[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1477 Referred in Senate (RFS)]
<DOC>
116th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 1477
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
March 26, 2019
Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
AN ACT
To require a threat assessment and strategy to counter Russian
influence in Venezuela, an assessment of foreign acquisition of CITGO
assets in the United States, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Russian-Venezuelan Threat Mitigation
Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The Russian Federation's increased presence in the
Western Hemisphere is of concern to the United States and our
allies in the region.
(2) In December 2018, the Russian Federation sent two Tu-
160 nuclear-capable bombers to Venezuela for joint exercises
with the Venezuelan military. The Tu-160 can carry conventional
or nuclear-tipped cruise missiles with an estimated maximum
range of around 3,000 miles.
(3) Russian and Venezuelan forces took part in a joint 10-
hour exercise across the Caribbean in December 2018 with the
Tu-160 nuclear-capable bombers.
(4) Nicolas Maduro and his regime have turned to the
Russian Federation, one of its strongest political allies, for
financial support during its current economic crisis and to
counter international support for Juan Guaido.
(5) In January 2018, Russia sent contractors linked to the
Wagner Group to provide security for Nicolas Maduro.
(6) Nicolas Maduro secured loans from the Russian
Federation to be repaid through future oil exports, but fell
behind on those payments in 2017. News reports in December 2018
suggest that Russian State oil company Rosneft has lent
Venezuelan state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela (PdVSA)
$6.5 billion partly as prepayment for crude oil, $3.1 billion
of which remained outstanding as of the end of September 2018.
(7) In 2016, PdVSA secured a $1.5 billion loan from
Rosneft, and PdVSA used 49.9 percent of its shares in United
States-based and Venezuelan-owned company CITGO as collateral.
A Venezuelan default could lead to potential Russian ownership
of United States energy infrastructure.
(8) At the conclusion of a 3-day visit to Moscow in
December 2018, Maduro announced $6 billion worth of Russian
investment pledges focused on the oil and mining sectors as
well as the export of 600,000 tons of Russian wheat to
Venezuela to cover its 2019 needs.
SEC. 3. THREAT ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGY TO COUNTER RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN
VENEZUELA.
(a) Threat Assessment.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees an assessment on Russian-
Venezuelan security cooperation and the potential threat such
cooperation poses to the United States and countries in the Western
Hemisphere.
(b) Strategy.--Not later than 30 days after the submission of the
threat assessment required under subsection (a), the Secretary of State
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy to
counter threats identified in such assessment from Russian-Venezuelan
cooperation.
(c) Form.--The threat assessment required under subsection (a)
shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified
annex.
(d) Definition.--In this section, the term ``appropriate
congressional committees'' means the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate.
SEC. 4. ASSESSMENT OF FOREIGN ACQUISITION OF CITGO ASSETS IN THE UNITED
STATES.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the appropriate
congressional committees an assessment of the national security risks
posed by potential Russian acquisition of CITGO's United States energy
infrastructure holdings.
(b) Definition.--In this section, the term ``appropriate
congressional committees'' means the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Financial Services of
the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations,
the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Banking of the
Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Banking of the Senate.
SEC. 5. ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.
(a) In General.--An alien who the Secretary of State or the
Secretary of Homeland Security (or a designee of one of such
Secretaries) knows, or has reason to believe, is an alien who is acting
or has acted on behalf of the Russian Government in direct support of
the Venezuelan security forces is--
(1) inadmissible to the United States;
(2) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to
enter the United States; and
(3) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the
United States or to receive any other benefit under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
(b) Current Visas Revoked.--
(1) In general.--The issuing consular officer, the
Secretary of State, or the Secretary of Homeland Security (or a
designee of one of such Secretaries) shall, in accordance with
section 221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1201(i)), revoke any visa or other entry documentation issued
to an alien described in subsection (a) regardless of when the
visa or other entry documentation is issued.
(2) Effect of revocation.--A revocation under paragraph (1)
shall--
(A) take effect immediately; and
(B) automatically cancel any other valid visa or
entry documentation that is in the alien's possession.
(c) Exception to Comply With United Nations Headquarters Agreement
or for National Security Reasons.--
(1) International obligations.--This section shall not
apply to an alien if admitting the alien into the United States
is necessary to permit the United States to comply with--
(A) the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the
United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947,
and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the
United Nations and the United States; or
(B) other applicable international obligations of
the United States.
(2) National security.--The President may waive the
application of this section to an alien if the President--
(A) determines that such a waiver is in the
national interest of the United States; and
(B) transmits to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Foreign Relations a notice of and justification for
such waiver.
(d) Termination.--This section shall terminate on the earlier of--
(1) the date that is one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act; or
(2) the date on which the President certifies to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the
Government of Venezuela has returned to a democratic form of
government with respect for the essential elements of
representative democracy as set forth in Article 3 of the
Inter-American Democratic Charter.
(e) Definition.--In this subsection, the term ``Venezuelan security
forces'' includes the following:
(1) The Bolivarian National Armed Forces, including the
Bolivarian National Guard.
(2) The Bolivarian National Intelligence Service.
(3) The Bolivarian National Police.
(4) The Bureau for Scientific, Criminal and Forensic
Investigations of the Ministry of Interior, Justice, and Peace.
Passed the House of Representatives March 25, 2019.
Attest:
CHERYL L. JOHNSON,
Clerk.