[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2980 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
115th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 2980
To improve the missile defense capabilities of the United States, and
for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
May 24, 2018
Mr. Sullivan (for himself, Mr. Schatz, Mr. Peters, Mr. Cruz, and Mr.
Cotton) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Armed Services
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To improve the missile defense capabilities of the United States, and
for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Integrated Missile Defense Act of
2018''.
SEC. 2. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON ACCELERATION OF MISSILE DEFENSE
CAPABILITIES.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) During the past six years, under the regime of Kim
Jong-un, North Korea has conducted approximately 100 ballistic
missile tests and four nuclear tests.
(2) Over the last few years, North Korea has made
deliberate and rapid progress in developing their medium-range
ballistic missiles (MRBMs), intermediate-range ballistic
missiles (IRBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM),
and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), including the
first-ever launches of two different intercontinental-range
ballistic missiles (ICBM) and six launches of an intermediate-
range ballistic missile (IRBM).
(3) As the only country to test nuclear weapons in the 21st
century, last year North Korea detonated its sixth and largest
nuclear device, estimated at over 140 kilotons in yield, and
has threatened to conduct an air burst of a nuclear warhead
mated to one of its long-range ballistic missiles.
(4) A report from Johns Hopkins University, published in
2015, and entitled ``North Korea's Nuclear Futures: Technology
and Strategy'', concluded that, by 2020, North Korea could have
as many as 100 nuclear weapons.
(5) The United States currently has 44 operational ground-
based interceptors distributed between Fort Greely, Alaska, and
Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.
(6) Section 1686 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115-91) authorizes up 28
additional ground-based interceptors (GBIs) and begins the
deployment of 20 additional ground-based interceptors to Fort
Greely.
(7) In September 2017, Congress approved a Department of
Defense reprogramming of fiscal year 2017 funding of more than
$400,000,000 to counter the North Korean missile threat.
(8) In November 2017, the President submitted an amendment
to his fiscal year 2018 budget request, which Congress
subsequently approved, for $4,000,000,000 for missile defeat
and defense, including funding to begin the construction of a
new missile field at Fort Greely, Alaska, and additional
procurement funding necessary for 20 new ground-based
interceptors to be fully deployed by 2023.
(9) The President's budget proposal for fiscal year 2019
includes $9,900,000,000 for the Missile Defense Agency and
$3,000,000,000 for air and missile defense activities in the
military departments.
(10) The 2018 National Defense Strategy states that in
order to ``deliver performance at the speed of relevance . . .
[W]e must not accept cumbersome approval chains, wasteful
applications of resources in uncompetitive space, or overly
risk-averse thinking that impedes change.''.
(b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that the
Missile Defense Agency should--
(1) accelerate the fielding, if technically feasible, of
the planned additional 20 ground-based interceptors with
Redesigned Kill Vehicles (RKV) at Missile Field 4 at Fort
Greely, Alaska, and to mate the Redesigned Kill Vehicles with
the newest booster technology;
(2) weigh the rapid growth in missile and nuclear threats
against the cost and risk of accelerating the Redesigned Kill
Vehicle and the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle development and
deployment;
(3) ensure, prior to its operational deployment, that the
Redesigned Kill Vehicle has demonstrated the ability to
accomplish its intended mission through a successful,
operationally realistic flight test;
(4) rapidly develop and deploy a persistent, space-based
sensor architecture to ensure our missile defenses are more
effective against ballistic missile threats and more responsive
to new and emergent threats from hypersonic and cruise
missiles;
(5) pursue innovative concepts for existing technologies,
such as a missile defense role for the F-35 aircraft; and
(6) invest in advanced technologies, such as boost-phase
warning, tracking, and intercept.
(c) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Missile Defense
Agency shall submit to the congressional defense committees a
report on ways the Missile Defense Agency can accelerate the
construction of Missile Field 4 at Fort Greely, Alaska, as well
as the deployment of 20 ground-based interceptors with
Redesigned Kill Vehicles (RKV) at such missile field, by at
least one year.
(2) Contents.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) A threat-based description of the benefits and
risks of accelerating the construction and deployment
referred to in paragraph (1).
(B) A description of the technical and acquisition
risks and potential effects on the reliability of the
Redesigned Kill Vehicle if deployment is accelerated as
described in paragraph (1).
(C) A description of the cost implications of
accelerating the construction and deployment referred
to in paragraph (1).
(D) A description of the effect such acceleration
would have on the Redesigned Kill Vehicle flight test
schedule and the overall Integrated Master Test Plan.
(E) A description of the effect that the
acceleration described in paragraph (1) would have on
re-tipping currently deployed exoatmospheric kill
vehicles with the Redesigned Kill Vehicle.
(F) A description of how such acceleration would
align with the deployment of the long range
discrimination radar and the homeland defense radar-
Hawaii.
(G) A cost-benefit analysis and a feasibility
assessment for construction of a fifth missile field at
Fort Greely, Alaska.
(3) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
SEC. 3. DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF PERSISTENT SPACE-BASED SENSOR
ARCHITECTURE.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Missile Defense Agency currently operates the Space
Tracking and Surveillance System-Demonstration (STSS-D), a two-
satellite constellation for testing purposes, which uses
sensors capable of detecting visible and infrared light and
serves as an experimental space tracker for the ballistic
missile defense system.
(2) Conceptually developed in 2009, the Precision Tracking
Space (PTSS) would have provided the persistent space-based
tracking of ballistic missiles, including object
characterization and discrimination, and would have also
supported homeland, regional, and theater missile defense.
(3) Projected to enter orbit in 2018, the Missile Defense
Agency and the Applied Physics Laboratory of Johns Hopkins
University is currently conducting a Space-Based Kill
Assessment (SKA) experiment, a network of small sensors hosted
on commercial satellites, used to collect the energy signature
of the impact between a ballistic missile threat and an
interceptor from the ballistic missile defense system.
(4) Section 236 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2014 (Public Law 113-66) required the Secretary
of Defense to conduct an evaluation of options and alternatives
for future sensor architectures for ballistic missile defense
in order to enhance the ballistic missile defense capabilities
of the United States.
(5) General John Hyten, Commander of the United States
Strategic Command, has argued for the ``deployment of a global
space-based sensor system with discrimination capability'' as a
``critical component to improving the effectiveness of our
deployed interceptors'' to ``conduct both the characterization
of these new threats . . . as well as discriminate better and
earlier the mid-course element of the threat that exists
today'', and finally to ``target against . . . hypersonic
capabilities [and] other capabilities in the boost phase.''.
(6) Admiral James Syring, the former Director of the
Missile Defense Agency, has stated, ``From a missile defense
perspective, we have to develop a future operational space
layer. Given where the threat is going with hypersonics and
more ICBMs and so forth this persistent tracking and
discrimination capability from space is a must.''.
(7) General Samuel Greaves, the current Director of the
Missile Defense Agency, has stated, that space-based sensors
are ``absolutely critical for the real threat that we see in
front of us, the hypersonic threat''.
(b) Dissociation With Ballistic Missile Defense Review.--Subsection
(a) of section 1683 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115-91) is amended by striking ``If
consistent'' and all that follows through ``develop'' and inserting
``the Director of the Missile Defense Agency shall, in coordination
with the Secretary of the Air Force and the Director of the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency, commence developing''.
(c) Deployment.--Such subsection is further amended--
(1) by striking ``(a) In General.--'' and inserting the
following:
``(a) Development and Deployment.--
``(1) Development.--''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) Deployment.--The Director of the Missile Defense
Agency shall ensure that the sensor architecture developed
under paragraph (1) is deployed as soon as practicable.''.
(d) Compatibility With Efforts of Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency.--Such section is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as subsection
(f) and (g), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new
subsection (e):
``(e) Compatibility With Efforts of Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency.--The Director shall ensure that the sensor
architecture developed under subsection (a) is compatible with efforts
of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency relating to space-
based sensors for missile defense.''.
(e) Report on Progress.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, Secretary of Defense shall submit to
the congressional defense committees a report on the progress
of all efforts being made by the Missile Defense Agency, the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Air Force
relating to space-based sensing and tracking capabilities for
missile defense and how each of such organizations will work
together to avoid duplication of efforts.
(2) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
SEC. 4. INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE FOR EVOLVING THEATER MISSILE
THREATS.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The December 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS)
states, ``great power competition [has] returned [as] China and
Russia began to reassert their influence regionally and
globally''.
(2) Additionally, such strategy states that China and
Russia are ``fielding military capabilities designed to deny
America access in times of crisis and to contest our ability to
operate freely in critical commercial zones during peacetime''
with the goal of ``contesting [United States] geopolitical
advantages and trying to change the international order in
their favor''.
(3) The 2018 National Defense Strategy states that--
(A) ``[t]he central challenge to U.S. prosperity
and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic
competition by what the National Security Strategy
classifies as revisionist powers'';
(B) ``[i]t is increasingly clear that China and
Russia want to shape a world consistent with their
authoritarian model--gaining veto authority over other
nations' economic, diplomatic, and security
decisions'';
(C) ``[l]ong-term strategic competitions with China
and Russia are the principal priorities for the
Department, and require both increased and sustained
investment, because of the magnitude of the threats
they pose to U.S. security and prosperity today, and
the potential for those threats to increase in the
future''; and
(D) ``[i]nvestments [on missile defense] will focus
on layered missile defenses and disruptive capabilities
for both theater missile threats and North Korean
ballistic missile threats''.
(4) Among his priorities for missile defense upgrades,
General John Hyten stated that the United States needs to
``increase the robustness of regional missile defense
capability and capacity including deployment of the Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense and the Terminal High-Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) capabilities and implementation of
recommendations from the Department's Joint Regional Integrated
Air and Missile Defense Capability Mix (JRICM) study''.
(5) General Curtis Scaparrotti, Commander of United States
European Command (USEUCOM) stated, ``It is essential that our
assigned and rotational multi-domain forces are protected by a
robust, layered [integrated air and missile defense (IAMD)]
capability . . . Our approach to IAMD must be inclusive with
our NATO allies and key partners as we face a growing ballistic
missile threat from regional adversaries.''.
(6) Admiral Harry Harris, Commander of United States
Pacific Command, stated, ``USPACOM will continue working with
Japan, the ROK, and Australia to improve our level of staff
coordination and information sharing with the goal of creating
a fully-integrated Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) architecture
that addresses the increasing cruise missile threat.''.
(b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the Sense of the Senate that--
(1) the United States should utilize regional missile
defense assets to counter and deter against cruise, short-to-
medium-range ballistic, and hypersonic missile threats;
(2) the United States should continue to rapidly work
toward the interoperability of all United States missile
defense systems for a more effective layered defense; and
(3) the United States Army should increase its attention,
focus, and resources developing an integrated air-and-missile
defense architecture to protect both land and air forces from
cruise, short-to-medium-range ballistic, and hypersonic missile
threats.
(c) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, if consistent with the direction or
recommendations of the Missile Defense Review that commenced in
2017, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
congressional defense committees a report on the Department's
plan for the creation of a fully interoperable and integrated
air and missile defense architecture.
(2) Elements.--Elements of the report required by paragraph
(1) are as follows:
(A) An intelligence assessment of cruise, short-to-
medium-range ballistic, and hypersonic missile threats
to the United States and its deployed forces.
(B) An examination of current United States
capabilities to defeat the threats included in the
report required by subparagraph (A) and an analysis of
the existing capability and resource gaps.
(C) An analysis of the level of integration and
interoperability of United States missile defense
systems and the future requirements needed to become
fully integrated and interoperable to defeat the
threats included in the report required by subparagraph
(A).
(D) A description of the current state of
survivability of United States missile defense systems
against the full spectrum of air and missile threats
from near-peer threats and any planned efforts to
increase survivability.
(3) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
SEC. 5. ACCELERATION OF HYPERSONIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) General Joe Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, stated, ``The United States military is in a fierce
competition to harness the benefits of emerging technologies,
including hypersonics . . . as these developments will
fundamentally change the character of war.''.
(2) General John Hyten, Commander of United States
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) stated, ``China is swiftly
developing and testing a hypersonic-glide vehicle capability, a
technology used to defeat ballistic missile defenses.''.
(3) General Hyten also stated, ``President Putin announced
Russia's development of . . . a maneuverable hypersonic glide
vehicle,'' which ``only reinforce Russia's commitment to
develop weapons designed to intimidate and coerce the U.S. and
its allies.''.
(4) Admiral Harry Harris, Commander of USPACOM stated,
``China and Russia continue to develop and operationally field
advanced counter-intervention technologies which include
fielding and testing of highly maneuverable re-entry vehicle/
warhead (i.e., hypersonic weapons) capabilities that challenge
U.S. strategic, operational, and tactical freedom of movement
and maneuver. China and Russia also present other notable
challenges in the form of cruise missiles and small-unmanned
aircraft systems (s-UAS) which fly different trajectories,
making them hard to detect, acquire, track, and intercept.''.
(b) Acceleration of Program.--The Director of the Missile Defense
Agency shall accelerate the hypersonic missile defense program of the
Missile Defense Agency.
(c) Deployment.--The Director shall deploy such program in
conjunction with a persistent space-based missile defense sensor
program.
(d) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the
congressional defense committees a report on how hypersonic
missile defense can be accelerated to meet emerging hypersonic
threats.
(2) Contents.--The report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall include the following:
(A) An estimate of the cost of such acceleration.
(B) The technical requirements and acquisition plan
needed for the Director to develop and deploy a
hypersonic missile defense program.
(C) A testing campaign plan that accelerates the
delivery of hypersonic defense systems to the
warfighter.
(3) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
SEC. 6. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON ALLIED PARTNERSHIPS FOR MISSILE DEFENSE.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) agreed to develop a missile defense
capability to protect North Atlantic Treaty Organization
European populations, territory, and armed forces against the
threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles by
Iran.
(2) The United States contribution to that North Atlantic
Treaty Organization effort is the European Phased Adaptive
Approach (EPAA), which includes the deployment of a Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) radar in Turkey, the
deployment of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense ships in Europe,
the deployment of an Aegis Ashore in Romania, and a second
Aegis Ashore site in Poland, which will be completed by 2020.
(3) Currently, ballistic missile defense-capable Aegis
ships are operating in European waters to defend Europe from
potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as
Iran.
(4) Additional ballistic missile defense-capable Aegis
ships are operating in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf
to provide regional defense against potential ballistic missile
attacks from countries such as North Korea and Iran.
(5) In early 2017, United States Pacific Command (USPACOM)
and United States Forces-Korea (USFK) deployed a Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery to the Korean peninsula
in 2017 that is now fully operational.
(6) In December 2017, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's
Cabinet agreed to purchase two United States-made Aegis Ashore
batteries to defend against ``North Korea's nuclear missile
development . . . a new level of threat to Japan.''.
(7) Under Secretary of Defense John Rood stated, ``We are
also encouraging our allies and partners in Europe, the Middle
East and Near East Asia to acquire missile defense
capabilities, and to strengthen missile defense cooperation in
order to move towards a more interoperable and integrated
missile defense architecture against hostile ballistic and
cruise missile threats.''.
(8) General Vincent Brooks, Commander of United States
Forces-Korea stated that ``Increasing interoperability with
[Republic of Korea (ROK)] systems is a key part of improving
Alliance missile defense, including program upgrades to the ROK
Patriot system and procurement of PAC-3 interceptors. As North
Korea continues to improve its missile forces, the ROK-United
States Alliance must also continue to expand its BMD
capabilities.''.
(9) General James Dickinson, Commander of United States
Army Space and Missile Defense Command, stated that
``integrating allies into a common and mutually supportive
[missile defense] architecture is a critical warfighter
priority'', and events like the NIMBLE TITAN campaign--the
world's premier strategic and military policy missile defense
event--``fosters greater confidence in combined missile
defenses and provide a means to advance U.S. efforts in
collaboration, integration, interoperability, and burden
sharing with our allies and partners.''.
(b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that--
(1) the United States should seek additional opportunities,
at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, to provide
missile defense capabilities, doctrine, interoperability, and
planning to allies and trusted partners of the United States;
(2) an expedited foreign military sales arrangement would
be beneficial in delivering such missile defenses to allies and
trusted partners; and
(3) it is important to continue to work with allies and
trusted partners, such as Israel, to learn from their
experience deploying successful missile defense technologies.
SEC. 7. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON RESULTS OF TESTS CARRIED OUT BY MISSILE
DEFENSE AGENCY.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) General John Hyten, Commander of the United States
Strategic Command, stated that North Korea is quickly advancing
their missile and nuclear technology because their rapid
testing cadence allows them to quickly apply lessons learned in
testing to advance new capabilities.
(2) Before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate,
General Hyten stated, ``If you look at what North Korea's
doing; test, fail, test, fail. And I look at what I did when I
was a younger officer in the space business, that's how you go
fast. [Carl] Von Braun in the early days the rocket business,
he had a 60 percent failure rate; maybe the greatest rocket
scientist of all time. Can you imagine if [the Missile Defense
Agency] had a 60 percent failure rate, what the--what the
newspapers would say?''.
(3) General Hyten characterized the current irregular
testing environment in the United States as ``the wrong kind of
testing environment'' due to risk-aversion and fear of failure.
(4) Regular missile defense testing, including ground
testing and non-intercept tests, not only improves the missile
defense system, but also gives the members of the Armed Forces
experience with and confidence in their tactics, techniques,
and procedures.
(5) Section 1690 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115-91) states that ``Director
of the Missile Defense Agency should continue to focus testing
campaigns on delivering increased capabilities to the Armed
Forces as quickly as possible and . . . should seek to
establish a more prudent balance between risk mitigation and
the more rapid testing pace needed to quickly develop and
deliver new capabilities to the Armed Forces.''.
(6) Regarding a needed shift to a less-risk adverse missile
defense testing culture, Under Secretary of Defense John Rood
stated, ``I think in some ways when we look at our allies like
Israel and their test regimen, they're much more willing to go
back out to the test range, begin a flight test regimen, work
through their issues, understanding there are going to be bumps
in the road . . . I certainly second the approach [of a less-
risk adverse testing culture].''.
(b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that--
(1) tests carried out by the Missile Defense Agency, which
do not achieve an intercept or the main objective, should not
be considered failures if they contribute to the advancement of
the capability;
(2) the Missile Defense Agency--in an effort to deliver
capabilities at the speed of relevance--should recognize the
learning value of individual advancements made by all test
events, rather than viewing any total outcome as an indication
of the reliability of entire missile defense systems;
(3) the Missile Defense Agency should, as part of its test
program, continue to build an independently accredited modeling
and simulation element to better inform missile defense
performance assessments and test criteria; and
(4) the Missile Defense Agency should continue to pursue an
increasingly rigorous testing regime, in coordination with the
Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, to
more rapidly deliver capabilities to the warfighter as the
threat evolves.
SEC. 8. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON DISCRIMINATION FOR MISSILE DEFENSE.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) General Lori Robinson, Commander of United States
Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), stated, ``I continue to
prioritize improvements to the intercontinental ballistic
missile defense sensor architecture to enhance system
resiliency and target discrimination . . . As our adversaries
develop and field more sophisticated intercontinental ballistic
missiles, improved target discrimination will improve the
likelihood of a successful engagement.''.
(2) General Robinson also stated, ``Improved discrimination
capability will increase the likelihood of a successful
intercept, and the Missile Defense Agency is developing
additional radars such as the Long Range Discrimination Radar
in Alaska and a persistent radar on Hawaii, both of which will
provide improved target discrimination and a more survivable
sensor network.''.
(3) General Samuel Greaves, the Director of the Missile
Defense Agency, stated, ``In addition, improvements in sensor
coverage to include the long-range discrimination radar in
Clear, Alaska, the addition of homeland defense radar in
Hawaii, if it's approved, and planning for a homeland defense
radar in the Pacific, as well as advanced discrimination
improvements, will enable the United States to improve
protection of the homeland.''.
(4) In the President's proposed budget for fiscal year
2019, the Missile Defense Agency requested the following:
(A) $220,900,000 to continue the development of
advanced discrimination for the AN/TPY-2, Sea-Based X-
band (SBX) radar, and the Upgraded Early Warning Radars
(UEWRs) to counter evolving threats.
(B) $164,600,000 to continue development of the
Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) and $174,000,000
for additional military construction for the Long Range
Discrimination Radar to provide persistent long-range
midcourse discrimination, precision tracking, and hit
assessment and improve ballistic missile defense system
target discrimination capability while supporting a
more efficient utilization of the ground-based
midcourse defense interceptor inventory.
(C) $62,200,000 in fiscal year 2019 for the
Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii (HDR-H) and $33.500,000
on for the Homeland Defense Radar-Pacific (HDR-P) to
close coverage gaps in the Pacific architecture and
provide persistent long-range acquisition and midcourse
discrimination, precision tracking, and hit assessment
to support the defense of the homeland against long-
range missile threats.
(5) As a part of its Fiscal Year 2019 Unfunded Priorities
List submitted to Congress, the Missile Defense Agency also
requested an additional $126,000,000 to develop advanced
discrimination capabilities and high-fidelity digital modeling
and simulation enhancements.
(b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that
prioritizing discrimination capabilities to improve missile defense
effectiveness against current and future threats is critically
important.
(c) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Missile Defense
Agency shall submit to the congressional defense committees a
report on the following:
(A) Needed discrimination improvements within the
missile defense architecture.
(B) The Missile Defense Agency's plan to rapidly
field advanced discrimination capabilities.
(C) An analysis of efforts to address
discrimination challenges against emerging adversary
threats, including hypersonic and cruise missiles.
(2) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
SEC. 9. CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES DEFINED.
In this Act, the term ``congressional defense committees'' has the
meaning given such term in section 101 of title 10, United States Code.
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