[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2980 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>






115th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 2980

 To improve the missile defense capabilities of the United States, and 
                          for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 24, 2018

 Mr. Sullivan (for himself, Mr. Schatz, Mr. Peters, Mr. Cruz, and Mr. 
    Cotton) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
              referred to the Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
 To improve the missile defense capabilities of the United States, and 
                          for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Integrated Missile Defense Act of 
2018''.

SEC. 2. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON ACCELERATION OF MISSILE DEFENSE 
              CAPABILITIES.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) During the past six years, under the regime of Kim 
        Jong-un, North Korea has conducted approximately 100 ballistic 
        missile tests and four nuclear tests.
            (2) Over the last few years, North Korea has made 
        deliberate and rapid progress in developing their medium-range 
        ballistic missiles (MRBMs), intermediate-range ballistic 
        missiles (IRBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), 
        and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), including the 
        first-ever launches of two different intercontinental-range 
        ballistic missiles (ICBM) and six launches of an intermediate-
        range ballistic missile (IRBM).
            (3) As the only country to test nuclear weapons in the 21st 
        century, last year North Korea detonated its sixth and largest 
        nuclear device, estimated at over 140 kilotons in yield, and 
        has threatened to conduct an air burst of a nuclear warhead 
        mated to one of its long-range ballistic missiles.
            (4) A report from Johns Hopkins University, published in 
        2015, and entitled ``North Korea's Nuclear Futures: Technology 
        and Strategy'', concluded that, by 2020, North Korea could have 
        as many as 100 nuclear weapons.
            (5) The United States currently has 44 operational ground-
        based interceptors distributed between Fort Greely, Alaska, and 
        Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.
            (6) Section 1686 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
        for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115-91) authorizes up 28 
        additional ground-based interceptors (GBIs) and begins the 
        deployment of 20 additional ground-based interceptors to Fort 
        Greely.
            (7) In September 2017, Congress approved a Department of 
        Defense reprogramming of fiscal year 2017 funding of more than 
        $400,000,000 to counter the North Korean missile threat.
            (8) In November 2017, the President submitted an amendment 
        to his fiscal year 2018 budget request, which Congress 
        subsequently approved, for $4,000,000,000 for missile defeat 
        and defense, including funding to begin the construction of a 
        new missile field at Fort Greely, Alaska, and additional 
        procurement funding necessary for 20 new ground-based 
        interceptors to be fully deployed by 2023.
            (9) The President's budget proposal for fiscal year 2019 
        includes $9,900,000,000 for the Missile Defense Agency and 
        $3,000,000,000 for air and missile defense activities in the 
        military departments.
            (10) The 2018 National Defense Strategy states that in 
        order to ``deliver performance at the speed of relevance . . . 
        [W]e must not accept cumbersome approval chains, wasteful 
        applications of resources in uncompetitive space, or overly 
        risk-averse thinking that impedes change.''.
    (b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that the 
Missile Defense Agency should--
            (1) accelerate the fielding, if technically feasible, of 
        the planned additional 20 ground-based interceptors with 
        Redesigned Kill Vehicles (RKV) at Missile Field 4 at Fort 
        Greely, Alaska, and to mate the Redesigned Kill Vehicles with 
        the newest booster technology;
            (2) weigh the rapid growth in missile and nuclear threats 
        against the cost and risk of accelerating the Redesigned Kill 
        Vehicle and the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle development and 
        deployment;
            (3) ensure, prior to its operational deployment, that the 
        Redesigned Kill Vehicle has demonstrated the ability to 
        accomplish its intended mission through a successful, 
        operationally realistic flight test;
            (4) rapidly develop and deploy a persistent, space-based 
        sensor architecture to ensure our missile defenses are more 
        effective against ballistic missile threats and more responsive 
        to new and emergent threats from hypersonic and cruise 
        missiles;
            (5) pursue innovative concepts for existing technologies, 
        such as a missile defense role for the F-35 aircraft; and
            (6) invest in advanced technologies, such as boost-phase 
        warning, tracking, and intercept.
    (c) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Missile Defense 
        Agency shall submit to the congressional defense committees a 
        report on ways the Missile Defense Agency can accelerate the 
        construction of Missile Field 4 at Fort Greely, Alaska, as well 
        as the deployment of 20 ground-based interceptors with 
        Redesigned Kill Vehicles (RKV) at such missile field, by at 
        least one year.
            (2) Contents.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall 
        include the following:
                    (A) A threat-based description of the benefits and 
                risks of accelerating the construction and deployment 
                referred to in paragraph (1).
                    (B) A description of the technical and acquisition 
                risks and potential effects on the reliability of the 
                Redesigned Kill Vehicle if deployment is accelerated as 
                described in paragraph (1).
                    (C) A description of the cost implications of 
                accelerating the construction and deployment referred 
                to in paragraph (1).
                    (D) A description of the effect such acceleration 
                would have on the Redesigned Kill Vehicle flight test 
                schedule and the overall Integrated Master Test Plan.
                    (E) A description of the effect that the 
                acceleration described in paragraph (1) would have on 
                re-tipping currently deployed exoatmospheric kill 
                vehicles with the Redesigned Kill Vehicle.
                    (F) A description of how such acceleration would 
                align with the deployment of the long range 
                discrimination radar and the homeland defense radar-
                Hawaii.
                    (G) A cost-benefit analysis and a feasibility 
                assessment for construction of a fifth missile field at 
                Fort Greely, Alaska.
            (3) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.

SEC. 3. DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF PERSISTENT SPACE-BASED SENSOR 
              ARCHITECTURE.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The Missile Defense Agency currently operates the Space 
        Tracking and Surveillance System-Demonstration (STSS-D), a two-
        satellite constellation for testing purposes, which uses 
        sensors capable of detecting visible and infrared light and 
        serves as an experimental space tracker for the ballistic 
        missile defense system.
            (2) Conceptually developed in 2009, the Precision Tracking 
        Space (PTSS) would have provided the persistent space-based 
        tracking of ballistic missiles, including object 
        characterization and discrimination, and would have also 
        supported homeland, regional, and theater missile defense.
            (3) Projected to enter orbit in 2018, the Missile Defense 
        Agency and the Applied Physics Laboratory of Johns Hopkins 
        University is currently conducting a Space-Based Kill 
        Assessment (SKA) experiment, a network of small sensors hosted 
        on commercial satellites, used to collect the energy signature 
        of the impact between a ballistic missile threat and an 
        interceptor from the ballistic missile defense system.
            (4) Section 236 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
        for Fiscal Year 2014 (Public Law 113-66) required the Secretary 
        of Defense to conduct an evaluation of options and alternatives 
        for future sensor architectures for ballistic missile defense 
        in order to enhance the ballistic missile defense capabilities 
        of the United States.
            (5) General John Hyten, Commander of the United States 
        Strategic Command, has argued for the ``deployment of a global 
        space-based sensor system with discrimination capability'' as a 
        ``critical component to improving the effectiveness of our 
        deployed interceptors'' to ``conduct both the characterization 
        of these new threats . . . as well as discriminate better and 
        earlier the mid-course element of the threat that exists 
        today'', and finally to ``target against . . . hypersonic 
        capabilities [and] other capabilities in the boost phase.''.
            (6) Admiral James Syring, the former Director of the 
        Missile Defense Agency, has stated, ``From a missile defense 
        perspective, we have to develop a future operational space 
        layer. Given where the threat is going with hypersonics and 
        more ICBMs and so forth this persistent tracking and 
        discrimination capability from space is a must.''.
            (7) General Samuel Greaves, the current Director of the 
        Missile Defense Agency, has stated, that space-based sensors 
        are ``absolutely critical for the real threat that we see in 
        front of us, the hypersonic threat''.
    (b) Dissociation With Ballistic Missile Defense Review.--Subsection 
(a) of section 1683 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115-91) is amended by striking ``If 
consistent'' and all that follows through ``develop'' and inserting 
``the Director of the Missile Defense Agency shall, in coordination 
with the Secretary of the Air Force and the Director of the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency, commence developing''.
    (c) Deployment.--Such subsection is further amended--
            (1) by striking ``(a) In General.--'' and inserting the 
        following:
    ``(a) Development and Deployment.--
            ``(1) Development.--''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
            ``(2) Deployment.--The Director of the Missile Defense 
        Agency shall ensure that the sensor architecture developed 
        under paragraph (1) is deployed as soon as practicable.''.
    (d) Compatibility With Efforts of Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency.--Such section is amended--
            (1) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as subsection 
        (f) and (g), respectively; and
            (2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new 
        subsection (e):
    ``(e) Compatibility With Efforts of Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency.--The Director shall ensure that the sensor 
architecture developed under subsection (a) is compatible with efforts 
of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency relating to space-
based sensors for missile defense.''.
    (e) Report on Progress.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, Secretary of Defense shall submit to 
        the congressional defense committees a report on the progress 
        of all efforts being made by the Missile Defense Agency, the 
        Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Air Force 
        relating to space-based sensing and tracking capabilities for 
        missile defense and how each of such organizations will work 
        together to avoid duplication of efforts.
            (2) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.

SEC. 4. INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE FOR EVOLVING THEATER MISSILE 
              THREATS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The December 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) 
        states, ``great power competition [has] returned [as] China and 
        Russia began to reassert their influence regionally and 
        globally''.
            (2) Additionally, such strategy states that China and 
        Russia are ``fielding military capabilities designed to deny 
        America access in times of crisis and to contest our ability to 
        operate freely in critical commercial zones during peacetime'' 
        with the goal of ``contesting [United States] geopolitical 
        advantages and trying to change the international order in 
        their favor''.
            (3) The 2018 National Defense Strategy states that--
                    (A) ``[t]he central challenge to U.S. prosperity 
                and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic 
                competition by what the National Security Strategy 
                classifies as revisionist powers'';
                    (B) ``[i]t is increasingly clear that China and 
                Russia want to shape a world consistent with their 
                authoritarian model--gaining veto authority over other 
                nations' economic, diplomatic, and security 
                decisions'';
                    (C) ``[l]ong-term strategic competitions with China 
                and Russia are the principal priorities for the 
                Department, and require both increased and sustained 
                investment, because of the magnitude of the threats 
                they pose to U.S. security and prosperity today, and 
                the potential for those threats to increase in the 
                future''; and
                    (D) ``[i]nvestments [on missile defense] will focus 
                on layered missile defenses and disruptive capabilities 
                for both theater missile threats and North Korean 
                ballistic missile threats''.
            (4) Among his priorities for missile defense upgrades, 
        General John Hyten stated that the United States needs to 
        ``increase the robustness of regional missile defense 
        capability and capacity including deployment of the Aegis 
        Ballistic Missile Defense and the Terminal High-Altitude Area 
        Defense (THAAD) capabilities and implementation of 
        recommendations from the Department's Joint Regional Integrated 
        Air and Missile Defense Capability Mix (JRICM) study''.
            (5) General Curtis Scaparrotti, Commander of United States 
        European Command (USEUCOM) stated, ``It is essential that our 
        assigned and rotational multi-domain forces are protected by a 
        robust, layered [integrated air and missile defense (IAMD)] 
        capability . . . Our approach to IAMD must be inclusive with 
        our NATO allies and key partners as we face a growing ballistic 
        missile threat from regional adversaries.''.
            (6) Admiral Harry Harris, Commander of United States 
        Pacific Command, stated, ``USPACOM will continue working with 
        Japan, the ROK, and Australia to improve our level of staff 
        coordination and information sharing with the goal of creating 
        a fully-integrated Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) architecture 
        that addresses the increasing cruise missile threat.''.
    (b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the Sense of the Senate that--
            (1) the United States should utilize regional missile 
        defense assets to counter and deter against cruise, short-to-
        medium-range ballistic, and hypersonic missile threats;
            (2) the United States should continue to rapidly work 
        toward the interoperability of all United States missile 
        defense systems for a more effective layered defense; and
            (3) the United States Army should increase its attention, 
        focus, and resources developing an integrated air-and-missile 
        defense architecture to protect both land and air forces from 
        cruise, short-to-medium-range ballistic, and hypersonic missile 
        threats.
    (c) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, if consistent with the direction or 
        recommendations of the Missile Defense Review that commenced in 
        2017, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the 
        congressional defense committees a report on the Department's 
        plan for the creation of a fully interoperable and integrated 
        air and missile defense architecture.
            (2) Elements.--Elements of the report required by paragraph 
        (1) are as follows:
                    (A) An intelligence assessment of cruise, short-to-
                medium-range ballistic, and hypersonic missile threats 
                to the United States and its deployed forces.
                    (B) An examination of current United States 
                capabilities to defeat the threats included in the 
                report required by subparagraph (A) and an analysis of 
                the existing capability and resource gaps.
                    (C) An analysis of the level of integration and 
                interoperability of United States missile defense 
                systems and the future requirements needed to become 
                fully integrated and interoperable to defeat the 
                threats included in the report required by subparagraph 
                (A).
                    (D) A description of the current state of 
                survivability of United States missile defense systems 
                against the full spectrum of air and missile threats 
                from near-peer threats and any planned efforts to 
                increase survivability.
            (3) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.

SEC. 5. ACCELERATION OF HYPERSONIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) General Joe Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
        Staff, stated, ``The United States military is in a fierce 
        competition to harness the benefits of emerging technologies, 
        including hypersonics . . . as these developments will 
        fundamentally change the character of war.''.
            (2) General John Hyten, Commander of United States 
        Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) stated, ``China is swiftly 
        developing and testing a hypersonic-glide vehicle capability, a 
        technology used to defeat ballistic missile defenses.''.
            (3) General Hyten also stated, ``President Putin announced 
        Russia's development of . . . a maneuverable hypersonic glide 
        vehicle,'' which ``only reinforce Russia's commitment to 
        develop weapons designed to intimidate and coerce the U.S. and 
        its allies.''.
            (4) Admiral Harry Harris, Commander of USPACOM stated, 
        ``China and Russia continue to develop and operationally field 
        advanced counter-intervention technologies which include 
        fielding and testing of highly maneuverable re-entry vehicle/
        warhead (i.e., hypersonic weapons) capabilities that challenge 
        U.S. strategic, operational, and tactical freedom of movement 
        and maneuver. China and Russia also present other notable 
        challenges in the form of cruise missiles and small-unmanned 
        aircraft systems (s-UAS) which fly different trajectories, 
        making them hard to detect, acquire, track, and intercept.''.
    (b) Acceleration of Program.--The Director of the Missile Defense 
Agency shall accelerate the hypersonic missile defense program of the 
Missile Defense Agency.
    (c) Deployment.--The Director shall deploy such program in 
conjunction with a persistent space-based missile defense sensor 
program.
    (d) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the 
        congressional defense committees a report on how hypersonic 
        missile defense can be accelerated to meet emerging hypersonic 
        threats.
            (2) Contents.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) 
        shall include the following:
                    (A) An estimate of the cost of such acceleration.
                    (B) The technical requirements and acquisition plan 
                needed for the Director to develop and deploy a 
                hypersonic missile defense program.
                    (C) A testing campaign plan that accelerates the 
                delivery of hypersonic defense systems to the 
                warfighter.
            (3) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.

SEC. 6. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON ALLIED PARTNERSHIPS FOR MISSILE DEFENSE.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, the North Atlantic Treaty 
        Organization (NATO) agreed to develop a missile defense 
        capability to protect North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
        European populations, territory, and armed forces against the 
        threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles by 
        Iran.
            (2) The United States contribution to that North Atlantic 
        Treaty Organization effort is the European Phased Adaptive 
        Approach (EPAA), which includes the deployment of a Terminal 
        High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) radar in Turkey, the 
        deployment of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense ships in Europe, 
        the deployment of an Aegis Ashore in Romania, and a second 
        Aegis Ashore site in Poland, which will be completed by 2020.
            (3) Currently, ballistic missile defense-capable Aegis 
        ships are operating in European waters to defend Europe from 
        potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as 
        Iran.
            (4) Additional ballistic missile defense-capable Aegis 
        ships are operating in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf 
        to provide regional defense against potential ballistic missile 
        attacks from countries such as North Korea and Iran.
            (5) In early 2017, United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) 
        and United States Forces-Korea (USFK) deployed a Terminal High 
        Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery to the Korean peninsula 
        in 2017 that is now fully operational.
            (6) In December 2017, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's 
        Cabinet agreed to purchase two United States-made Aegis Ashore 
        batteries to defend against ``North Korea's nuclear missile 
        development . . . a new level of threat to Japan.''.
            (7) Under Secretary of Defense John Rood stated, ``We are 
        also encouraging our allies and partners in Europe, the Middle 
        East and Near East Asia to acquire missile defense 
        capabilities, and to strengthen missile defense cooperation in 
        order to move towards a more interoperable and integrated 
        missile defense architecture against hostile ballistic and 
        cruise missile threats.''.
            (8) General Vincent Brooks, Commander of United States 
        Forces-Korea stated that ``Increasing interoperability with 
        [Republic of Korea (ROK)] systems is a key part of improving 
        Alliance missile defense, including program upgrades to the ROK 
        Patriot system and procurement of PAC-3 interceptors. As North 
        Korea continues to improve its missile forces, the ROK-United 
        States Alliance must also continue to expand its BMD 
        capabilities.''.
            (9) General James Dickinson, Commander of United States 
        Army Space and Missile Defense Command, stated that 
        ``integrating allies into a common and mutually supportive 
        [missile defense] architecture is a critical warfighter 
        priority'', and events like the NIMBLE TITAN campaign--the 
        world's premier strategic and military policy missile defense 
        event--``fosters greater confidence in combined missile 
        defenses and provide a means to advance U.S. efforts in 
        collaboration, integration, interoperability, and burden 
        sharing with our allies and partners.''.
    (b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that--
            (1) the United States should seek additional opportunities, 
        at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, to provide 
        missile defense capabilities, doctrine, interoperability, and 
        planning to allies and trusted partners of the United States;
            (2) an expedited foreign military sales arrangement would 
        be beneficial in delivering such missile defenses to allies and 
        trusted partners; and
            (3) it is important to continue to work with allies and 
        trusted partners, such as Israel, to learn from their 
        experience deploying successful missile defense technologies.

SEC. 7. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON RESULTS OF TESTS CARRIED OUT BY MISSILE 
              DEFENSE AGENCY.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) General John Hyten, Commander of the United States 
        Strategic Command, stated that North Korea is quickly advancing 
        their missile and nuclear technology because their rapid 
        testing cadence allows them to quickly apply lessons learned in 
        testing to advance new capabilities.
            (2) Before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, 
        General Hyten stated, ``If you look at what North Korea's 
        doing; test, fail, test, fail. And I look at what I did when I 
        was a younger officer in the space business, that's how you go 
        fast. [Carl] Von Braun in the early days the rocket business, 
        he had a 60 percent failure rate; maybe the greatest rocket 
        scientist of all time. Can you imagine if [the Missile Defense 
        Agency] had a 60 percent failure rate, what the--what the 
        newspapers would say?''.
            (3) General Hyten characterized the current irregular 
        testing environment in the United States as ``the wrong kind of 
        testing environment'' due to risk-aversion and fear of failure.
            (4) Regular missile defense testing, including ground 
        testing and non-intercept tests, not only improves the missile 
        defense system, but also gives the members of the Armed Forces 
        experience with and confidence in their tactics, techniques, 
        and procedures.
            (5) Section 1690 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
        for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115-91) states that ``Director 
        of the Missile Defense Agency should continue to focus testing 
        campaigns on delivering increased capabilities to the Armed 
        Forces as quickly as possible and . . . should seek to 
        establish a more prudent balance between risk mitigation and 
        the more rapid testing pace needed to quickly develop and 
        deliver new capabilities to the Armed Forces.''.
            (6) Regarding a needed shift to a less-risk adverse missile 
        defense testing culture, Under Secretary of Defense John Rood 
        stated, ``I think in some ways when we look at our allies like 
        Israel and their test regimen, they're much more willing to go 
        back out to the test range, begin a flight test regimen, work 
        through their issues, understanding there are going to be bumps 
        in the road . . . I certainly second the approach [of a less-
        risk adverse testing culture].''.
    (b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that--
            (1) tests carried out by the Missile Defense Agency, which 
        do not achieve an intercept or the main objective, should not 
        be considered failures if they contribute to the advancement of 
        the capability;
            (2) the Missile Defense Agency--in an effort to deliver 
        capabilities at the speed of relevance--should recognize the 
        learning value of individual advancements made by all test 
        events, rather than viewing any total outcome as an indication 
        of the reliability of entire missile defense systems;
            (3) the Missile Defense Agency should, as part of its test 
        program, continue to build an independently accredited modeling 
        and simulation element to better inform missile defense 
        performance assessments and test criteria; and
            (4) the Missile Defense Agency should continue to pursue an 
        increasingly rigorous testing regime, in coordination with the 
        Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, to 
        more rapidly deliver capabilities to the warfighter as the 
        threat evolves.

SEC. 8. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON DISCRIMINATION FOR MISSILE DEFENSE.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) General Lori Robinson, Commander of United States 
        Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), stated, ``I continue to 
        prioritize improvements to the intercontinental ballistic 
        missile defense sensor architecture to enhance system 
        resiliency and target discrimination . . . As our adversaries 
        develop and field more sophisticated intercontinental ballistic 
        missiles, improved target discrimination will improve the 
        likelihood of a successful engagement.''.
            (2) General Robinson also stated, ``Improved discrimination 
        capability will increase the likelihood of a successful 
        intercept, and the Missile Defense Agency is developing 
        additional radars such as the Long Range Discrimination Radar 
        in Alaska and a persistent radar on Hawaii, both of which will 
        provide improved target discrimination and a more survivable 
        sensor network.''.
            (3) General Samuel Greaves, the Director of the Missile 
        Defense Agency, stated, ``In addition, improvements in sensor 
        coverage to include the long-range discrimination radar in 
        Clear, Alaska, the addition of homeland defense radar in 
        Hawaii, if it's approved, and planning for a homeland defense 
        radar in the Pacific, as well as advanced discrimination 
        improvements, will enable the United States to improve 
        protection of the homeland.''.
            (4) In the President's proposed budget for fiscal year 
        2019, the Missile Defense Agency requested the following:
                    (A) $220,900,000 to continue the development of 
                advanced discrimination for the AN/TPY-2, Sea-Based X-
                band (SBX) radar, and the Upgraded Early Warning Radars 
                (UEWRs) to counter evolving threats.
                    (B) $164,600,000 to continue development of the 
                Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) and $174,000,000 
                for additional military construction for the Long Range 
                Discrimination Radar to provide persistent long-range 
                midcourse discrimination, precision tracking, and hit 
                assessment and improve ballistic missile defense system 
                target discrimination capability while supporting a 
                more efficient utilization of the ground-based 
                midcourse defense interceptor inventory.
                    (C) $62,200,000 in fiscal year 2019 for the 
                Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii (HDR-H) and $33.500,000 
                on for the Homeland Defense Radar-Pacific (HDR-P) to 
                close coverage gaps in the Pacific architecture and 
                provide persistent long-range acquisition and midcourse 
                discrimination, precision tracking, and hit assessment 
                to support the defense of the homeland against long-
                range missile threats.
            (5) As a part of its Fiscal Year 2019 Unfunded Priorities 
        List submitted to Congress, the Missile Defense Agency also 
        requested an additional $126,000,000 to develop advanced 
        discrimination capabilities and high-fidelity digital modeling 
        and simulation enhancements.
    (b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that 
prioritizing discrimination capabilities to improve missile defense 
effectiveness against current and future threats is critically 
important.
    (c) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Missile Defense 
        Agency shall submit to the congressional defense committees a 
        report on the following:
                    (A) Needed discrimination improvements within the 
                missile defense architecture.
                    (B) The Missile Defense Agency's plan to rapidly 
                field advanced discrimination capabilities.
                    (C) An analysis of efforts to address 
                discrimination challenges against emerging adversary 
                threats, including hypersonic and cruise missiles.
            (2) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.

SEC. 9. CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES DEFINED.

    In this Act, the term ``congressional defense committees'' has the 
meaning given such term in section 101 of title 10, United States Code.
                                 <all>