[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2949 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>






116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2949

To provide for oversight of North Korea policy, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 23, 2019

Mr. Engel (for himself and Mr. Wilson of South Carolina) introduced the 
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be 
subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration 
  of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee 
                               concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
To provide for oversight of North Korea policy, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``North Korea Policy Oversight Act of 
2019''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
                on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations 
                of the House of Representatives; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
                Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on 
                Appropriations of the Senate.
            (2) Denuclearization.--The term ``denuclearization'' refers 
        to the complete, verified, and irreversible dismantlement of 
        North Korea's nuclear weapons programs and programs related to 
        the delivery mechanisms for nuclear weapons, including 
        ballistic missile programs.
            (3) Government of north korea.--The term ``Government of 
        North Korea'' means the Government of North Korea and its 
        agencies, instrumentalities, and controlled entities.
            (4) North korea.--The term ``North Korea'' means the 
        Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
            (5) Nuclear nonproliferation treaty.--The term ``Nuclear 
        Nonproliferation Treaty'' means the Treaty on the Non-
        Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, 
        and Moscow July 1, 1968 (21 UST 483).
            (6) South korea.--The term ``South Korea'' means the 
        Republic of Korea.
            (7) Vienna convention on diplomatic relations.--The term 
        ``Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations'' means the Vienna 
        Convention on Diplomatic Relations, done at Vienna April 18, 
        1961.

SEC. 3. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The North Korean nuclear weapons program is the 
        culmination of the Government of North Korea's illegal efforts 
        over six decades to acquire a nuclear weapons program capable 
        of threatening both the United States and United States 
        critical allies in the Indo-Pacific region.
            (2) North Korea maintains a robust ballistic missile 
        arsenal that includes a diverse array of delivery systems 
        capable of striking targets throughout the Indo-Pacific region, 
        including short- and medium-range missiles that hold regional 
        countries, including some United States allies, at risk, and 
        intercontinental ballistic missiles that are potentially 
        capable of targeting the United States mainland.
            (3) North Korea has flagrantly defied the international 
        community by continuing to illicitly develop its nuclear and 
        ballistic missile programs in violation of United Nations 
        Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 
        (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 
        2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017).
            (4) United States law, including the North Korea Sanctions 
        and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (Public Law 114-122; 22 
        U.S.C. 9201 et seq.) authorizes sanctions in response to North 
        Korea's pursuit of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, 
        and ballistic missiles, and its human rights abuses. United 
        States law also specifies the conditions under which sanctions 
        may be removed or waived, including that North Korea takes 
        meaningful and verifiable actions toward denuclearization and 
        addresses human rights concerns.
            (5) International economic and diplomatic sanctions applied 
        since the passage of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy 
        Enhancement Act of 2016, including by the United States and the 
        United Nations, when enforced, have intensified pressure on 
        North Korea and degraded North Korea's ability to advance it's 
        nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
            (6) The United States has applied sanctions against North 
        Korean individuals and entities, including on Kim Jong Un, for 
        their complicity in human rights abuses against the North 
        Korean people and citizens of other countries, including the 
        United States, South Korea, and Japan.
            (7) For decades, the Government of North Korea has failed 
        to live up to its diplomatic commitments, rejecting good faith 
        efforts by United States and international negotiators, and 
        leveraging talks to extract concessions such as sanctions 
        relief.
            (8) On January 1, 2018, in a New Year's Day address, Kim 
        Jong Un signaled an interest in undertaking diplomatic 
        engagement, which led to direct bilateral talks between Kim 
        Jong Un and the leaders of the South Korea, China, and the 
        United States.
            (9) On April 22, 2018, Kim Jong Un asserted that North 
        Korea had completed its quest for nuclear weapons, stating that 
        ``under the proven condition of complete nuclear weapons, we no 
        longer need any nuclear tests, mid-range and intercontinental 
        ballistic rocket tests, and that the nuclear test site in 
        northern area has also completed its mission''.
            (10) The Panmunjom Declaration released following the 
        Inter-Korean summit meeting on April 27, 2018, and the joint 
        declaration by President Trump and Kim Jong Un at the June 12, 
        2018, summit between the United States and North Korea in 
        Singapore reaffirmed that North Korea ``commits to working 
        toward the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula''.
            (11) On June 13, 2018, Secretary of State Pompeo said, 
        ``President Trump has been incredibly clear about the 
        sequencing of denuclearization and relief from the sanctions. 
        We are going to get complete denuclearization; only then will 
        there be relief from the sanctions.''.
            (12) The Secretary of State confirmed on July 25, 2018, in 
        testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that 
        North Korea does ``continue to produce fissile material'' and, 
        according to open source analysis, North Korea has enough 
        fissile material for at least 30 to 60 nuclear weapons.
            (13) The North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act 
        of 2016 provides that certain sanctions terminate when North 
        Korea has ``made significant progress toward--
                    (A) ``completely, verifiably, and irreversibly 
                dismantling all of its nuclear, chemical, biological, 
                and radiological weapons programs, including all 
                programs for the development of systems designed in 
                whole or in part for the delivery of such weapons''; 
                and
                    (B) accounting for and repatriating the citizens of 
                other countries abducted or unlawfully held captive, 
                releasing political prisoners including those in 
                political prison camps, and accepting and abiding by 
                internationally recognized standards for the 
                distribution and monitoring of humanitarian aid.
            (14) A robust military posture, including regular training 
        and exercises, by the United States, South Korea, and Japan, 
        has contributed to peace and stability in Northeast Asia.
            (15) South Korea has contributed heavily to its own defense 
        and to the defense of the United States military forces in 
        South Korea, including by providing $10 billion of the $10.8 
        billion toward the Camp Humphreys project to build and relocate 
        United States military forces to a new base in South Korea.
            (16) United States military forces, pursuant to 
        international law, are lawfully deployed on the Korean 
        Peninsula.
            (17) The nuclear and ballistic missile programs of North 
        Korea are clear and consistent violations of international law.
            (18) The long-stated strategic objective of authoritarian 
        states, such as China, Russia, and North Korea, has been the 
        removal of United States military forces from the Korean 
        Peninsula.
            (19) On September 18, 2018, the Pyongyang Declaration 
        between President Moon of South Korea and Chairman Kim Jong Un 
        of North Korea clarified that North Korea's willingness to 
        denuclearize was conditioned on unspecified United States or 
        international concessions stating, ``The North expressed its 
        willingness to continue to take additional measures, such as 
        the permanent dismantlement of the nuclear facilities in 
        Yeongbyeon, as the United States takes corresponding measures 
        in accordance with the spirit of the June 12 U.S.-DPRK Joint 
        Statement.''.
            (20) On December 31, 2018, President Trump signed into law 
        the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-
        409), which states that--
                    (A) it is the policy of the United States that the 
                objective of negotiations with respect to the nuclear 
                and ballistic missile programs of the Democratic 
                People's Republic of Korea be the complete, verifiable, 
                and irreversible dismantlement of such programs;
                    (B) it is the policy of the United States to 
                continue to impose sanctions with respect to activities 
                of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic 
                of Korea, persons acting for or on behalf of such 
                government, or other persons in accordance with 
                applicable United States law;
                    (C) the Secretary of State shall submit regular 
                reports to the appropriate congressional committees 
                that describe actions taken by the United States to 
                address the threats posed by, and the capabilities of, 
                the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; and
                    (D) the Secretary of State, in consultation with 
                the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit 
                justifications to the appropriate committees not later 
                than 30 days after terminating any sanction with 
                respect to the activities of the Government of the 
                Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or a person 
                acting for or on behalf of such government.
            (21) On December 20, 2018, North Korean state media 
        reiterated North Korea's longstanding nuclear policy, stating 
        ``if we unilaterally eliminate our security guarantees against 
        a U.S. nuclear preemptive strike, it would not be considered 
        denuclearization'', and further defined ``denuclearization of 
        the Korean peninsula'' as ``removing all nuclear threats, not 
        only from North and South Korean territory, but also from the 
        surrounding area aimed at the Korean Peninsula''.
            (22) On January 1, 2019, in his New Year's Day address, Kim 
        Jong Un stated, ``Given that the North and South committed 
        themselves to advancing along the road of peace and prosperity, 
        we maintain that the joint military exercises with foreign 
        forces, which constitute the source of aggravating the 
        situation on the Korean Peninsula, should no longer be 
        permitted and the introduction of war equipment including 
        strategic assets from outside should be completely 
        suspended.''.
            (23) On January 1, 2019, in his New Year's Day address, Kim 
        Jong Un further stated, ``But if the United States does not 
        keep the promise it made in the eyes of the world, and of the 
        miscalculation of our people's patience, it attempts to 
        unilaterally enforce something upon us and persists in imposing 
        sanctions and pressure against our Republic, we may be 
        compelled to find a new way for defending the sovereignty of 
        the country and the supreme interests of the state and for 
        achieving peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula.''.
            (24) On January 29, 2019, Director of National Intelligence 
        Coats testified before the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
        the Senate that ``we currently assess that North Korea will 
        seek to retain its WMD (weapons of mass destruction) 
        capabilities and is unlikely to completely give up its nuclear 
        weapons and production capability because its leaders 
        ultimately view nuclear weapons as critical to regime 
        survival'' and that the United States intelligence agencies are 
        observing ``activity that is inconsistent with full 
        denuclearization''.
            (25) On February 28, 2019, a second United States-North 
        Korea summit ended without a joint statement or agreement, and 
        Secretary of State Pompeo has said that ``I am confident there 
        will be'' a third summit between President Trump and Chairman 
        Kim Jong Un, adding ``We came out of Hanoi with a deeper 
        understanding of each other. The positions that the two sides 
        had, the two leaders were able to make progress in that 
        respect. We didn't get as far as the world is demanding. These 
        are global sanctions that are on North Korea today . . . We're 
        determined. I'm convinced the North Koreans are determined as 
        well. Chairman Kim has promised me, he's promised President 
        Trump, he will denuclearize. Now it's the mission of my team to 
        make sure that happens.''.
            (26) On May 5, 2019, North Korea tested three missile 
        systems at ranges of up to 240 kilometers, including a short-
        range ballistic missile (SRBM), a 300mm multiple rocket 
        launcher (MRL), and a 240mm multiple rocket launcher.
            (27) On May 9, 2019, the Department of Justice announced 
        the filing of a civil forfeiture complaint against a bulk 
        carrier ship registered in North Korea, which according to the 
        complaint, ``was used to illicitly ship coal from North Korea 
        and to deliver heavy machinery to the DPRK'', in violation of 
        ``longstanding U.S. law and United Nations Security Council 
        resolutions''.

SEC. 4. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.

    (a) In General.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to pursue all credible diplomatic means to achieve the 
        denuclearization of North Korea, including--
                    (A) the complete abandonment of all North Korean 
                nuclear weapons, fissile material, and existing nuclear 
                programs; and
                    (B) North Korea returning to, and at an early date 
                coming into compliance with, the Nuclear 
                Nonproliferation Treaty and International Atomic Energy 
                Agency (IAEA) safeguards;
            (2) to seek the complete and verifiable dismantlement of 
        all North Korean nuclear weapons-related facilities, including 
        for--
                    (A) the production and processing of fissile 
                material; and
                    (B) scientific research related to the production 
                of nuclear weapons;
            (3) to seek appropriate inspections, verification, and 
        compliance measures, including full-scope safeguards, to assure 
        the complete denuclearization of North Korea;
            (4) to seek the complete and verifiable dismantlement of--
                    (A) all North Korean ballistic missiles, of any 
                range; and
                    (B) all infrastructure and facilities related to 
                the production, testing, and fielding or deployment of 
                ballistic missiles;
            (5) to seek the complete and verifiable dismantlement of 
        all North Korean programs related to weapons of mass 
        destruction, including chemical and biological weapons and the 
        industrial and scientific facilities to support such programs;
            (6) to affirm that the United States has no intention to 
        undertake any military action against North Korea that is 
        contrary to the United States Constitution and international 
        law;
            (7) until such time as denuclearization is achieved--
                    (A) to deter North Korea from using weapons of mass 
                destruction or leveraging those weapons to coerce 
                United States allies;
                    (B) to contain attempts by North Korea to 
                proliferate such weapons and technologies;
                    (C) to sustain United States and multilateral 
                efforts to reduce the risk of conflict on the Korean 
                Peninsula; and
                    (D) to continue to exert economic pressure against 
                North Korea in cooperation with the United Nations and 
                the international community;
            (8) should diplomacy and deterrence fail to result in the 
        denuclearization of North Korea, to reserve the right to 
        utilize all available options pursuant to the United States 
        Constitution to protect and defend United States national 
        security interests and meet United States treaty obligations; 
        and
            (9) to uphold the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and not 
        recognize North Korea as a legitimate nuclear weapons state.
    (b) Diplomacy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to pursue diplomatic engagement with the Government of 
        North Korea for the purposes of--
                    (A) advancing meaningful negotiations regarding 
                denuclearization, including the Government of North 
                Korea abandoning and dismantling its missile and 
                nuclear weapons programs, ceasing its proliferation 
                activities, and coming into compliance with 
                international agreements and United Nations Security 
                Council resolutions;
                    (B) reducing the risks of military miscalculation; 
                and
                    (C) creating opportunities for the development of 
                confidence-building measures;
            (2) to formulate and carry out policy affecting the Korean 
        Peninsula in close cooperation with United States allies, 
        particularly South Korea;
            (3) to encourage those countries that maintain diplomatic 
        relations with North Korea to take all necessary steps to 
        ensure that North Korean diplomatic missions are not used for 
        any activities inconsistent with the Vienna Convention on 
        Diplomatic Relations, international law governing the operation 
        of diplomatic missions, United States and United Nations 
        sanctions, and accepted norms of behavior for diplomats and 
        diplomatic missions;
            (4) to encourage all countries to fully implement and 
        enforce United Nations sanctions commitments with respect to 
        North Korea, including ending the practice of hosting overseas 
        North Korean workers;
            (5) to increase the effectiveness of United States 
        sanctions by seeking to work through the United Nations and 
        with other like-minded countries to ensure a multilateral 
        approach to sanctions;
            (6) to provide unmistakable assurance to Japan and South 
        Korea that the United States is committed to fulfilling its 
        treaty obligations if they are attacked;
            (7) to provide support for North Korean refugees and asylum 
        seekers in accordance with United States and international law;
            (8) to promote the human rights and dignity of the North 
        Korean people, including through the United Nations and other 
        multilateral institutions; and
            (9) to seek opportunities for humanitarian actions, such as 
        family reunification and the return of human remains of United 
        States servicemembers missing in action and killed in action on 
        the Korean Peninsula.
    (c) Economic Pressure.--It is the policy of the United States to 
sustain and calibrate economic pressure on North Korea until North 
Korea undertakes meaningful and verifiable actions toward 
denuclearization, including by--
            (1) encouraging all countries to implement and enforce 
        existing United Nations sanctions;
            (2) leveraging the strength of the United States financial 
        system to deny access by the Government of North Korea and 
        those with whom such government facilitates illicit financial 
        transactions to the United States and global markets, including 
        through the use of secondary sanctions;
            (3) encouraging all countries, in accordance with United 
        Nations Security Council resolutions, to end the practice of 
        hosting North Koreans as guest workers, recognizing that such 
        workers are demonstrated to constitute an illicit source of 
        revenue for the Government of North Korea and its nuclear 
        program;
            (4) working with the international community on 
        interdiction of shipments to and from North Korea, including 
        ship-to-ship transfers, consistent with United Nations Security 
        Council resolutions that have banned nearly every major export 
        from North Korea; and
            (5) enforcing United States laws with respect to 
        sanctioning entities, including Russian and Chinese entities, 
        that knowingly engage with sanctioned entities from North Korea 
        or trade in items prohibited under United Nations Security 
        Council resolutions.
    (d) Proliferation of Nuclear and Missile Technology.--It is the 
policy of the United States--
            (1) to prevent the transfer of nuclear weapons, missile 
        technology, or related material to or from North Korea and 
        other states or non-state actors;
            (2) to support the efforts of the international community 
        to detect, interdict, and prevent the transfers of nuclear or 
        missile technology or related items to or from North Korea;
            (3) to prioritize coordination with global partners, 
        including through technical assistance and capacity building, 
        to enhance the ability of the global community to monitor, 
        interdict, and prosecute entities that engage in transfer of 
        nuclear weapons, missile technology, or related material to or 
        from North Korea; and
            (4) to abide by United States obligations under the Nuclear 
        Nonproliferation Treaty--
                    (A) not to assist any country in the development of 
                nuclear weapons; and
                    (B) to encourage all countries to abide by their 
                commitments under such Treaty and International Atomic 
                Energy Agency agreements.
    (e) Alliances and Military Posture.--It is the policy of the United 
States--
            (1) to reaffirm the importance of the United States-Japan 
        and United States-South Korea alliances for maintaining peace 
        and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond;
            (2) to reaffirm that the United States commitments to South 
        Korea and Japan, as codified under the Mutual Defense Treaty 
        between the United States and the Republic of Korea (1954) and 
        the Mutual Security Treaty between the United States and Japan 
        (1951), are not contingent on the state of the United States' 
        relations with North Korea or any progress that may be made 
        towards North Korea's denuclearization;
            (3) to reaffirm United States extended deterrence 
        commitments to Japan and South Korea, including through 
        maintaining forward-deployed United States military forces;
            (4) to reaffirm the importance of the forward-deployed 
        presence of United States military forces in Japan and South 
        Korea that continues to play a critical role in safeguarding 
        the peaceful and stable rules-based international order that 
        benefits all countries;
            (5) to reaffirm close alliance coordination on any 
        adjustment of United States military posture in the region;
            (6) to strengthen United States efforts to confront 
        emerging or asymmetric challenges, including in the cyber and 
        space domains;
            (7) to safeguard maritime security and ensure freedom of 
        navigation, commerce, and overflight in the region;
            (8) to cooperate with allies and partners in the provision 
        of public goods to the region, including humanitarian relief 
        and disaster response; and
            (9) to ensure any action to curtail or remove United States 
        military forces in South Korea shall include regular 
        consultation with Congress regarding the implications of 
        proposed changes on United States readiness to meet our 
        commitments in the region.
    (f) Defense and Deterrence Measures.--It is the policy of the 
United States--
            (1) to keep United States security commitments to United 
        States allies and take necessary actions for United States 
        self-defense and the defense of United States allies, including 
        joint military exercises, the modernization of weapons systems 
        deployed in the Indo-Pacific region, and counter-provocation 
        planning by the United States and Republic of Korea Combined 
        Forces Command, as well as to negotiate full and equitable 
        Special Measures Agreements for alliance burden sharing with 
        South Korea and Japan;
            (2) to develop and deploy antiballistic missile 
        capabilities to defend the United States homeland, United 
        States military forces in the region, and United States allies 
        Japan and South Korea;
            (3) to formulate and carry out military planning and 
        operations impacting the Korean Peninsula in close cooperation 
        with United States allies, particularly South Korea and Japan;
            (4) to deter North Korea in a manner that bolsters the 
        force posture and military strength of United States alliance 
        and partner networks in the region; and
            (5) to maintain, as necessary and appropriate, credible and 
        overwhelming military options to be used in a manner consistent 
        with the United States Constitution against the Government of 
        North Korea, to deter the Government of North Korea from use of 
        nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and related technology.
    (g) Human Rights.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to promote human rights for the North Korean people;
            (2) to revisit and explore new opportunities for 
        coordinating efforts to plan for humanitarian needs in North 
        Korea, in accordance with United States and international law 
        and with appropriate measures in place to discourage the 
        diversion of humanitarian assistance to the North Korean 
        military or other unintended recipients;
            (3) to press for access for the Special Rapporteur on the 
        situation of human rights in North Korea and the United Nations 
        High Commissioner for Human Rights;
            (4) to continue to seek cooperation from foreign 
        governments on the resettlement of North Korean refugees 
        overseas;
            (5) to urge China to halt forcible repatriation of North 
        Koreans;
            (6) to promote democracy, human rights, and a market 
        economy in North Korea; and
            (7) to appoint a Special Envoy on North Korean Human Rights 
        Issues in accordance with section 107 of the North Korean Human 
        Rights Act of 2004 (22 U.S.C. 7817).
    (h) Information Dissemination Efforts.--It is the policy of the 
United States--
            (1) to increase the availability of information not 
        controlled by the Government of North Korea inside North Korea;
            (2) to continue to prioritize expanding access to 
        information in North Korea by exploring the use of new and 
        emerging technologies, including digital media, and expanding 
        nongovernmental radio broadcasting to North Korea, including 
        news and information, to increase information dissemination in 
        North Korea; and
            (3) to fulfill all requirements under United States law, 
        including the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act 
        of 2016, with regard to providing resources for freedom of 
        information efforts into North Korea, and to regularly consult 
        with Congress regarding such efforts.
    (i) Strategy and Briefings Required.--
            (1) In general.--The President shall submit to the national 
        security committees a detailed strategy, which may include a 
        classified annex, for the implementation of policies outlined 
        in subsections (a) through (h), augmented by briefings to the 
        national security committees on a quarterly basis or as 
        requested.
            (2) National security committees defined.--In this 
        subsection, the term ``national security committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
                on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee 
                on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
                Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee 
                on Intelligence of the Senate.

SEC. 5. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY REPORT.

    Section 210(d)(2) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 
(Public Law 115-409) is amended--
            (1) in subparagraph (B)--
                    (A) in clause (i), by striking ``and'' at the end;
                    (B) in clause (ii), by striking the period at the 
                end and inserting a semicolon; and
                    (C) by inserting after clause (ii) the following:
                            ``(iii) how diplomatic negotiations with 
                        the Government of the Democratic People's 
                        Republic of Korea are expected to proceed; and
                            ``(iv) United States efforts to continue to 
                        exert economic pressure, in coordination with 
                        United States allies, with respect to the 
                        Democratic People's Republic of Korea;''; and
            (2) in subparagraph (C)--
                    (A) in clause (iii), by striking ``and'' at the 
                end; and
                    (B) by inserting after clause (iv) the following:
                            ``(v) an assessment of credible diplomatic 
                        engagement by the Democratic People's Republic 
                        of Korea; and
                            ``(vi) an assessment of the threat posed by 
                        the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of 
                        the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;''.

SEC. 6. BRIEFINGS.

    (a) Member Briefings.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 15 legislative days after 
        each visit for the purposes of diplomatic talks between the 
        United States and North Korea at the Secretary of State level 
        or above, including any meeting between the respective heads of 
        state, the Secretary of State or the Secretary's designee, in 
        coordination with appropriate officials, shall brief the 
        national security committees (as such term is defined in 
        section 4(i)(2)), briefings on the diplomatic talks.
            (2) Classification.--The briefings required under paragraph 
        (1) shall be held in a classified format.
    (b) Staff Briefings.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary of State for 
        East Asian and Pacific Affairs shall hold quarterly briefings 
        for appropriately cleared staff members of the national 
        security committees (as such term is defined in section 
        4(i)(2)).
            (2) Classification.--The briefings required under paragraph 
        (1) shall be held in a classified format.
            (3) Exception.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply when 
        diplomatic talks described in subsection (a)(1) have not taken 
        place within the prior 60-day period and will not take place 
        within the next 30 days.

SEC. 7. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS.

    It is the sense of Congress that regular congressional oversight 
through hearings is important while diplomatic talks between the United 
States and North Korea continue, and as such the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate should, as appropriate, hold such hearings, 
including with participation of official witnesses, and otherwise 
obtain information in order to fully review the negotiations.

SEC. 8. OVERSIGHT OF AGREEMENTS WITH NORTH KOREA.

    (a) Transmission to Congress of Nuclear Agreements With North Korea 
and Verification Assessment With Respect to Such Agreements.--
            (1) Transmission of agreements.--Not later than 5 days 
        after entering into an agreement with North Korea relating to 
        the nuclear and missile program of North Korea, the President 
        shall transmit to the chairmen and ranking members of the 
        Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives 
        and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the 
        Speaker, majority leader, and minority leader of the House of 
        Representatives and the majority and minority leader of the 
        Senate--
                    (A) the agreement, including all related materials 
                and annexes; and
                    (B) a verification assessment report prepared by 
                the Secretary of State in accordance with paragraph 
                (2).
            (2) Verification assessment report.--
                    (A) In general.--The Secretary of State shall 
                prepare, with respect to an agreement described in 
                paragraph (1), a report assessing--
                            (i) the extent to which the Secretary will 
                        be able to verify that North Korea is complying 
                        with its obligations and commitments under the 
                        agreement, including how North Korea might 
                        attempt to conceal its program;
                            (ii) whether North Korea has made a 
                        complete, transparent, and verifiable 
                        declaration of all facilities and 
                        infrastructure materially relevant to North 
                        Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs;
                            (iii) the adequacy of the safeguards and 
                        other control mechanisms and other assurances 
                        contained in the agreement with respect to 
                        North Korean nuclear and missile programs to 
                        ensure North Korea activities are limited to 
                        the subset of activities permitted under the 
                        agreement; and
                            (iv) the capacity and capability of the 
                        United States and international organizations, 
                        such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
                        to effectively implement the verification 
                        regime required by or related to the agreement, 
                        including whether the United States or 
                        international organizations will have--
                                    (I) sufficient access to--
                                            (aa) all nuclear facilities 
                                        that span the entire nuclear 
                                        fuel cycle;
                                            (bb) facilities associated 
                                        with the nuclear weaponization 
                                        program;
                                            (cc) facilities associated 
                                        with its missile program; and
                                            (dd) declared and 
                                        undeclared sites; and
                                    (II) the ability to investigate 
                                suspicious sites or allegations of 
                                covert nuclear-related activities.
                    (B) Classified annex.--The report required under 
                subparagraph (A) shall be transmitted in unclassified 
                form, but shall include a classified annex prepared in 
                consultation with the Director of National 
                Intelligence, summarizing relevant classified 
                information.
    (b) Sense of Congress on North Korea Final Agreement.--It is the 
sense of Congress that any binding agreement between the United States 
and North Korea should be submitted to the United States Congress as a 
treaty and subject to the advice and consent of the Senate in 
accordance with article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of 
the United States.

SEC. 9. VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE.

    (a) Verification and Compliance Reports.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        coordination with appropriate cabinet-level officials, shall 
        submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on 
        North Korea's record of verification and compliance.
            (2) Classification.--The report required under paragraph 
        (1)--
                    (A) may be submitted in classified form;
                    (B) shall contain an unclassified executive 
                summary; and
                    (C) may contain an unclassified annex.
    (b) Semiannual Report.--Not later than 180 days after entering into 
an agreement with North Korea, and not less frequently than once every 
180 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on North Korea's nuclear and missile 
program and the compliance of North Korea with the agreement during the 
period covered by the report, which shall include--
            (1) a description of any action or failure to act by the 
        Government of North Korea that breached the agreement or is in 
        noncompliance with the terms of the agreement;
            (2) a description of the status and activities of any North 
        Korea nuclear facilities related to the nuclear fuel cycle, 
        including mining and exploration, milling, conversion, 
        enrichment, fuel fabrication, reactors, reprocessing, and 
        storage;
            (3) a description of the status and activities of any North 
        Korea nuclear facilities related to the North Korean nuclear 
        weaponization program, including research and development, 
        education and training, and testing;
            (4) a description of the status and activities of any North 
        Korea missile facilities, including research and development, 
        production, testing, and basing;
            (5) a description of any delay by the Government of North 
        Korea of more than 1 week in providing inspectors access to 
        facilities, people, and documents in North Korea as required by 
        the agreement;
            (6) a description of any covert nuclear activities 
        undertaken by the Government of North Korea, including any 
        covert nuclear weapons-related activities, covert fissile 
        material activities, covert missile activities, or research and 
        development activities; and
            (7) a description of any transfer or diversion by the 
        Government of North Korea of its nuclear materials, components, 
        technology, or equipment to state or non-state actors.

SEC. 10. AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS.

    Any reports required to be submitted to the appropriate 
congressional committees under this Act or any amendments made by this 
Act that are subject to a deadline for submission consisting of the 
same unit of time may be consolidated into a single report. The 
consolidated report shall contain all information required under this 
Act or any amendment made by this Act with respect to the reports 
comprising such consolidated report.
                                 <all>