[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3049 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

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115th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 3049

To amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to require paper ballots and 
 risk-limiting audits in all Federal elections, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             June 12, 2018

 Mr. Wyden (for himself, Mrs. Gillibrand, Ms. Warren, Mrs. Murray, Mr. 
Markey, and Mr. Merkley) introduced the following bill; which was read 
    twice and referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
To amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to require paper ballots and 
 risk-limiting audits in all Federal elections, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Protecting American Votes and 
Elections Act of 2018''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Access to the ballot, free and fair elections, and a 
        trustworthy election process are at the core of American 
        Democracy. Just as the Founding Fathers signed their names to 
        paper supporting their views for a government by and for the 
        people, access to the paper ballot is the best way to ensure 
        elections stay by and for the American people. Using paper 
        provides an easily auditable, tamper proof, and simple way for 
        citizens to access their ballot. It is for these reasons and 
        more that using paper ballots to ensure resilient and fair 
        elections should be the priority of this Nation.
            (2) Risk-limiting audits will help to protect our elections 
        from cyberattacks, by ensuring that if the electoral outcome is 
        incorrect, for instance because someone tampered with the 
        electronic counts or reporting, the audit has a large, known 
        probability of correcting the outcome by requiring a full hand 
        count. Paper ballots are vital to the audit process since, 
        other than through manual inspection of a sample of paper 
        ballots, there is currently no reliable way to determine 
        whether an election was hacked or the outcome was 
        miscalculated.
            (3) Risk-limiting audits are a cost effective way of 
        auditing election results. They generally require inspecting 
        only a small percentage of the ballots cast in an election, and 
        proceed to a full hand count only when sampling does not 
        provide strong evidence that the reported outcome is correct. 
        This will ensure that Americans have confidence in their 
        election results, without the cost of a full recount of every 
        ballot in the country.

SEC. 3. PAPER BALLOT AND MANUAL COUNTING REQUIREMENTS.

    (a) In General.--Section 301(a)(2) of the Help America Vote Act of 
2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)(2)) is amended to read as follows:
            ``(2) Paper ballot requirement.--
                    ``(A) Voter-verified paper ballots.--
                            ``(i) Paper ballot requirement.--(I) The 
                        voting system shall require the use of an 
                        individual, durable, voter-verified, paper 
                        ballot of the voter's vote that shall be marked 
                        and made available for inspection and 
                        verification by the voter before the voter's 
                        vote is cast and counted, and which shall be 
                        counted by hand or read by an optical character 
                        recognition device or other counting device. 
                        For purposes of this subclause, the term 
                        `individual, durable, voter-verified, paper 
                        ballot' means a paper ballot marked by the 
                        voter by hand or a paper ballot marked through 
                        the use of a nontabulating ballot marking 
                        device or system, so long as the voter shall 
                        have the option to mark his or her ballot by 
                        hand.
                            ``(II) The voting system shall provide the 
                        voter with an opportunity to correct any error 
                        on the paper ballot before the permanent voter-
                        verified paper ballot is preserved in 
                        accordance with clause (ii).
                            ``(III) The voting system shall not 
                        preserve the voter-verified paper ballots in 
                        any manner that makes it possible, at any time 
                        after the ballot has been cast, to associate a 
                        voter with the record of the voter's vote 
                        without the voter's consent.
                            ``(ii) Preservation as official record.--
                        The individual, durable, voter-verified, paper 
                        ballot used in accordance with clause (i) shall 
                        constitute the official ballot and shall be 
                        preserved and used as the official ballot for 
                        purposes of any recount or audit conducted with 
                        respect to any election for Federal office in 
                        which the voting system is used.
                            ``(iii) Manual counting requirements for 
                        recounts and audits.--(I) Each paper ballot 
                        used pursuant to clause (i) shall be suitable 
                        for a manual audit, and shall be counted by 
                        hand in any recount or audit conducted with 
                        respect to any election for Federal office.
                            ``(II) In the event of any inconsistencies 
                        or irregularities between any electronic vote 
                        tallies and the vote tallies determined by 
                        counting by hand the individual, durable, 
                        voter-verified, paper ballots used pursuant to 
                        clause (i), and subject to subparagraph (B), 
                        the individual, durable, voter-verified, paper 
                        ballots shall be the true and correct record of 
                        the votes cast.
                            ``(iv) Application to all ballots.--The 
                        requirements of this subparagraph shall apply 
                        to all ballots cast in elections for Federal 
                        office, including ballots cast by absent 
                        uniformed services voters and overseas voters 
                        under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens 
                        Absentee Voting Act and other absentee voters.
                    ``(B) Special rule for treatment of disputes when 
                paper ballots have been shown to be compromised.--
                            ``(i) In general.--In the event that--
                                    ``(I) there is any inconsistency 
                                between any electronic vote tallies and 
                                the vote tallies determined by counting 
                                by hand the individual, durable, voter-
                                verified, paper ballots used pursuant 
                                to subparagraph (A)(i) with respect to 
                                any election for Federal office; and
                                    ``(II) it is demonstrated by clear 
                                and convincing evidence (as determined 
                                in accordance with the applicable 
                                standards in the jurisdiction involved) 
                                in any recount, audit, or contest of 
                                the result of the election that the 
                                paper ballots have been compromised (by 
                                damage or mischief or otherwise) and 
                                that a sufficient number of the ballots 
                                have been so compromised that the 
                                result of the election could be 
                                changed,
                        the determination of the appropriate remedy 
                        with respect to the election shall be made in 
                        accordance with applicable State law, except 
                        that the electronic tally shall not be used as 
                        the exclusive basis for determining the 
                        official certified result.
                            ``(ii) Rule for consideration of ballots 
                        associated with each voting machine.--For 
                        purposes of clause (i), only the paper ballots 
                        deemed compromised, if any, shall be considered 
                        in the calculation of whether or not the result 
                        of the election could be changed due to the 
                        compromised paper ballots.''.
    (b) Conforming Amendment Clarifying Applicability of Alternative 
Language Accessibility.--Section 301(a)(4) of such Act (52 U.S.C. 
21081(a)(4)) is amended by inserting ``(including the paper ballots 
required to be used under paragraph (2))'' after ``voting system''.
    (c) Other Conforming Amendments.--Section 301(a)(1) of such Act (52 
U.S.C. 21081(a)(1)) is amended--
            (1) in subparagraph (A)(i), by striking ``counted'' and 
        inserting ``counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and 
        (3)'';
            (2) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking ``counted'' and 
        inserting ``counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and 
        (3)'';
            (3) in subparagraph (A)(iii), by striking ``counted'' each 
        place it appears and inserting ``counted, in accordance with 
        paragraphs (2) and (3)''; and
            (4) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking ``counted'' and 
        inserting ``counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and 
        (3)''.
    (d) Effective Date.--Notwithstanding section 301(d) of the Help 
America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(d)), each State and 
jurisdiction shall be required to comply with the amendments made by 
this section for the regularly scheduled election for Federal office in 
November 2020, and for each subsequent election for Federal office.

SEC. 4. ACCESSIBILITY AND BALLOT VERIFICATION FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH 
              DISABILITIES.

    (a) In General.--Section 301(a)(3)(B) of the Help America Vote Act 
of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)(3)(B)) is amended to read as follows:
                    ``(B)(i) satisfy the requirement of subparagraph 
                (A) through the use of at least 1 voting system 
                equipped for individuals with disabilities, including 
                nonvisual and enhanced visual accessibility for the 
                blind and visually impaired, and nonmanual and enhanced 
                manual accessibility for the mobility and dexterity 
                impaired, at each polling place; and
                    ``(ii) meet the requirements of subparagraph (A) 
                and paragraph (2)(A) by using a system that--
                            ``(I) allows the voter to privately and 
                        independently verify the permanent paper ballot 
                        through the presentation, in accessible form, 
                        of the printed or marked vote selections from 
                        the same printed or marked information that 
                        would be used for any vote counting or 
                        auditing; and
                            ``(II) allows the voter to privately and 
                        independently verify and cast the permanent 
                        paper ballot without requiring the voter to 
                        manually handle the paper ballot; and''.
    (b) Specific Requirement of Study, Testing, and Development of 
Accessible Paper Ballot Verification Mechanisms.--
            (1) Study and reporting.--Subtitle C of title II of such 
        Act (52 U.S.C. 21081 et seq.) is amended by inserting after 
        section 246 the following new section:

``SEC. 246A. STUDY AND REPORT ON ACCESSIBLE PAPER BALLOT VERIFICATION 
              MECHANISMS.

    ``(a) Study and Report.--The Director of the National Science 
Foundation shall make grants to not fewer than 3 eligible entities to 
study, test, and develop accessible paper ballot voting, verification, 
and casting mechanisms and devices and best practices to enhance the 
accessibility of paper ballot voting and verification mechanisms for 
individuals with disabilities, for voters whose primary language is not 
English, and for voters with difficulties in literacy, including best 
practices for the mechanisms themselves and the processes through which 
the mechanisms are used.
    ``(b) Eligibility.--An entity is eligible to receive a grant under 
this part if it submits to the Director (at such time and in such form 
as the Director may require) an application containing--
            ``(1) certifications that the entity shall specifically 
        investigate enhanced methods or devices, including non-
        electronic devices, that will assist such individuals and 
        voters in marking voter-verified paper ballots and presenting 
        or transmitting the information printed or marked on such 
        ballots back to such individuals and voters, and casting such 
        ballots;
            ``(2) a certification that the entity shall complete the 
        activities carried out with the grant not later than December 
        31, 2020; and
            ``(3) such other information and certifications as the 
        Director may require.
    ``(c) Availability of Technology.--Any technology developed with 
the grants made under this section shall be treated as non-proprietary 
and shall be made available to the public, including to manufacturers 
of voting systems.
    ``(d) Coordination With Grants for Technology Improvements.--The 
Director shall carry out this section so that the activities carried 
out with the grants made under subsection (a) are coordinated with the 
research conducted under the grant program carried out by the 
Commission under section 271, to the extent that the Director and 
Commission determine necessary to provide for the advancement of 
accessible voting technology.
    ``(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated to carry out subsection (a) $10,000,000, to remain 
available until expended.''.
            (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents of such Act 
        is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 246 
        the following new item:

``Sec. 246A. Study and report on accessible paper ballot verification 
                            mechanisms.''.

SEC. 5. RISK-LIMITING AUDITS.

    (a) In General.--Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 
U.S.C. 21081 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 303 the 
following new section:

``SEC. 303A. RISK-LIMITING AUDITS.

    ``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
            ``(1) Risk-limiting audit.--
                    ``(A) In general.--The term `risk-limiting audit' 
                means a post-election process such that, if the 
                reported outcome of the contest is incorrect, there is 
                at least a 95 percent chance that the audit will 
                replace the incorrect outcome with the correct outcome 
                as determined by a full, hand-to-eye tabulation of all 
                votes validly cast in that election contest that 
                ascertains voter intent manually and directly from 
                voter-verifiable paper records.
                    ``(B) Reported outcome.--The term `reported 
                outcome' means the outcome of an election contest which 
                is determined according to the canvass and which will 
                become the official, certified outcome unless it is 
                revised by an audit, recount, or other legal process.
                    ``(C) Incorrect outcome.--The term `incorrect 
                outcome' means an outcome that differs from the outcome 
                that would be determined by a full tabulation of all 
                votes validly cast in that election contest, 
                determining voter intent manually, directly from voter-
                verifiable paper records.
                    ``(D) Outcome.--The term `outcome' means the winner 
                or set of winners of an election contest, which might 
                be candidates or positions.
            ``(2) Ballot manifest.--The term `ballot manifest' means a 
        record maintained by each county that--
                    ``(A) is created without reliance on any part of 
                the voting system used to tabulate votes;
                    ``(B) functions as a sampling frame for conducting 
                a risk-limiting audit; and
                    ``(C) contains the following information about 
                ballots cast and counted:
                            ``(i) The total number of ballots cast and 
                        counted in the election (including undervotes, 
                        overvotes, and other invalid votes).
                            ``(ii) The total number of ballots cast in 
                        each contest in the election (including 
                        undervotes, overvotes, and other invalid 
                        votes).
                            ``(iii) A precise description of the manner 
                        in which the ballots are physically stored, 
                        including the total number of physical groups 
                        of ballots, the numbering system for each 
                        group, a unique label for each group, and the 
                        number of ballots in each such group.
    ``(b) Requirement.--
            ``(1) In general.--
                    ``(A) Audits.--Each State and jurisdiction shall 
                administer risk-limiting audits of the results of all 
                elections for Federal office held in the State in 
                accordance with the requirements of paragraph (2).
                    ``(B) Full manual tally.--If a risk-limiting audit 
                conducted under subparagraph (A) leads to a full manual 
                tally of an election contest, the State or jurisdiction 
                shall use the results of the full manual tally as the 
                official results of the election contest.
            ``(2) Audit requirements.--
                    ``(A) Rules and procedures.--
                            ``(i) In general.--Risk-limiting audits 
                        shall be conducted in accordance with the rules 
                        and procedures established by the chief State 
                        election official of the State not later than 1 
                        year after the date of the enactment of this 
                        section.
                            ``(ii) Matters included.--The rules and 
                        procedures established under clause (i) may 
                        include the following:
                                    ``(I) Rules for ensuring the 
                                security of ballots and documenting 
                                that prescribed procedures were 
                                followed.
                                    ``(II) Rules and procedures for 
                                ensuring the accuracy of ballot 
                                manifests produced by jurisdictions.
                                    ``(III) Rules and procedures for 
                                governing the format of ballot 
                                manifests, cast vote records, and other 
                                data involved in risk-limiting audits.
                                    ``(IV) Methods to ensure that any 
                                cast vote records used in a risk-
                                limiting audit are those used by the 
                                voting system to tally the election 
                                results sent to the Secretary of State 
                                and made public.
                                    ``(V) Procedures for the random 
                                selection of ballots to be inspected 
                                manually during each audit.
                                    ``(VI) Rules for the calculations 
                                and other methods to be used in the 
                                audit and to determine whether and when 
                                the audit of each contest is complete.
                                    ``(VII) Procedures and requirements 
                                for testing any software used to 
                                conduct risk-limiting audits.
                    ``(B) Timing.--The risk-limiting audit shall be 
                completed not later than the date that the result of 
                the election is certified by the State.
                    ``(C) Public report.--After the completion of the 
                risk-limiting audit, the State shall publish a report 
                on the results of the audit, together with such 
                information as necessary to confirm that the audit was 
                conducted properly.
    ``(c) Effective Date.--Each State and jurisdiction shall be 
required to comply with the requirements of this section for the 
regularly scheduled election for Federal office in November 2020, and 
for each subsequent election for Federal office.''.
    (b) Conforming Amendments Related to Enforcement.--Section 401 of 
such Act (52 U.S.C. 21111) is amended by striking ``and 303'' and 
inserting ``303, and 303A''.
    (c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for such Act is 
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 303 the 
following new item:

``Sec. 303A. Risk-limiting audits.''.
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