[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2529 Introduced in House (IH)]

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116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2529

 To require certain reports and briefings to Congress relating to the 
      expiration of the New START Treaty, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 7, 2019

 Mr. Engel (for himself and Mr. McCaul) introduced the following bill; 
which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition 
 to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select), 
for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case 
for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of 
                        the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
 To require certain reports and briefings to Congress relating to the 
      expiration of the New START Treaty, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Richard G. Lugar and Ellen O. 
Tauscher Act to Maintain Limits on Russian Nuclear Forces''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Since the end of World War II, the United States has 
        relied on a robust and effective nuclear deterrent as part of 
        its national defense, particularly against the Soviet Union and 
        its successor state, the Russian Federation.
            (2) The United States nuclear arsenal must remain, safe, 
        secure, and reliable such that it can effectively ensure the 
        security of the United States and its allies.
            (3) Along with its nuclear deterrent, the United States has 
        pursued a number of arms control, disarmament, and 
        nonproliferation agreements with the Soviet Union and Russia to 
        ensure strategic stability and the protection of the United 
        States homeland, such as--
                    (A) the Interim Agreement Between the United States 
                of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
                on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of 
                Strategic Offensive Arms, signed on May 26, 1972 
                (commonly referred to as SALT I); and
                    (B) the Treaty Between the United States of America 
                and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
                Strategic Offensive Reductions, signed on July 31, 1991 
                (commonly referred to as START I).
            (4) In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, the 
        United States continues to rely on a combination of nuclear 
        deterrence and strategic arms control to help protect the 
        United States from nuclear attack.
            (5) On April 8, 2010, the United States and the Russia 
        signed the Treaty between the United States of America and the 
        Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and 
        Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (commonly referred to as 
        ``New Start Treaty'').
            (6) In an op-ed to the Washington Post dated December 2, 
        2010, former Secretaries of State Henry A. Kissinger, George P. 
        Shultz, James A. Baker III, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, and Colin 
        L. Powell urged the Senate to ratify the Treaty, stating that 
        it was in ``the national interest to ratify''.
            (7) During the ratification process, the Treaty garnered 
        bipartisan support, and the United States Senate approved the 
        Treaty on December 22, 2010, by a 71-26 vote.
            (8) The Treaty entered into force on February 5, 2011, 
        placing numerical limits on United States and Russian strategic 
        systems, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, 
        submarine launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers, as 
        well as warheads.
            (9) On February 5, 2018, the Treaty's central limits on 
        strategic arms took effect.
            (10) Through the Treaty's verification regime, which 
        includes short-notice, on-site inspections at military bases 
        and facilities, the United States is able to verify the data 
        provided by Russia regarding its strategic nuclear arsenal. The 
        verification regime provides both countries insight into each 
        other's strategic nuclear delivery systems, warheads, and 
        facilities, as well as data exchanges to track the status and 
        makeup of nuclear weapons systems.
            (11) During a February 26, 2019, hearing on nuclear 
        deterrence requirements of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
        Commander of the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) 
        General John Hyten voiced his support for the Treaty, saying he 
        was ``a big supporter of the New START agreement'' and stating, 
        ``The New START treaty'' provides ``insights into the Russians 
        capabilities. Those are hugely beneficial to me.''.
            (12) During a March 2017 hearing on nuclear deterrence 
        requirements of the House Armed Services Committee, Air Force 
        General Paul Selva, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
        Staff, also endorsed the New START Treaty, saying the Treaty is 
        ``a bilateral, verifiable agreement that gives us some degree 
        of predictability on what our potential adversaries look 
        like''.
            (13) Lieutenant General Jack Weinstein, the Air Force 
        Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear 
        Integration, asserted that the New START Treaty was of ``huge 
        value'' to United States security.
            (14) During a September 2018 hearing before the Senate 
        Committee on Foreign Relations, Deputy Secretary of Defense for 
        Policy David Trachtenberg stated that ``the transparency and 
        verification requirements of the New START Treaty are a 
        benefit'' to the security of the United States and, in response 
        to a question regarding missile defense, asserted that the 
        Treaty had ``no'' effect on limiting United States missile 
        defense capabilities.
            (15) In a March 2017 hearing of the Strategic Forces 
        Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, Retired Air 
        Force General and former commander of United States Strategic 
        Command Robert Kehler stated, ``I think that we have gotten 
        tremendous benefit out of those kinds of agreements with the 
        Russians over the years, provided that the Russians comply,'' 
        regarding the importance of the New START Treaty.
            (16) The Department of State confirmed in February 2018 
        that Russia had met the Treaty's central limits on strategic 
        arms and stated that ``implementation of the New START Treaty 
        enhances the safety and security of the United States''.
            (17) The Nuclear Posture Review states that arms control 
        agreements can ``foster transparency, understanding, and 
        predictability in adversary relations, thereby reducing the 
        risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation''.
            (18) The New START Treaty strengthens United States nuclear 
        security and strategic stability by reducing the number of 
        strategic systems in Russia's nuclear arsenal and provides the 
        United States with the inspection and monitoring tools 
        necessary to confidently verify Russian compliance with the 
        Treaty.
            (19) The New START Treaty does not restrict United States 
        nuclear modernization programs or limit United States missile 
        defense efforts.
            (20) If the New START Treaty is not extended or replaced 
        before it expires in 2021, the United States runs the risk of 
        having no legally binding, verifiable limits on Russia's 
        strategic nuclear arsenal for the first time since 1972.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that the United States should seek to 
extend the New START Treaty from its initial termination date in 
February 2021 to February 2026, as provided for under Article XIV of 
the Treaty, unless the President determines and informs the appropriate 
congressional committees that--
            (1) Russia is in material breach of the Treaty; or
            (2) the United States and Russia have entered into a new 
        arms control agreement to replace the Treaty that provides 
        equal or greater constraints, transparency, and verification 
        measures with regard to Russia's nuclear forces.

SEC. 4. REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS TO CONGRESS.

    (a) Director of National Intelligence.--Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees 
an intelligence assessment based on all sources of the national 
security and intelligence implications of the expiration of the New 
START Treaty without the United States and Russia having entered into a 
new arms control agreement to replace the Treaty that provides equal or 
greater constraints, transparency, and verification measures with 
regard to Russia's nuclear forces. The assessment shall be submitted in 
an unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex, and shall 
include the following elements:
            (1) A description of the size and posture of Russia's 
        nuclear forces and strategic delivery vehicles, as well as 
        predicted force levels through February 2026 under each of the 
        following potential scenarios:
                    (A) The Treaty expires in February 2021 without 
                such a replacement agreement.
                    (B) The Treaty is extended until February 2026.
            (2) An assessment of how strategic stability would be 
        impacted if the Treaty is not extended or such a replacement 
        agreement is not concluded.
            (3) An assessment of the impact on United States allies if 
        the limitations on Russia's nuclear forces are dissolved if the 
        Treaty is not extended or such a replacement agreement is not 
        concluded.
            (4) A description of the intelligence collection benefits 
        of the Treaty.
            (5) An assessment of how the United States intelligence 
        community's confidence in its assessments of Russia's strategic 
        nuclear arsenal and future nuclear force levels would be 
        impacted if the Treaty is not extended or such a replacement 
        agreement is not concluded.
            (6) An assessment of what specific capabilities the United 
        States intelligence community would have to develop, deploy, or 
        realign to ensure no loss of collection capability occurs if 
        the Treaty is not extended or such a replacement agreement is 
        not concluded.
    (b) Secretary of State.--
            (1) Relating to nato, nato member countries, and other 
        united states allies.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
        of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a 
        report, which shall be in an unclassified form, but may contain 
        a classified annex, and provide a briefing to the appropriate 
        congressional committees that includes an assessment of the 
        likely reactions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
        (NATO), NATO member countries, and other United States allies 
        to a United States decision not to extend the New START Treaty 
        or enter into a new arms control agreement with Russia to 
        replace the Treaty that provides equal or greater constraints, 
        transparency, and verification measures with regard to Russia's 
        nuclear forces.
            (2) Relating to other matters.--Not later than 60 days 
        after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days 
        thereafter until the New START Treaty is extended or expires, 
        the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of 
        Defense, shall provide a briefing to the appropriate 
        congressional committees that includes the following elements:
                    (A) A description of any discussions with Russia on 
                the Treaty or a similar agreement on the reduction and 
                limitation of strategic offensive arms at the Assistant 
                Secretary, Ambassadorial level or higher.
                    (B) The dates, locations, discussion topics, 
                agenda, outcomes, and Russian interlocutors involved in 
                those discussions.
                    (C) An identification of the United States 
                Government departments and agencies involved in the 
                discussions.
                    (D) The types of systems, both nuclear and 
                nonnuclear, discussed by either side in such 
                discussions.
                    (E) Whether an offer of extension of the Treaty, of 
                any length of time, has been offered by either side.

SEC. 5. PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION IN EVENT OF EXPIRATION OF NEW START 
              TREATY.

    If the New START Treaty is allowed to expire before the United 
States and Russia enter into a new arms control agreement to replace 
the Treaty that provides equal or greater constraints, transparency, 
and verification measures with regard to Russia's nuclear forces, not 
later than 30 days after such expiration the President shall submit to 
the appropriate congressional committees--
            (1) a justification for why the New START Treaty was 
        allowed to expire; and
            (2) a certification that extending the Treaty was not in 
        the national security interest of the United States.

SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
                on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee 
                on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
                Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee 
                on Intelligence of the Senate.
            (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
        community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the 
        National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
            (3) New start treaty; treaty.--The terms ``New START 
        Treaty'' and ``Treaty'' mean the Treaty between the United 
        States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for 
        the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
        Arms, signed on April 8, 2010, and entered into force on 
        February 5, 2011.
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