interests of the  
15 United States, allies and partners of the United States,  
16 and the rules-based international order.

17 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report under subsection (a)  
18 shall include the following:

19 (1) An assessment of—

20 (A) the tactics and techniques used by  
21 China to obstruct or retaliate against countries,  
22 such as Australia, that have sought a full and  
23 fair inquiry into the role of China in the emer-  
24 gence and spread of COVID-19; and

25 (B) the motivations of China for under-  
26 taking such obstruction or retaliation.

1           (2) A description of activities undertaken by  
2           China, including with respect to cyber-theft, in-  
3           tended to licitly or illicitly acquire information and  
4           intellectual property in the possession of non-Chi-  
5           nese governments and businesses relating to  
6           COVID–19 testing, treatment, and vaccines.

7           (3) An assessment of whether the activities de-  
8           scribed under paragraph (2) violate the commitment  
9           of China under the cybersecurity agreement entered  
10          into by China and the United States in 2015 to re-  
11          frain from conducting or supporting cyber-enabled  
12          economic espionage.

13          (4) An assessment of the manner by which  
14          China seeks to advance the foreign policy interests  
15          of China by providing economic aid or medical  
16          equipment to countries adversely affected by  
17          COVID–19 and a discussion of the degree to which  
18          such aid renders recipient countries more likely to  
19          adopt positions favorable to the interests of China or  
20          detrimental to the interests of the United States.

21          (5) An assessment of—

22                  (A) the effects of the pledged economic  
23                  support by China to international organizations,  
24                  such as the World Health Organization; and

1           (B) whether, and in what manner, China  
2           uses such support to induce such organizations  
3           to take actions favorable to the interests of  
4           China or detrimental to the interests of the  
5           United States.

6           (6) An identification of the different ways in  
7           which China is using, or may be planning to use, the  
8           global disruption and distraction associated with the  
9           COVID–19 pandemic as an opportunity to more ag-  
10          gressively pursue longstanding domestic and foreign  
11          policy objectives, including the objectives of China  
12          with respect to Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xinjiang, and  
13          territorial disputes.

14          (7) An assessment of—

15               (A) the means and methods by which  
16               China disseminates misinformation, whether  
17               overtly or covertly, about COVID–19, including  
18               on United States-based social media platforms  
19               or through other English language-based media;  
20               and

21               (B) the motivations of China for dissemi-  
22               nating such misinformation and a description of  
23               how the departments and agencies of the Fed-  
24               eral Government are collaborating to track,  
25               analyze, and respond to such dissemination.

1 (8) An overarching assessment of—

2 (A) how the activities of China described in  
3 this subsection collectively further the national  
4 interests of China; and

5 (B) the extent to which such activities con-  
6 stitute a continuation of the longstanding prac-  
7 tices of China or are an evolution of the foreign  
8 policy behavior of China.

9 (c) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) shall be  
10 submitted in unclassified form without any designation re-  
11 lating to dissemination control, but the report submitted  
12 to the appropriate congressional committees may include  
13 a classified annex.

14 (d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES  
15 DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-  
16 gressional committees” means the following:

17 (1) the Committee on Appropriations, the Com-  
18 mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on For-  
19 eign Affairs, the Committee on Homeland Security,  
20 and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence  
21 of the House of Representatives; and

22 (6) the Committee on Appropriations, the Com-  
23 mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on For-  
24 eign Relations, the Committee on Homeland Secu-

1 rity and Governmental Affairs, and the Select Com-  
2 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate.

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