[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3169 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

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115th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 3169

To establish as United States policy that, pending confirmation of the 
 Russian Federation's continued compliance with New START, the United 
              States should extend New START through 2026.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             June 28, 2018

  Mr. Menendez (for himself, Mr. Warner, and Mr. Reed) introduced the 
 following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 
                           Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
To establish as United States policy that, pending confirmation of the 
 Russian Federation's continued compliance with New START, the United 
              States should extend New START through 2026.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``New START Policy Act of 2018''.

SEC. 2. NEW START DEFINED.

    In this Act, the term ``New START'' means the Treaty between the 
United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the 
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed 
April 8, 2010, and entered into force February 5, 2011 (commonly known 
as the ``New START Treaty'').

SEC. 3. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Since the end of World War II, the United States has 
        relied on a robust and effective nuclear deterrent as part of 
        our national defense, particularly against the Soviet Union and 
        its successor state, the Russian Federation.
            (2) In tandem with our nuclear deterrent, the United States 
        pursued a number of arms control, disarmament, and 
        nonproliferation agreements with the Soviet Union as a means of 
        ensuring strategic stability and United States defense of the 
        homeland, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and the 
        Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.
            (3) The Nuclear Posture Review issued in February 2018 
        states that arms control agreements during the Cold War 
        ``increased transparency, moderated competition, codified rough 
        parity in strategic nuclear areas, and closed off areas of 
        competition''.
            (4) In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, the 
        United States continues to rely on a combination of nuclear 
        deterrence and strategic arms control to protect the United 
        States from nuclear attack.
            (5) On April 8, 2010, the United States and the Russian 
        Federation signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New 
        START).
            (6) In an op-ed to the Washington Post dated December 2, 
        2010, former Secretaries of State Henry A. Kissinger, George P. 
        Shultz, James A. Baker III, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, and Colin 
        L. Powell all urged the Senate to ratify New START, stating 
        that it was in ``the national interest to ratify''.
            (7) During the ratification process, New START garnered 
        bipartisan support, and the United States Senate approved New 
        START on December 22, 2010, by a 71-26 vote.
            (8) New START entered into force on February 5, 2011, 
        placing limitations on United States and Russian strategic 
        systems, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, 
        submarine launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers, as 
        well as warheads that threatened the United States.
            (9) On February 5, 2018, the central limits on United 
        States and Russia strategic nuclear arsenals took effect.
            (10) In March 2018, the United States and the Russian 
        Federation exchanged data on their respective strategic nuclear 
        arsenals in accordance with the Treaty.
            (11) Through the Treaty's verification regime, which 
        includes short-notice, on-site inspections at military bases 
        and facilities, the United States is able to verify the data 
        provided by the Russian Federation regarding its strategic 
        nuclear arsenal. The verification regime provides both 
        countries insight into each other's strategic nuclear delivery 
        systems, warheads, and facilities, as well as data exchanges to 
        track the status and makeup of nuclear weapons systems.
            (12) During a March 2017 hearing of the Committee on Armed 
        Services of the House of Representatives on nuclear deterrence 
        requirements, Commander of the United States Strategic Command 
        (STRATCOM) and Air Force General John Hyten voiced his 
        enthusiastic support for the Treaty, saying he was ``a big 
        supporter'' and stating ``when it comes to nuclear weapons and 
        nuclear capabilities, that bilateral, verifiable arms control 
        agreements are essential to our ability to provide an effective 
        deterrent''.
            (13) In the same hearing, Air Force General Paul Selva, the 
        Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also endorsed the 
        treaty, saying New START is ``a bilateral, verifiable agreement 
        that gives us some degree of predictability on what our 
        potential adversaries look like''.
            (14) Lieutenant General Jack Weinstein, the Air Force 
        Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear 
        Integration, asserted that New START was of ``huge value'' to 
        United States security.
            (15) The Nuclear Posture Review states that arms control 
        agreements can ``foster transparency, understanding, and 
        predictability in adversary relations, thereby reducing the 
        risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation''.
            (16) New START strengthens United States nuclear security 
        and strategic stability by reducing the number of strategic 
        systems in Russia's nuclear arsenal and provides the United 
        States with the inspection and monitoring tools necessary to 
        confidently verify Russian compliance with New START.
            (17) New START does not restrict United States nuclear 
        modernization programs or limit United States missile defense 
        efforts.

SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    Unless the President determines and so informs Congress that Russia 
is not in material compliance with New START, it is the policy of the 
United States to extend New START from its initial termination date in 
February 2021 to February 2026, as allowed in the Treaty.
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