[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3667 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>






115th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 3667

 To prevent a nuclear arms race resulting from weakened international 
 restrictions on the proliferation of intermediate- and shorter-range 
                   missiles, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           November 28, 2018

Mr. Merkley (for himself, Ms. Warren, Mrs. Gillibrand, Mr. Markey, Mr. 
Wyden, Mr. Sanders, and Mrs. Feinstein) introduced the following bill; 
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
 To prevent a nuclear arms race resulting from weakened international 
 restrictions on the proliferation of intermediate- and shorter-range 
                   missiles, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Prevention of Arms Race Act of 
2018''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) On October 20, 2018, President Donald J. Trump 
        announced his intent to withdraw the United States from the 
        Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of 
        Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their 
        Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, together with 
        the Memorandum of Understanding and Two Protocols (commonly 
        known as the ``INF Treaty''), signed at Washington December 8, 
        1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988.
            (2) The United States Senate provided its advice and 
        consent to ratification of the INF Treaty on May 27, 1988, by a 
        vote of 93 to 5.
            (3) The INF Treaty permanently bans the United States and 
        twelve former Soviet republics, including Russia, Belarus, 
        Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, from testing or possessing ground-
        launched cruise or ballistic missiles of intermediate range 
        (500 to 5,500 kilometers, or roughly 300 to 3,400 miles).
            (4) The INF Treaty, signed by President Ronald Reagan and 
        Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, led to the 
        elimination of entire classes of United States and Russian 
        nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise 
        missiles--2,692 in total--supported by on-site inspections that 
        allowed both sides to ``trust but verify'' compliance with the 
        Treaty.
            (5) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies 
        were deeply involved in the pursuit of negotiation on the INF 
        Treaty and have significant national security interests in the 
        Treaty's preservation. The communique from the July 11, 2018, 
        NATO Summit in Brussels stated that the INF Treaty ``has been 
        crucial to Euro-Atlantic security''.
            (6) Less than one month prior to the announcement of the 
        United States intent to withdraw from the INF Treaty, Secretary 
        of Defense Jim Mattis met with his NATO counterparts to discuss 
        the full-range of diplomatic, economic, and INF-compliant 
        military options to pressure the Russian Federation to return 
        to compliance with the Treaty as outlined in the ``Trump 
        Administration INF Treaty Integrated Strategy'' published 
        December 8, 2017.
            (7) Since the United States publicly declared in July 2014 
        that the Russian Federation was in violation of the INF 
        Treaty's prohibition on possessing, producing, or flight-
        testing a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), which is the 
        equivalent of the Russian SSC-8 missile system, the United 
        States has worked with its NATO allies to identify a unified 
        approach on the best way forward.
            (8) The United States has yet to exhaust diplomatic, 
        economic, and military means to bring the Russian Federation 
        back into compliance with the Treaty, and in 2018 alone, the 
        United States has cancelled at least two strategic stability 
        dialogues planned to be conducted with the Russian Federation.
            (9) The United States withdrawal from the INF Treaty would 
        allow the Russian Federation to escape international criticism 
        for its violation of the Treaty and sow division among NATO 
        allies at a time when Alliance unity is critical to respond to 
        a range of destabilizing actions by the Russian Federation.
            (10) The United States withdrawal from the INF Treaty would 
        free the Russian Federation to expand deployment of the SSC-8 
        missile system in ways that threaten NATO and Indo-Pacific 
        allies without bearing any international legal cost in doing 
        so.
            (11) The Department of Defense has also not yet identified 
        the full estimated research, development, testing, and 
        evaluation, procurement, or personnel costs of producing, 
        testing, and deploying a new shorter- or intermediate-range 
        ground-launched cruise or ballistic missile currently 
        prohibited by the INF Treaty.
            (12) No European or Asian ally has publicly declared its 
        willingness or readiness to host a future United States 
        intermediate- or shorter-range ground-launched cruise or 
        ballistic missile currently prohibited by the INF Treaty should 
        the United States seek to deploy that capability.
            (13) The Secretary General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg, 
        stated on November 12, 2018, that ``NATO has no intention to 
        deploy new nuclear missiles in Europe,'' which follows United 
        States National Security Advisor John Bolton's statement of 
        November 9, 2018, that ``there are no American plans to seek to 
        deploy INF non-compliant missiles in Europe for the foreseeable 
        future''.
            (14) Any effort by the United States Government to proceed 
        beyond research and development of an intermediate-range cruise 
        or ballistic missile that is nuclear armed will be portrayed in 
        as deeply inconsistent with the United States obligation under 
        Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
        Weapons, signed at Washington July 1, 1968 (commonly known as 
        the ``NPT''), to ``pursue negotiations in good faith on 
        effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear 
        arms race''.
            (15) Achieving the objective of expanding the INF Treaty's 
        membership to the People's Republic of China, which has 
        deployed intermediate-range missile systems in great number, is 
        greatly diminished if parties to the existing Treaty cease 
        implementation.
            (16) The Congressional Budget Office in October 2017 
        estimated that the costs of United States nuclear weapons 
        spending over the next three decades will amount to 
        $1,200,000,000,000, or $1,700,000,000,000 when adjusted for 
        inflation, which does not include new systems proposed in the 
        2018 United States Nuclear Posture Review such as a low-yield 
        submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), sea-launched 
        cruise missile (SLCM), and a ground launched cruise missile 
        (GLCM).

SEC. 3. SENSE OF THE SENATE.

    It is the sense of the Senate that--
            (1) President Trump's announcement of the intent of the 
        United States to withdraw from the INF Treaty, without proper 
        consultation with Congress, is a serious breach of Congress's 
        proper constitutional role as a co-equal branch of government;
            (2) United States withdrawal from the INF Treaty would free 
        the Russian Federation to deploy greater quantities of the SSC-
        8 missile to the detriment of United States national security 
        and that of our allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific;
            (3) withdrawal from the INF Treaty will fail to limit or 
        eliminate China's shorter- and intermediate-range missiles; and
            (4) as opposed to formally notifying the Russian Federation 
        of the intention of the United States to withdraw, the United 
        States should seek one or more additional meetings of the 
        Special Verification Commission (SVC), and other measures 
        outlined in the ``Trump Administration INF Treaty Integrated 
        Strategy'', to resolve the concerns related to the Russian 
        Federation's violation of the Treaty and to reach agreement on 
        measures to ensure the Treaty's future viability.

SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR PROCUREMENT OR DEPLOYMENT OF 
              SHORTER- OR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE GROUND LAUNCHED BALLISTIC 
              OR CRUISE MISSILE SYSTEM.

    (a) In General.--No funds may be appropriated or otherwise made 
available for the procurement or deployment of a United States shorter- 
or intermediate-range ground launched ballistic or cruise missile 
system with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers until the 
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State and 
the Director of National Intelligence, submits a report and offers a 
briefing to the appropriate committees of Congress that--
            (1) includes a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) from a 
        NATO or Indo-Pacific ally committing it to host deployment of 
        any such missile on its own territory;
            (2) confirms that the United States has initiated efforts 
        through the Special Verification Commission (SVC) and/or other 
        high-level bilateral forums since January 1, 2018, to resolve 
        the Russian Federation's violation of the INF Treaty;
            (3) assesses the implications, in terms of the military 
        threat to the United States and its allies in Europe and the 
        Indo-Pacific, of a Russian Federation deployment of 
        intermediate-range cruise and ballistic missiles without 
        restriction;
            (4) assesses what mission requirements with respect to the 
        Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China cannot be 
        met by INF-compliant capabilities;
            (5) identifies what types of technologies and programs the 
        United States would need to pursue to offset the additional 
        Russian capabilities, and at what cost; and
            (6) identifies the ramifications of a collapse of the INF 
        Treaty on the ability to generate consensus among States 
        Parties to the NPT Treaty ahead of the 2020 NPT Review 
        Conference and assess the degree to which the Russian 
        Federation will use the United States unilateral withdrawal to 
        sow discord within the NATO alliance.
    (b) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
be unclassified with a classified annex.
    (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        Armed Services of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
        Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
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