[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3662 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>






115th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 3662

To limit the availability of funds to extend the implementation of the 
               New START Treaty, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           November 28, 2018

  Mr. Cotton introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
             referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
To limit the availability of funds to extend the implementation of the 
               New START Treaty, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Stopping Russian Nuclear Aggression 
Act''.

SEC. 2. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS TO EXTEND THE 
              IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW START TREATY.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The New START Treaty provides that ``[w]hen a Party 
        believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is 
        emerging, that Party shall have the right to raise the question 
        of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the 
        Bilateral Consultative Commission''.
            (2) Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin stated in a 
        March 1, 2018, public speech that--
                    (A) ``I will speak about the newest systems of 
                Russian strategic weapons that we are creating . . . we 
                have embarked on the development of the next generation 
                of missiles.'';
                    (B) ``We started to develop new types of strategic 
                arms that do not use ballistic trajectories at all when 
                moving toward a target.'';
                    (C) ``One of them is a small-scale heavy-duty 
                nuclear energy unit that can be installed in a missile 
                like our latest X-101 air-launched missile . . . . In 
                late 2017, Russia successfully launched its latest 
                nuclear-powered missile at the central training ground. 
                During its flight, the nuclear-powered engine reached 
                its design capacity and provided the necessary 
                propulsion.'';
                    (D) ``[i]n December 2017, an innovative nuclear 
                power unit for this unmanned underwater vehicle 
                completed a test cycle that lasted many years . . . 
                [t]he tests that were conducted enabled us to begin 
                developing a new type of strategic weapon that would 
                carry massive nuclear ordnance'';
                    (E) ``[b]y the way, we have yet to choose names for 
                these two new strategic weapons, the global range 
                cruise missile and the unmanned underwater vehicle. We 
                are waiting for suggestions from the Defense 
                Ministry'';
                    (F) ``A real technological breakthrough is the 
                development of a strategic missile system with 
                fundamentally new combat equipment--a gliding wing 
                unit, which has also been successfully tested . . . 
                [w]e called it the Avangard''; and
                    (G) ``I want to specifically emphasize that the 
                newly developed strategic arms--in fact, new types of 
                strategic weapons--are not the result of something left 
                over from the Soviet Union. Of course, we relied on 
                some ideas from our ingenious predecessors. But 
                everything I have described today is the result of the 
                last several years, the product of dozens of research 
                organizations, design bureaus and institute.''.
            (3) During the House Armed Services Committee hearing on 
        April 12, 2018, Secretary of Defense James Mattis was asked 
        whether Russia should honor the terms of the treaty and limit 
        its new strategic offensive arms under the New START Treaty as 
        it requires and he stated, ``Sir, I believe they should.''.
            (4) At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on 
        September 18, 2018, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control 
        and International Security Andrea Thompson stated, ``The value 
        of any arms control agreement is derived from our treaty 
        partners maintaining compliance with their obligations and 
        avoiding actions that result in mistrust and the potential for 
        miscalculation. Russia continues to violate a series of arms 
        control obligations that undermine the trust the United States 
        can place in treaties.''.
            (5) At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on 
        September 18, 2018, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy 
        David Trachtenberg stated that--
                    (A) ``The bottom line is that arms control with 
                Russia is troubled because the Russian Federation 
                apparently believes it need only abide by the 
                agreements that suit it. As a result, the credibility 
                of all international agreements with Russia is at 
                risk''; and
                    (B) ``Any decision on extending the treaty will, 
                and should be, based on a realistic assessment of 
                whether the New START treaty remains in our national 
                security interests in light of overall Russian arms 
                control behavior''.
    (b) Limitation.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no 
funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for 
fiscal year 2019 or any subsequent fiscal year may be obligated or 
expended to extend the implementation of the New START Treaty beyond 
the current expiration date in 2021 unless the President certifies to 
the appropriate congressional committees that--
            (1) extending the New START Treaty is in the national 
        security interest of the United States; and
            (2) the Russian Federation has--
                    (A) agreed to include all covered Russian systems 
                under the limits set by the New START Treaty; and
                    (B) in accordance with paragraph (a)(12) of the 
                resolution advising and consenting to the ratification 
                of the New START Treaty, adopted in the Senate on 
                December 22, 2010 (Treaty Document 111-5), entered into 
                an agreement with the United States to address the 
                disparity between the nonstrategic (tactical) nuclear 
                weapons stockpiles of the Russian Federation and of the 
                United States by securing and reducing in a verifiable 
                manner Russian tactical nuclear weapons.
    (c) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
                Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
                Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
                Representatives.
            (2) New start treaty.--The term ``New START Treaty'' means 
        the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian 
        Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation 
        of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Prague, April 8, 2010, 
        and entered into force February 5, 2011.
            (3) Covered russian systems.--The term ``covered Russian 
        systems'' means the following systems:
                    (A) The heavy intercontinental missile system known 
                as ``Sarmat'', or otherwise identified.
                    (B) An air-launched nuclear-powered cruise missile 
                known as ``X-101'', or otherwise identified.
                    (C) An unmanned underwater vehicle known as 
                ``Status 6'', or otherwise identified.
                    (D) The long-distance guided flight hypersonic 
                weapons system known by ``Avangard'', or otherwise 
                identified.
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