115 S2736 RS: Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018
U.S. Senate
2018-10-03
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EN
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1.Short title; table of contents
(a)This Act may be cited as the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018
.
(b)The table of contents for this Act is as follows:Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.Sec. 2. Findings.Sec. 3. Statement of policy on United States engagement in the Indo-Pacific region.TITLE I—Promoting United States Security Interests in the Indo-Pacific RegionSec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.Sec. 102. Treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific region.Sec. 103. United States-China relationship.Sec. 104. United States-India strategic partnership.Sec. 105. United States-ASEAN strategic partnership.Sec. 106. United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral security partnership.Sec. 107. Quadrilateral security dialogue.Sec. 108. Enhanced security partnerships in Southeast Asia.Sec. 109. Commitment to Taiwan.Sec. 110. North Korea strategy.Sec. 111. New Zealand and the Pacific islands.Sec. 112. Freedom of navigation and overflight; promotion of international law.Sec. 113. Combating terrorism in Southeast Asia.Sec. 114. Cybersecurity cooperation.Sec. 115. Nuclear nonproliferation and arms control in the Indo-Pacific region.TITLE II—Promoting United States Economic Interests in the Indo-Pacific RegionSec. 201. Findings; sense of Congress.Sec. 202. Trade negotiations, multilateral agreements, and regional economic summits.Sec. 203. United States-ASEAN Economic Partnership.Sec. 204. Trade capacity building and trade facilitation.Sec. 205. Intellectual property protection.Sec. 206. Energy programs and initiatives.Sec. 207. Lower Mekong Initiative.TITLE III—Promoting United States Values in the Indo-Pacific RegionSec. 301. Findings.Sec. 302. Trafficking-in-persons.Sec. 303. Bilateral and regional dialogues; people-to-people engagement.Sec. 304. Imposition of sanctions and suspension of United States assistance.Sec. 305. Authorization of appropriations. 2.Congress makes the following findings:
(1)The Indo-Pacific region— (A)represents nearly 1/2 of the global population;
(B)is home to some of the most dynamic economies in the world; and (C)poses security challenges that threaten to undermine United States national security interests, regional peace, and global stability.
(2)The core tenants of the United States-backed international system are being challenged with increasingly coercive behavior, including—
(A)China’s illegal construction and militarization of artificial features in the South China Sea; (B)North Korea’s acceleration of its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities; and
(C)the increased presence throughout Southeast Asia of the Islamic State (referred to in this Act as ISIS
) and other international terrorist organizations that threaten the United States.
(3)The economic order in the Indo-Pacific region continues to transform, presenting both opportunities and challenges to United States economic interests.
(4)The United States has a fundamental interest in defending human rights and promoting the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific region. Although many countries in that region have improved the treatment of their citizens, several Indo-Pacific countries continue to be human rights abusers and there are serious concerns with political rights and civil liberties throughout the Indo-Pacific region.
(5)Without strong leadership from the United States, the international system, fundamentally rooted in the rule of law, may wither, to the detriment of United States, regional, and global interests. It is imperative that the United States continue to play a leading role in the Indo-Pacific region by—
(A)defending peace and security; (B)advancing economic prosperity; and
(C)promoting respect for fundamental human rights. (6)In 2017, the Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate held a series of hearings on United States leadership in the Indo-Pacific region, in which—
(A)experts, including Representative Randy Forbes, Ambassador Robert Gallucci, Ms. Tami Overby, Dr. Robert Orr, Ambassador Derek Mitchell, Ambassador Robert King, Mr. Murray Hiebert, and others detailed the security challenges, economic opportunities, and imperatives of promoting rule of law, human rights, and democracy, in the Indo-Pacific region; and
(B)Dr. Graham Allison, the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, testified, As realistic students of history, Chinese leaders recognize that the role the U.S. has played since World War II as the architect and underwriter of regional stability and security has been essential to the rise of Asia, including China itself. But they believe that as the tide that brought the U.S. to Asia recedes, America must leave with it. Much as Britain’s role in the Western Hemisphere faded at the beginning of the twentieth century, so must America’s role in Asia as the region’s historic superpower resumes its place.
.
(7)The United States National Security Strategy (referred to in this Act as the National Security Strategy
), which was released in December 2017, states— (A)A geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region. The region, which stretches from the west coast of India to the western shores of the United States, represents the most populous and economically dynamic part of the world. The U.S. interest in a free and open Indo-Pacific extends back to the earliest days of our republic.
; and
(B)Our vision for the Indo-Pacific excludes no nation. We will redouble our commitment to established alliances and partnerships, while expanding and deepening relationships with new partners that share respect for sovereignty, fair and reciprocal trade, and the rule of law. We will reinforce our commitment to freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes in accordance with international law. We will work with allies and partners to achieve complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and preserve the non-proliferation regime in Northeast Asia.
.
3.Statement of policy on United States engagement in the Indo-Pacific regionIt is the policy of the United States to develop, and to commit to, a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region that—
(1)preserves peace through strength by securing the vital national security interests of the United States;
(2)promotes American prosperity by advancing the economic interests of the United States; (3)advances American influence by reflecting the values of the American people and universal human rights; and
(4)accords with and supports the rule of law and international norms. <enum>I</enum><header>Promoting United States security interests in the Indo-Pacific region</header> <section id="idd71b659f10164b1cbed3b11a3ad20c31"><enum>101.</enum><header>Authorization of appropriations</header> <subsection id="idAC4AEB3BB0294583961C24381D0B35FE"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">There are authorized to be appropriated for the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, and, as appropriate, the Department of Defense $1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, which shall be used—</text>
<paragraph id="id9EC51E8D30B14C4290282D97CE655A2F"><enum>(1)</enum><text>to advance United States foreign policy interests and objectives in the Indo-Pacific region in recognition of the value of diplomatic initiatives and programs in the furtherance of United States strategy;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idBF57F4F9662E46FAABCF7C5292E6A37B"><enum>(2)</enum><text>to bolster the United States military presence and readiness in the Indo-Pacific region for the purpose of deterring and defending against provocative actions, including by improving the defense infrastructure and critical munitions stockpiles of the United States Armed Forces;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idE40CC982087647B1A75833947B0A1863"><enum>(3)</enum><text>to improve the defense capacity of partner nations to resist coercion and to deter and defend against security threats, including through foreign military financing and international military education and training programs;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id8d2d61503098428fb44fad6591fed8c3"><enum>(4)</enum><text>to conduct regular bilateral and multilateral exercises, particularly with our most highly-capable allies and partners, to meet strategic challenges, including—</text>
<subparagraph id="id56A933B500764640B9E09F65B2C90DB3"><enum>(A)</enum><text>certain destabilizing activities of the People’s Republic of China; and</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="idFAE1DD7A679A407BB20BE52B40F82AD4"><enum>(B)</enum><text>emerging threats, such as the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea;</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id3E236BC406AB426A91FFF776E86C29B1"><enum>(5)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">to build new counterterrorism partnership programs in Southeast Asia to combat the growing presence of ISIS and other terrorist organizations that pose a significant threat to the United States, our allies, and our citizens’ interests abroad; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id1532337194f44540b0be1f7d3f2a143c"><enum>(6)</enum><text>to increase maritime domain awareness programs in Southeast Asia—</text> <subparagraph id="id2785FC282D924007BFD3B45DBE037FC3"><enum>(A)</enum><text>by expanding the scope of naval and coast guard training efforts with Southeast Asian countries;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id60CA99AD6A304E44B93F18C7100648D5"><enum>(B)</enum><text>through intelligence sharing and other information-sharing efforts; and</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="id5351BFBE64744D7288A9BA29B3DF437E"><enum>(C)</enum><text>through multilateral exercises, including by involving Japan, Australia, and India in such efforts and exercises.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id13142007a80647de9abf4ebf79938c35"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Countering China’s influence To undermine the international system</header><text>Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) shall be made available for United States Government efforts to counter the strategic influence of the People’s Republic of China, in accordance with the strategy required under section 7043(e)(3) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014 (division K of <external-xref legal-doc="public-law" parsable-cite="pl/113/76">Public Law 113–76</external-xref>; 128 Stat. 536) and in consultation with the appropriate committees of Congress.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="idf5622ecf1f8247028b8d333e7b80ea53"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Burma</header><text>None of the amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) may be made available for the programs, initiatives, or interactions that may benefit the defense sector of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (historically known as <quote>Burma</quote>).</text>
</subsection><subsection id="id1cb5e24464794e058ce067e6a18c54d9"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Philippines</header><text>Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) may not be made available for counternarcotics assistance (other than maritime programs) for the Philippine National Police unless the Secretary of State certifies and reports to the appropriate committees of Congress that the Government of the Philippines has adopted and is implementing a counternarcotics strategy that complies with international norms of due process.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="id2aa5c93a3beb454f9e7d113e78cff5e8"><enum>(e)</enum><header>Cambodia</header><text>Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) may not be made available for certain United States assistance programs that benefit the Government of Cambodia.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="id0114C9EF77534B86A43B964DA0D1093C"><enum>(f)</enum><header>Defined term</header><text>In this section, the term <term>appropriate committees of Congress</term> means—</text> <paragraph id="idC43D87A2CF0B45DA9371DDC4E0509490"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the <committee-name committee-id="SSAP00">Committee on Appropriations of the Senate</committee-name>;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idCBE87F8436DB44AE9FFB84DFC10E01D8"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the <committee-name committee-id="SSFR00">Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate</committee-name>;</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="id253f1bf13539487fb11acd4af33cd985"><enum>(3)</enum><text>the <committee-name committee-id="">Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives</committee-name>; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id2548FE3690D54FB88713184ABBE676B0"><enum>(4)</enum><text>the <committee-name committee-id="">Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives</committee-name>.</text> </paragraph></subsection></section><section id="id467588e0cc1a4bbd9274703fcd18dfaa"><enum>102.</enum><header>Treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific region</header> <subsection id="idba5cee67439643f59983a31b9216f502"><enum>(a)</enum><header>United States-Japan alliance</header><text>The United States Government—</text>
<paragraph id="id0cc4e964a1ab44d293b7a95353cbe1c0"><enum>(1)</enum><text>is committed to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, done at Washington, January 19, 1960, and subsequent security agreements;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="ide2e239e458f5414fb8a426792db1c0e5"><enum>(2)</enum><text>recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the United States and Japan in promoting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id15f8795a32be423bb5e949c4653fbb40"><enum>(3)</enum><text>calls for the strengthening and broadening of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United States and Japan.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="idd2ae3c2cbfb1475c966ba9b283543f79"><enum>(b)</enum><header>United States-Republic of Korea alliance</header><text>The United States Government—</text> <paragraph id="id94e197aae0ca486d9562155c25f7e98b"><enum>(1)</enum><text>is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea, done at Washington October 1, 1953, and subsequent security agreements;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id61618b1423b54607ad1ac360428827ff"><enum>(2)</enum><text>recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the United States and South Korea in promoting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id43ae1bedde624e0dabca2746b6192889"><enum>(3)</enum><text>calls for the strengthening and broadening of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United States and the Republic of Korea.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id7DC24F02B64643F2B5026F0C899C8B11"><enum>(c)</enum><header>United States-Australia alliance</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The United States Government—</text> <paragraph id="idBCBFE21255B94F9B9C95CD0896781D5E"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">is committed to the Security Treaty Between Australia and the United States of America, done at San Francisco September 1, 1951, and subsequent security agreements between these 2 nations;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id085F9616625B4FD3B3ECF4447505BAD2"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the United States and Australia in promoting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id0ED2CF7DE3574E57A759A4ABEFD707D4"><enum>(3)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">calls for the strengthening and broadening of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United States and Australia.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id7bebec6726df430089e740e7380a98f4"><enum>(d)</enum><header>United States-Philippines alliance</header><text>The United States Government is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America, done at Washington August 30, 1951, and subsequent bilateral security agreements, including the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, done at Manila April 28, 2014.</text>
</subsection><subsection commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id5600B419CAD64B2B959B64E871780485"><enum>(e)</enum><header display-inline="yes-display-inline">Thailand</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The United States Government is committed to—</text> <paragraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id97A93EA92A1D479F840037A6A4111434"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the Agreement Respecting Military Assistance Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Thailand, done at Bangkok October 17, 1950;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id25250A2711C941E39392B5ACBD69319C"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, done at Manila September 8, 1954; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id4C06E7406A294B698BEBA7137FCC1CA0"><enum>(3)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">all subsequent bilateral security agreements, including the Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-U.S. Defense Alliance, issued in Bangkok November 15, 2012.</text>
</paragraph></subsection></section><section id="iddd0da5c416d64e64b18ddc398d3e8498"><enum>103.</enum><header>United States-China relationship</header>
<subsection id="id15648666fdd9446c9bf83ccabfc4b849"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text>The United States Government—</text> <paragraph id="idda0dd1c5829745829e6bf0c0544abe05"><enum>(1)</enum><text>expresses grave concerns with Chinese actions that seek—</text>
<subparagraph id="id9F7B002AE6154CB4B47FD5F17BCC6493"><enum>(A)</enum><text>to further constrain space for civil society within China; and</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="id327781A2AE304B7384E210B55BF3AA0B"><enum>(B)</enum><text>to undermine a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region;</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idbe736cd52af64bcc8bf4a676dfefad4b"><enum>(2)</enum><text>encourages China to play a constructive role in world affairs by demonstrating consistent respect for the rule of law and international norms;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idada528d330654ae5a41d14d981eb7f69"><enum>(3)</enum><text>seeks to build a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship with China—</text> <subparagraph id="id57F044EACAB54AAC81D87402A2CA1D89"><enum>(A)</enum><text>by expanding areas of cooperation; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="idF8B2F98C42684E049734F10A0101134B"><enum>(B)</enum><text>by addressing areas of disagreement, including over human rights, economic policies, and maritime security; and</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id40edee85d0f540eb951258d7ea8a85b3"><enum>(4)</enum><text>is committed to working with China on shared regional and global challenges, especially—</text> <subparagraph id="id75F132490A954441AE34F5CAB79B921E"><enum>(A)</enum><text>upholding and strengthening the rules-based international system; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id1A166877DB4640A9975580BDC6ABFF32"><enum>(B)</enum><text>the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.</text> </subparagraph></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id703B61A5A78141019C9E877B26143951"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Sense of Congress</header><text>It is the sense of Congress that the United States should—</text>
<paragraph id="idDDBA02DB6ED64CB5B785B4FA2D3862CE"><enum>(1)</enum><text>welcome China’s decision to change course and pursue responsible engagement on global issues;</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="idEE00C79207A04BABA2F62B1DAB61AE97"><enum>(2)</enum><text>encourage China to play a constructive role in the Indo-Pacific region and globally; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idD1ADB3AABEF94BA1A266B53D7224CFCF"><enum>(3)</enum><text>continue to call out Chinese actions that undermine the rules-based international system.</text> </paragraph></subsection></section><section id="idc6328547c2e34691b053a42cda8dde52"><enum>104.</enum><header>United States-India strategic partnership</header> <subsection id="idF1DAB7AA65F647D2A931EEF800ED5B89"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The United States Government—</text>
<paragraph id="idee1171ed8a1f418dad10a395d08b9a65"><enum>(1)</enum><text>recognizes the vital role of the strategic partnership between the United States and India in promoting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id228D5A4C0C8D4DF29BE92067182E0EFC"><enum>(2)</enum><text>calls for the strengthening and broadening of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United States and India; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id2198eeab43094c39b4d63d09609e6676"><enum>(3)</enum><text>is committed to—</text> <subparagraph id="idF0EF809FAA9C4FF8901C70503354E59E"><enum>(A)</enum><text>the New Framework for the United States-India Defense Relationship, done at Arlington, Virginia June 28, 2005;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="idD24475E1AA4A4A9BA89E1003D247AE76"><enum>(B)</enum><text>the United States-India Defense Technology and Trade Initiative, launched in 2012;</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="id5380B5AD95834BB8926089BE3D0C45B5"><enum>(C)</enum><text>the Joint Strategic Vision for the Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, announced on January 25, 2015; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id564E7BB45B3E4636BB2D6B9495F9EDEA"><enum>(D)</enum><text>all related and subsequent bilateral and security agreements.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id6c6918ad6a5548d58c650b34c38d80ac"><enum>(b)</enum><header>India as major defense partner</header><text>Congress makes the following findings:</text> <paragraph id="id3e6fa86eb6904318850c0360f1a967fb"><enum>(1)</enum><text>Section 1292(a)(1)(A) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (<external-xref legal-doc="public-law" parsable-cite="pl/114/328">Public Law 114–328</external-xref>; 130 Stat. 2559; <external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/22/2751">22 U.S.C. 2751</external-xref> note) requires the recognition of India as a major defense partner.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id474bffed10ac4360ba24546dc383b2d6"><enum>(2)</enum><text>The designation of India as a major defense partner, which is unique to India—</text> <subparagraph id="id3BC2C98555BD481FB02594538D782BDE"><enum>(A)</enum><text>institutionalizes the progress made to facilitate defense trade and technology sharing between the United States and India;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="idB5C09E73F2C5447695645BA865CBE4BA"><enum>(B)</enum><text>elevates defense trade and technology cooperation between the United States and India to a level commensurate with the closest allies and partners of the United States;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id57d88bdb51f4430886e6fc965e5460ab"><enum>(C)</enum><text>facilitates technology sharing between the United States and India, including license-free access to a wide range of dual-use technologies, after taking into account national security concerns; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id6006781b18b64c87a35b7629f0a5ef6f"><enum>(D)</enum><text>facilitates joint exercises, coordination on defense strategy and policy, military exchanges, and port calls in support of defense cooperation between the United States and India.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></subsection></section><section id="id74964c534ab54bf69acdd1d61345d2ab"><enum>105.</enum><header>United States-ASEAN strategic partnership</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the sense of the Senate that the United States should—</text> <paragraph id="idd1b9f649aefe4cb8a4318d2a04cfaf05"><enum>(1)</enum><text>support and affirm the elevation of the United States-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) relationship to a strategic partnership;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id3D667BD6B7AD4C5CB420E535463227FD"><enum>(2)</enum><text>recommit to ASEAN centrality by helping build a strong, stable, politically cohesive, economically integrated, and socially responsible community of nations that has common rules, norms, procedures, and standards which are consistent with international law and the principles of a rules-based Indo-Pacific community;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="ide011aaec0e6643ef8411c9e9ec7a4975"><enum>(3)</enum><text>urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster greater integration among its members;</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="id6fccfa4cd7864a6d807d5e1ecbffaf9b"><enum>(4)</enum><text>recognize the value of—</text>
<subparagraph id="idBCC17E0AB94F4F08AA4CF7884D256DAE"><enum>(A)</enum><text>ASEAN engagement with economic, political, and security partners within Asia and elsewhere, including Australia, Canada, the European Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="idECF6FBD862CF420B98BAECE7AF3BDEC2"><enum>(B)</enum><text>strategic economic initiatives, such as the U.S.-ASEAN Connect, which demonstrate a commitment to ASEAN and the ASEAN Economic Community and build upon economic relationships in the Indo-Pacific region;</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idc209325d23c04517953ab8b602699087"><enum>(5)</enum><text>support efforts by the nations comprising ASEAN—</text> <subparagraph id="id15F40962E92541CE9F4909A14E548049"><enum>(A)</enum><text>to address maritime and territorial disputes in a constructive manner; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id9EBE0B786FD3427AABA161B02DF48F9D"><enum>(B)</enum><text>to pursue claims through peaceful, diplomatic, and legitimate regional and international arbitration mechanisms, consistent with international law, including through the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea to further promote peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region;</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idde735fa119654a9b98d9816ddcbe7449"><enum>(6)</enum><text>support efforts by United States partners and allies in ASEAN—</text> <subparagraph id="ide104a1c461d84beca6ec2167e7e278d2"><enum>(A)</enum><text>to enhance maritime capability and maritime domain awareness;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id5de8a6b033dc446bbe47ac06b5ded0dd"><enum>(B)</enum><text>to protect unhindered access to, and use of, international waterways in the Asia-Pacific region that are critical to ensuring the security and free flow of commerce;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="idf9897b57d0964c5692ba7410a17c0536"><enum>(C)</enum><text>to counter piracy;</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="ide703aa067d0148e0809e8493588713c9"><enum>(D)</enum><text>to disrupt illicit maritime trafficking activities such as the trafficking of persons, goods, and drugs; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id51159c18de144fb0aef13b2c2ecc78f8"><enum>(E)</enum><text>to enhance the maritime capabilities of countries or regional organizations to respond to emerging threats to maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region; and</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idfb0c8160a61a41e585e4976af82819c9"><enum>(7)</enum><text>urge ASEAN member states to develop a common approach to reaffirm the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling with respect to the case between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China.</text>
</paragraph></section><section id="id428b669d49f94028833d1b97b6fc4973"><enum>106.</enum><header>United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral security partnership</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that the President should develop a strategy to deepen the trilateral security cooperation between the United States, South Korea, and Japan, including missile defense, intelligence-sharing, and other defense-related initiatives.</text>
</section><section id="ida0d3f85cb8684df0b38f412668aeadfa"><enum>107.</enum><header>Quadrilateral security dialogue</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that—</text> <paragraph id="id52C33F3066DF4C329FE21538FD360682"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the security dialogue between the United States, Australia, India, and Japan is vital to addressing pressing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region in order to promote—</text>
<subparagraph id="idDCC743F0E28844E4AB10345E02E1C910"><enum>(A)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">a rules-based order;</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="id10BC7A546F464A29AF524B78D0326863"><enum>(B)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">respect for international law; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id04BC4033A2D74D83AFF1D6BAAE3BA1B1"><enum>(C)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">a free and open Indo-Pacific; and</text> </subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id88085176EB5A4317999EC81B8F49C553"><enum>(2)</enum><text>such a dialogue is intended to augment, rather than to replace, current mechanisms.</text>
</paragraph></section><section id="id4c48a0832fc044428d2464372000785c"><enum>108.</enum><header>Enhanced security partnerships in Southeast Asia</header>
<subsection commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="ida1b5dfae1128473ba15f91ad7129434a"><enum>(a)</enum><header display-inline="yes-display-inline">Indonesia</header><text>The United States Government is committed to—</text> <paragraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id79CCCE10F2DC4348BF3ABC82574C56A5"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership, done in Washington November 9, 2010;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="idBE64816DC2B3493F88877CC2A0A6E8EA"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the Joint Statement on Comprehensive Defense Cooperation, done in Washington October 26, 2015; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id672C8AA487094AD6BB60B1D36337E315"><enum>(3)</enum><text>all related and subsequent bilateral and security agreements between the United States and Indonesia.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id58E1258528174F6EAFE166FFC4ACEFF3"><enum>(b)</enum><header display-inline="yes-display-inline">Malaysia</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The United States Government is committed to—</text> <paragraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id42993160209B4A6981958F72760C82D9"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the U.S.-Malaysia Comprehensive Partnership, done at Putrajaya April 27, 2014;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="idFD98AB8B8ECC4E8B8E533A1BCC42CF5A"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the Joint Statement for Enhancing the Comprehensive Partnership between the United States of America and Malaysia, done in Washington September 13, 2017; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id7A0C87B08EFD4D2996CD889E3D7315E5"><enum>(3)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">all related and subsequent bilateral and security agreements between the United States and Malaysia.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id85beb6bdbd0f41bf848616a4615cc57a"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Singapore</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The United States Government is committed to—</text> <paragraph id="id578652E11D844D5989265CD4C0C704F4"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the Strategic Framework Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Singapore for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security, done at Washington July 12, 2005;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idFB1482C584D540D98AA0BDDE85E897BC"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, done at Arlington, Virginia December 7, 2015; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id5E02E477B0E74A5B9371F66E7BB5E969"><enum>(3)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">all related and subsequent bilateral and security agreements between the United States and Singapore.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="idE7E9746F61D14FDD8F3F691EFD74479F"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Vietnam</header><text>The United States Government is committed to—</text> <paragraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id5ECB189D566A40D58613A962A71444AC"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership, done at Washington December 16, 2013;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id7F609F6F21A346DD8238964ACBD705EC"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the U.S.-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement on Defense Relations, done at Hanoi on June 1, 2015;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id54E50F18D2C64C739B0ED6B28241DF0F"><enum>(3)</enum><text>the U.S.-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement, done at Washington May 31, 2017; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="idD2575453813542A5848106922ACB6AA3"><enum>(4)</enum><text>all related and subsequent bilateral and security agreements between the United States and Vietnam.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id332a64d6105d4e40870e978ca208a4ef"><enum>(e)</enum><header>Sense of Congress</header><text>It is the sense of Congress that the United States should deepen the diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation, especially in the areas of maritime security and counterterrorism, with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam.</text>
</subsection></section><section id="idf9f1cfc2f6114f6db73ab917c25dce66"><enum>109.</enum><header>Commitment to Taiwan</header>
<subsection id="id697B90AF7B4E455BB513DC12E1D1098B"><enum>(a)</enum><header>United States commitment to Taiwan</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">It is the policy of the United States to faithfully enforce all existing United States Government commitments to Taiwan, as enshrined in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (<external-xref legal-doc="public-law" parsable-cite="pl/96/8">Public Law 96–8</external-xref>) and the Six Assurances agreed to by President Ronald Reagan in July 1982.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="id03947c40d2b74958a0280476831dc2b2"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Arms sales to Taiwan</header><text>The President shall conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan that are tailored to meet the existing and likely future threats from the People’s Republic of China, including supporting the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate asymmetric capabilities, including undersea warfare and air defense capabilities, into its military forces.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="idDC19D2F2DAFC4AD48D113AB2A0F0E07C"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Travel</header><text>The President shall authorize the travel of high-level United States officials to Taiwan, in accordance with the Taiwan Travel Act (<external-xref legal-doc="public-law" parsable-cite="pl/115/135">Public Law 115–135</external-xref>).</text>
</subsection></section><section id="id1a4fe13befb442c08d65d1bfb7a36db4"><enum>110.</enum><header>North Korea strategy</header>
<subsection id="idbe6f279c71d04fb7b3e4fd8b5be89804"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Findings</header><text>Congress makes the following findings:</text> <paragraph id="id5d7aaa5d8e494913a7d496ec43a8ba26"><enum>(1)</enum><text>The Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has flagrantly defied the international community by illicitly developing its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017).</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idda7e34fbe1b2439da6f6d7aaa5dd5c3e"><enum>(2)</enum><text>The Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea engages in gross human rights abuses against its own people and citizens of other countries, including the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idc3e12618180a480c97c8fceedb252b34"><enum>(3)</enum><text>The United States is committed to pursuing a peaceful denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea through a policy of maximum pressure and engagement, in close concert with its partners.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id53FDB368AF2B409C968940B5971C8BC6"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Policy of the United States with respect to sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea</header>
<paragraph id="id2949915e8af84eb0a87288dcdaa25849"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Statement of policy</header><text>It is the policy of the United States to continue to impose sanctions with respect to activities of the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, persons acting for or on behalf of such government, or other persons in accordance with Executive Order 13687 (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/50/1701">50 U.S.C. 1701</external-xref> note; relating to imposing additional sanctions with respect to North Korea), Executive Order 13694 (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/50/1701">50 U.S.C. 1701</external-xref> note; relating to blocking the property of certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), Executive Order 13722 (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/50/1701">50 U.S.C. 1701</external-xref> note; relating to blocking the property of the Government of North Korea and the Workers’ Party of Korea, and prohibiting certain transactions with respect to North Korea), and Executive Order 13810 (82 Fed. Reg. 44705; relating to imposing additional sanctions with respect to North Korea), as such Executive orders are in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, until the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is no longer engaged in the illicit activities described in such Executive orders, including actions in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), and 2375 (2017).</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id8ef2bd3e60294e029b6de1f938f08a45"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Report</header><text>Not later than 30 days after terminating any sanction with respect to the activities of the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, a person acting for or on behalf of such government, or any other person provided for in an Executive order listed in subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees regarding the cessation of any illicit activity that violates United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), or 2375 (2017) by such Government or person.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idabdbe03e5b744494b0f1226dd0065c92"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Rule of construction</header><text>Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit the authority of the President pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/50/1701">50 U.S.C. 1701</external-xref> et seq.).</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="ided51f443a0a240cfb7d6bf155d9219f6"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Policy of the United States with respect to negotiation on the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs</header><text>It is the policy of the United States that the objective of negotiations with respect to the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea be the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of such programs.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="id41d5e6f3493d4bbbb1ff3353ffd10398"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Report on a strategy To address the threats posed by, and the capabilities of, the Democratic
People’s
Republic of Korea</header>
<paragraph id="id57797c38912847219a6fad61792a0e78"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In general</header><text>Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, or a designee of the Secretary, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes actions taken by the United States to address the threats posed by, and the capabilities of, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="iddc13cab84b03484aa67a94ee724899f5"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Elements</header><text>Each report required under paragraph (1) shall include—</text> <subparagraph id="id0a078ed5ab814db0b5d8902990ffefe3"><enum>(A)</enum><text>a summary of ongoing efforts by the United States to identify strategies and policies, including an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of such strategies and policies—</text>
<clause id="id79BBAD90315640A5ABF2EDA5DC5ACE7B"><enum>(i)</enum><text>to achieve peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; and</text> </clause><clause id="id213EAFB216B744B5A6C29C92F6CB1B11"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>to eliminate the threat posed by the ballistic missile program of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea;</text>
</clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idb323bf52bc9b43c1afc0952c41d9cbc9"><enum>(B)</enum><text>an assessment of—</text> <clause id="id0EDEE98E50C74B21B9C018AE88D5155E"><enum>(i)</enum><text>potential road maps toward peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the elimination of the nuclear and ballistic missile threats posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; and</text>
</clause><clause id="id126F417A4A8E4BF594CA5F064B5EE252"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>specific actions that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would need to take for each such roadmap to become viable;</text>
</clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idec84b0a93be24c2c9c9b70172ab0de25"><enum>(C)</enum><text>a summary of the United States strategy to increase international coordination and cooperation, whether unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally, including sanctions enforcement and interdiction, to address the threat posed by the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which shall include—</text>
<clause id="ide87b6938dc834f568674dfc5a3fa482e"><enum>(i)</enum><text>a description of the actions taken by the Secretary of State, or designees of the Secretary, to consult with governments around the world, with the purpose of inducing such governments to diplomatically and economically isolate the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea;</text>
</clause><clause id="id71b1befe119547299b84397af0dfdefa"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>a description of the actions taken by such governments to implement measures to diplomatically and economically isolate the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea;</text>
</clause><clause id="idd20f1644056448b6b33b426803bb97a5"><enum>(iii)</enum><text>a list of countries with governments that the Secretary has determined are noncooperative with respect to implementing measures to diplomatically and economically isolate the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; and</text>
</clause><clause id="idf8ef7e4984c840448a21c27496b0fae1"><enum>(iv)</enum><text>a plan of action to engage, and increase cooperation with respect to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, with the governments of the countries on the list described in clause (iii); and</text>
</clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id54a27942c74347d2989697e84599b344"><enum>(D)</enum><text>an assessment of the adequacy of the national export control regimes of countries that are members of the United Nations, and multilateral export control regimes, that are necessary to enforce sanctions imposed with respect to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolutions; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="idE2E207E8CA0D490B929D5512F24FDAC9"><enum>(E)</enum><text>an action plan to encourage and assist countries in adopting and using authorities necessary to enforce export controls required by United Nations Security Council resolutions.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id718e0b591955404d9f9093e8ccf7bb12"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Form of report</header><text>Each report required under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id96b3f1a7ed7e4cf6b10557426dbf07ff"><enum>(e)</enum><header>Sense of Congress</header><text>It is the sense of Congress that—</text> <paragraph id="id6C7FC997DA9744D2B1E0B40BBAB7996C"><enum>(1)</enum><text>representatives of the United States shall use the voice and vote of the United States in all international organizations, as appropriate, to advocate for the expulsion of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from such organizations, until such time as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea meets its commitments under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017);</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idD7C7FBC5C4444E1697417ACD3A8785F5"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the Secretary of State may take such actions as are necessary to induce countries to take measures to diplomatically and economically isolate the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including—</text>
<subparagraph id="id47dcd588f7454763a1cefb228aa24dc1"><enum>(A)</enum><text>reducing the diplomatic presence in the United States of countries with governments that the Secretary has determined are noncooperative with respect to implementing measures to diplomatically and economically isolate the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id44465c54a4da4817b6da134446b3bd8e"><enum>(B)</enum><text>reducing the diplomatic presence of the United States in such countries; and</text> </subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id478D4A36E6AE4D729CC4141FEF7AE952"><enum>(3)</enum><text>the Secretary of State may terminate or reduce United States foreign assistance to countries enabling the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.</text>
</paragraph></subsection></section><section id="id4ba9d640dd504789b435143ed4a234ee"><enum>111.</enum><header>New Zealand and the Pacific islands</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that—</text> <paragraph id="idb4dff23e20cf420c81212f281e4d21be"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the United States supports strengthening diplomatic, economic, and the security relationship with New Zealand;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id3b44d524432442fd9923dad2e969a037"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the United States supports strong United States engagement with the nations of the South Pacific, including Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="iddd76036f4b7e43c3a3c66ab6ca4f0490"><enum>(3)</enum><text>the United States recognizes the strong historical, strategic and cultural ties to these countries;</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="ideb8e3bb8dee348bba15f25566b6308a9"><enum>(4)</enum><text>the United States should deepen its cooperation with New Zealand and the nations of the South Pacific in areas of mutual interest, including—</text>
<subparagraph id="id22f6bf9cf0324ffe818d15533f66e1db"><enum>(A)</enum><text>fisheries and marine resource conservation;</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="id6dd8c61d1e6343ad841fcd898af8919a"><enum>(B)</enum><text>environmental challenges and resilience;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id7F4311B984B843A09E14CF4E30A22B90"><enum>(C)</enum><text>global health;</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="iddb3ce90dc55d4c2f94ae9491d9810edc"><enum>(D)</enum><text>development and trade; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id12b2aad0a04c499e98df8172e78d909b"><enum>(E)</enum><text>people-to-people ties; and</text> </subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id3df8807af5984e7288354a41105b61ce"><enum>(5)</enum><text>the United States should provide robust foreign assistance to the Pacific islands.</text>
</paragraph></section><section id="id951530c0a4a147d9aec3d2c232eb388f"><enum>112.</enum><header>Freedom of navigation and overflight; promotion of international law</header>
<subsection id="idF0D47D534B8E4B5B813CA0A3EC1764A2"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Freedom of navigation</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">It is the policy of the United States—</text> <paragraph id="id7D6C32F68EF74A1882079ADBDB7D6B16"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">to conduct, as part of its global Freedom of Navigation Program, regular freedom of navigation and overflight operations in the Indo-Pacific region, in accordance with applicable international law; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idFE878FA608B34601AA156E5ACCC8EE77"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">to promote genuine multilateral negotiations to peacefully resolve maritime disputes in the South China Sea, in accordance with applicable international law.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id68805efba54e441e9a9714e63f42c6d7"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Joint Indo-Pacific diplomatic strategy</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that the President should develop a diplomatic strategy that includes working with United States allies and partners to conduct joint maritime training and freedom of navigation operations in the Indo-Pacific region, including the East China Sea and the South China Sea, in support of a rules-based international system benefitting all countries.</text>
</subsection></section><section id="idfa5ca87d78f04ca1930757970a81877f"><enum>113.</enum><header>Combating terrorism in Southeast Asia</header>
<subsection id="id8b3cf56c1f69484ebd3d7e8dcf6f669c"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Report</header><text>Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and other appropriate officials, shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress that contains an assessment of the current and future capabilities and activities of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist groups in Southeast Asia that pose a significant threat to the United States, its allies, and its citizens interests abroad.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="idaf7df17cffd843f39c5e733de8d2b58d"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Elements</header><text>The report required under subsection (a) shall include—</text> <paragraph id="idf582ed1a5c3043439e856903af7d9645"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the current number of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters in Southeast Asia;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id92ccb1d874cf485eae5a429b2834cf23"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the estimated number of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters expected to return to Southeast Asia from fighting in the Middle East;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idd4233b345bbe4913917c2acbb70b9789"><enum>(3)</enum><text>the current resources available to combat the threat of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters in Southeast Asia, and the additional resources required to combat such threat;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id76cfd364feac4737bac420b2c50d710f"><enum>(4)</enum><text>a detailed assessment of the capabilities of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters to operate effectively in countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id54337782e44e4be9881e92eeeef21541"><enum>(5)</enum><text>a description of the capabilities and resources of governments in Southeast Asia to counter violent extremist groups; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="ide8c79677bf144b489eda2a8847b0b0d3"><enum>(6)</enum><text>a list of additional United States resources and capabilities that the Department of Defense recommends providing to governments in Southeast Asia to combat violent extremist groups.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="idcb7058918a8f4d1ea099ccf7c5f939d2"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Definitions</header><text>In this section—</text> <paragraph id="idC7A41FE2E14949E4939EE4BF21D9AE2F"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the term <term>appropriate committees of Congress</term> means—</text>
<subparagraph id="id9C48706573F44ACF814AFB6C62956F5C"><enum>(A)</enum><text>the <committee-name committee-id="SSAS00">Committee on Armed Services of the Senate</committee-name>;</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id63B4EB7031E441159D67CCD93CFAC6D3"><enum>(B)</enum><text>the <committee-name committee-id="SSFR00">Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate</committee-name>;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id2cf5244882cd4f9facc62cf3264e6cb3"><enum>(C)</enum><text>the <committee-name committee-id="">Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives</committee-name>; and</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="idA74D85CA20584150A784FD737B240CF5"><enum>(D)</enum><text>the <committee-name committee-id="">Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;</committee-name> and</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id9BF3E9FAC2B747DA85AE6B5B53056BAA"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the term <term>ISIS</term> means the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.</text> </paragraph></subsection></section><section id="idebca8bb652484b898ff5fe47493260af"><enum>114.</enum><header>Cybersecurity cooperation</header> <subsection id="id561B01A51A2545E2A43D641BEE2840F2"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Sense of Congress</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that there should be robust cybersecurity cooperation between the United States and nations in the Indo-Pacific region—</text>
<paragraph id="id1AB0B34D69844B10B751C377627AE3C8"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">to effectively respond to cybersecurity threats, including state-sponsored threats;</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="idE33BEF74A94C42C6B0762B5E6F871C0A"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">to share best practices to combat such threats; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idA8752B2389FD459BBE353F3555F0D78F"><enum>(3)</enum><text>to strengthen resilience against misinformation and propaganda.</text> </paragraph></subsection><subsection id="idE9B295B434904CD2869DCF7FAF79D251"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Authorization of appropriations</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary—</text>
<paragraph id="id2B2A028C49DB4E58A4EF7162C8B5EB56"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">to build capacity for responding to cybersecurity threats originating in the Indo-Pacific region; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idB57B7D466343408EBB34B345FE7F4E2D"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">to enhance cooperation between the United States and nations in such region for combating such threats.</text>
</paragraph></subsection></section><section id="idd093c94de5be4c10afdfcd807bd7ad95"><enum>115.</enum><header>Nuclear nonproliferation and arms control in the Indo-Pacific region</header>
<subsection id="id5ab88fed99514090beb77f19bf1103f8"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text>The United States Government—</text> <paragraph id="id7d8617e6a6f9410dbab55131ef0b93df"><enum>(1)</enum><text>recognizes that the spread of nuclear weapons, and their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idc69c5de4146c4093a3fba32c08328d27"><enum>(2)</enum><text>seeks to peacefully address the unique challenge posed to regional and global stability by the illicit use, and the proliferation to and from North Korea, of sensitive nuclear and missile technologies;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id53961f387f1e4367a38b0617346c1cd3"><enum>(3)</enum><text>notes efforts by China and Russia—</text> <subparagraph id="id23D556C984C0474E8C00DCE0B20640BA"><enum>(A)</enum><text>to expand and modernize their respective nuclear arsenals; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="idA750AA4C8F41442D9B20A938BEDA1176"><enum>(B)</enum><text>to pursue sales of commercial nuclear technologies; and</text> </subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idb2ba626bbd294be2b4c3606693a28bc4"><enum>(4)</enum><text>recognizes the legitimate pursuit by many countries in the Indo-Pacific region of nuclear energy for a variety of peaceful applications.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="ideac3279dff83422ab107887659d13e3b"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Sense of Congress</header><text>It is the sense of Congress that the United States Government should undertake all reasonable and appropriate efforts to pursue effective arms control and nuclear nonproliferation policies in the Indo-Pacific region to limit the further spread of potentially dangerous and destabilizing conventional and nuclear weapons.</text>
</subsection></section><enum>II</enum><header>Promoting United States economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region</header>
<section id="idb19cef71a359476ebf71f0306816b915"><enum>201.</enum><header>Findings; sense of Congress</header>
<subsection id="id7E371154C782456091BC79F815139D8C"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Findings</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Congress makes the following findings:</text> <paragraph id="idf16cb4078aa140329275f229a3e11a56"><enum>(1)</enum><text>According to the United States Chamber of Commerce, by 2030—</text>
<subparagraph id="id05753040859349F7A04403BFBA4013D5"><enum>(A)</enum><text>66 percent of the global middle class population will be in Asia; and</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="id1E96C4553E224958A2151D8E287758AF"><enum>(B)</enum><text>59 percent of middle class consumption will be in Asia.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idd1953c2290a24f199dd06259235851cb"><enum>(2)</enum><text>According to the Asian Development Bank—</text> <subparagraph id="idC80869599D444A478221F713320FCFA5"><enum>(A)</enum><text>Asian countries have signed 140 bilateral or regional trade agreements; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id548DAFE53A4347EEB68B92E5068D97C8"><enum>(B)</enum><text>75 more trade agreements with Asian countries are under negotiation or concluded and awaiting entry into force.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idc60903d63ca44ffba18f76c29149a114"><enum>(3)</enum><text>The United States has signed free trade agreements with 3 nations in the Indo-Pacific region, namely Australia, Singapore, and the Republic of Korea.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id96afdca2d223484c99775c3eef0f7a8f"><enum>(4)</enum><text>The member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (referred to in this section as <quote>ASEAN</quote>), as a group—</text> <subparagraph id="id57A9B5DEB6B747B592C4A66B1E3357F3"><enum>(A)</enum><text>represent the fifth largest economy in the world; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id0ACD66C9C8434F3181974E932C0B34B3"><enum>(B)</enum><text>have a combined gross domestic product of $2,400,000,000,000.</text> </subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idde76f75ae7064a11bec64db108ecf4e7"><enum>(5)</enum><text>The economy comprised of ASEAN member states grew by 66 percent between 2006 and 2015, and the total value of bilateral trade between the United States and ASEAN member states has increased by 78 percent since 2004.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idc57498c3ae294003ad757ec26f205e4a"><enum>(6)</enum><text>In 2015, the trade surplus of goods sold by companies in ASEAN member states to consumers in the United States was $77,000,000,000, while the United States 2015 trade surplus of services provided to consumers in ASEAN member states was $8,000,000,000.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id7319b6ad9b6148a6957f44e2d0a1fe6e"><enum>(7)</enum><text>According to U.S.-ASEAN Business Council, Inc., goods and services exported from the United States to ASEAN member states support 550,000 jobs in the United States.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id58df12d22f7448ce85b2ceed3bd7165b"><enum>(8)</enum><text>According to the Business Roundtable—</text> <subparagraph id="id8F086F25774F475CA52EC59F7F6247A8"><enum>(A)</enum><text>the United States, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam were responsible for a combined 40 percent of global gross domestic product in 2017; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id483A523591A846D79599FA399DBBE505"><enum>(B)</enum><text>United States bilateral trade with the other nations referred to in subparagraph (A) supports 15,600,000 jobs in the United States.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id6977ac7c0e0544e7936257dd4b977844"><enum>(9)</enum><text>According to the United States National Security Strategy—</text> <subparagraph id="id6f8624e1f8f94130adb89bfa65fc9e6e"><enum>(A)</enum><text>ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) <quote>remain centerpieces of the Indo-Pacific’s regional architecture and platforms for promoting an order based on freedom</quote>; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="idee46aaffe38e4e339d17f4ddb6f0c102"><enum>(B)</enum><text>the United States will <quote>work with partners to build a network of states dedicated to free markets and protected from forces that would subvert their sovereignty.</quote>.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="idE70FF9931ACC42F6A6C8839347062FD0"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Sense of Congress</header><text>It is the sense of Congress that trade between the United States and the nations in the Indo-Pacific region is vitally important to the United States economy, United States exports, and jobs in the United States.</text>
</subsection></section><section id="idbef48eb09959446eb2bf17e629089059"><enum>202.</enum><header>Trade negotiations, multilateral agreements, and regional economic summits</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">Congress supports—</text> <paragraph id="idAB0ED55D2F134BF09E3D2FCED6359586"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">multilateral, bilateral, or regional trade agreements that increase United States employment and expand the economy;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id4A9A4CE0249444738BB06018D2C26F7B"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">formal economic dialogues that include concrete outcomes;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idC814842763AA4E1C96BFEE3FC62FE5C1"><enum>(3)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">high-standard bilateral investment treaties between the United States and nations in the Indo-Pacific region;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id677B8A37B8614680814A5E8A7E2EE14D"><enum>(4)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">negotiations of the Trade in Services Agreement and the Environmental Goods Agreement that include several major Asian economies; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id7DBCD133798440CEBBB048ACFFC0B1BF"><enum>(5)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the proactive, strategic, and continuing high-level use of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the East Asia Summit, and the Group of 20 to pursue United States economic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.</text>
</paragraph></section><section id="ideff825d192a4420ba0776b455f33b76a"><enum>203.</enum><header>United States-ASEAN Economic Partnership</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">The President, acting through the United States Trade Representative, is authorized to negotiate a comprehensive economic engagement framework with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.</text>
</section><section id="id5C91FE1A91954B4589C59A6CFE7D1544"><enum>204.</enum><header>Trade capacity building and trade facilitation</header>
<subsection id="id4CE694728D034AF2B4BABF726FD72D19"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The President is encouraged to produce a robust and comprehensive trade capacity building and trade facilitation strategy for the Indo-Pacific region.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="id14F45EBEAA384A809DA40B5C792A6F9F"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Authorization of appropriations</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">There are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to carry out subsection (a).</text>
</subsection></section><section id="idf2826abfc85c4702b97d854be7fb5176"><enum>205.</enum><header>Intellectual property protection</header>
<subsection id="id7523D8A3A5634DDC98C5B4EFD70C053E"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The President is encouraged to impose penalties on all entities found to be complicit in the theft of United States intellectual property, in accordance with applicable law, including commercial cyber-enabled theft.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="id5E2EDD9A70314F8FA4763F915B8FB48D"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Annual report</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit a report to Congress that—</text>
<paragraph id="idA693609412704CB18A883C409AB84DF3"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">describes the efforts of the United States Government to combat intellectual property and commercial cyber-enabled theft in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly the People’s Republic of China; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id9EB36CB34C4049639FEA8E209F3DEECE"><enum>(2)</enum><text>includes a country-by-country assessment of priority areas for United States engagement and capacity building assistance.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id6a64b0923038435fab8b02198b2b1d7e"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Authorization of appropriations</header><text>There are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to sponsor bilateral and multilateral activities designed to build capacity in the identified priority areas described in the annual report required under subsection (b).</text>
</subsection></section><section id="idcf05d59f51004c3883ca2d95499cc109"><enum>206.</enum><header>Energy programs and initiatives</header>
<subsection id="id1B8A546604DE462E880233B45CDB9FB5"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Indo-Pacific energy strategy</header>
<paragraph id="id93FE2831FA4C4D389DC9A48CD46D51FC"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Strategy</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, shall create a United States Government strategy to increase United States exports of energy to the nations in the Indo-Pacific region.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id13D9890636F54148BE788485A6BE2036"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Authorization of appropriations</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">There are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to carry out paragraph (1).</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="idd8c2a8f3d0e441efbf7a59918ef44a97"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Reliable energy partnerships</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that—</text> <paragraph id="id10B58D6C5CC34726BDB94FC64245E779"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the President should establish bilateral and regional initiatives to increase energy security in the Indo-Pacific region;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idB956BF345E8648AFA93EE30C503A7D72"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the United States should authorize the supply of liquefied natural gas to the nations in the Indo-Pacific region; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id7B56C63197C8495E8A4DBECFE3C62105"><enum>(3)</enum><text>the United States should create a dedicated program, in partnership with the private sector and multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, to promote universal access to reliable electricity in Myanmar (historically known as <quote>Burma</quote>).</text>
</paragraph></subsection></section><section id="iddd955a53252040a7bc8db7a8a4c116f3"><enum>207.</enum><header>Lower Mekong Initiative</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, should increase regional engagement in the areas of environment, health, education, and infrastructure development with the Lower Mekong countries, including—</text>
<paragraph id="id70ca6b7633984b6eb781c4c24090c506"><enum>(1)</enum><text>assisting to develop programs that focus on forecasting environmental challenges and resilience;</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="idf25c6662f4e345ed8ba0e9e2b810036b"><enum>(2)</enum><text>assisting with transnational cooperation on sustainable uses of forest and water resources with the goal of preserving the biodiversity of the Mekong Basin and access to safe drinking water;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idb1a7a7f34996485e8b6ffa67ed5b2c3c"><enum>(3)</enum><text>assisting with education enrollment and broadband internet connectivity, particularly English training and connectivity in rural communities; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idafca528fba9444bdba29edf14dea1f7d"><enum>(4)</enum><text>improving global health in the Lower Mekong countries, including—</text> <subparagraph id="idf77c530e427f4784b0df403d715f2a7a"><enum>(A)</enum><text>reducing the HIV/AIDS infection rate; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="idf0852d62840d4799a9e503c6fdce6875"><enum>(B)</enum><text>helping regional partners to track and treat malaria and tuberculosis.</text> </subparagraph></paragraph></section><enum>III</enum><header>Promoting United States values in the Indo-Pacific region</header> <section id="id8fbc0c9836e547ac945b68b2fcc8289a"><enum>301.</enum><header>Findings</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">Congress finds that—</text>
<paragraph id="id1CB471E1F2A5409FBEBB8FEA89C1B972"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the promotion of human rights and respect for democratic values in the Indo-Pacific region is in the United States national security interests;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id1B73124D66E24B52A56EEC654C1D2871"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">there are serious concerns with the rule of law and civil liberties in Cambodia, China, North Korea, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, which have all been identified by Freedom House as <quote>Not Free</quote>;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idAF30DCDF4E87414CA6B9E63483628E27"><enum>(3)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">there have been recent disturbing human rights developments in—</text>
<subparagraph id="id2EA73F53244341D685264BB87FB42CBD"><enum>(A)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Burma (Myanmar), which has been identified by Freedom House as <quote>Not Free</quote>; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id06902D8ECF0744BE8D467AC1E046AED8"><enum>(B)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">the Philippines, which has been identified by Freedom House as <quote>Partly Free</quote>; and</text> </subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idd22f50741ad7406b8ad75601bf3121be"><enum>(4)</enum><text>according to the National Security Strategy, the United States—</text>
<subparagraph id="idFAF9D39DBFBF45DAB15FF75AF758DB59"><enum>(A)</enum><text>will <quote>support, with our words and actions, those who live under oppressive regimes and who seek freedom, individual dignity, and the rule of law</quote>;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id9FDA5A6341574C53B4C187905A6EE8DE"><enum>(B)</enum><text><quote>may use diplomacy, sanctions, and other tools to isolate states and leaders who threaten our interests and whose actions run contrary to our values</quote>; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id964074C8DCBB455490D6534A14B80608"><enum>(C)</enum><text><quote>will support efforts to advance women’s equality, protect the rights of women and girls, and promote women and youth empowerment programs.</quote>.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></section><section id="id88248c9a255d4744abc9c5ecbab0a9d1"><enum>302.</enum><header>Trafficking-in-persons</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">The President is encouraged to pursue additional efforts to combat trafficking in persons and human slavery in the Indo-Pacific region.</text>
</section><section id="id32db26a1df984b6bbe42377286374acd"><enum>303.</enum><header>Bilateral and regional dialogues; people-to-people engagement</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">The Secretary of State should—</text> <paragraph id="id7F5309A366B54A509338AA9ECB5F8E7B"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">establish high-level bilateral and regional dialogues with nations in the Indo-Pacific region regarding human rights and religious freedom violations;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id4EA628B8CAAE4BE9885E9ED559BBBC88"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">establish or support robust, people-to-people exchange programs in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly programs engaging young leaders; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idBB65E2B88A6340728B70F15A4FFE878D"><enum>(3)</enum><text>establish educational exchanges and capacity-building programs emphasizing civil society development.</text>
</paragraph></section><section id="ida1fce940914e49eda391afe2cd13ef5b"><enum>304.</enum><header>Imposition of sanctions and suspension of United States assistance</header>
<subsection id="idC689F2621818471D958D16DD108ACF22"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Sanctions</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The President is authorized to impose sanctions, in accordance with applicable law, including financial penalties and visa bans, on any individual or entity that—</text>
<paragraph id="idF8F13CF946D145DAAB40E027594801E8"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">violates human rights or religious freedoms; or</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idC52187229C1F4E82A33D942535C23220"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">engages in censorship activities.</text> </paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id840670c011c548009a7372dfc242c562"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Suspension of foreign assistance</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The President is authorized, in accordance with applicable law, to terminate, suspend, or otherwise alter United States economic assistance to any country that has engaged in serious violations of human rights or religious freedoms.</text>
</subsection></section><section commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="idDC9F0D21D47A47EB9F6D6DD851020EE4"><enum>305.</enum><header display-inline="yes-display-inline">Authorization of appropriations</header>
<subsection commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="idF512C378AE8E476CB26382583B861A31"><enum>(a)</enum><header display-inline="yes-display-inline">Promotion of democracy in the Indo-Pacific region</header>
<paragraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id723E5651E01C41CBB4AF0579C5AEEAEE"><enum>(1)</enum><header display-inline="yes-display-inline">In general</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">There is authorized to be appropriated $150,000,000, for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, to promote democracy, strengthen civil society, human rights, rule of law, transparency, and accountability in the Indo-Pacific region.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id1bd90e62f6c044e9b2617a618da95253"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Democracy in china</header><text>Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be made available for United States Government efforts, led by the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, to promote democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in the People’s Republic of China.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="idab1038939dbb4d1ca211db11dc01c10b"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Tibet</header><text>Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be made available for nongovernmental organizations to support activities preserving cultural traditions and promoting sustainable development, education, and environmental conservation in Tibetan communities in the Tibet Autonomous Region and in other Tibetan communities in China, India, and Nepal.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id3D761A725E5B4CC6B7CA836974CB5E40"><enum>(b)</enum><header display-inline="yes-display-inline">Freedom of information to North Korea</header>
<paragraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id99A8390508DD46338CDAA435E5038D5A"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In general</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">There is authorized to be appropriated $10,000,000, for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, to implement programs to enhance freedom of information efforts with regard to North Korea.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="id6E021F539BF84D15A06F6C720398E1A4"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Report</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter through September 30, 2023, the Broadcasting Board of Governors shall submit a report to Congress that describes the implementation of the programs described in paragraph (1).</text></paragraph></subsection></section>
1.Short title; table of contents
(a)This Act may be cited as the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018
. (b)The table of contents for this Act is as follows:Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.Sec. 2. Findings.TITLE I—United States policy and diplomatic strategy in the Indo-Pacific regionSec. 101. Policy.Sec. 102. Diplomatic strategy.TITLE II—Promoting United States security interests in the Indo-Pacific regionSec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.Sec. 202. Treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific region.Sec. 203. United States-China relationship.Sec. 204. United States-India strategic partnership.Sec. 205. United States-ASEAN strategic partnership.Sec. 206. United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral security partnership.Sec. 207. Quadrilateral security dialogue.Sec. 208. Enhanced security partnerships in Southeast Asia.Sec. 209. Commitment to Taiwan.Sec. 210. North Korea strategy.Sec. 211. New Zealand.Sec. 212. The Pacific Islands.Sec. 213. Freedom of navigation and overflight; promotion of international law.Sec. 214. Combating terrorism in Southeast Asia.Sec. 215. Cybersecurity cooperation.Sec. 216. Nonproliferation and arms control in the Indo-Pacific region.TITLE III—Promoting United States economic interests in the Indo-Pacific regionSec. 301. Findings; sense of Congress.Sec. 302. Trade negotiations, multilateral agreements, and regional economic summits.Sec. 303. United States-ASEAN economic partnership.Sec. 304. Trade capacity building and trade facilitation.Sec. 305. Intellectual property protection.Sec. 306. Energy programs and initiatives.Sec. 307. Lower Mekong initiative.Sec. 308. Sense of Congress on economic growth and natural resource conservation.Sec. 309. Sense of Congress in support of women's economic rights.TITLE IV—Promoting United States values in the Indo-Pacific regionSec. 401. Findings.Sec. 402. Trafficking-in-persons.Sec. 403. Freedom of the press.Sec. 404. Democracy, human rights, and labor personnel.Sec. 405. Bilateral and regional dialogues; people-to-people engagement.Sec. 406. Association of Southeast Asian Nations Human Rights Strategy.Sec. 407. Freedom of information to North Korea.Sec. 408. Sense of Congress on imposition of sanctions and suspension of United States assistance.Sec. 409. Authorization of appropriations.Sec. 410. Indo-Pacific human rights and environmental defenders.Sec. 411. Young leaders people-to-people initiatives.
2.Congress makes the following findings: (1)The Indo-Pacific region—
(A)represents nearly 50 percent of the global population; (B)is home to some of the most dynamic economies in the world; and
(C)poses security challenges that threaten to undermine United States national security interests, regional peace, and global stability.
(2)The core tenets of the United States-backed international system are being challenged, including by—
(A)China’s illegal construction and militarization of artificial features in the South China Sea and coercive economic practices;
(B)North Korea’s acceleration of its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities; and (C)the increased presence throughout Southeast Asia of the Islamic State (referred to in this Act as ISIS
) and other international terrorist organizations that threaten the United States.
(3)The economic order in the Indo-Pacific region continues to transform, presenting opportunities and challenges to United States economic interests.
(4)The United States has a fundamental interest in defending human rights and promoting the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific region. Although many countries in the region have improved the treatment of their citizens, several Indo-Pacific governments continue to commit human rights abuses and place restrictions on basic human rights and political and civil liberties.
(5)Without strong leadership from the United States, the international system, fundamentally rooted in the rule of law, may wither, to the detriment of United States, regional, and global interests. It is imperative that the United States continue to play a leading role in the Indo-Pacific region by—
(A)defending peace and security; (B)advancing economic prosperity; and
(C)promoting respect for fundamental human rights. (6)In 2017, the Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate held a series of hearings on United States leadership in the Indo-Pacific region, in which—
(A)experts, including Representative Randy Forbes, Ambassador Robert Gallucci, Ms. Tami Overby, Dr. Robert Orr, Ambassador Derek Mitchell, Ambassador Robert King, Mr. Murray Hiebert, and others detailed the security challenges, economic opportunities, and imperatives of promoting the rule of law, human rights, and democracy, in the Indo-Pacific region; and
(B)Dr. Graham Allison, the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, testified, As realistic students of history, Chinese leaders recognize that the role the United States has played since World War II as the architect and underwriter of regional stability and security has been essential to the rise of Asia, including China itself. But they believe that as the tide that brought the United States to Asia recedes, America must leave with it. Much as Britain’s role in the Western Hemisphere faded at the beginning of the twentieth century, so must America’s role in Asia as the region’s historic superpower resumes its place.
.
(7)The United States National Security Strategy (referred to in this Act as the National Security Strategy
), which was released in December 2017, states— (A)A geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region. The region, which stretches from the west coast of India to the western shores of the United States, represents the most populous and economically dynamic part of the world. The United States interest in a free and open Indo-Pacific extends back to the earliest days of our republic.
; and
(B)Our vision for the Indo-Pacific excludes no nation. We will redouble our commitment to established alliances and partnerships, while expanding and deepening relationships with new partners that share respect for sovereignty, fair and reciprocal trade, and the rule of law. We will reinforce our commitment to freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes in accordance with international law. We will work with allies and partners to achieve complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and preserve the non-proliferation regime in Northeast Asia.
.
<enum>I</enum><header>United States policy and diplomatic strategy in the Indo-Pacific region</header>
<section id="idA19709B686F147578CC2F0CB4BC66C44"><enum>101.</enum><header>Policy</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the policy of the United States to develop and commit to a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region that—</text>
<paragraph id="ide305bf23e1504e07ad01199cc07ebfa6"><enum>(1)</enum><text>secures the vital national security interests of the United States and our allies and partners;</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="id42e50262c5b34a11a08735a44865131f"><enum>(2)</enum><text>promotes American prosperity and economic interests by advancing economic growth and development of a rules-based Indo-Pacific economic community;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idcc3fb37e9d5a45019d7f04add1be8457"><enum>(3)</enum><text>advances American influence by reflecting the values of the American people and universal human rights;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id4581fdb75b4248e08a6d2a7f6830aced"><enum>(4)</enum><text>supports functional problem-solving regional architecture; and</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="idf97b39f4ea974b35b07a03257a1f418e"><enum>(5)</enum><text>accords with and supports the rule of law and international norms.</text>
</paragraph></section><section id="iddb4cd2841109440493c8eb24b10d9599"><enum>102.</enum><header>Diplomatic strategy</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the diplomatic strategy of the United States—</text> <paragraph id="ide5f15b40e3654fea9ab3639a50850014"><enum>(1)</enum><text>to work with United States allies—</text>
<subparagraph id="idB791F5087B0340EBB9D9B49780ED72E1"><enum>(A)</enum><text>to confront common challenges;</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="id55B362BF0F394CA8B078DCA63E84ECA7"><enum>(B)</enum><text>to improve information sharing;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id8CE9730D8AEA467DBE8B7DFB0D623F90"><enum>(C)</enum><text>to increase defense investment and trade;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="idB2B6949B151E4D58ADB886B9D231905D"><enum>(D)</enum><text>to ensure interoperability; and</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="idD1555BA552E043DC8137A015055133C1"><enum>(E)</enum><text>to strengthen shared capabilities;</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idf084161d9fb3449888b30202ed8f2325"><enum>(2)</enum><text>to strengthen relationships with partners who—</text> <subparagraph id="id0D2EA25C856E49FDA5B0C77282F5652C"><enum>(A)</enum><text>share mutual respect for the rule of law;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="idF13C601AF8F944049BFBF9482374F6B7"><enum>(B)</enum><text>agree with fair and reciprocal trade; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="idDDE7E9C9837B4229A7AA444B199C4DBB"><enum>(C)</enum><text>understand the importance of civil society, the rule of law, and transparent governance;</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id65cb709b6692459998b85c72ab5131aa"><enum>(3)</enum><text>to support functional problem-solving regional architecture, including through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the East Asia Summit;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id509a37f6b041427f9c056e2b24dbb598"><enum>(4)</enum><text>to emphasize the commitment of the United States—</text> <subparagraph id="id40D15981CEAB4B34B730E754C1127B78"><enum>(A)</enum><text>to freedom of navigation under international law;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id68A3ECA6CA1B4B0CBCB18D871519BDE8"><enum>(B)</enum><text>to promote peaceful resolutions of maritime and territorial disputes; and</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="id625C0B7E25AB4CFDABF5B0040B0123F6"><enum>(C)</enum><text>to expand security and defense cooperation with allies and partners, as appropriate;</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id28933808188a4dba85368fb9b5763555"><enum>(5)</enum><text>to pursue diplomatic measures to achieve complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id78d82ad99e204a448d6adf6139231e0c"><enum>(6)</enum><text>to improve civil society, strengthen the rule of law, and advocate for transparent governance;</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="id6d45e1a0c10145849f63ae8133e64178"><enum>(7)</enum><text>to develop and grow the economy through private sector partnerships between the United States and Indo-Pacific partners;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id81ed83720b4b4efa9e72fba3e0812d68"><enum>(8)</enum><text>to pursue multilateral and bilateral trade agreements in a free, fair, and reciprocal manner and build a network of partners in the Indo-Pacific committed to free markets;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id37189560446b4dd188c85aff7153bce1"><enum>(9)</enum><text>to work with and encourage Indo-Pacific countries—</text> <subparagraph id="id42A6F0FE01324620A2C8CB8E6C64934F"><enum>(A)</enum><text>to pursue high-quality and transparent infrastructure projects;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="idD2C1FFF04F3A43A7A8906A09C84970A7"><enum>(B)</enum><text>to maintain unimpeded commerce, open sea lines or air ways, and communication; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="idB3BBFCA6428C45B2BF38F9C3ADDD6581"><enum>(C)</enum><text>to seek the peaceful resolution of disputes; and</text> </subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idc3b31952c441402ba3afeeb41ab54c0b"><enum>(10)</enum><text>to sustain a strong military presence in the Indo-Pacific region and strengthen security relationships with allies and partners throughout the region.</text>
</paragraph></section><enum>II</enum><header>Promoting United States security interests in the Indo-Pacific region</header>
<section id="ide1384b0656b74014a26cd8afc0dfd66f"><enum>201.</enum><header>Authorization of appropriations</header>
<subsection id="id5059fb2f1637433d9e54b7d9a20bd758"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Defined term</header><text>In this section, the term <term>appropriate committees of Congress</term> means—</text> <paragraph id="id1b8398c71865461e88d01c56f0e7c2c3"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the <committee-name committee-id="SSAP00">Committee on Appropriations of the Senate</committee-name>;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id478135675b0540898a8dc6d8c26e49c4"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the <committee-name committee-id="SSFR00">Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate</committee-name>;</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="id143b92379a7045d28f42a4af0ba20285"><enum>(3)</enum><text>the <committee-name committee-id="">Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives</committee-name>; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idb13b66469a1e4eb09dc9495f590c7eeb"><enum>(4)</enum><text>the <committee-name committee-id="">Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives</committee-name>.</text> </paragraph></subsection><subsection id="ide5c0340075014061b64f99b32ed313ea"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Authorization of appropriations</header><text>There are authorized to be appropriated for the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, and, as appropriate, the Department of Defense, $1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, which shall be used—</text>
<paragraph id="id0e3be609604a4c4ba3191025e1bcd9e9"><enum>(1)</enum><text>to advance United States foreign policy interests and objectives in the Indo-Pacific region in recognition of the value of diplomatic initiatives and programs in the furtherance of United States strategy;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="ide963af38b2b94d8aab8e1ff6acc5ab7a"><enum>(2)</enum><text>to improve the defense capacity of partner nations to resist coercion and deter and defend against security threats, including through foreign military financing and international military education and training programs;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id39c3e7732bb047219902c391f0e5ea6f"><enum>(3)</enum><text>to conduct regular bilateral and multilateral engagements, particularly with the United States’ most highly-capable allies and partners, to meet strategic challenges, including—</text>
<subparagraph id="id5dc9a5ef320940f7be50181fc3f3caf6"><enum>(A)</enum><text>certain destabilizing activities of the People’s Republic of China; and</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="id7f025a3e186b4523ba24af4edb31f1d8"><enum>(B)</enum><text>emerging threats, such as the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea;</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id73e68617eefa421eab68ab690ea65e77"><enum>(4)</enum><text>to build new counterterrorism partnership programs in Southeast Asia to combat the growing presence of ISIS and other terrorist organizations that pose a significant threat to the United States, its allies, and its citizens’ interests abroad; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id4e23b36238394483a0f10e329b47fe82"><enum>(5)</enum><text>to increase maritime domain awareness programs in South Asia and Southeast Asia—</text> <subparagraph id="idae7059746a54432ab7bb428d66b7b080"><enum>(A)</enum><text>by expanding the scope of naval and coast guard training efforts with Southeast Asian countries;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id2e74b4384de347ef900c2ad5a75f0394"><enum>(B)</enum><text>by expanding cooperation with democratic partners in South Asia, including Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="idbea9dacea79144bfa81947c98459b50c"><enum>(C)</enum><text>through intelligence sharing and other information-sharing efforts; and</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="ida8c34f4009584fada3972aa958e624b6"><enum>(D)</enum><text>through multilateral engagements, including by involving Japan, Australia, and India in such efforts.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="idcf45bc2783c64b49b9e8eedf1e69c244"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Countering China’s influence to undermine the international system</header><text>Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (b) shall be made available for United States Government efforts to counter the strategic influence of the People’s Republic of China, in accordance with the strategy required under section 7043(e)(3) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014 (division K of <external-xref legal-doc="public-law" parsable-cite="pl/113/76">Public Law 113–76</external-xref>; 128 Stat. 536) and in consultation with the appropriate committees of Congress.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="id21da26f5c8ed4a5a8f70cf0abac1ac1e"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Burma</header><text>None of the amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (b) may be made available for International Military Education and Training and Foreign Military Financing Programs for the armed forces of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (historically known as <quote>Burma</quote>).</text>
</subsection><subsection id="ide05a6d59f0314d728b7ec3e1097431ff"><enum>(e)</enum><header>Philippines</header>
<paragraph id="id907D5EF3526C4A62911578F8E4FC2D19"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In general</header><text>None of the amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (b) may be made available for counternarcotics assistance for the Philippine National Police unless the Secretary of State determines and reports to the appropriate committees of Congress that the Government of the Philippines has adopted and is implementing a counternarcotics strategy that is consistent with international human rights standards, including investigating and prosecuting individuals who are credibly alleged to have ordered, committed, or covered up extrajudicial killings and other gross violations of human rights in the conduct of counternarcotics operations.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id9D83F10279784E04B8E59BC2772AC2E5"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Exception</header><text>The limitation under paragraph (1) shall not apply to funds made available—</text> <subparagraph id="id6E17CF1DBC6440E4B108DA45B7C0C690"><enum>(A)</enum><text>for drug demand reduction, maritime programs, or transnational interdiction programs; or</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id5C95E6EF51C84137B8F4EE93A99A7DA3"><enum>(B)</enum><text>to support for the development of such counternarcotics strategy, after consultation with the appropriate committees of Congress.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id8ca2f0ca40d14829a8ffb6685ac1092b"><enum>(f)</enum><header>Cambodia</header><text>None of the amounts authorized to be appropriated pursuant to subsection (b) may be made available for United States assistance programs that benefit the Government of Cambodia unless the Secretary of State certifies and reports to the appropriate congressional committees that the requirements under section 7043(b)(1) of division K of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (<external-xref legal-doc="public-law" parsable-cite="pl/115/141">Public Law 115–141</external-xref>) have been met.</text>
</subsection></section><section id="id123699c0007d43acabe249722ff9fae6"><enum>202.</enum><header>Treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific region</header>
<subsection id="id19f204d9602b4fa992400395a28fdc3c"><enum>(a)</enum><header>United States-Japan alliance</header><text>The United States Government—</text> <paragraph id="id7f418114059b4048be3a13784ce60707"><enum>(1)</enum><text>is committed to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, done at Washington, January 19, 1960, and all related and subsequent bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date of the enactment of this Act;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idb7fb0d44cfc94433a5abc6a82187ef94"><enum>(2)</enum><text>recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the United States and Japan in promoting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id1413a98ce6964daab859236b28967c4d"><enum>(3)</enum><text>calls for the strengthening and broadening of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United States and Japan.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id816862ad9c994a0f82fb91a9fe1f02b4"><enum>(b)</enum><header>United States-Republic of Korea alliance</header><text>The United States Government—</text> <paragraph id="ide13d234d9c1047b6bac8c66e7f9125fd"><enum>(1)</enum><text>is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea, done at Washington October 1, 1953, and all related and subsequent bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date of the enactment of this Act;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="ided784bc8ebd44edda16b6d06840a1957"><enum>(2)</enum><text>recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the United States and South Korea in promoting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="iddf93160976a6424198b7271b782c576e"><enum>(3)</enum><text>calls for the strengthening and broadening of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United States and the Republic of Korea.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id4a7f43e1002e48e2b79adb88ea52a671"><enum>(c)</enum><header>United States-Australia alliance</header><text>The United States Government—</text> <paragraph id="id5e290f2b981d4721897b68cea1e51769"><enum>(1)</enum><text>is committed to the Security Treaty Between Australia and the United States of America, done at San Francisco September 1, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date of the enactment of this Act;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idd11b0e0bda034a3ebe4f50a33fa2472c"><enum>(2)</enum><text>recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the United States and Australia in promoting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="ided02f60a9935472c93411156b538c596"><enum>(3)</enum><text>calls for the strengthening and broadening of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United States and Australia.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="ide90d193f0cb447649c744b964506d73b"><enum>(d)</enum><header>United States-Philippines alliance</header><text>The United States Government is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America, done at Washington August 30, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date of the enactment of this Act, including the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, done at Manila April 28, 2014.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="id14c6c0709882411f8501f31bb210b061"><enum>(e)</enum><header>Thailand</header><text>The United States Government is committed to—</text> <paragraph id="id22cdf066149449f68fcdb3065c27711a"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the Agreement Respecting Military Assistance Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Thailand, done at Bangkok October 17, 1950;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id63ce2b3b43d84f52af7745cf22558ce9"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, done at Manila September 8, 1954; and</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="ida6c6913066f24b909089861ecf349b3d"><enum>(3)</enum><text>all related and subsequent bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date of the enactment of this Act, including the Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-United States Defense Alliance, issued in Bangkok November 15, 2012.</text>
</paragraph></subsection></section><section id="idc16d92fcc6b140eea8515f759ebf19cb"><enum>203.</enum><header>United States-China relationship</header>
<subsection id="idd6ce25e8ff7a4f848ce7b270afbfc011"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text>The United States Government—</text> <paragraph id="id7eb76670ee614f8d9861295dc6e1d336"><enum>(1)</enum><text>expresses grave concerns with Chinese actions that seek—</text>
<subparagraph id="id40d34b2168cc488b8d805c9fd33e6d03"><enum>(A)</enum><text>to further constrain space for civil society within China; and</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="id9508d27de2294946889e231b371670a0"><enum>(B)</enum><text>to undermine a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region;</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idc45c95bbff1a4895ace58e9fd5afc1b7"><enum>(2)</enum><text>encourages China to play a constructive role in world affairs by demonstrating consistent respect for the rule of law and international norms;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id19d1eaebe0114d3899f68f95e3089586"><enum>(3)</enum><text>seeks to build a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship with China—</text> <subparagraph id="id2ce82a26efd641b8b6d4fc25e99ff33f"><enum>(A)</enum><text>by expanding areas of cooperation; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id1d75dbcee49445d4ac9d44760ad06f13"><enum>(B)</enum><text>by addressing areas of disagreement, including over human rights, economic policies, and maritime security; and</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id67093700f9b64d6793b3b5048a23de19"><enum>(4)</enum><text>is committed to working with China on shared regional and global challenges, especially—</text> <subparagraph id="id9ebd2994cbef4745859527bb20d2a800"><enum>(A)</enum><text>upholding and strengthening the rules-based international system; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id84687bc85d7b42e1ab08774fb6d0b206"><enum>(B)</enum><text>the denuclearization of North Korea.</text> </subparagraph></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id29ccfe3ec3904619b7aaf38ac03ed85b"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Sense of Congress</header><text>It is the sense of Congress that the United States should—</text>
<paragraph id="id638b52de01f84fa1b65e35241df172a8"><enum>(1)</enum><text>welcome a decision by China to change course and pursue a responsible results-oriented relationship with the United States and engagement on global issues;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="iddd24470e07344da997dd172310551ae7"><enum>(2)</enum><text>encourage China to play a constructive role in the Indo-Pacific region and globally; and</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="idbde862d6285a431aaec4ed6b72677e59"><enum>(3)</enum><text>continue to call out Chinese actions that undermine the rules-based international system.</text>
</paragraph></subsection></section><section id="idc208d39b7e1a471fa4739483155882f9"><enum>204.</enum><header>United States-India strategic partnership</header>
<subsection id="id2179611f4af0452abcf1222c6736b63a"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text>The United States Government—</text> <paragraph id="id42362140c7884c49bd620717bab8eea2"><enum>(1)</enum><text>recognizes the vital role of the strategic partnership between the United States and India in promoting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id25ea7b9e63164c45a9c2c34cdbfcc373"><enum>(2)</enum><text>calls for the strengthening and broadening of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United States and India; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idfc23c9dd2c2744bcb5d1c5ab6000056d"><enum>(3)</enum><text>is committed to—</text> <subparagraph id="iddb87a2a0efc840e5886b551f593b2fe4"><enum>(A)</enum><text>the New Framework for the United States-India Defense Relationship, done at Arlington, Virginia on June 28, 2005;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id2d6f9977f12b47b6b1b15a2f698b3ed2"><enum>(B)</enum><text>the United States-India Defense Technology and Trade Initiative, launched in 2012;</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="id2765e3cbd464401a91985a2f753d8465"><enum>(C)</enum><text>the Joint Strategic Vision for the Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, announced on January 25, 2015;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id3f6478f8bdb04fd2a3c9968c4c6c2bf9"><enum>(D)</enum><text>the United States-India Joint Statement on Prosperity Through Partnership, issued on June 26, 2017; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id7e190e1a0470447395e0214c851907d5"><enum>(E)</enum><text>all related and subsequent bilateral and security agreements and arrangements concluded as of the date of the enactment of this Act.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="idcd84d6ea96154aaf9e6277f5b82ae754"><enum>(b)</enum><header>India as major defense partner</header><text>Congress makes the following findings:</text> <paragraph id="id32a0a7d1783246c59912eb313bd238cd"><enum>(1)</enum><text>Section 1292(a)(1)(A) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (<external-xref legal-doc="public-law" parsable-cite="pl/114/328">Public Law 114–328</external-xref>; 130 Stat. 2559; <external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/22/2751">22 U.S.C. 2751</external-xref> note) requires the recognition of India as a major defense partner.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id5c215e70f6df4f3d96d9efc42dac5960"><enum>(2)</enum><text>The designation of India as a major defense partner, which is unique to India—</text> <subparagraph id="idf72052659cd645d6bede2922b19d5d85"><enum>(A)</enum><text>institutionalizes the progress made to facilitate defense trade and technology sharing between the United States and India;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id501926bb6a1d49488a7b2dc19681796b"><enum>(B)</enum><text>elevates defense trade and technology cooperation between the United States and India to a level commensurate with the closest allies and partners of the United States;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id7fab9a72c234403980c494d9ec3b3574"><enum>(C)</enum><text>facilitates technology sharing between the United States and India, including license-free access to a wide range of dual-use technologies, after taking into account national security concerns; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id2057534af0be4c59b67e3418cf9a8e0a"><enum>(D)</enum><text>facilitates joint exercises, coordination on defense strategy and policy, military exchanges, and port calls in support of defense cooperation between the United States and India.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></subsection></section><section id="ide471a2a8621b47c0a58777187ea6ca4d"><enum>205.</enum><header>United States-ASEAN strategic partnership</header>
<subsection id="idE4F2BC427622489FAC47949E07BB25BE"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Sense of Congress</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that the United States should—</text> <paragraph id="id40eb4f7dce834bd9816151f563ff97ec"><enum>(1)</enum><text>support and reaffirm the elevation of the United States-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (referred to in this section as <quote>ASEAN</quote>) relationship to a strategic partnership;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idc2e3ffd0facb478c92810f8c5225d325"><enum>(2)</enum><text>recommit to ASEAN centrality by helping build a strong, stable, politically cohesive, economically integrated, and socially responsible community of nations that has common rules, norms, procedures, and standards which are consistent with international law and the principles of a rules-based Indo-Pacific community;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id41e02389b21941da82eddec7068d4557"><enum>(3)</enum><text>urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster greater integration among its members;</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="idc17b75a4313e463f9632844271e69339"><enum>(4)</enum><text>recognize the value of—</text>
<subparagraph id="id9ce6440c75e84e5a83b638c5636b26bc"><enum>(A)</enum><text>ASEAN engagement with economic, political, and security partners within Asia and elsewhere, including Australia, Canada, the European Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id70ca1790aaf8468586c3e5e73d8997ea"><enum>(B)</enum><text>strategic economic initiatives, such as the United States-ASEAN Connect, which demonstrate a commitment to ASEAN and the ASEAN Economic Community and build upon economic relationships in the Indo-Pacific region;</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id6c8fa05258e64a169f08a7cb15a1fce6"><enum>(5)</enum><text>support efforts by the nations comprising ASEAN—</text> <subparagraph id="idc807550fedfd4fe7ba8bf9605a72facd"><enum>(A)</enum><text>to address maritime and territorial disputes in a constructive manner; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id0dc805b374514c71819ee18f661f76a6"><enum>(B)</enum><text>to pursue claims through peaceful, diplomatic, and legitimate regional and international arbitration mechanisms, consistent with international law, including through the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea to further promote peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region;</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id6b2c70199dd54b1a89a02cc4b0d99719"><enum>(6)</enum><text>support efforts by United States partners and allies in ASEAN—</text> <subparagraph id="idfbd2facffd164560b1fcf352e56ad28d"><enum>(A)</enum><text>to enhance maritime capability and maritime domain awareness;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="idf6d5a0de29a040f0b3f74951b9c376a2"><enum>(B)</enum><text>to protect unhindered access to, and use of, international waterways in the Asia-Pacific region that are critical to ensuring the security and free flow of commerce;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id9afe5047fa2c43aea838e34f977c57c8"><enum>(C)</enum><text>to counter piracy;</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="ide8b325a826244f8c99facac4373b4fe2"><enum>(D)</enum><text>to disrupt illicit maritime trafficking activities such as the trafficking of persons, goods, and drugs; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id668e1aee3d3148efa2721c78cc404235"><enum>(E)</enum><text>to enhance the maritime capabilities of countries or regional organizations to respond to emerging threats to maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region; and</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="iddb6a4a5cc11740da8f110935317486bd"><enum>(7)</enum><text>urge ASEAN member states to develop a common approach to reaffirm the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling with respect to the case between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id20e60394ef3c4abbad7b46cb31eed9b9"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Report on strategic framework for engagement with ASEAN</header>
<paragraph id="idC5EC3C1C80714EA98B488E38C9368976"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In general</header><text>Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees on a strategic framework to administer programs, projects, and activities of the United States to support diplomatic and economic engagement between the United States and ASEAN member countries for the 10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id454fe10e889842cb83f9fbf5e20aa721"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Elements</header><text>The report required under paragraph (1) shall address the following elements of United States strategy:</text>
<subparagraph id="id872009f2342549318152d41e9777eb74"><enum>(A)</enum><text>Promoting commercial engagement between the United States and member countries of ASEAN.</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="idcbbe08d6140744cdac3ec1c870f85876"><enum>(B)</enum><text>Helping member countries of ASEAN use sustainable, efficient, and innovative technologies in their respective energy sectors.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id530e43c105a6492e920cdd16374a8207"><enum>(C)</enum><text>Supporting economic conditions in member countries of ASEAN that promote innovation, the creation of new businesses, sustainable growth, and the education of the region’s future innovators, entrepreneurs, and business leaders.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id8f3906b0d86a40a088ce2a55d40bdc53"><enum>(D)</enum><text>Working with member countries of ASEAN to improve the policy and regulatory environment for growth, trade, innovation, and investment.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id6536b5ad00d44e0ea0447c749a17f871"><enum>(E)</enum><text>Supporting the regional integration objectives of member countries of ASEAN under the ASEAN Economic Community.</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="idd4e6dbaa2d3e46149a2e437bbab017dc"><enum>(F)</enum><text>Partnership opportunities with the governments of other countries friendly to the United States that have committed to a high set of standards for investment and development with ASEAN, as determined by the Secretary of State.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></subsection></section><section id="id6e954cd19f9647aba72fa6d6c9f765cb"><enum>206.</enum><header>United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral security partnership</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that the President should develop a strategy to deepen the trilateral security cooperation between the United States, South Korea, and Japan, including missile defense, intelligence-sharing, and other defense-related initiatives.</text>
</section><section id="ide5eff114242f42169cd5a00b44ee9d4b"><enum>207.</enum><header>Quadrilateral security dialogue</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that—</text> <paragraph id="id0d23932ec88345b2bb3661bdaaeea408"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the security dialogue between the United States, Australia, India, and Japan is vital to address pressing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region in order to promote—</text>
<subparagraph id="idc97322ad2ab14185804433b0bb10e01c"><enum>(A)</enum><text>a rules-based order;</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="iddc57582387884de6b457246802f7cba3"><enum>(B)</enum><text>respect for international law; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="ideb3b0b23e1504976a5fda585e5333471"><enum>(C)</enum><text>a free and open Indo-Pacific; and</text> </subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id44e14a3ea7d84563a12c6de587a73ae7"><enum>(2)</enum><text>such a dialogue is intended to augment, rather than to replace, current mechanisms.</text>
</paragraph></section><section id="id520e1ca016fb47c5ad1d88050d33659c"><enum>208.</enum><header>Enhanced security partnerships in Southeast Asia</header>
<subsection id="id4b2be07521014bc6aa3853d17d52e6a0"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Indonesia</header><text>The United States Government is committed to—</text> <paragraph id="id5b3faedce24c4118a01a3063fe0ebf8e"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the United States-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership, done in Washington November 9, 2010;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id50c187137bfa47a58306b90be7e556cb"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the Joint Statement on Comprehensive Defense Cooperation, done in Washington October 26, 2015; and</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="id85798caa3f0e4d85aae635654973cea8"><enum>(3)</enum><text>all related and subsequent bilateral and security agreements and arrangements between the United States and Indonesia concluded on or before the date of the enactment of this Act.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="idc2a775521e8149dfbcfba5029c4c4987"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Malaysia</header><text>The United States Government is committed to—</text> <paragraph id="id2946ab6687ee49ca99769b46348197d9"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the United States-Malaysia Comprehensive Partnership, done at Putrajaya April 27, 2014;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id275dbeeec68c4e8ca417d2e1acc73cf6"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the Joint Statement for Enhancing the Comprehensive Partnership between the United States of America and Malaysia, done in Washington September 13, 2017; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idd99de6d48b984f219015bb662719905c"><enum>(3)</enum><text>all related and subsequent bilateral and security agreements and arrangements between the United States and Malaysia concluded on or before the date of the enactment of this Act.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id1ddd3ae649bb4202a3b5ba94d0c0f278"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Singapore</header><text>The United States Government is committed to—</text> <paragraph id="id80ed7cda77f84dafaa05536334671519"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the Strategic Framework Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Singapore for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security, done at Washington July 12, 2005;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="ide363509dcaca48abb49e1ac2729dd849"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, done at Arlington, Virginia December 7, 2015; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id5a02125542924b119adf27cc121834bf"><enum>(3)</enum><text>all related and subsequent bilateral and security agreements and arrangements between the United States and Singapore concluded on or before the date of the enactment of this Act.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id7adc4168e3a24c34a54e2f83164dce22"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Vietnam</header><text>The United States Government is committed to—</text> <paragraph id="id1a3f658a57e943699319c9653a6224bb"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the United States-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership, done at Washington December 16, 2013;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id1c25af5f2dd34cbaa0159fe787624087"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the United States-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement on Defense Relations, done at Hanoi on June 1, 2015;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id8e5028d4512e41218774b1608a193ac6"><enum>(3)</enum><text>the United States-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement, done at Washington May 31, 2017; and</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="id1ccfc77ca60143f1af9a266f087ebb02"><enum>(4)</enum><text>all related and subsequent bilateral and security agreements and arrangements between the United States and Vietnam concluded on or before the date of the enactment of this Act.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="idf3a8e860f2ef4c00ab332890b9bca7ac"><enum>(e)</enum><header>Sense of Congress</header><text>It is the sense of Congress that the United States should deepen diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation, especially in the areas of maritime security and counterterrorism, with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam.</text>
</subsection></section><section id="id9ad0465f581842a9a8011479cc98b605"><enum>209.</enum><header>Commitment to Taiwan</header>
<subsection id="id84cc4f20deb0445693b17e1dc0595f9e"><enum>(a)</enum><header>United States commitment to Taiwan</header><text>It is the policy of the United States—</text> <paragraph id="id24AA126BDD3240BFB8375E8C858EE336"><enum>(1)</enum><text>to support the close economic, political, and security relationship between Taiwan and the United States;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id582CA5EE7D0E4CD79F5B8846AD9745B6"><enum>(2)</enum><text>to faithfully enforce all existing United States Government commitments to Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (<external-xref legal-doc="public-law" parsable-cite="pl/96/8">Public Law 96–8</external-xref>), the 3 joint communiques, and the Six Assurances agreed to by President Ronald Reagan in July 1982; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idAE13199708FC4859B8813752566A433F"><enum>(3)</enum><text>to counter efforts to change the status quo and to support peaceful resolution acceptable to both sides of the Taiwan Strait.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="iddf40d8846f7b4d338ad705b6bb77f110"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Arms sales to Taiwan</header><text>The President should conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan that are tailored to meet the existing and likely future threats from the People’s Republic of China, including supporting the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate asymmetric capabilities, as appropriate, including undersea warfare and air defense capabilities, into its military forces.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="id1d050100fcd94244aba280e58d4e6a4c"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Travel</header><text>The President should encourage the travel of high-level United States officials to Taiwan, in accordance with the Taiwan Travel Act (<external-xref legal-doc="public-law" parsable-cite="pl/115/135">Public Law 115–135</external-xref>).</text>
</subsection></section><section id="id7fc8f55ac8664f70918779e5de370c27"><enum>210.</enum><header>North Korea strategy</header>
<subsection id="id69ea4ce95da749e1ad014a1793e3df31"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Findings</header><text>Congress makes the following findings:</text> <paragraph id="idc94e5b17cdc147d58335adce1e201c5a"><enum>(1)</enum><text>The Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has flagrantly defied the international community by illicitly developing its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017 ).</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idb3425b3e15a84e14ae706c078355dd9f"><enum>(2)</enum><text>The Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea engages in gross human rights abuses against its own people and citizens of other countries, including the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id74ae8dded6dd4572a119b31da0c51779"><enum>(3)</enum><text>The United States is committed to pursuing a peaceful denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea through a policy of maximum pressure and engagement, in close concert with its partners.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id168582ce71224925ab4729cb4fff56d8"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Policy of the United States with respect to sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea</header>
<paragraph id="id81f06f0b50a24228a2440a0db87055a0"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Statement of policy</header><text>It is the policy of the United States to continue to impose sanctions with respect to activities of the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, persons acting for or on behalf of such government, or other persons in accordance with Executive Order 13687 (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/50/1701">50 U.S.C. 1701</external-xref> note; relating to imposing additional sanctions with respect to North Korea), Executive Order 13694 (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/50/1701">50 U.S.C. 1701</external-xref> note; relating to blocking the property of certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), Executive Order 13722 (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/50/1701">50 U.S.C. 1701</external-xref> note; relating to blocking the property of the Government of North Korea and the Workers’ Party of Korea, and prohibiting certain transactions with respect to North Korea), and Executive Order 13810 (82 Fed. Reg. 44705; relating to imposing additional sanctions with respect to North Korea), as such Executive orders are in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, until the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is no longer engaged in the illicit activities described in such Executive orders, including actions in violation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1).</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id80db881c26484694974b617c803c61fa"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Report</header><text>Not later than 30 days after terminating any sanction with respect to the activities of the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, a person acting for or on behalf of such government, or any other person provided for in an Executive order listed in subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees justifying the termination of the sanction and explaining the relationship between such termination and the cessation of any illicit activity that violates any of the United Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1) by such Government or person.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id2b88dce0f9dc4cd0b9bc57cd981daf74"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Rule of construction</header><text>Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit the authority of the President pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (<external-xref legal-doc="usc" parsable-cite="usc/50/1701">50 U.S.C. 1701</external-xref> et seq.).</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id035aae361c034a5987ea4b48b544ac60"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Policy of the United States with respect to negotiation on the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs</header><text>It is the policy of the United States that the objective of negotiations with respect to the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea be the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of such programs.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="id9da72a10ecd74bb2b5189f87f7706748"><enum>(d)</enum><header>Report on a strategy to address the threats posed by, and the capabilities of,
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</header>
<paragraph id="id913d9ac5c8d9456294982c77ce84facb"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In general</header><text>Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, or a designee of the Secretary, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes actions taken by the United States to address the threats posed by, and the capabilities of, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id1875c8f276da4b878b377823a1bb07f8"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Elements</header><text>Each report required under paragraph (1) shall include—</text> <subparagraph id="id2adae32d18a14924b6b20539b6affb57"><enum>(A)</enum><text>a summary of ongoing efforts by the United States to identify strategies and policies, including an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of such strategies and policies—</text>
<clause id="id66be306b819a46a88faedb7436df521d"><enum>(i)</enum><text>to achieve peaceful denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; and</text> </clause><clause id="id139bf0e151904090ac073571e4508996"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>to eliminate the threat posed by the ballistic missile program of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea;</text>
</clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="id58c9cbb86b02453ca520dea06eb50d6a"><enum>(B)</enum><text>an assessment of—</text> <clause id="idaebe2cf84a604effa2450e0337d81219"><enum>(i)</enum><text>potential road maps toward peaceful denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the elimination of the nuclear and ballistic missile threats posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; and</text>
</clause><clause id="id1a474224b6d6483b96fc9e6db351c04b"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>specific actions that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would need to take for each such roadmap to become viable;</text>
</clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idec3b17cbf3774553af6fe08ae100c2a5"><enum>(C)</enum><text>a summary of the United States strategy to increase international coordination and cooperation, whether unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally, including sanctions enforcement and interdiction, to address the threat posed by the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which shall include—</text>
<clause id="id961b9e607d104e948293086de48bd540"><enum>(i)</enum><text>a description of the actions taken by the Secretary of State, or designees of the Secretary, to consult with governments around the world, with the purpose of inducing such governments to fully implement the United Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1);</text>
</clause><clause id="id3ac6a73169774a65b60529ca72da2383"><enum>(ii)</enum><text>a description of the actions taken by such governments to fully implement United Nations Security Council resolutions related to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea;</text>
</clause><clause id="idc2a6479e03d847e686e9a6e2e4b2c088"><enum>(iii)</enum><text>a list of countries with governments that the Secretary has determined are noncooperative with respect to implementing the United Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1); and</text>
</clause><clause id="id4649125eb4de4106b7ef08fac959e9f6"><enum>(iv)</enum><text>a plan of action to engage, and increase cooperation with respect to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, with the governments of the countries on the list described in clause (iii);</text>
</clause></subparagraph><subparagraph id="idc3fe2580c9ac4687876bf1094f351534"><enum>(D)</enum><text>an assessment of the adequacy of the national export control regimes of countries that are members of the United Nations, and multilateral export control regimes, that are necessary to enforce sanctions imposed with respect to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea pursuant to the United Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1); and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="idd9210404ea7e49808fe06dbe463f4659"><enum>(E)</enum><text>an action plan to encourage and assist countries in adopting and using authorities necessary to enforce export controls required by United Nations Security Council resolutions.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idD85747588FB94AAD801C8D632EF6C8A6"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Form of report</header><text>Each report required under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id4c8cd4802c164d71aaa301de45d4035d"><enum>(e)</enum><header>Sense of Congress</header><text>It is the sense of Congress that—</text> <paragraph id="id58edffc1e4524e1986cbedbbe1b17b3a"><enum>(1)</enum><text>representatives of the United States shall use the voice and vote of the United States in all international organizations, as appropriate, to advocate for the expulsion of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from such organizations, until such time as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea meets its commitments under the United Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1); and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id14949f57f0a1424491cef93989996246"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the Secretary of State should work to induce countries to meet their commitments under the United Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1), including by considering appropriate adjustments to the diplomatic posture and foreign assistance of the United States with governments that the Secretary has determined are noncooperative with respect to implementing the United Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1).</text>
</paragraph></subsection></section><section id="id9bbdbe6c0ce04dd5bb56c6aeaaf02a94"><enum>211.</enum><header>New Zealand</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">The United States Government is committed to—</text> <paragraph id="id6527b2a9ecee43329d52af7ae91eec8f"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the Wellington Declaration, signed on November 5, 2010, which reaffirmed close ties and outlined future practical cooperation between the United States and New Zealand;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id9fcba3c6c51b4c87889dd185bc84f341"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the Washington Declaration, signed on June 19, 2012, which strengthened the defense relationship by providing a framework and strategic guidance for security cooperation and defense dialogues; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idf486aedbd43245afa5238bfde62cef50"><enum>(3)</enum><text>all related and subsequent bilateral and security agreements and arrangements between the United States and New Zealand concluded on or before the date of enactment of this Act.</text>
</paragraph></section><section id="id87a67849e06e4612981147b90429431d"><enum>212.</enum><header>The Pacific Islands</header>
<subsection id="idE0C0D4EDA7494198BCC3A2E339CDA35F"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that the United States should—</text> <paragraph id="idbcfa4f08254e433fa52c0770a304e3b0"><enum>(1)</enum><text>support strong United States engagement with the nations of the South Pacific, including Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id2badda5b213946a48a3c52cefbe97f1b"><enum>(2)</enum><text>deepen its cooperation with the nations of the South Pacific in areas of mutual interest, including—</text>
<subparagraph id="idb4541c9f6de34a8b9bbfcac0aa884b5b"><enum>(A)</enum><text>fisheries and marine resource conservation;</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="id70d616cafc8e4a3ba729df47c9e967cd"><enum>(B)</enum><text>environmental challenges and resilience;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="idb232af804384473d91c69a39b882b0fc"><enum>(C)</enum><text>global health;</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="id5a1bc523d0354fc0b829a09854c2e510"><enum>(D)</enum><text>development and trade; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="ide24291e8ccb0408d9f7d6963561254ad"><enum>(E)</enum><text>people-to-people ties; and</text> </subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="ida2c936ca5235417cb39a02c0bfe3d692"><enum>(3)</enum><text>continue to provide assistance to the Pacific Islands, as appropriate, to support the rule of law, good governance, and economic development.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id490ed7a7f79b4c169982ca2ef06ce079"><enum>(b)</enum><header>United States-Compacts of Free Association</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that the Compacts of Free Association entered between the United States and the Freely Associated States (Republic of Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau)—</text>
<paragraph id="id81E20B10942A45B09D14118F80237890"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">enhance the strategic posture of the United States in the Western Pacific;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idB52A4205720D4DFDB4F8AD04168AA5D8"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">reinforce United States regional commitment;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id93DBDA16EB2A4CE8B52F4A73175F2EB7"><enum>(3)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">preempt potential adversaries from establishing positional advantage; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idF88F6B5577D34CB5AB5C302758F6FCCA"><enum>(4)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">further self-governance, economic development, and self-sufficiency of the Freely Associated States.</text>
</paragraph></subsection></section><section id="id2d6c3a950ca541caadb89cf9d7905dc0"><enum>213.</enum><header>Freedom of navigation and overflight; promotion of international law</header>
<subsection id="idf3033481ab854baebf210f2c4e6b51ac"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Freedom of navigation</header><text>It is the policy of the United States—</text> <paragraph id="id5ccfea6c441840d5854d5fa610e83974"><enum>(1)</enum><text>to conduct, as part of its global Freedom of Navigation Program, regular freedom of navigation, and overflight operations in the Indo-Pacific region, in accordance with applicable international law; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id107d6bb61938477dbdd23e6ea690e338"><enum>(2)</enum><text>to promote genuine multilateral negotiations to peacefully resolve maritime disputes in the South China Sea, in accordance with applicable international law.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id35e02306eebe4be2a6b84be1aa1de11d"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Joint Indo-Pacific diplomatic strategy</header><text>It is the sense of Congress that the President should develop a diplomatic strategy that includes working with United States allies and partners to conduct joint maritime training and freedom of navigation operations in the Indo-Pacific region, including the East China Sea and the South China Sea, in support of a rules-based international system benefitting all countries.</text>
</subsection></section><section id="idc5d614b5c5374fad854492aa279859ed"><enum>214.</enum><header>Combating terrorism in Southeast Asia</header>
<subsection id="id84b25264c2fb4844903e47292ebe86f9"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Definitions</header><text>In this section:</text> <paragraph id="idf9e6990245544eb5a8a721835b1c503c"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Appropriate committees of Congress</header><text>The term <term>appropriate committees of Congress</term> means—</text>
<subparagraph id="id4ba095a92fb5485e8a4ff0d1f0f573f7"><enum>(A)</enum><text>the <committee-name committee-id="SSAS00">Committee on Armed Services of the Senate</committee-name>;</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="idac891d830e5743f7936f719bedde0f8f"><enum>(B)</enum><text>the <committee-name committee-id="SSFR00">Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate</committee-name>;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id216c45d5d7874c45ae4acd9ab2e967a3"><enum>(C)</enum><text>the <committee-name committee-id="">Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives</committee-name>; and</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="idbdad8274b7ce47ea881690d0e6bd34c7"><enum>(D)</enum><text>the <committee-name committee-id="">Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives</committee-name>.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="ideb40e408079f42a6a5892b3c34f3769d"><enum>(2)</enum><header>ISIS</header><text>The term <term>ISIS</term> means the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.</text> </paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id2c392af5e1c141baa9503f05d47c08a8"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Report</header><text>Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and other appropriate Federal officials, shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress that contains an assessment of the current and future capabilities and activities of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist groups in Southeast Asia that pose a significant threat to the United States, its allies, and its citizens interests abroad.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="ida5ec55b2a06d43c380c60491123067fa"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Elements</header><text>The report required under subsection (b) shall include—</text> <paragraph id="id4bde42764ece4ac6a1d793c9eeab252c"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the current number of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters in Southeast Asia;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idab667c4c4cf94f08825325dc9b221065"><enum>(2)</enum><text>an estimate of the number of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters expected to return to Southeast Asia from fighting in the Middle East;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id34c59f0a4c264371b4df01ed0e4e1351"><enum>(3)</enum><text>an analysis of the amounts and sources of ISIS-linked, al Qaeda-linked, and other various extremist group affiliated-fighters in Southeast Asia;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id5338f194032b42e6bdbee50a7fda6f14"><enum>(4)</enum><text>the current resources available to combat the threat of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters in Southeast Asia, and the additional resources required to combat such threat;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id4660115b09db472694734d760e255c91"><enum>(5)</enum><text>a detailed assessment of the capabilities of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters to operate effectively in the Indo-Pacific region, including the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id74592c69ebe54d8683d17735bca8c0f3"><enum>(6)</enum><text>a description of the capabilities and resources of governments in Southeast Asia to counter violent extremist groups; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id4732b29ba29e461c9233418ec4ff49df"><enum>(7)</enum><text>a list of additional United States resources and capabilities that the Department of Defense and the Department of State recommend providing to governments in Southeast Asia to combat violent extremist groups.</text>
</paragraph></subsection></section><section id="idb2d6b9813fd94966b433bfe3c1b222e0"><enum>215.</enum><header>Cybersecurity cooperation</header>
<subsection id="id2a834fca45bf4a51abfb923bd6cfad6d"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Sense of Congress</header><text>It is the sense of Congress that there should be robust cybersecurity cooperation between the United States and nations in the Indo-Pacific region—</text>
<paragraph id="iddbba89b916fa47c293733b86fd72db27"><enum>(1)</enum><text>to effectively respond to cybersecurity threats, including state-sponsored threats;</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="id61f625258faa42c4baf48909945a05f0"><enum>(2)</enum><text>to share best practices to combat such threats; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id14f21c4707f447f98576ebd46bf99edc"><enum>(3)</enum><text>to strengthen resilience against misinformation and propaganda.</text> </paragraph></subsection><subsection id="idff4cc65f742041209f21416db10e31a3"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Authorization of appropriations</header><text>There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023—</text>
<paragraph id="idf2479a1a257944be8ac5faf298227194"><enum>(1)</enum><text>to build capacity for responding to cybersecurity threats originating in the Indo-Pacific region; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id2f28e69bd6b840d083f1a481daf996d7"><enum>(2)</enum><text>to enhance cooperation between the United States and Indo-Pacific nations for combating such threats.</text>
</paragraph></subsection></section><section id="id01f39b4884664478aea1a34b5c3f869e"><enum>216.</enum><header>Nonproliferation and arms control in the Indo-Pacific region</header>
<subsection id="idc9e8c0cc61224598b3db7b386079831a"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text>The United States Government—</text> <paragraph id="idc116dcdda2eb4c1bbc6057907201b179"><enum>(1)</enum><text>recognizes that the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id007f2bbbf2d14ad0a3944a8046b55cbc"><enum>(2)</enum><text>seeks to peacefully address the unique challenge posed to regional and global stability by the illicit use, and the proliferation to and from North Korea, of sensitive nuclear and missile technologies, and other weapons of mass destruction;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idbb7d6e429e5442339dc9d2d59a60d6a5"><enum>(3)</enum><text>notes efforts by China and Russia—</text> <subparagraph id="id51069f5fef9d472a8589ceeefedebc8c"><enum>(A)</enum><text>to expand and modernize their respective nuclear arsenals, including through significant research and development resources in hypersonic glide vehicles and other advanced technologies; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id45f2217edaa64ef8ad7c62b6814f183d"><enum>(B)</enum><text>to pursue sales of commercial nuclear technologies; and</text> </subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idbc0a6f9b60ab470686f99c7cd3e618b0"><enum>(4)</enum><text>recognizes the legitimate pursuit by many countries in the Indo-Pacific region of nuclear energy for a variety of peaceful applications.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id7e67076b726c46989b538e37be582d6d"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Sense of Congress</header><text>It is the sense of Congress that the United States Government should undertake all reasonable and appropriate efforts to pursue effective arms control and nonproliferation policies in the Indo-Pacific region to limit the further spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.</text>
</subsection></section><enum>III</enum><header>Promoting United States economic interests in the Indo-Pacific
region</header>
<section id="id6981cf09252d408094b6cc803f6a4e83"><enum>301.</enum><header>Findings; sense of Congress</header>
<subsection id="idf841599a711949afb1b0e2d58c6dcf22"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Findings</header><text>Congress makes the following findings:</text> <paragraph id="id4d9be87050ee4e3f88ca4e21ff841589"><enum>(1)</enum><text>According to the United States Chamber of Commerce, by 2030—</text>
<subparagraph id="iddd758eb619ff48ad833b38693ff4776e"><enum>(A)</enum><text>66 percent of the global middle class population will be living in Asia; and</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="id6cddefd973384f0490275aba9504b0b7"><enum>(B)</enum><text>59 percent of middle class consumption will take place in Asia.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idaaca043a59244972b896200ed13befa2"><enum>(2)</enum><text>According to the Asian Development Bank—</text> <subparagraph id="id240bcd5376e649c3b313e30e4de6960e"><enum>(A)</enum><text>Asian countries have signed 140 bilateral or regional trade agreements; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id19103cd1c8ce473aaf75b0fd121d93db"><enum>(B)</enum><text>75 more trade agreements with Asian countries are under negotiation or concluded and awaiting entry into force.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id5434c1c943384999b4984ffc8cab5e5d"><enum>(3)</enum><text>Free trade agreements between the United States and 3 nations in the Indo-Pacific region (Australia, Singapore, and the Republic of Korea) have entered into force.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id685bbe76edfd4613886d73e83ac6b8ce"><enum>(4)</enum><text>The member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (referred to in this section as <quote>ASEAN</quote>), as a group—</text> <subparagraph id="id1062d4694e8643e3aadaa5a5a5b99230"><enum>(A)</enum><text>represent the fifth largest economy in the world; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="idc9031bc8dd1b4f37a073f8ec8f8c9ce9"><enum>(B)</enum><text>have a combined gross domestic product of $2,400,000,000,000.</text> </subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idcd6d3fdfc4484862b6519eac2a5f84f8"><enum>(5)</enum><text>The economy comprised of ASEAN member states grew by 66 percent between 2006 and 2015, and the total value of bilateral trade between the United States and ASEAN member states has increased by 78 percent since 2004.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id992c2925b112431bb5db55c22daa4745"><enum>(6)</enum><text>In 2015, the trade surplus of goods sold by companies in ASEAN member states to consumers in the United States was $77,000,000,000, while the United States 2015 trade surplus of services provided to consumers in ASEAN member states was $8,000,000,000.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idbecbcd096416401b94c9b4b2552d3008"><enum>(7)</enum><text>According to US-ASEAN Business Council, goods and services exported from the United States to ASEAN member states support 550,000 jobs in the United States.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idb0ffe860efd743009a3050efc7f5218a"><enum>(8)</enum><text>According to the Business Roundtable—</text> <subparagraph id="idf6ffa28b21e841318361fac9e7a1a51b"><enum>(A)</enum><text>the United States, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam were responsible for a combined 40 percent of global gross domestic product in 2017; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id27b8a8c605004360846de83829333de9"><enum>(B)</enum><text>United States bilateral trade with the other nations referred to in subparagraph (A) supports 15,600,000 jobs in the United States.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="idd020b846ce184ce989340b6e90ed4bbb"><enum>(9)</enum><text>According to the United States National Security Strategy—</text> <subparagraph id="id9E8EB7DE6DD845BF8E1DF5F5F1FA067D"><enum>(A)</enum><text>ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation <quote>remain centerpieces of the Indo-Pacific’s regional architecture and platforms for promoting an order based on freedom</quote>; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="idce8809cdcea94a1e814e4b2d872bc7aa"><enum>(B)</enum><text>the United States will <quote>work with partners to build a network of states dedicated to free markets and protected from forces that would subvert their sovereignty.</quote>.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></subsection><subsection id="idcf077ffa82df4ba1a2cbb476c78d1bb1"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Sense of Congress</header><text>It is the sense of Congress that trade between the United States and the nations in the Indo-Pacific region is vitally important to the United States economy, United States exports, and jobs in the United States.</text>
</subsection></section><section id="id2f49024b3ca44d0991c3600061816f31"><enum>302.</enum><header>Trade negotiations, multilateral agreements, and regional economic summits</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">Congress supports—</text> <paragraph id="id7d5114306c4542ec8db0e24039662311"><enum>(1)</enum><text>multilateral, bilateral, or regional trade agreements that increase United States employment and expand the economy;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id2501656142b64c2faa6e0392d64a8d57"><enum>(2)</enum><text>formal economic dialogues that include concrete, verifiable, and measured outcomes;</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="id4411576864704f56af83a6d5641aae0b"><enum>(3)</enum><text>high-standard bilateral investment treaties between the United States and nations in the Indo-Pacific region;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idce3d32dbc3a240a5ba3b0d07e6812249"><enum>(4)</enum><text>negotiations of the Trade in Services Agreement and the Environmental Goods Agreement that include several major Asian economies; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id0df2ca36f3324a5f9202b71dc8f4112e"><enum>(5)</enum><text>the proactive, strategic, and continuing high-level use of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the East Asia Summit, and the Group of 20 to pursue United States economic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.</text>
</paragraph></section><section id="id26441b3ab8f34416848b4956059e42d2"><enum>303.</enum><header>United States-ASEAN economic partnership</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">The President is authorized to negotiate a comprehensive economic engagement framework with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.</text>
</section><section id="id311e35ddf1084ee6b2ea99cb70e5a082"><enum>304.</enum><header>Trade capacity building and trade facilitation</header>
<subsection id="id23d21956cb864528b1e6aff309b07136"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text>The President is encouraged to produce a robust and comprehensive trade capacity building and trade facilitation strategy for the Indo-Pacific region.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="idd5332e35da814d188b1dc1df73645c03"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Authorization of appropriations</header><text>There are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to carry out subsection (a).</text>
</subsection></section><section id="id2227921e6c0b4fedbb131359bb407cf6"><enum>305.</enum><header>Intellectual property protection</header>
<subsection id="id9591978fbd5a404493c3dbfa8aa2660b"><enum>(a)</enum><header>In general</header><text>The President is encouraged to make enforcement of United States intellectual property laws a top priority, including taking all appropriate action to deter and punish commercial cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="idbc522ad7aa8a404e9635547897a02d1b"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Annual report</header><text>Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit a report to Congress that—</text>
<paragraph id="id17f58aeaa2c84be4b11b878e27c39020"><enum>(1)</enum><text>describes the efforts of the United States Government to combat intellectual property violations and commercial cyber-enabled theft in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly the People’s Republic of China; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idb90d70a08b0a4f9fa6b77248f7601235"><enum>(2)</enum><text>includes a country-by-country assessment of priority areas for United States engagement and capacity building assistance.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="idc5878ec429d64a12a3374c30702783df"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Authorization of appropriations</header><text>There are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to sponsor bilateral and multilateral activities designed to build capacity in the identified priority areas described in the annual report required under subsection (b).</text>
</subsection></section><section id="ide7021a65e27c4cc3b1e434049e43a876"><enum>306.</enum><header>Energy programs and initiatives</header>
<subsection id="id5bc0852ee77a449aabed90de5d339a25"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Indo-Pacific energy strategy</header>
<paragraph id="id8af8dbfb76804ecdb216277c6773a7e9"><enum>(1)</enum><header>Strategy</header><text>Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall establish a comprehensive, integrated, multiyear strategy to encourage the efforts of Indo-Pacific countries to implement national power strategies and cooperation with United States energy companies to develop an appropriate mix of power solutions to provide access to sufficient, reliable, and affordable power in order to reduce poverty and drive economic growth and job creation.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idd3ee7e229d8845ae8489a80ffb7aaab2"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Authorization of appropriations</header><text>There are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to carry out paragraph (1).</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="idc70f2f806ef14525ba329a331e724316"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Reliable energy partnerships</header><text>It is the sense of Congress that—</text> <paragraph id="idd93a1b7a6057449ebd0644f2c63b52e7"><enum>(1)</enum><text>the President should establish bilateral and regional initiatives to increase energy security in the Indo-Pacific region;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idcfafbf0a19dd4b288a7474b2e529c85f"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the United States should reaffirm support for liquefied natural gas exports to the nations in the Indo-Pacific region;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id3ce108318589489bb895e1b5fdf35f00"><enum>(3)</enum><text>the United States should seek to establish partnership between Department of Energy national laboratories and Indo-Pacific countries to provide technical assistance on electrical grid development and for the development and deployment of new and advanced energy technologies; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idd683b3db09414a3ab952bf2e30082e39"><enum>(4)</enum><text>the United States should explore opportunities to partner with the private sector and multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, to promote universal access to reliable electricity in Myanmar (historically known as <quote>Burma</quote>).</text>
</paragraph></subsection></section><section id="id6c6eba3b540c4af88fa9aadb06359432"><enum>307.</enum><header>Lower Mekong initiative</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, should increase regional engagement in the areas of environment, health, education, and infrastructure development with the Lower Mekong countries, including—</text>
<paragraph id="idc897f465c770486da8ce6ecb43bdd5ff"><enum>(1)</enum><text>assisting in the development of programs that focus on forecasting environmental challenges and resilience;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id3c83621798024c67b4177360654bd554"><enum>(2)</enum><text>assisting with transnational cooperation on sustainable uses of forest and water resources with the goal of preserving the biodiversity of the Mekong Basin and access to safe drinking water;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id6851d658a51048c4bda11e247455d34b"><enum>(3)</enum><text>assisting with education enrollment and broadband internet connectivity, particularly English training and connectivity in rural communities; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id044ee40a87b84214a279ae98ddfa367c"><enum>(4)</enum><text>improving global health in the Lower Mekong countries, including—</text> <subparagraph id="idc9ac659a4ba7489f998a9c8e040a9f12"><enum>(A)</enum><text>reducing the HIV/AIDS infection rate; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id6041e877bb48482da9ebe9849014fec4"><enum>(B)</enum><text>helping regional partners to track and treat malaria and tuberculosis.</text> </subparagraph></paragraph></section><section id="id4f0d5a3509d944c2b35c281c1f72586f"><enum>308.</enum><header>Sense of Congress on economic growth and natural resource conservation</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that the President should encourage the governments of countries in the Indo-Pacific region and United States private sector interests with operations and investments in the region to deploy agriculture practices that—</text>
<paragraph id="idDBBC08780A334BF3BC693C922D2F97BA"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">conserve natural resources; and</text> </paragraph><paragraph id="idA360CDA103AE45C794DCCCC170840D30"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">preserve culturally and ecological valuable lands and water bodies.</text>
</paragraph></section><section id="ida070c47063804d6ca8bb526a6eebc352"><enum>309.</enum><header>Sense of Congress in support of women’s economic rights</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the sense of the Congress that the United States should—</text> <paragraph id="id45BC0A469D244D039C632BE5CBF2379E"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">support activities that secure private property rights and land tenure for women in developing countries in Asia, including—</text>
<subparagraph id="idB2F8FBE159DC418795834DCF1F619D7E"><enum>(A)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">establishing legal frameworks to give women equal rights to own, register, use, profit from, and inherit land and property;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id1E65944115364B5A88C98A9AA7273A7F"><enum>(B)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">improving legal literacy to enable women to exercise the rights described in subparagraph (A); and</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="idECF5C88066434BA180254EE9C4E334F6"><enum>(C)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">increasing the capacity of law enforcement and community leaders to enforce such rights;</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id374C50D2608B4C27AA384A26BF313BB8"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">work with Asian civil society, governments, and multilateral organizations to increase the capability of disadvantaged women and girls in Asia—</text>
<subparagraph id="idE8538F295DF044C1815F9449C36FA9C1"><enum>(A)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">to realize their rights;</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="id4DEA4A2029D6469D815001D9C459CE26"><enum>(B)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">to determine their life outcomes;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id10D65303322049A7B988ACABC9E0944B"><enum>(C)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">to assume leadership roles; and</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="id293CED9422CE43A3AEB6221F172F09F4"><enum>(D)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">to influence decision-making in their households, communities, and societies; and</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id6098CA602D744013863A2D47ADE23A13"><enum>(3)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">seek to expand access to appropriate financial products and services for women-owned micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises in Asia.</text>
</paragraph></section><enum>IV</enum><header>Promoting United States values in the Indo-Pacific region</header>
<section id="id5e6207c53b8e47dea82de14d1a0d94fc"><enum>401.</enum><header>Findings</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">Congress makes the following findings:</text> <paragraph id="id045cdc63ad094edea33ba64dc18331c6"><enum>(1)</enum><text>The promotion of human rights and respect for democratic values in the Indo-Pacific region is in the United States’ national security interest.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idBFEE72A613654B4B857300924C69F281"><enum>(2)</enum><text>Continued support for human rights, democratic values, and good governance is critical to a successful United States diplomatic strategy in the Indo-Pacific.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idaa51da377572459499902623eeabd2b0"><enum>(3)</enum><text>Strong support for human rights and democracy in the Indo-Pacific region is critical to efforts to reduce poverty, build rule of law, combat corruption, reduce the allure of extremism, and promote economic growth.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="ide7911eaf73e64f1f9c90e71af82b0aef"><enum>(4)</enum><text>There are serious concerns with the rule of law and civil liberties in Cambodia, China, North Korea, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, which have all been identified by Freedom House as <quote>Not Free</quote>.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idc9522fed4a4249eab8c5474877f88aed"><enum>(5)</enum><text>There have been unacceptable human rights developments in—</text> <subparagraph id="ida848b0d431fb42518d416c5b38eacc9f"><enum>(A)</enum><text>Burma (Myanmar), which has been identified by Freedom House as <quote>Not Free</quote>, according to the Department of State, and the Department of State has declared that the violence against the Rohingya constitutes ethnic cleansing;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id9d9abc0f335447849a88e7ba487fb0e2"><enum>(B)</enum><text>the Philippines, which has been identified by Freedom House as <quote>Partly Free</quote>, and where there are continued disturbing reports of extra-judicial killings; and</text> </subparagraph><subparagraph id="id7a43b04ce75b4e17ba57b6e9f2187682"><enum>(C)</enum><text>China, where forced disappearances, extralegal detentions, and lack of due process in judicial proceedings remain troublesome.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id040388d3bdd24149866668bbac2a7c3a"><enum>(6)</enum><text>according to the National Security Strategy, the United States—</text> <subparagraph id="id2f853b3e3c6a467b90facd85632fa56f"><enum>(A)</enum><text>will <quote>support, with our words and actions, those who live under oppressive regimes and who seek freedom, individual dignity, and the rule of law</quote>;</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id276baaeaa3904c419c945f38950dbbee"><enum>(B)</enum><text><quote>may use diplomacy, sanctions, and other tools to isolate states and leaders who threaten our interests and whose actions run contrary to our values</quote>; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id6902ffc01ffd47cfb146f9d06c0b61f4"><enum>(C)</enum><text><quote>will support efforts to advance women’s equality, protect the rights of women and girls, and promote women and youth empowerment programs</quote>.</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph></section><section id="ideb5cedd980df45b2975852051994f2f9"><enum>402.</enum><header>Trafficking-in-persons</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">The President is encouraged to pursue additional efforts to combat trafficking in persons and human slavery in the Indo-Pacific region.</text>
</section><section id="idf25ed51607e14f408e750b68d907c439"><enum>403.</enum><header>Freedom of the press</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that—</text> <paragraph id="iddad19e20c0b0436584f9dc8ebfde1ef2"><enum>(1)</enum><text>United States Government officials should lead by example—</text>
<subparagraph id="idC6E27573C11C4082A483453B92E695F5"><enum>(A)</enum><text>by continuing to advocate for freedom of the press in the Indo-Pacific region; and</text>
</subparagraph><subparagraph id="id899FF80ED3FF447D9A52109925966203"><enum>(B)</enum><text>by engaging with the press corps at every appropriate opportunity; and</text>
</subparagraph></paragraph><paragraph id="id774cfc8b97154c8e8c8b9a98540dc3f2"><enum>(2)</enum><text>the United States should advocate and support a Ministerial to Advance Press Freedom in the Indo-Pacific to convene government and civil society, including journalists, to discuss and address the challenges facing press freedom in the Indo-Pacific region.</text>
</paragraph></section><section id="id585461e4d4974e26af5b504d24d2ab76"><enum>404.</enum><header>Democracy, human rights, and labor personnel</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that—</text> <paragraph id="id112270260E2E4524A70FDB7B32DDDA7B"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">United States embassies and consulates in the Indo-Pacific region should have personnel, as appropriate, who are dedicated to reporting on and advancing United States democracy, human rights, labor, anti-corruption, and good governance policy interests; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idA8BC8C0757564514B118B23708275079"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">appropriate resources should be made available to carry out such activities.</text>
</paragraph></section><section id="id324B8025C0EE4CC7A33EBDADAB44528D"><enum>405.</enum><header>Bilateral and
regional dialogues; people-to-people engagement</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">The Secretary of State should, as appropriate—</text>
<paragraph id="id59DDE78BFC5B4E8DBB63A4604C2C0BF0"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">establish high-level bilateral and regional dialogues with nations in the Indo-Pacific region regarding human rights and religious freedom violations;</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="idE586ADC0EB6F4D78BB59F7A6521524B8"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">establish or support robust, people-to-people exchange programs in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly programs engaging young leaders; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id68A0D04454BD4252A6C729FC987AB45A"><enum>(3)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">establish educational exchanges and capacity-building programs emphasizing civil society development.</text>
</paragraph></section><section id="id892A3638811D46208D1314EC34D2EB7E"><enum>406.</enum><header>Association of Southeast Asian Nations Human
Rights Strategy</header>
<subsection id="idC7C3F13FA9F04CDAA14EC469EE6EA627"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Sense of Congress</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that the United States should continue to work with ASEAN to improve the capacity of ASEAN to address human rights, democracy, and good governance issues in Southeast Asia.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="id3CA6AA9C6BB9441881577AF2746B2AAE"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Strategy</header><text>Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a strategy to the appropriate congressional committees to increase cooperation with ASEAN to promote human rights, democracy, and good governance in Southeast Asia.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="id3C25D1BBFC2B422DB489FD3D5E62BC33"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Contents</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">The strategy submitted under subsection (b) should include—</text> <paragraph id="idBC472F06E19F410292B06427F646C233"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">an assessment of the types of United States Government resources available to support increased cooperation; and</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id35379D9C552342A7BA0F0817E8612B0B"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">an assessment to identify entities within ASEAN that the United States could potentially support or partner with to promote human rights, democracy, and good governance in Southeast Asia.</text>
</paragraph></subsection></section><section id="idC47B6C4BDD714FB4A324CB5E942704D4"><enum>407.</enum><header>Freedom of information to North Korea</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">The President is encouraged to continue efforts to enhance freedom of information access with regard to North Korea.</text>
</section><section id="id0ECDAFB909D347E5BE814B9E686950C8"><enum>408.</enum><header>Sense of Congress on imposition of sanctions
and suspension of United States assistance</header>
<subsection id="id31235EBFB0DA40DA8334EF99F99F51A8"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Sanctions</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that the President should impose sanctions, in accordance with applicable law and other relevant authorities, including targeted financial penalties and visa bans, on any individual or entity that—</text>
<paragraph id="id8B3EAA4578554721800B2DCC3C1103CF"><enum>(1)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">violates human rights or religious freedoms; or</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id9FDACB4B7B2948CC9DEC9D09659D82CD"><enum>(2)</enum><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">engages in censorship activities.</text>
</paragraph></subsection><subsection id="id013A8F6BCC1A44CE95A374BC372FECDA"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Suspension of foreign assistance</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that the President should, in accordance with applicable law, terminate, suspend, or otherwise alter United States economic assistance to any country that has engaged in serious violations of human rights or religious freedoms.</text>
</subsection></section><section id="id86DCD054A4DA4296B343E3F74666BE49"><enum>409.</enum><header>Authorization of appropriations</header>
<subsection id="id269B4265A84143B1A71054347E43F0F7"><enum>(a)</enum><header>Promotion of democracy in
the Indo-Pacific region</header>
<paragraph id="idDFDA044091A54A06AEE9C85F19503AD2"><enum>(1)</enum><header>In general</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">There is authorized to be appropriated $210,000,000, for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, to promote democracy, strengthen civil society, human rights, rule of law, transparency, and accountability in the Indo-Pacific region, including for universities, civil society, and multilateral institutions that are focusing on education awareness, training, and capacity building.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id8A33205D948D44B39D34B5F272C9FD39"><enum>(2)</enum><header>Democracy in china</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be made available for United States Government efforts, led by the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, to promote democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in the People’s Republic of China.</text>
</paragraph><paragraph id="id76057C84003D4EF7B71F72F45472AAAB"><enum>(3)</enum><header>Tibet</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be made available for nongovernmental organizations to support activities preserving cultural traditions and promoting sustainable development, education, and environmental conservation in Tibetan communities in the Tibet Autonomous Region and in other Tibetan communities in China, India, and Nepal.</text>
</paragraph></subsection></section><section id="idD684DCBAB04A4C5F8809BF6DE3A99EA7"><enum>410.</enum><header>Indo-Pacific human rights and environmental defenders</header>
<subsection commented="no" display-inline="no-display-inline" id="idFF033546CBC549D793F3D6B668FE3002"><enum>(a)</enum><header display-inline="yes-display-inline">Defined term</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">In this section, the term <term>human rights and environmental defenders</term> means individuals, working alone or in groups, who nonviolently advocate for the promotion and protection of universally recognized human rights, fundamental freedoms, land issues, or the conservation of local ecosystems if the advocacy of such issues may result in the risk of safety or life.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="id42DC085AB0EB43FFA4B8F7AAA6285318"><enum>(b)</enum><header>Sense of Congress</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">It is the sense of Congress that human rights and environmental defenders in the Indo-Pacific region have been facing increased difficulties with the rise of unprecedented crackdowns and conflicts.</text>
</subsection><subsection id="id8E44E33D28DE45268C2041FEE174DC79"><enum>(c)</enum><header>Authorization of appropriations</header><text display-inline="yes-display-inline">There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to support human rights and environmental defenders through the Department of State’s Human Rights Defenders Fund.</text>
</subsection></section><section id="idC575B597FF184B7585BD7E319EA43607"><enum>411.</enum><header>Young leaders people-to-people initiatives</header><text display-inline="no-display-inline">There are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may be necessary, for fiscal years 2019 through 2025, to support Indo-Pacific young leaders initiatives, including the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative, the ASEAN Youth Volunteers Program, and other people-to-people exchange programs that focus on building the capacity of democracy, human rights, and good governance activists in the Indo-Pacific region.</text></section>October 3 (legislative day, September 28), 2018Reported with an amendment