[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3171 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>






115th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 3171

    To require an unclassified interagency report on the political 
influence operations of the Government of China and the Communist Party 
  of China with respect to the United States, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             June 28, 2018

  Mr. Rubio (for himself, Ms. Cortez Masto, Mr. Cornyn, Mr. Cruz, Mr. 
  Cotton, Mr. Gardner, and Mr. Markey) introduced the following bill; 
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
    To require an unclassified interagency report on the political 
influence operations of the Government of China and the Communist Party 
  of China with respect to the United States, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Countering the Chinese Government 
and Communist Party's Political Influence Operations Act''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
                    (B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
                    (C) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate;
                    (D) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
                Pensions of the Senate;
                    (E) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
                    (F) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
                Senate;
                    (G) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
                Affairs of the Senate;
                    (H) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
                Representatives;
                    (I) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
                Representatives;
                    (J) the Committee on Education and the Workforce of 
                the House of Representatives;
                    (K) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives;
                    (L) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
                Representatives;
                    (M) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
                of the House of Representatives; and
                    (N) the Committee on Financial Services of the 
                House of Representatives.
            (2) Political influence operations.--The term ``political 
        influence operations'' means the coordinated and often 
        concealed application of disinformation, press manipulation, 
        economic coercion, targeted investments, corruption, or 
        academic censorship. Such efforts are often intended--
                    (A) to coerce and corrupt United States interests, 
                institutions, or individuals; and
                    (B) to foster attitudes, behavior, decisions, or 
                outcomes in the United States that support the 
                interests of the Government of the People's Republic of 
                China or the Communist Party of China.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) The Government of China and the Communist Party of 
        China employ a wide range of political, informational, and 
        economic measures to influence, coerce, intimidate, or 
        undermine the United States interests or the interests of 
        United States partners and allies.
            (2) The December 2017 National Security Strategy of the 
        United States of America states, ``Although the United States 
        seeks to continue to cooperate with China, China is using 
        economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and 
        implied military threats to persuade other states to heed its 
        political and security agenda.''
            (3) The political influence operations efforts of the 
        Government of China and the Communist Party of China have 
        received less scrutiny than the efforts of the Government of 
        the Russian Federation, but given China's economic strength and 
        the growing apparatus being used to spread its influence 
        globally, efforts to promote its authoritarian ideal pose 
        significant and consequential long-term challenges to United 
        States interests and values.
            (4) The Government of China and the Communist Party of 
        China use both overt and covert means to target the political 
        and economic elite, the media and public opinion, civil society 
        and academia, and members of the Chinese diaspora.
            (5) The Government of China and the Communist Party of 
        China employ an array of government entities, friendship and 
        exchange organizations, and government-funded foundations, 
        think tanks, educational and other projects to carry out 
        political influence operations, which is often referred to as 
        united front work.
            (6) These political influence operations violate national 
        sovereignty, and as such, are fundamentally different from 
        traditional efforts by states to shape international policy 
        debates and improve their public image through public diplomacy 
        and strategic communications campaigns.
            (7) The aims of the political influence operations of the 
        Government of China and the Communist Party of China are--
                    (A) to secure the political stability of the regime 
                within China; and
                    (B) to globally promote the idea that the Chinese 
                political and economic model is superior to the 
                governments of Western democracies.
            (8) The political influence operations of the Government of 
        China and the Communist Party of China take advantage of the 
        open and democratic nature of the United States, including--
                    (A) constitutional protections for free speech and 
                a free press; and
                    (B) the desire of some individuals or institutions 
                to attract Chinese investment, gain access to Chinese 
                markets, or attain greater global influence.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the political influence operations of the Government of 
        China and the Communist Party of China are not ``soft power'' 
        intended to persuade, but ``sharp power'' intended--
                    (A) to penetrate or corrupt democratic countries;
                    (B) to foster attitudes, behavior, laws, and 
                policies favorable to the Government of China's 
                interest through disinformation, coercion, and other 
                means;
                    (C) to widen the scope of Chinese authoritarian 
                influence around the world, including to suppress 
                political dissent and internationally recognized human 
                and civil rights of their citizens in nations around 
                the world; and
                    (D) to undermine the strength of American alliances 
                around the world; and
            (2) the American people need reliable and current 
        information--
                    (A) to understand the malign goals of these 
                political influence operations;
                    (B) to identify the key institutions, individuals, 
                entities, and ministries that carry out such 
                operations; and
                    (C) to distinguish the entities referred to in 
                subparagraph (B) from the cultural, educational, and 
                people-to-people exchanges that benefit the United 
                States and China.
    (c) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to clearly differentiate between the Chinese people and 
        culture and the Government of China and the Communist Party of 
        China in official statements, media, and messaging;
            (2) to clearly differentiate between legal, internationally 
        accepted public diplomacy and strategic communications 
        campaigns and illicit activities to undermine democratic 
        institutions or freedoms;
            (3) to ensure that efforts to curtail the political 
        influence operations of the Government of China and the 
        Communist Party of China do not lead to the targeting of 
        Chinese Americans or members of the Chinese diaspora, who are 
        often the victims and primary targets of such political 
        influence operations;
            (4) to take steps to ensure that Chinese nationals who are 
        legally studying, living, or working temporarily in the United 
        States know that intimidation or surveillance by the Government 
        of China and the Communist Party of China is an unacceptable 
        invasion of their rights while they reside in the United 
        States;
            (5) to enhance cooperation and coordination with Australia, 
        Canada, New Zealand, and Taiwan (officially known as the 
        ``Republic of China''), whose governments and institutions have 
        faced acute pressure from the political influence operations of 
        the Government of China and the Communist Party of China, and 
        with other allies throughout the world--
                    (A) to counter such political influence operations;
                    (B) to curtail the advancement of authoritarian 
                ideals that challenge democratic values and 
                international human rights norms;
                    (C) to create strategies to ensure that countries 
                in Africa, the Western Hemisphere, Southeast Asia, and 
                elsewhere are aware of China's ``sharp power''; and
                    (D) to work collaboratively to counter coercive, 
                covert, and corrupting elements;
            (6) to develop a strategic assessment and long-term 
        strategy to counter the political influence operations of the 
        Government of China and the Communist Party of China that--
                    (A) undermine democratic institutions;
                    (B) target United States citizens or nationals or 
                intimidates their families in China; and
                    (C) use economic tools, market access, 
                cyberattacks, or other capabilities to undermine the 
                freedoms of speech, expression, the press, association, 
                assembly, religion, or academic thought;
            (7) to implement more advanced transparency requirements 
        concerning collaboration with Chinese actors for media 
        agencies, universities, think tanks, and government officials;
            (8) to use various forums to raise awareness about--
                    (A) the goals and methods of the political 
                influence operations of the Government of China and the 
                Communist Party of China; and
                    (B) common patterns and approaches used by Chinese 
                intelligence agencies or related actors;
            (9) to require greater transparency for Confucius 
        Institutes, think tanks, academic programs, and nongovernmental 
        organizations funded primarily by the Government of China or by 
        individuals or public or private organizations with a 
        demonstrable affiliation with the Government of China that are 
        operating in the United States to register through the Foreign 
        Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 612) or a comparable 
        mechanism;
            (10) to seek ways to increase Chinese language proficiency 
        among mid-career professionals;
            (11) to ensure that existing tools are sufficiently 
        screening for the risk of Chinese influence operations; and
            (12) to create more flexible tools, as needed, with the 
        goals of--
                    (A) screening investments from the Government of 
                China or sources backed by the Government of China to 
                protect against the takeover of United States companies 
                by Chinese state-owned or state-driven entities; and
                    (B) protecting institutions or business sectors 
                critically important to United States national security 
                and the viability of democratic institutions.

SEC. 4. REPORT ON THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT 
              OF CHINA AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
Director of National Intelligence, and in consultation with the heads 
of relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall submit an 
unclassified report to the appropriate congressional committees that 
describes the political influence operations of the Government of China 
and the Communist Party of China affecting the United States and not 
more than 5 allies and partners most impacted by the Government of 
China's influence operations in their countries, as defined by the 
Director of National Intelligence, including efforts--
            (1) to exert undue influence over United States 
        governmental or nongovernmental institutions or individuals, or 
        government officials among United States allies and partners;
            (2) to coerce or threaten United States citizens or legal 
        permanent residents or their families or relatives living in 
        China;
            (3) to undermine democratic institutions and the freedoms 
        of speech, expression, the press, association, assembly, 
        religion, or academic thought;
            (4) to otherwise suppress information in public fora, in 
        the United States and abroad; or
            (5) to develop or obtain property, facilities, 
        infrastructure, business entities, or other assets for use in 
        facilitating the activities described in paragraphs (1) through 
        (4).
    (b) Contents.--The report required under subsection (a) shall also 
include recommendations for the President and Congress relating to--
            (1) the need for additional resources or authorities to 
        counter political influence operations in the United States 
        directed by the Government of China or the Communist Party of 
        China, including operations carried out in concert with allies;
            (2) ways to use existing resources to develop core 
        competencies among Federal agencies and the Armed Forces in the 
        subject area of Chinese political influence operations;
            (3) whether a permanent office to monitor and respond to 
        political influence operations of the Government of China and 
        the Communist Party of China should be established within the 
        Department of State or the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence; and
            (4) whether regular public reports on the political 
        influence operations of the Government of China and the 
        Communist Party of China are needed to inform Congress and the 
        American people of the scale and scope of such operations.
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