[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3142 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>






115th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 3142

 To provide for proper oversight of North Korea policy, and for other 
                               purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             June 26, 2018

  Mr. Menendez (for himself and Mr. Gardner) introduced the following 
  bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign 
                               Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
 To provide for proper oversight of North Korea policy, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``North Korea Policy Oversight Act of 
2018''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate;
                    (B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
                    (C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives; and
                    (D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
                Representatives.
            (2) Nuclear nonproliferation treaty.--The term ``nuclear 
        nonproliferation treaty'' means the Treaty on the Non-
        Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, 
        and Moscow July 1, 1968 (21 UST 483).

SEC. 3. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The world faces a greater risk of nuclear conflict 
        today than at any time since the height of the Cold War, due to 
        Kim Jong-un's relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons and 
        ballistic missiles in the face of global condemnation and 
        unprecedented economic sanctions from the international 
        community.
            (2) The North Korean nuclear program did not arise 
        instantaneously, but is the culmination of the rogue regime's 
        illegal efforts over 6 decades to acquire a viable deterrent 
        that threatens both the United States and our critical allies 
        in the Pacific region.
            (3) North Korea has conducted 6 nuclear tests since 2006, 
        with each test increasing in explosive strength.
            (4) North Korea's latest nuclear test, occurring on 
        September 3, 2017, was its largest nuclear explosion to date, 
        registering a 6.3 magnitude earthquake according to the United 
        States Geological Survey with an estimated yield of 140 
        kilotons.
            (5) According to open source analysis, North Korea has 
        produced enough fissile material for at least 30 to 60 nuclear 
        weapons.
            (6) North Korea maintains a robust ballistic missile 
        portfolio that includes a diverse array of delivery systems 
        capable of striking targets throughout the region, including 
        short-range Scuds, medium-range No-Dong missiles, and 
        intercontinental ballistic missiles that are potentially 
        capable of targeting the United States mainland.
            (7) The Department of Defense estimates that North Korea 
        currently wields approximately 200 launchers capable of firing 
        short and medium range ballistic missiles.
            (8) Increasingly rigorous international economic sanctions 
        applied since the passage of the North Korea Sanctions and 
        Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (Public Law 114-122), including 
        by the United States and the United Nations Security Council, 
        have clearly intensified pressure on the regime and focused 
        international attention on the urgency of the challenge posed 
        by the Kim regime in Pyongyang.
            (9) The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of 
        Korea has flagrantly defied the international community by 
        illicitly developing its nuclear and ballistic missile 
        programs, in violation of United Nations Security Council 
        Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 
        2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 
        (2017).
            (10) The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of 
        Korea engages in gross human rights abuses against its own 
        people and citizens of other countries, including the United 
        States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan.
            (11) Kim Jong-un appears to have signaled an interest in 
        undertaking diplomatic talks that could provide an opening for 
        re-initiating negotiations regarding the regime's nuclear 
        program and peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
            (12) The stakes for the security of the United States and 
        United States allies are such that all credible diplomatic 
        options must be prioritized, resourced, and fully pursued.
            (13) Economic pressure and sanctions provide critical 
        leverage in any such diplomatic negotiations and must be 
        maintained and strengthened until the North Korean regime takes 
        meaningful and verifiable actions toward denuclearization.
            (14) The North Korean regime has a record of failing to 
        live up to its diplomatic commitments, rejecting good faith 
        efforts by United States and international negotiators, and 
        leveraging talks to extract concessions such as sanctions 
        relief.
            (15) The United States Government should continue a 
        campaign of economic pressure and sanctions, counter-
        proliferation, containment, and deterrence to prevent the 
        regime from further developing, using, or disseminating nuclear 
        or ballistic weapons, technology, and related material until 
        North Korea takes significant, meaningful, and verifiable steps 
        to complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization.
            (16) On June 13, 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said, 
        ``President Trump has been incredibly clear about the 
        sequencing of denuclearization and relief from the sanctions. 
        We are going to get complete denuclearization; only then will 
        there be relief from the sanctions.''.
            (17) The North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act 
        of 2016 states that there can be no sanctions relief unless 
        North Korea has ``made significant progress toward completely, 
        verifiably, and irreversibly dismantling all of its nuclear, 
        chemical, biological, and radiological weapons programs, 
        including all programs for the development of systems designed 
        in whole or in part for the delivery of such weapons''.
            (18) The United States Government has successfully pursued 
        a policy of deterrence, which has kept the American people safe 
        from a nuclear attack from the Russian Federation, China, and 
        other states with nuclear weapons, which have a combined 
        nuclear arsenal of more than 7,000 warheads.
            (19) Over time, the United States policy of deterrence, 
        containment, and diplomacy to reduce nuclear weapons risks 
        protected the American people and contributed to the peaceful 
        dissolution of the Soviet Union.
            (20) The United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan 
        are all free societies that are committed to the principles of 
        inclusive democracy, respect for human potential and individual 
        character, and the belief that the peaceful spread of these 
        principles will result in a safer and brighter future for all 
        of mankind.
            (21) The Governments and people of the United States, the 
        Republic of Korea, and Japan can help realize this future 
        through further strengthening their economic, political, 
        social, cultural, and security relationships.
            (22) The Governments and people of the United States, the 
        Republic of Korea, and Japan share a commitment to free and 
        open markets, high standards for the free flow of commerce and 
        trade, and the establishment of an inclusive architecture for 
        regional and global trade and development.
            (23) The United States-Japan and United States-Republic of 
        Korea security alliances have evolved considerably over many 
        decades and will continue to transform as genuine partnerships, 
        sharing greater responsibilities and dedicated to ensuring a 
        secure and prosperous region and world.
            (24) Robust military posture, including regular training 
        and exercises, by the United States, the Republic of Korea, and 
        Japan, is critical to ensuring peace and stability in Northeast 
        Asia.
            (25) Kim Jong-un, who is operating as a ruthless and cruel 
        despot in pursuit of his own ambitions, has demonstrated an 
        overwhelming interest in regime survival, such that the 
        preponderance of experts believe with confidence that he can be 
        deterred from initiating a nuclear attack on the United States 
        or its allies that would lead to the certain destruction of his 
        regime.
            (26) In the absence of an imminent threat to the United 
        States or its allies, a preventive war against North Korea 
        would pose extraordinary risks to the United States and 
        security in Northeast Asia and would require consent of 
        Congress under article I of the Constitution.
            (27) An effective policy of deterrence requires--
                    (A) clear, consistent, and credible messaging of 
                costs to an adversary such that they recognize that 
                their use of nuclear weapons would result in massive 
                retaliation; and
                    (B) the vigorous use of diplomatic, economic, 
                military, and other coercive tools to ensure stable 
                deterrence and prevent an adversary from proliferating 
                material or technology.
            (28) The Panmunjom Declaration and the June 12, 2018, 
        summit in Singapore between President Trump and Kim Jong-un 
        (``U.S.-DPRK Summit''), where it was reaffirmed that the DPRK 
        ``commits to working toward the complete denuclearization of 
        the Korean Peninsula'' are welcome steps toward alleviating 
        tensions on the Korean Peninsula, but further progress must be 
        made to ensure and verify the complete denuclearization of the 
        Korean Peninsula.
            (29) The joint statement issued by the United States and 
        the DPRK after the Singapore Summit stated, ``the United States 
        and the DPRK commit to hold follow-on negotiations, led by the 
        U.S. Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, and a relevant high-level 
        DPRK official, at the earliest possible date, to implement the 
        outcomes of the U.S.-DPRK summit.''.
            (30) The May 10, 2018, release of Tony Kim, Kim Hak-song, 
        and Kim Dong-chul, who had been held hostage by the Government 
        of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, is a positive 
        sign for the possibility of a diplomatic pathway to 
        denuclearization, peace, and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
            (31) On April 22, 2018, Kim Jong-un asserted that North 
        Korea had completed its quest for nuclear weapons, stating that 
        ``under the proven condition of complete nuclear weapons, we no 
        longer need any nuclear tests, mid-range and intercontinental 
        ballistic rocket tests, and that the nuclear test site in 
        northern area has also completed its mission''.
            (32) Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, in his prepared 
        remarks during his confirmation hearing to the Committee on 
        Foreign Relations of the Senate on April 12, 2018, stated, 
        ``There is no higher diplomatic task for the State Department 
        team than solving this decades-in-the-making threat to our 
        nation'' when discussing North Korea.
            (33) President Donald J. Trump outlined his belief that Kim 
        Jong-un is being forthright in his desire to agree to a nuclear 
        deal with the United States, when he said, ``Chairman Kim and I 
        just signed a joint statement in which he reaffirmed his 
        unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the 
        Korean Peninsula.''.
            (34) The United States requires a comprehensive diplomatic 
        strategy that outlines the fundamental principles, actions, and 
        verification and compliance mechanisms necessary to properly 
        engage the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of 
        Korea on the full denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

SEC. 4. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.

    (a) In General.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to pursue all credible diplomatic means to achieve the 
        complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of North 
        Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs;
            (2) until such time as denuclearization is achieved--
                    (A) to deter North Korea from using weapons of mass 
                destruction or leveraging those weapons to coerce 
                United States allies;
                    (B) to contain attempts by North Korea to 
                proliferate such weapons and technologies;
                    (C) to sustain United States and multilateral 
                efforts to reduce the risk of conflict on the Korean 
                Peninsula; and
                    (D) to continue the maximum pressure campaign 
                against North Korea and its enablers, in cooperation 
                with the United Nations and the international 
                community;
            (3) should diplomacy and deterrence fail to result in the 
        complete, verifiable denuclearization of North Korea, to 
        reserve the right to utilize all available options to protect 
        and defend United States national security interests and meet 
        United States treaty obligations; and
            (4) to uphold the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and not 
        recognize North Korea as a legitimate nuclear weapons state.
    (b) Diplomacy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to pursue diplomatic engagement with the North Korean 
        regime for the purposes of--
                    (A) advancing meaningful negotiations regarding 
                denuclearization, including the Government of North 
                Korea abandoning and dismantling its provocative 
                missile and nuclear weapons programs, ceasing its 
                proliferation activities, and coming into compliance 
                with all relevant international agreements and United 
                Nations Security Council resolutions;
                    (B) reducing the risks of military miscalculation; 
                and
                    (C) creating opportunities for the development of 
                confidence building measures;
            (2) to formulate and carry out policy affecting the Korean 
        Peninsula in close cooperation with United States allies, 
        particularly the Republic of Korea;
            (3) to encourage all nations to deny North Korea the right 
        to maintain diplomatic missions on foreign soil until such time 
        as the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
        takes credible and verifiable steps toward denuclearization;
            (4) to encourage all nations to fully implement and enforce 
        United Nations sanctions commitments with respect to North 
        Korea, including ending the practice of hosting overseas North 
        Korean workers;
            (5) to increase the effectiveness of United States 
        sanctions by seeking to work through the United Nations and 
        with other like-minded countries to ensure a multilateral 
        approach to sanctions;
            (6) to provide unmistakable assurance to Japan and the 
        Republic of Korea, including through extended deterrence 
        commitments and the presence of forward-deployed United States 
        military forces, that the United States is committed to 
        fulfilling its treaty obligations if they are attacked;
            (7) to provide support for North Korean refugees and asylum 
        seekers in accordance with United States law;
            (8) to promote the human rights and dignity of the North 
        Korean people, including through the United Nations and other 
        multilateral institutions; and
            (9) to seek opportunities for humanitarian actions, such as 
        family reunification and the return of human remains.
    (c) Economic Pressure.--It is the policy of the United States to 
sustain and calibrate economic pressure on North Korea until the regime 
undertakes meaningful and verifiable actions toward denuclearization, 
including by--
            (1) encouraging all nations to robustly implement and 
        enforce existing United Nations sanctions;
            (2) leveraging the strength of the United States financial 
        system to deny access by the Government of the Democratic 
        People's Republic of Korea and those with whom such government 
        facilitates illicit financial transactions to the United States 
        and global markets, including through the use of secondary 
        sanctions;
            (3) encouraging all nations, in accordance with United 
        Nations Security Council resolutions, to end the practice of 
        hosting North Korean citizens as guest workers, recognizing 
        that such workers are demonstrated to constitute an illicit 
        source of revenue for the Kim regime and its nuclear ambitions;
            (4) working with the international community on rigorous 
        interdiction of shipments to and from North Korea, including 
        ship-to-ship transfers, consistent with United Nations Security 
        Council resolutions that have banned nearly every major export 
        from North Korea; and
            (5) strictly enforcing United States laws with respect to 
        sanctioning entities, including Russian and Chinese entities, 
        that knowingly engage with sanctioned entities from North Korea 
        or trade in items prohibited under United Nations Security 
        Council resolutions.
    (d) Proliferation of Nuclear and Missile Technology.--It is the 
policy of the United States--
            (1) to prevent the transfer of nuclear weapons, missile 
        technology or related material to or from North Korea and other 
        states or non-state actors;
            (2) to support the efforts of the international community 
        to detect, interdict, and prevent the transfers of nuclear or 
        missile technology or related items to or from North Korea;
            (3) to prioritize close coordination with global partners, 
        including through technical assistance and capacity building, 
        to enhance the ability of the global community to monitor, 
        interdict, and prosecute entities that engage in transfer of 
        nuclear weapons, missile technology, or related material to or 
        from North Korea; and
            (4) consistent with United States obligations under the 
        nuclear nonproliferation treaty--
                    (A) to not assist any country, including Japan and 
                the Republic of Korea, in the development of nuclear 
                weapons; and
                    (B) to encourage all countries to abide by their 
                commitments under such treaty and International Atomic 
                Energy Agency agreements.
    (e) Alliances and Military Posture.--It is the policy of the United 
States--
            (1) to reaffirm the importance of the United States-Japan 
        and United States-Republic of Korea alliances for maintaining 
        peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond;
            (2) to reaffirm United States extended deterrence 
        commitments to Japan and the Republic of Korea;
            (3) to reaffirm the importance of the forward-deployed 
        presence of United States military forces in Japan and Korea, 
        and affirm close alliance coordination on any adjustment of 
        United States military posture in the region; and
            (4) to strengthen United States efforts to confront 
        emerging or asymmetric challenges, including cyber and space;
            (5) to safeguard maritime security and ensure freedom of 
        navigation, commerce, and overflight in the Indo-Pacific 
        region; and
            (6) to cooperate with allies and partners in the provision 
        of public goods to the region, including humanitarian relief 
        and disaster response.
    (f) Military Measures.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to keep United States security commitments to United 
        States allies in the face of North Korea's continuing threat, 
        including taking necessary actions for United States self-
        defense and the defense of United States allies, including 
        joint military exercises, modernization of weapons systems 
        deployed in the region, and robust counter-provocation planning 
        by the United States and Republic of Korea Combined Forces 
        Command;
            (2) consistent with longstanding United States interests in 
        attenuating strategic competition in Asia, to develop and 
        deploy effective and reliable anti-ballistic missile 
        capabilities to defend the United States homeland, United 
        States forces in the region, and United States allies Japan and 
        South Korea;
            (3) to formulate and carry out military planning and 
        operations impacting the Korean Peninsula in close cooperation 
        with United States allies, particularly the Republic of Korea 
        and Japan;
            (4) to deter North Korea in a manner that bolsters the 
        force posture and military strength of our alliance and partner 
        networks in the broader Asia-Pacific region; and
            (5) to maintain, as necessary and appropriate, credible and 
        overwhelming military options against the Government of the 
        Democratic People's Republic of Korea, consistent with efforts 
        to deter the regime from use of nuclear weapons, ballistic 
        missiles, and related technology.
    (g) Human Rights.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to continue to make it a priority to improve 
        information access in North Korea by exploring the use of new 
        and emerging technologies and expanding nongovernmental radio 
        broadcasting to North Korea, including news and information, to 
        increase information dissemination in the Democratic People's 
        Republic of Korea (``DPRK'');
            (2) to commit to revisit and explore new opportunities for 
        coordinating efforts to plan for humanitarian needs in the 
        DPRK;
            (3) to press for access for the Special Rapporteur on the 
        situation of human rights in the DPRK and the United Nations 
        High Commissioner for Human Rights;
            (4) to continue to seek cooperation from foreign 
        governments to allow the United States to process North Korean 
        refugees overseas for United States resettlement;
            (5) to urge China to halt forcible repatriation of North 
        Koreans;
            (6) to promote democracy, human rights, and a market 
        economy in North Korea; and
            (7) to increase the availability of nongovernmental 
        controlled information inside North Korea.
    (h) Information Dissemination Efforts.--It is the policy of the 
United States--
            (1) to increase the flow of information, news, and cultural 
        programming into North Korea, including through radio and 
        television broadcasts, digital media, and other means;
            (2) to increase the flow of information to North Korean 
        citizens, including through radio and television broadcasts, 
        digital media, and other means; and
            (3) to fulfill all requirements under United States law, 
        including the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act 
        of 2016, with regard to providing resources for freedom of 
        information efforts into North Korea, and to regularly consult 
        with Congress regarding such efforts.
    (i) Strategy Required.--
            (1) In general.--The President shall submit to the national 
        security committees a detailed strategy, which may include a 
        classified annex, for the implementation of policies outlined 
        in subsections (b) through (h), augmented by briefings to the 
        national security committees on a quarterly basis or as 
        requested.
            (2) National security committees defined.--In this 
        subsection, the term ``national security committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Select 
                Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Foreign 
                Relations of the Senate; and
                    (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent 
                Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on 
                Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 5. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY.

    (a) United States Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to seek the complete and verifiable denuclearization of 
        North Korea in a peaceful manner, including--
                    (A) the complete abandonment of all DPRK nuclear 
                weapons, fissile material, and existing nuclear 
                programs; and
                    (B) the DPRK returning, at an early date, to the 
                nuclear nonproliferation treaty and to International 
                Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;
            (2) to seek the complete and verifiable dismantlement of 
        all DPRK nuclear weapons-related facilities, including for--
                    (A) the production and processing of fissile 
                material; and
                    (B) scientific research related to the production 
                of nuclear weapons;
            (3) to seek appropriate inspections, verification, and 
        compliance measures, including full-scope safeguards, to assure 
        the complete denuclearization of North Korea;
            (4) to seek the complete and verifiable dismantlement of--
                    (A) all DPRK ballistic missiles, of any range; and
                    (B) all infrastructure and facilities related to 
                the production, testing, and fielding or deployment of 
                ballistic missiles;
            (5) to seek the complete and verifiable dismantlement of 
        all DPRK programs related to weapons of mass destruction, 
        including chemical and biological weapons and the industrial 
        and scientific facilities to support such programs;
            (6) to affirm that the United States has no intention to 
        undertake any military action against the DPRK that is contrary 
        to the United States Constitution and international law; and
            (7) to commit to joint efforts for lasting peace and 
        stability in Northeast Asia, including--
                    (A) facilitating the negotiation between directly 
                related parties of a permanent peace regime on the 
                Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum; and
                    (B) exploring ways and means for promoting security 
                cooperation in Northeast Asia, in conjunction with 
                significant, meaningful, and verifiable steps to 
                achieve the complete denuclearization of North Korea.
    (b) Diplomatic Strategy Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the 
        President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
        committees a report that describes--
                    (A) how the diplomatic negotiations with the 
                Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
                are expected to proceed; and
                    (B) actions taken by the United States Government 
                to address the threats posed by, and the capabilities 
                of, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
            (2) Elements.--Each report required under paragraph (1) 
        shall include--
                    (A) a summary of ongoing efforts by the United 
                States to identify diplomatic strategies and policies 
                and engage in negotiations, including an assessment of 
                the strengths and weaknesses of such strategies, 
                policies and negotiations--
                            (i) to achieve peaceful denuclearization of 
                        the Korean Peninsula;
                            (ii) to eliminate the threat posed by the 
                        ballistic missile program of the Democratic 
                        People's Republic of Korea; and
                            (iii) to continue the maximum pressure 
                        campaign, in coordination with United States 
                        allies;
                    (B) an assessment of--
                            (i) the roadmap toward peaceful 
                        denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and 
                        the elimination of the nuclear and ballistic 
                        missile threats posed by the Democratic 
                        People's Republic of Korea; and
                            (ii) specific actions that the Government 
                        of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
                        would need to take for such roadmap to become 
                        viable; and
                    (C) a summary of the United States strategy to 
                increase international coordination and cooperation, 
                whether unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally, 
                including sanctions enforcement and interdiction--
                            (i) to encourage credible diplomatic 
                        engagement by the DPRK; and
                            (ii) to address any threat posed by the 
                        nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the 
                        Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
            (3) Form.--Each report required under this subsection shall 
        be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.
            (4) Updates.--Not later than 30 days after the date the 
        first strategy report is submitted under paragraph (1), and 
        every 30 days thereafter while the United States and North 
        Korea are engaged in bilateral or multilateral diplomacy to 
        achieve, implement, or verify that North Korea's 
        denuclearization is ongoing, the President shall augment the 
        strategy report with written updates on the negotiation 
        process.
    (c) Policy of the United States With Respect to Sanctions Against 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.--
            (1) Statement of policy.--It is the policy of the United 
        States to continue to impose sanctions with respect to 
        activities of the Government of the Democratic People's 
        Republic of Korea, persons acting for or on behalf of such 
        government, and other persons in accordance with Executive 
        Order 13687 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to imposing 
        additional sanctions with respect to North Korea), Executive 
        Order 13694 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking the 
        property of certain persons engaging in significant malicious 
        cyber-enabled activities), Executive Order 13722 (50 U.S.C. 
        1701 note; relating to blocking the property of the Government 
        of North Korea and the Workers' Party of Korea, and prohibiting 
        certain transactions with respect to North Korea), and 
        Executive Order 13810 (82 Fed. Reg. 44705; relating to imposing 
        additional sanctions with respect to North Korea), as those 
        Executive orders are in effect on the day before the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, until the Government of the 
        Democratic People's Republic of Korea--
                    (A) takes meaningful and verifiable action towards 
                denuclearization, as mandated by the North Korea 
                Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016; and
                    (B) is no longer engaged in any activity described 
                in those Executive orders or in violation of United 
                Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006), 1874 
                (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 
                (2016), 2371 (2017), or 2375 (2017).
            (2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after terminating any 
        sanction with respect to the activities of the Government of 
        the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a person acting for 
        or on behalf of that government, or any other person as 
        provided in an Executive order listed in paragraph (1), the 
        Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate 
        congressional committees a report regarding the cessation of 
        any illicit activity that violates United Nations Security 
        Council Resolution 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 
        (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), or 2375 (2017) 
        by that government or person.
    (d) Alliances and Military Posture.--
            (1) Report on united states force posture in the united 
        states indo-pacific command area of responsibility.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the 
                date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days 
                thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to 
                the appropriate congressional committees a report 
                providing an assessment of the effect of any 
                negotiations or agreements with the DPRK on United 
                States security interests and United States military 
                presence and alliance implications in the United States 
                Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility.
                    (B) Elements.--The report required under 
                subparagraph (A) shall include--
                            (i) a review of current and emerging United 
                        States national security interests in the 
                        United States Indo-Pacific Command area of 
                        responsibility;
                            (ii) a review of current United States 
                        military force posture and deployment plans of 
                        the United States Indo-Pacific Command; and
                            (iii) the views of counterpart governments, 
                        including military commanders in the region.
            (2) Report on united states force posture in the united 
        states forces korea area of responsibility.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the 
                date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days 
                thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to 
                the appropriate congressional committees a report 
                providing an assessment of the effect of any 
                negotiations or agreements with the DPRK on United 
                States security interests and United States military 
                presence and alliance implications in the United States 
                Forces Korea area of responsibility.
                    (B) Elements.--The report required under 
                subparagraph (A) shall include--
                            (i) a review of current and emerging United 
                        States national security interests in the 
                        United States Forces Korea area of 
                        responsibility;
                            (ii) a review of current United States 
                        military force posture and deployment plans of 
                        the United States Forces Korea; and
                            (iii) the views of counterpart governments, 
                        including military commanders in the region.
            (3) Report on united states force posture in the united 
        states forces japan area of responsibility.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the 
                date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days 
                thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to 
                the appropriate congressional committees a report 
                providing an assessment of the effect of any 
                negotiations or agreements with the DPRK on United 
                States security interests and United States military 
                presence and alliance implications in the United States 
                Forces Japan area of responsibility.
                    (B) Elements.--The report required under 
                subparagraph (A) shall include--
                            (i) a review of current and emerging United 
                        States national security interests in the 
                        United States Forces Japan area of 
                        responsibility;
                            (ii) a review of current United States 
                        military force posture and deployment plans of 
                        the United States Forces Japan; and
                            (iii) the views of counterpart governments, 
                        including military commanders in the region.

SEC. 6. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES TROOPS ON THE KOREAN 
              PENINSULA.

    It is the sense of the Congress that--
            (1) South Korea is a close friend and ally of the United 
        States, and the United States-South Korea alliance is the 
        linchpin of peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region;
            (2) the presence of United States military forces on the 
        Korean Peninsula and across the Indo-Pacific region continues 
        to play a critical role in safeguarding the peaceful and stable 
        rules-based international order that benefits all countries;
            (3) South Korea has contributed heavily to its own defense 
        and to the defense of the United States Armed Forces in South 
        Korea, including by providing $10,000,000,000 of the 
        $10,800,000,0000 Camp Humphreys project to build and relocate 
        United States military forces to a new base in South Korea;
            (4) United States military forces, pursuant to 
        international law, are lawfully deployed on the Korean 
        Peninsula;
            (5) the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the 
        Democratic People's Republic of Korea are clear and consistent 
        violations of international law;
            (6) the long-stated strategic objective of authoritarian 
        states, such as the People's Republic of China, the Russian 
        Federation, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, has 
        been the significant removal of United States military forces 
        from the Korean Peninsula;
            (7) economic sanctions, military pressure, and diplomatic 
        measures undertaken by the United States and its allies and 
        regional partners, have contributed to bring Kim Jong-un to the 
        negotiation table; and
            (8) the removal of United States military forces from the 
        Korean Peninsula is a non-negotiable item as it relates to the 
        complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the 
        Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

SEC. 7. BRIEFINGS.

    (a) Member Briefings.--
            (1) In general.--Following each round of diplomatic talks 
        between the United States and North Korea, the Secretary of 
        State and the Director of National Intelligence shall hold, for 
        the appropriate congressional committees and congressional 
        leaders, briefings on the negotiations.
            (2) Classification.--The briefings required under paragraph 
        (1) shall be held in a classified format.
    (b) Staff Briefings.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, with the 
        concurrence of the Director of National Intelligence, shall 
        hold monthly briefings for cleared national security staff 
        members of the appropriate congressional committees.
            (2) Classification.--The briefings required under paragraph 
        (1) shall be held in a classified format.

SEC. 8. CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS.

    During each quarterly period that the diplomatic talks between the 
United States and North Korea continue, the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives shall, as appropriate, hold hearings and 
otherwise obtain information in order to fully review the negotiations.

SEC. 9. OVERSIGHT OF AGREEMENTS WITH NORTH KOREA.

    (a) Transmission to Congress of Nuclear Agreements With North Korea 
and Verification Assessment With Respect to Such Agreements.--
            (1) Transmission of agreements.--Not later than 5 days 
        after reaching an agreement with North Korea relating to the 
        nuclear and missile program of North Korea, the President shall 
        transmit to the appropriate congressional committees, the 
        Majority and Minority Leader of the Senate and the Speaker, 
        Majority Leader, and Minority Leader of the House of 
        Representatives--
                    (A) the agreement, including all related materials 
                and annexes; and
                    (B) a verification assessment report prepared by 
                the Secretary of State in accordance with paragraph 
                (2).
            (2) Verification assessment report.--
                    (A) In general.--The Secretary of State shall 
                prepare, with respect to an agreement described in 
                paragraph (1), a report assessing--
                            (i) the extent to which the Secretary will 
                        be able to verify that North Korea is complying 
                        with its obligations and commitments under the 
                        agreement, including how North Korea might 
                        attempt to conceal its program;
                            (ii) the adequacy of the safeguards and 
                        other control mechanisms and other assurances 
                        contained in the agreement with respect to 
                        North Korean nuclear and missile programs to 
                        ensure North Korea activities are limited to 
                        the subset of activities permitted under the 
                        agreement; and
                            (iii) the capacity and capability of the 
                        United States and international organizations, 
                        such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
                        to effectively implement the verification 
                        regime required by or related to the agreement, 
                        including whether the United States or 
                        international organizations will have--
                                    (I) sufficient access to--
                                            (aa) all nuclear facilities 
                                        that span the entire nuclear 
                                        fuel cycle;
                                            (bb) facilities associated 
                                        with the nuclear weaponization 
                                        program;
                                            (cc) facilities associated 
                                        with its missile program; and
                                            (dd) declared and 
                                        undeclared sites; and
                                    (II) the ability to investigate 
                                suspicious sites or allegations of 
                                covert nuclear-related activities.
                    (B) Classified annex.--The report required under 
                subparagraph (A) shall be transmitted in unclassified 
                form, but shall include a classified annex prepared in 
                consultation with the Director of National 
                Intelligence, summarizing relevant classified 
                information.
    (b) Sense of Congress on North Korea Final Agreement.--It is the 
sense of Congress that any binding agreement between the United States 
and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should be submitted to 
the United States as a treaty and subject to the advice and consent of 
the Senate in accordance with article II, section 2, clause 2 of the 
Constitution of the United States.

SEC. 10. ADDITIONAL REPORTS.

    (a) Verification and Compliance Reports.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, with the 
        concurrence of the Director of National Intelligence, shall 
        submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on 
        North Korea's record of verification and compliance.
            (2) Classification.--The report required under paragraph 
        (1)--
                    (A) may be submitted in classified form;
                    (B) shall contain an unclassified executive 
                summary; and
                    (C) may contain an unclassified annex.
    (b) Semi-Annual Report.--Not later than 180 days after entering 
into an agreement with North Korea, and not less frequently than once 
every 180 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees and leadership a report on North 
Korea's nuclear and missile program and the compliance of North Korea 
with the agreement during the period covered by the report, which shall 
include--
            (1) a description of any action or failure to act by the 
        Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that 
        breached the agreement or is in noncompliance with the terms of 
        the agreement;
            (2) a description of the status and activities of any North 
        Korea nuclear facilities related to the nuclear fuel cycle, 
        including mining and exploration, milling, conversion, 
        enrichment, fuel fabrication, reactors, reprocessing, and 
        storage;
            (3) a description of the status and activities of any North 
        Korea nuclear facilities related to the North Korean nuclear 
        weaponization program, including research and development, 
        education and training, and testing;
            (4) a description of the status and activities of any North 
        Korea missile facilities, including research and development, 
        production, testing, and basing;
            (5) a description of any delay by the Government of the 
        Democratic People's Republic of Korea of more than 1 week in 
        providing inspectors access to facilities, people, and 
        documents in North Korea as required by the agreement;
            (6) a description of any covert nuclear activities 
        undertaken by the Government of the Democratic People's 
        Republic of Korea, including any covert nuclear weapons-
        related, covert fissile material activities, covert missile 
        activities, or research and development; and
            (7) a description of any transfer or diversion by the 
        Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its 
        nuclear materials, components, technology, or equipment to 
        state or non-state actors.
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