[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3233 Introduced in House (IH)]
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116th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 3233
To support the implementation of the National Defense Strategy for the
United States, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
June 12, 2019
Mr. Gallagher introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the
Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall
within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To support the implementation of the National Defense Strategy for the
United States, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``National Defense Strategy
Implementation Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) According to the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS),
``China and Russia are developing advanced weapons and
capabilities that could threaten our critical infrastructure
and our command and control architecture'' and ``China and
Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests,
attempting to erode American security and prosperity''. The NSS
sets the country's primary focus as sustaining favorable
regional balances of power in the key regions of the world, and
the use of our alliance and partnership architecture as the
mechanism for doing so.
(2) The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) rightly
stresses that long-term, strategic competition with China and
Russia should be the top priority of the United States and the
Department of Defense and require both increased and sustained
investment, both because of the magnitude of the threats they
pose to United States security and prosperity today and the
potential for those threats to increase in the future.
(3) To meet such challenges, the NDS states that the
strategy of the United States will be to expand the competitive
space while pursuing three distinct lines of effort, including
rebuilding military readiness to build a more lethal Joint
Force, strengthening alliances and attracting new partners, and
reforming the Department's business practices for greater
performance and affordability.
(4) In the January 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment, the
United States Intelligence Community stated that ``Russia and
China seek to shape the international system and regional
security dynamics and exert influence over the politics and
economics of states in all regions of the world and especially
in their backyards''.
(5) ``China and Russia will present a wide variety of
economic, political, counterintelligence, military, and
diplomatic challenges to the United States and its allies. We
anticipate that they will collaborate to counter U.S.
objectives, taking advantage of rising doubts in some places
about the liberal democratic model.''.
(6) The December 2018 U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO) report to congressional committees on Long-Range Emerging
Threats Facing the United States as Identified by Federal
Agencies stated that, ``China is marshalling its diplomatic,
economic, and military resources to facilitate its rise as a
regional and global power. This may challenge U.S. access to
air, space, cyberspace, and maritime domains. China's use of
cyberspace and electronic warfare could impact various U.S.
systems and operations. Russia is increasing its capability to
challenge the United States across multiple warfare domains,
including attempting to launch computer-based directed energy
attacks against U.S. military assets. Russia is also increasing
its military and political presence in key locations across the
world.''.
(7) According to the 2018 Assessment and Recommendations by
the National Defense Strategy Commission (NDSC), ``the U.S.
military could suffer unacceptably high casualties and loss of
major capital assets in its next conflict. It might struggle to
win, or perhaps lose, a war against China or Russia. The United
States is particularly at risk of being overwhelmed should its
military be forced to fight on two or more fronts
simultaneously. Additionally, it would be unwise for and
irresponsible not to expect adversaries to attempt debilitating
kinetic, cyber, or other types of attacks against Americans at
home while they seek to defeat our military abroad. U.S.
military superiority is no longer assured and the implications
for American interests and American security are severe.''.
(8) As such, the NDSC states that ``DOD and the
Congressional committees that oversee national security must
focus current and future investments on operational challenges
such as protecting critical bases of operations; rapidly
reinforcing and sustaining forces engaged forward; assuring
information systems and conducting effective information
operations; defeating anti-access/area-denial threats;
deterring, and if necessary defeating, the use of nuclear or
other strategic weapons in ways that fall short of justifying a
large-scale nuclear response; enhancing the capabilities and
survivability of space systems and supporting infrastructure;
and developing an interoperable joint command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture that supports the warfare
of the future.''.
(9) Additionally, the NDSC states that ``Making informed
decisions about strategic, operational, and force development
issues requires a foundation of state-of-the-art analytic
capabilities. . . . Specifically, the Department needs a
rigorous force development plan that connects its investment
strategy with its key priorities of winning in conflict and
competing effectively with China and Russia.''.
(10) The March 2019 GAO report on Defense Strategy: Revised
Analytic Approach Needed to Support Force Structure Decision-
Making, found that ``The Department of Defense's (DOD) analytic
approach has not provided senior leaders with the support they
need to evaluate and determine the force structure necessary to
implement the National Defense Strategy.''.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress as follows:
(1) The United States must be prepared to meet the
challenges of competitive nations that are seeking to diminish
the United States military advantage and threaten vital United
States interests, and China is the most significant such
challenge.
(2) The National Defense Strategy provides the correct
framework to prepare for major-power competition and conflict,
but adequate resources are required and implementation across
the entire Department of Defense enterprise in line with the
focus of that strategy on readying the Joint Force for
competition and conflict against China and Russia.
(3) The United States is committed to upholding a free and
open international order that promotes republican government
and governance in concert with collective security,
international laws, and human dignity while respecting the
sovereignty of other countries.
(4) The Department of Defense should urgently and at scale
adapt the Joint Force's shape, posture, development vectors,
and employment models to maintain military advantage alongside
our allies and partners against China and Russia. To do this,
the Department of Defense should develop adapted, new
warfighting concepts at the operational level of war that allow
the United States to achieve its political objectives in
politically tenable ways. In concert, the Joint Force should
become more lethal, resilient, agile, and ready to deal with
Chinese and Russian strategies and theories of victory.
(5) Investments should be focused on expanding United
States operational options while constraining those to
strategic competitors, such as China and Russia.
SEC. 4. REPORT ON OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS AND PLANS TO DEFEAT CHINA AND
RUSSIA.
Not later than February 1, 2020, and then biannually thereafter,
the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense
committees a report on the Department of Defense's operational concepts
and plans to defeat China and Russia in competition and war, including
on key strategically significant scenarios identified in the National
Defense Strategy that also addresses each of the following:
(1) Ways of employing the force in peace time to
effectively compete and deter China and Russia below the
threshold of war while ensuring readiness for war.
(2) Ways of adapting innovative, operational concepts
needed for strategically significant and plausible scenarios
related to China and Russia.
(3) Ways of addressing operational challenges related to
achieving the strategic advantage against China and Russia
related to nuclear, space, cyber, conventional, and
unconventional means in warfighting doctrine.
(4) The technologies, force developments, posture and
capabilities, readiness, infrastructure, organization,
personnel, and other elements of the defense program necessary
to enable these operational concepts and its implementation
listed in paragraphs (1) through (3).
(5) The ability of the National Security Innovation Base to
support the operational concepts listed in paragraphs (1)
through (3).
(6) The resources and defense investments necessary to
support the operational concepts and its implementation,
including budget recommendations.
(7) The risks associated with the operational concepts,
including the relationship and tradeoffs between missions,
risks, and resources.
(8) The likely needed boundaries of conflict needed to
achieve these operational concepts.
(9) Measures and metrics to track the effectiveness of the
operational concepts and plans.
SEC. 5. ACTIONS TO INCREASE ANALYTIC SUPPORT.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of Defense shall direct the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Director of the Joint Staff, and
the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, in consultation
with the head of each military service, to jointly develop and
implement a plan to strengthen the analytic capabilities, expertise,
and processes necessary to meet the National Defense Strategy.
(b) Elements.--The plan under subsection (a) shall include--
(1) an assessment of the decision support capability of the
Department of Defense, specifically the analytic expertise the
Department is using to link National Defense Strategy
objectives to innovative approaches for meeting future
challenges, including winning in conflict and competing
effectively against China and Russia;
(2) an approach for comparing competing analyses and
conducting joint analyses for force structure to support senior
leaders in implementing the National Defense Strategy;
(3) a determination of the analytic products and support
required to implement the National Defense Strategy, including
the ability to update these products to reflect current
strategy, intelligence assessments, and future threats; and
(4) such other matters as the Secretary of Defense
determines to be appropriate.
(c) Briefing Required.--Not later than March 1, 2020, the Secretary
of Defense shall provide to the congressional defense committees a
briefing on the plan under subsection (a).
SEC. 6. EXTENSION AND ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES.
Section 942 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328; 130 Stat. 2367) is amended--
(1) by amending subsection (f) to read as follows:
``(f) Annual Update on National Defense Strategy.--
``(1) In general.--On an annual basis during the covered
period, the chair and vice chair of the Commission, or their
designees, shall jointly submit to the congressional defense
committees a report that assesses whether, and to what extent,
the Department of Defense executed the National Defense
Strategy in the preceding fiscal year.
``(2) Elements.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall assess the performance of the Department of Defense with
respect to each of the elements described in sections 4 and
5(b) of the National Defense Strategy Implementation Act.
``(3) Covered period defined.--In this subsection, the term
`covered period' means a period that--
``(A) begins not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this subsection; and
``(B) ends on the date on which the first National
Defense Strategy is submitted to Congress after such
date of enactment.''.
(2) by striking subsection (g); and
(3) by redesignating subsection (h) as subsection (g).
SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS AND GUIDANCE.
(a) Congressional Defense Committees.--In this Act, the term
``congressional defense committees'' has the meaning given that term in
section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code.
(b) Operational Challenges.--In this Act, the term ``operational
challenges'' means the principal operational challenges to meeting the
defense objectives described in the most recent National Defense
Strategy, as such challenges are defined by the Secretary of Defense in
guidance issued to the Department of Defense. The guidance issued by
the Secretary of Defense under the preceding sentence shall--
(1) specifically identify operational challenges to the
Department's principal strategic priorities of winning in
conflict and competing effectively with China and Russia; and
(2) be made available in unclassified and publicly
accessible form.
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