[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7260 Introduced in House (IH)]

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116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 7260

To reduce and eliminate threats posed by nuclear weapons to the United 
                    States, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 18, 2020

 Mr. McGovern (for himself, Ms. Titus, and Mr. Blumenauer) introduced 
   the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed 
 Services, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a 
 period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for 
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the 
                          committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
To reduce and eliminate threats posed by nuclear weapons to the United 
                    States, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Hastening Arms Limitations Talks Act 
of 2020'' or the ``HALT Act of 2020''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The use of nuclear weapons poses an existential threat 
        to humanity, a fact that led President Ronald Reagan and Soviet 
        Premier Mikhail Gorbachev to declare in a joint statement in 
        1987 that a ``nuclear war cannot be won and must never be 
        fought''.
            (2) On June 12, 1982, an estimated 1,000,000 people 
        attended the largest peace rally in United States history, in 
        support of a movement to freeze and reverse the nuclear arms 
        race, a movement that helped to create the political will 
        necessary for the negotiation of several bilateral arms control 
        treaties between the United States and former Soviet Union, and 
        then the Russian Federation. Those treaties contributed to 
        strategic stability through mutual and verifiable reciprocal 
        nuclear weapons reductions.
            (3) Since the advent of nuclear weapons in 1945, millions 
        of people around the world have stood up to demand meaningful, 
        immediate international action to halt, reduce, and eliminate 
        the threats posed by nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons testing, 
        and nuclear war, to humankind and the planet.
            (4) In 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
        Weapons done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (21 
        UST 483) (commonly referred to as the ``Nuclear Non-
        Proliferation Treaty'' or the ``NPT''), entered into force, 
        which includes a binding obligation on the 5 nuclear-weapon 
        states (commonly referred to as the ``P5''), among other 
        things, ``to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective 
        measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race . . 
        . and to nuclear disarmament''.
            (5) Bipartisan United States global leadership has curbed 
        the growth in the number of countries possessing nuclear 
        weapons and has slowed overall vertical proliferation among 
        countries already possessing nuclear weapons, as is highlighted 
        by a more than 85-percent reduction in the United States 
        nuclear weapons stockpile from its Cold War height of 31,255 in 
        1967.
            (6) The United States testing of nuclear weapons is no 
        longer necessary as a result of the following major technical 
        developments since the Senate's consideration of the 
        Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (commonly referred to as 
        the ``CTBT'') in 1999:
                    (A) The verification architecture of the 
                Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Organization 
                (commonly referred to as the ``CTBTO'')--
                            (i) has made significant advancements, as 
                        seen through its network of 300 International 
                        Monitoring Stations and its International Data 
                        Centre, which together provide for the near 
                        instantaneous detection of nuclear explosives 
                        tests, including all 6 such tests conducted by 
                        North Korea between 2006 and 2017; and
                            (ii) is operational 24 hours a day, 7 days 
                        a week.
                    (B) Since the United States signed the CTBT, 
                confidence has grown in the science-based Stockpile 
                Stewardship and Management Plan of the Department of 
                Energy, which forms the basis of annual certifications 
                to the President regarding the continual safety, 
                security, and effectiveness of the United States 
                nuclear deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing, 
                leading former Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz to 
                remark in 2015 that ``lab directors today now state 
                that they certainly understand much more about how 
                nuclear weapons work than during the period of nuclear 
                testing''.
            (7) Despite the progress made to reduce the number and role 
        of, and risks posed by, nuclear weapons, and to halt the Cold 
        War-era nuclear arms race, tensions between countries that 
        possess nuclear weapons are on the rise, key nuclear risk 
        reduction treaties are under threat, significant stockpiles of 
        weapons-usable fissile material remain, and a qualitative 
        global nuclear arms race is now underway with each of the 
        countries that possess nuclear weapons spending tens of 
        billions of dollars each year to maintain and improve their 
        arsenals.
            (8) The United States and the Russian Federation are both 
        pursuing the development of destabilizing types of nuclear 
        weapons, including new lower-yield nuclear weapons that are 
        more usable, and the People's Republic of China, India, 
        Pakistan, and North Korea have each taken concerning steps to 
        diversify their more modest, but nonetheless very deadly, 
        nuclear arsenals.
            (9) Since January 2017, President Donald Trump has taken 
        the following actions, which have run counter to the objectives 
        of the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament 
        (commonly referred to as ``CEND'') initiative that his 
        administration launched in 2018:
                    (A) The release of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review 
                on February 5, 2018, which lowered the threshold for 
                nuclear weapons use and called for the development of 
                the following new nuclear weapons:
                            (i) A low-yield warhead on a submarine-
                        launched ballistic missile, which was deployed 
                        before the date of the enactment of this Act.
                            (ii) A sea-launched cruise missile, still 
                        under development on the date of the enactment 
                        of this Act.
                    (B) The unilateral United States withdrawal from 
                the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (commonly 
                referred to as the ``JCPOA'') announced on May 8, 2018, 
                which may lead to the complete collapse of an agreement 
                that had verifiably closed of each of Iran's pathways 
                to a nuclear weapon.
                    (C) The unilateral United States withdrawal, 
                completed on August 2, 2019, from the Treaty Between 
                the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
                Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their 
                Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed 
                at Washington December 8, 1987, and entered into force 
                June 1, 1988 (commonly referred to as the 
                ``Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty'' or the 
                ``INF Treaty''), in response to the material breach by 
                the Russian Federation of its obligations under that 
                Treaty, which has removed all legal constraints on the 
                testing, procurement, and deployment of ground-based 
                shorter-range and intermediate-range missiles, 
                increasing the risk of a missile arms race in the Euro-
                Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions.
                    (D) The unilateral United States withdrawal, 
                announced on May 22, 2020, from the Treaty on Open 
                Skies, done at Helsinki March 24, 1992, and entered 
                into force January 1, 2002 (commonly referred to as the 
                ``Open Skies Treaty''), which is likely to deny to 
                United States allies and partners a key confidence-
                building measure and one of the few remaining 
                operational diplomatic forums, through the Open Skies 
                Consultative Commission, to engage with the Russian 
                Federation.
            (10) During a May 15, 2020, National Security Council 
        meeting, one or more senior officials of the Trump 
        administration reportedly advocated that the United States 
        conduct its first nuclear explosives test since 1992, as part 
        of an effort to bring the Russian Federation and the People's 
        Republic of China into negotiations on a trilateral arms 
        control agreement.
            (11) A move by the United States to break its moratorium on 
        nuclear explosives testing would conflict with United Nations 
        Security Council Resolution 2310, led by the United States and 
        adopted in 2016, which states that any nuclear explosives test 
        would defeat the ``object and purpose'' of the CTBT and called 
        on all countries to maintain their respective moratoriums on 
        such tests.
            (12) In light of moves by the United States and other 
        countries to increase their reliance on nuclear weapons, the 
        21st century nuclear freeze movement would seek to halt the new 
        nuclear arms race by seeking conclusion of a comprehensive and 
        verifiable freeze on the testing, deployment, and production of 
        nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for such weapons.
            (13) The United States would benefit from conclusion of a 
        comprehensive nuclear arms agreement with each of the nuclear-
        weapon state parties to the NPT and potentially all countries 
        that possess nuclear weapons.
            (14) In 2013, the report on a nuclear weapons employment 
        strategy of the United States submitted under section 492 of 
        title 10, United States Code, determined that it is possible to 
        ensure the security of the United States and allies and 
        partners of the United States and maintain a strong and 
        credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a \1/
        3\ reduction in deployed nuclear weapons from the level 
        established in the Treaty between the United States of America 
        and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further 
        Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed 
        April 8, 2010, and entered into force February 5, 2011 
        (commonly referred to as the ``New START Treaty'').

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States that:
            (1) The United States should build upon its decades long, 
        bipartisan efforts to reduce the number and salience of nuclear 
        weapons by leading international negotiations on specific arms-
        reduction measures as part of a 21st century global nuclear 
        freeze movement.
            (2) The United States should immediately agree to extend 
        the New START Treaty for 5 years, until February 5, 2026, 
        through mutual agreement with the Russian Federation to provide 
        continued insight into the location, movement, and disposition 
        of strategic delivery vehicles and deployed warheads belonging 
        to the Russian Federation, which would be an important first 
        step to building momentum for a multilateral arms control 
        initiative.
            (3) Upon the successful extension of the New START Treaty, 
        the United States should engage with all other countries that 
        possess nuclear weapons to negotiate and conclude future 
        multilateral arms control, disarmament, and risk reduction 
        agreements, which should contain some or all of the following 
        provisions:
                    (A) An agreement on a verifiable freeze on the 
                testing, production, and further deployment of all 
                nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for such weapons.
                    (B) An agreement that establishes a verifiable 
                numerical ceiling on the deployed shorter-range and 
                intermediate-range and strategic delivery systems (as 
                defined by the INF Treaty and the New START Treaty, 
                respectively) and the nuclear warheads associated with 
                such systems belonging to the P5, and to the extent 
                possible, all countries that possess nuclear weapons, 
                at August 2, 2019, levels.
                    (C) An agreement by each country to adopt a policy 
                of no first use of nuclear weapons.
                    (D) An agreement on a proactive United Nations 
                Security Council resolution that expands access by the 
                International Atomic Energy Agency to any country found 
                by the Board of Governors of that Agency to be 
                noncompliant with its obligations under the NPT.
                    (E) An agreement to refrain from configuring 
                nuclear forces in a ``launch on warning'' nuclear 
                posture allowing a country to launch a ballistic 
                missile attack in response to detection by an early-
                warning satellite or sensor of a suspected incoming 
                ballistic missile.
                    (F) An agreement not to target or interfere in the 
                nuclear command, control, and communications (commonly 
                referred to as ``NC3'') infrastructure of another 
                country through a cyberattack.
                    (G) An agreement on transparency measures or 
                verifiable limits, or both, on hypersonic cruise 
                missiles and glide vehicles that are mounted on 
                ballistic missiles.
                    (H) An agreement to provide a baseline and 
                continuous exchanges detailing the aggregate number of 
                active nuclear weapons and associated systems possessed 
                by each country.
            (4) The United States should rejuvenate efforts in the 
        United Nations Conference on Disarmament governing the 
        consensus rule on negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Material 
        Treaty or Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, or move negotiations 
        to another international body or fora, such as a meeting of the 
        P5. Successful conclusion of such a treaty would verifiably 
        prevent any country's production of highly enriched uranium and 
        plutonium for use in nuclear weapons.
            (5) The United States should convene a series of high level 
        summits on nuclear disarmament modeled on the Nuclear Security 
        Summits process, which saw the elimination of the equivalent of 
        3,000 nuclear weapons.
            (6) The President should seek ratification by the Senate of 
        the CTBT and mobilize all countries covered by Annex 2 of the 
        CTBT to pursue similar action to hasten entry into force of the 
        CTBT. The entry into force of the CTBT, for which ratification 
        by the United States will provide critical momentum, will 
        activate the CTBT's onsite inspection provision to investigate 
        allegations that any country that is a party to the CTBT has 
        conducted a nuclear test of any yield.
            (7) The President should make the accession of North Korea 
        to the CTBT a component of any final agreement in fulfilling 
        the pledges the Government of North Korea made in Singapore, as 
        North Korea is reportedly the only country to have conducted a 
        nuclear explosive test since 1998.
            (8) The United States should--
                    (A) refrain from developing any new designs for 
                nuclear warheads or bombs, but especially designs that 
                could add a level of technical uncertainty into the 
                United States stockpile and thus renew calls to resume 
                nuclear explosive testing in order to test that new 
                design; and
                    (B) seek reciprocal commitments from other 
                countries that possess nuclear weapons.

SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR NUCLEAR TEST EXPLOSIONS.

    (a) In General.--None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or 
otherwise made available for fiscal year 2021 or any fiscal year 
thereafter, or authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made 
available for any fiscal year before fiscal year 2021 and available for 
obligation as of the date of the enactment of this Act, may be 
obligated or expended to conduct or make preparations for any explosive 
nuclear weapons test that produces any yield until such time as--
            (1) the President submits to Congress an addendum to the 
        report required by section 4205 of the Atomic Energy Defense 
        Act (50 U.S.C. 2525) that details any change to the condition 
        of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile from the report 
        submitted under that section in the preceding year; and
            (2) there is enacted into law a joint resolution of 
        Congress that approves the test.
    (b) Rule of Construction.--Subsection (a) does not limit nuclear 
stockpile stewardship activities that are consistent with the zero-
yield standard and other requirements under law.
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