[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2736 Reported in Senate (RS)]

<DOC>





                                                       Calendar No. 616
115th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 2736

     To develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, 
multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific 
                    region, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 24, 2018

Mr. Gardner (for himself, Mr. Markey, Mr. Rubio, Mr. Cardin, Mr. Young, 
    Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Perdue, Mr. Graham, Mr. Coons, and Mr. Kaine) 
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the 
                     Committee on Foreign Relations

            October 3 (legislative day, September 28), 2018

               Reported by Mr. Corker, with an amendment
 [Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed 
                               in italic]

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
     To develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, 
multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific 
                    region, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

<DELETED>SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Asia 
Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
is as follows:</DELETED>

<DELETED>Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
<DELETED>Sec. 2. Findings.
<DELETED>Sec. 3. Statement of policy on United States engagement in the 
                            Indo-Pacific region.
  <DELETED>TITLE I--PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE 
                          INDO-PACIFIC REGION

<DELETED>Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
<DELETED>Sec. 102. Treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific region.
<DELETED>Sec. 103. United States-China relationship.
<DELETED>Sec. 104. United States-India strategic partnership.
<DELETED>Sec. 105. United States-ASEAN strategic partnership.
<DELETED>Sec. 106. United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral 
                            security partnership.
<DELETED>Sec. 107. Quadrilateral security dialogue.
<DELETED>Sec. 108. Enhanced security partnerships in Southeast Asia.
<DELETED>Sec. 109. Commitment to Taiwan.
<DELETED>Sec. 110. North Korea strategy.
<DELETED>Sec. 111. New Zealand and the Pacific islands.
<DELETED>Sec. 112. Freedom of navigation and overflight; promotion of 
                            international law.
<DELETED>Sec. 113. Combating terrorism in Southeast Asia.
<DELETED>Sec. 114. Cybersecurity cooperation.
<DELETED>Sec. 115. Nuclear nonproliferation and arms control in the 
                            Indo-Pacific region.
 <DELETED>TITLE II--PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE 
                          INDO-PACIFIC REGION

<DELETED>Sec. 201. Findings; sense of Congress.
<DELETED>Sec. 202. Trade negotiations, multilateral agreements, and 
                            regional economic summits.
<DELETED>Sec. 203. United States-ASEAN Economic Partnership.
<DELETED>Sec. 204. Trade capacity building and trade facilitation.
<DELETED>Sec. 205. Intellectual property protection.
<DELETED>Sec. 206. Energy programs and initiatives.
<DELETED>Sec. 207. Lower Mekong Initiative.
<DELETED>TITLE III--PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 
                                 REGION

<DELETED>Sec. 301. Findings.
<DELETED>Sec. 302. Trafficking-in-persons.
<DELETED>Sec. 303. Bilateral and regional dialogues; people-to-people 
                            engagement.
<DELETED>Sec. 304. Imposition of sanctions and suspension of United 
                            States assistance.
<DELETED>Sec. 305. Authorization of appropriations.

<DELETED>SEC. 2. FINDINGS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    Congress makes the following findings:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) The Indo-Pacific region--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) represents nearly \1/2\ of the global 
                population;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) is home to some of the most dynamic 
                economies in the world; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) poses security challenges that 
                threaten to undermine United States national security 
                interests, regional peace, and global 
                stability.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) The core tenants of the United States-backed 
        international system are being challenged with increasingly 
        coercive behavior, including--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) China's illegal construction and 
                militarization of artificial features in the South 
                China Sea;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) North Korea's acceleration of its 
                nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) the increased presence throughout 
                Southeast Asia of the Islamic State (referred to in 
                this Act as ``ISIS'') and other international terrorist 
                organizations that threaten the United 
                States.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) The economic order in the Indo-Pacific region 
        continues to transform, presenting both opportunities and 
        challenges to United States economic interests.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) The United States has a fundamental interest 
        in defending human rights and promoting the rule of law in the 
        Indo-Pacific region. Although many countries in that region 
        have improved the treatment of their citizens, several Indo-
        Pacific countries continue to be human rights abusers and there 
        are serious concerns with political rights and civil liberties 
        throughout the Indo-Pacific region.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) Without strong leadership from the United 
        States, the international system, fundamentally rooted in the 
        rule of law, may wither, to the detriment of United States, 
        regional, and global interests. It is imperative that the 
        United States continue to play a leading role in the Indo-
        Pacific region by--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) defending peace and 
                security;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) advancing economic prosperity; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) promoting respect for fundamental 
                human rights.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) In 2017, the Subcommittee on East Asia, the 
        Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy of the 
        Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate held a series of 
        hearings on United States leadership in the Indo-Pacific 
        region, in which--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) experts, including Representative 
                Randy Forbes, Ambassador Robert Gallucci, Ms. Tami 
                Overby, Dr. Robert Orr, Ambassador Derek Mitchell, 
                Ambassador Robert King, Mr. Murray Hiebert, and others 
                detailed the security challenges, economic 
                opportunities, and imperatives of promoting rule of 
                law, human rights, and democracy, in the Indo-Pacific 
                region; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) Dr. Graham Allison, the Douglas Dillon 
                Professor of Government at the John F. Kennedy School 
                of Government at Harvard University, testified, ``As 
                realistic students of history, Chinese leaders 
                recognize that the role the U.S. has played since World 
                War II as the architect and underwriter of regional 
                stability and security has been essential to the rise 
                of Asia, including China itself. But they believe that 
                as the tide that brought the U.S. to Asia recedes, 
                America must leave with it. Much as Britain's role in 
                the Western Hemisphere faded at the beginning of the 
                twentieth century, so must America's role in Asia as 
                the region's historic superpower resumes its 
                place.''.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) The United States National Security Strategy 
        (referred to in this Act as the ``National Security 
        Strategy''), which was released in December 2017, states--
        </DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) ``A geopolitical competition between 
                free and repressive visions of world order is taking 
                place in the Indo-Pacific region. The region, which 
                stretches from the west coast of India to the western 
                shores of the United States, represents the most 
                populous and economically dynamic part of the world. 
                The U.S. interest in a free and open Indo-Pacific 
                extends back to the earliest days of our republic.''; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) ``Our vision for the Indo-Pacific 
                excludes no nation. We will redouble our commitment to 
                established alliances and partnerships, while expanding 
                and deepening relationships with new partners that 
                share respect for sovereignty, fair and reciprocal 
                trade, and the rule of law. We will reinforce our 
                commitment to freedom of the seas and the peaceful 
                resolution of territorial and maritime disputes in 
                accordance with international law. We will work with 
                allies and partners to achieve complete, verifiable, 
                and irreversible denuclearization on the Korean 
                Peninsula and preserve the non-proliferation regime in 
                Northeast Asia.''.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES ENGAGEMENT IN THE 
              INDO-PACIFIC REGION.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It is the policy of the United States to develop, and to 
commit to, a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, 
multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific 
region that--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) preserves peace through strength by securing 
        the vital national security interests of the United 
        States;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) promotes American prosperity by advancing the 
        economic interests of the United States;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) advances American influence by reflecting the 
        values of the American people and universal human rights; 
        and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) accords with and supports the rule of law and 
        international norms.</DELETED>

  <DELETED>TITLE I--PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE 
                     INDO-PACIFIC REGION</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--There are authorized to be appropriated 
for the Department of State, the United States Agency for International 
Development, and, as appropriate, the Department of Defense 
$1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, which 
shall be used--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) to advance United States foreign policy 
        interests and objectives in the Indo-Pacific region in 
        recognition of the value of diplomatic initiatives and programs 
        in the furtherance of United States strategy;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) to bolster the United States military presence 
        and readiness in the Indo-Pacific region for the purpose of 
        deterring and defending against provocative actions, including 
        by improving the defense infrastructure and critical munitions 
        stockpiles of the United States Armed Forces;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) to improve the defense capacity of partner 
        nations to resist coercion and to deter and defend against 
        security threats, including through foreign military financing 
        and international military education and training 
        programs;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) to conduct regular bilateral and multilateral 
        exercises, particularly with our most highly-capable allies and 
        partners, to meet strategic challenges, including--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) certain destabilizing activities of 
                the People's Republic of China; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) emerging threats, such as the nuclear 
                and ballistic missile programs of the Democratic 
                People's Republic of Korea;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) to build new counterterrorism partnership 
        programs in Southeast Asia to combat the growing presence of 
        ISIS and other terrorist organizations that pose a significant 
        threat to the United States, our allies, and our citizens' 
        interests abroad; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) to increase maritime domain awareness programs 
        in Southeast Asia--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) by expanding the scope of naval and 
                coast guard training efforts with Southeast Asian 
                countries;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) through intelligence sharing and other 
                information-sharing efforts; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) through multilateral exercises, 
                including by involving Japan, Australia, and India in 
                such efforts and exercises.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Countering China's Influence To Undermine the 
International System.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) 
shall be made available for United States Government efforts to counter 
the strategic influence of the People's Republic of China, in 
accordance with the strategy required under section 7043(e)(3) of the 
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 2014 (division K of Public Law 113-76; 128 Stat. 
536) and in consultation with the appropriate committees of 
Congress.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Burma.--None of the amounts appropriated pursuant to 
subsection (a) may be made available for the programs, initiatives, or 
interactions that may benefit the defense sector of the Republic of the 
Union of Myanmar (historically known as ``Burma'').</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Philippines.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to 
subsection (a) may not be made available for counternarcotics 
assistance (other than maritime programs) for the Philippine National 
Police unless the Secretary of State certifies and reports to the 
appropriate committees of Congress that the Government of the 
Philippines has adopted and is implementing a counternarcotics strategy 
that complies with international norms of due process.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (e) Cambodia.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection 
(a) may not be made available for certain United States assistance 
programs that benefit the Government of Cambodia.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (f) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
committees of Congress'' means--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the Committee on Appropriations of the 
        Senate;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
        Senate;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the Committee on Appropriations of the House 
        of Representatives; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
        of Representatives.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 102. TREATY ALLIANCES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 
              REGION.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) United States-Japan Alliance.--The United States 
Government--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) is committed to the Treaty of Mutual 
        Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, 
        done at Washington, January 19, 1960, and subsequent security 
        agreements;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance 
        between the United States and Japan in promoting peace and 
        security in the Indo-Pacific region; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of 
        diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United 
        States and Japan.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) United States-Republic of Korea Alliance.--The United 
States Government--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty 
        Between the United States and the Republic of Korea, done at 
        Washington October 1, 1953, and subsequent security 
        agreements;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance 
        between the United States and South Korea in promoting peace 
        and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of 
        diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United 
        States and the Republic of Korea.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) United States-Australia Alliance.--The United States 
Government--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) is committed to the Security Treaty Between 
        Australia and the United States of America, done at San 
        Francisco September 1, 1951, and subsequent security agreements 
        between these 2 nations;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance 
        between the United States and Australia in promoting peace and 
        security in the Indo-Pacific region; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of 
        diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United 
        States and Australia.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) United States-Philippines Alliance.--The United States 
Government is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty between the 
Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America, done at 
Washington August 30, 1951, and subsequent bilateral security 
agreements, including the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, done 
at Manila April 28, 2014.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (e) Thailand.--The United States Government is committed 
to--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the Agreement Respecting Military Assistance 
        Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
        Government of Thailand, done at Bangkok October 17, 
        1950;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, 
        done at Manila September 8, 1954; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) all subsequent bilateral security agreements, 
        including the Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-U.S. Defense 
        Alliance, issued in Bangkok November 15, 2012.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 103. UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONSHIP.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--The United States Government--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) expresses grave concerns with Chinese actions 
        that seek--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) to further constrain space for civil 
                society within China; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) to undermine a rules-based order in 
                the Indo-Pacific region;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) encourages China to play a constructive role 
        in world affairs by demonstrating consistent respect for the 
        rule of law and international norms;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) seeks to build a positive, cooperative, and 
        comprehensive relationship with China--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) by expanding areas of cooperation; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) by addressing areas of disagreement, 
                including over human rights, economic policies, and 
                maritime security; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) is committed to working with China on shared 
        regional and global challenges, especially--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) upholding and strengthening the rules-
                based international system; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) the denuclearization of the Korean 
                peninsula.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
the United States should--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) welcome China's decision to change course and 
        pursue responsible engagement on global issues;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) encourage China to play a constructive role in 
        the Indo-Pacific region and globally; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) continue to call out Chinese actions that 
        undermine the rules-based international system.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 104. UNITED STATES-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--The United States Government--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) recognizes the vital role of the strategic 
        partnership between the United States and India in promoting 
        peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) calls for the strengthening and broadening of 
        diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United 
        States and India; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) is committed to--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) the New Framework for the United 
                States-India Defense Relationship, done at Arlington, 
                Virginia June 28, 2005;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) the United States-India Defense 
                Technology and Trade Initiative, launched in 
                2012;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) the Joint Strategic Vision for the 
                Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, announced on 
                January 25, 2015; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) all related and subsequent bilateral 
                and security agreements.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) India as Major Defense Partner.--Congress makes the 
following findings:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Section 1292(a)(1)(A) of the National Defense 
        Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328; 130 
        Stat. 2559; 22 U.S.C. 2751 note) requires the recognition of 
        India as a major defense partner.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) The designation of India as a major defense 
        partner, which is unique to India--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) institutionalizes the progress made to 
                facilitate defense trade and technology sharing between 
                the United States and India;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) elevates defense trade and technology 
                cooperation between the United States and India to a 
                level commensurate with the closest allies and partners 
                of the United States;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) facilitates technology sharing between 
                the United States and India, including license-free 
                access to a wide range of dual-use technologies, after 
                taking into account national security concerns; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) facilitates joint exercises, 
                coordination on defense strategy and policy, military 
                exchanges, and port calls in support of defense 
                cooperation between the United States and 
                India.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 105. UNITED STATES-ASEAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It is the sense of the Senate that the United States 
should--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) support and affirm the elevation of the United 
        States-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
        relationship to a strategic partnership;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) recommit to ASEAN centrality by helping build 
        a strong, stable, politically cohesive, economically 
        integrated, and socially responsible community of nations that 
        has common rules, norms, procedures, and standards which are 
        consistent with international law and the principles of a 
        rules-based Indo-Pacific community;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster 
        greater integration among its members;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) recognize the value of--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) ASEAN engagement with economic, 
                political, and security partners within Asia and 
                elsewhere, including Australia, Canada, the European 
                Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic 
                of Korea, and Taiwan; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) strategic economic initiatives, such 
                as the U.S.-ASEAN Connect, which demonstrate a 
                commitment to ASEAN and the ASEAN Economic Community 
                and build upon economic relationships in the Indo-
                Pacific region;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) support efforts by the nations comprising 
        ASEAN--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) to address maritime and territorial 
                disputes in a constructive manner; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) to pursue claims through peaceful, 
                diplomatic, and legitimate regional and international 
                arbitration mechanisms, consistent with international 
                law, including through the adoption of a code of 
                conduct in the South China Sea to further promote peace 
                and stability in the Indo-Pacific region;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) support efforts by United States partners and 
        allies in ASEAN--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) to enhance maritime capability and 
                maritime domain awareness;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) to protect unhindered access to, and 
                use of, international waterways in the Asia-Pacific 
                region that are critical to ensuring the security and 
                free flow of commerce;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) to counter piracy;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) to disrupt illicit maritime 
                trafficking activities such as the trafficking of 
                persons, goods, and drugs; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) to enhance the maritime capabilities 
                of countries or regional organizations to respond to 
                emerging threats to maritime security in the Asia-
                Pacific region; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) urge ASEAN member states to develop a common 
        approach to reaffirm the decision of the Permanent Court of 
        Arbitration's ruling with respect to the case between the 
        Republic of the Philippines and the People's Republic of 
        China.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 106. UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA-JAPAN TRILATERAL 
              SECURITY PARTNERSHIP.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It is the sense of Congress that the President should 
develop a strategy to deepen the trilateral security cooperation 
between the United States, South Korea, and Japan, including missile 
defense, intelligence-sharing, and other defense-related 
initiatives.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 107. QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It is the sense of Congress that--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the security dialogue between the United 
        States, Australia, India, and Japan is vital to addressing 
        pressing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region in 
        order to promote--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) a rules-based order;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) respect for international law; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) a free and open Indo-Pacific; 
                and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) such a dialogue is intended to augment, rather 
        than to replace, current mechanisms.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 108. ENHANCED SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTHEAST 
              ASIA.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Indonesia.--The United States Government is committed 
to--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership, 
        done in Washington November 9, 2010;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive Defense 
        Cooperation, done in Washington October 26, 2015; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and 
        security agreements between the United States and 
        Indonesia.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Malaysia.--The United States Government is committed 
to--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the U.S.-Malaysia Comprehensive Partnership, 
        done at Putrajaya April 27, 2014;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Joint Statement for Enhancing the 
        Comprehensive Partnership between the United States of America 
        and Malaysia, done in Washington September 13, 2017; 
        and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and 
        security agreements between the United States and 
        Malaysia.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Singapore.--The United States Government is committed 
to--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the Strategic Framework Agreement Between the 
        United States of America and the Republic of Singapore for a 
        Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security, done at 
        Washington July 12, 2005;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, 
        done at Arlington, Virginia December 7, 2015; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and 
        security agreements between the United States and 
        Singapore.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Vietnam.--The United States Government is committed 
to--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership, 
        done at Washington December 16, 2013;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the U.S.-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement on 
        Defense Relations, done at Hanoi on June 1, 2015;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the U.S.-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement, done 
        at Washington May 31, 2017; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) all related and subsequent bilateral and 
        security agreements between the United States and 
        Vietnam.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (e) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
the United States should deepen the diplomatic, economic, and security 
cooperation, especially in the areas of maritime security and 
counterterrorism, with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Vietnam.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 109. COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) United States Commitment to Taiwan.--It is the policy 
of the United States to faithfully enforce all existing United States 
Government commitments to Taiwan, as enshrined in the Taiwan Relations 
Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-8) and the Six Assurances agreed to by 
President Ronald Reagan in July 1982.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Arms Sales to Taiwan.--The President shall conduct 
regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan that are tailored to 
meet the existing and likely future threats from the People's Republic 
of China, including supporting the efforts of Taiwan to develop and 
integrate asymmetric capabilities, including undersea warfare and air 
defense capabilities, into its military forces.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Travel.--The President shall authorize the travel of 
high-level United States officials to Taiwan, in accordance with the 
Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135).</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 110. NORTH KOREA STRATEGY.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following 
findings:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) The Government of the Democratic People's 
        Republic of Korea has flagrantly defied the international 
        community by illicitly developing its nuclear and ballistic 
        missile programs, in violation of United Nations Security 
        Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 
        (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 
        2397 (2017).</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) The Government of the Democratic People's 
        Republic of Korea engages in gross human rights abuses against 
        its own people and citizens of other countries, including the 
        United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) The United States is committed to pursuing a 
        peaceful denuclearization of the Democratic People's Republic 
        of Korea through a policy of maximum pressure and engagement, 
        in close concert with its partners.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Policy of the United States With Respect to Sanctions 
Against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Statement of policy.--It is the policy of the 
        United States to continue to impose sanctions with respect to 
        activities of the Government of the Democratic People's 
        Republic of Korea, persons acting for or on behalf of such 
        government, or other persons in accordance with Executive Order 
        13687 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to imposing additional 
        sanctions with respect to North Korea), Executive Order 13694 
        (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking the property of 
        certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled 
        activities), Executive Order 13722 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; 
        relating to blocking the property of the Government of North 
        Korea and the Workers' Party of Korea, and prohibiting certain 
        transactions with respect to North Korea), and Executive Order 
        13810 (82 Fed. Reg. 44705; relating to imposing additional 
        sanctions with respect to North Korea), as such Executive 
        orders are in effect on the day before the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, until the Democratic People's Republic 
        of Korea is no longer engaged in the illicit activities 
        described in such Executive orders, including actions in 
        violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 
        (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 
        2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), and 2375 (2017).</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after 
        terminating any sanction with respect to the activities of the 
        Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a 
        person acting for or on behalf of such government, or any other 
        person provided for in an Executive order listed in subsection 
        (a), the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the 
        appropriate congressional committees regarding the cessation of 
        any illicit activity that violates United Nations Security 
        Council Resolution 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 
        (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), or 2375 (2017) 
        by such Government or person.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this 
        subsection shall be construed to limit the authority of the 
        President pursuant to the International Emergency Economic 
        Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Policy of the United States With Respect to 
Negotiation on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Nuclear and 
Ballistic Missile Programs.--It is the policy of the United States that 
the objective of negotiations with respect to the nuclear and ballistic 
missile programs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea be the 
complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of such 
programs.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Report on a Strategy To Address the Threats Posed by, 
and the Capabilities of, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days 
        thereafter, the Secretary of State, or a designee of the 
        Secretary, shall submit a report to the appropriate 
        congressional committees that describes actions taken by the 
        United States to address the threats posed by, and the 
        capabilities of, the Democratic People's Republic of 
        Korea.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Elements.--Each report required under 
        paragraph (1) shall include--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) a summary of ongoing efforts by the 
                United States to identify strategies and policies, 
                including an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses 
                of such strategies and policies--</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (i) to achieve peaceful 
                        denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; 
                        and</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (ii) to eliminate the threat posed 
                        by the ballistic missile program of the 
                        Democratic People's Republic of 
                        Korea;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) an assessment of--</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (i) potential road maps toward 
                        peaceful denuclearization of the Korean 
                        Peninsula and the elimination of the nuclear 
                        and ballistic missile threats posed by the 
                        Democratic People's Republic of Korea; 
                        and</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (ii) specific actions that the 
                        Democratic People's Republic of Korea would 
                        need to take for each such roadmap to become 
                        viable;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) a summary of the United States 
                strategy to increase international coordination and 
                cooperation, whether unilaterally, bilaterally, or 
                multilaterally, including sanctions enforcement and 
                interdiction, to address the threat posed by the 
                nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the 
                Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which shall 
                include--</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (i) a description of the actions 
                        taken by the Secretary of State, or designees 
                        of the Secretary, to consult with governments 
                        around the world, with the purpose of inducing 
                        such governments to diplomatically and 
                        economically isolate the Democratic People's 
                        Republic of Korea;</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (ii) a description of the actions 
                        taken by such governments to implement measures 
                        to diplomatically and economically isolate the 
                        Democratic People's Republic of 
                        Korea;</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (iii) a list of countries with 
                        governments that the Secretary has determined 
                        are noncooperative with respect to implementing 
                        measures to diplomatically and economically 
                        isolate the Democratic People's Republic of 
                        Korea; and</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (iv) a plan of action to engage, 
                        and increase cooperation with respect to the 
                        Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with the 
                        governments of the countries on the list 
                        described in clause (iii); and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) an assessment of the adequacy of the 
                national export control regimes of countries that are 
                members of the United Nations, and multilateral export 
                control regimes, that are necessary to enforce 
                sanctions imposed with respect to the Democratic 
                People's Republic of Korea pursuant to United Nations 
                Security Council resolutions; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) an action plan to encourage and assist 
                countries in adopting and using authorities necessary 
                to enforce export controls required by United Nations 
                Security Council resolutions.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) Form of report.--Each report required under 
        this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but 
        may include a classified annex.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (e) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) representatives of the United States shall use 
        the voice and vote of the United States in all international 
        organizations, as appropriate, to advocate for the expulsion of 
        the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from such 
        organizations, until such time as the Democratic People's 
        Republic of Korea meets its commitments under United Nations 
        Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 
        (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 
        2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017);</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Secretary of State may take such actions 
        as are necessary to induce countries to take measures to 
        diplomatically and economically isolate the Democratic People's 
        Republic of Korea, including--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) reducing the diplomatic presence in 
                the United States of countries with governments that 
                the Secretary has determined are noncooperative with 
                respect to implementing measures to diplomatically and 
                economically isolate the Democratic People's Republic 
                of Korea; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) reducing the diplomatic presence of 
                the United States in such countries; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the Secretary of State may terminate or reduce 
        United States foreign assistance to countries enabling the 
        Democratic People's Republic of Korea.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 111. NEW ZEALAND AND THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It is the sense of Congress that--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the United States supports strengthening 
        diplomatic, economic, and the security relationship with New 
        Zealand;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the United States supports strong United 
        States engagement with the nations of the South Pacific, 
        including Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated 
        States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, 
        the Solomon Islands Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the United States recognizes the strong 
        historical, strategic and cultural ties to these 
        countries;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) the United States should deepen its 
        cooperation with New Zealand and the nations of the South 
        Pacific in areas of mutual interest, including--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) fisheries and marine resource 
                conservation;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) environmental challenges and 
                resilience;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) global health;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) development and trade; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) people-to-people ties; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) the United States should provide robust 
        foreign assistance to the Pacific islands.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 112. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT; PROMOTION OF 
              INTERNATIONAL LAW.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Freedom of Navigation.--It is the policy of the United 
States--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) to conduct, as part of its global Freedom of 
        Navigation Program, regular freedom of navigation and 
        overflight operations in the Indo-Pacific region, in accordance 
        with applicable international law; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) to promote genuine multilateral negotiations 
        to peacefully resolve maritime disputes in the South China Sea, 
        in accordance with applicable international law.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Joint Indo-Pacific Diplomatic Strategy.--It is the 
sense of Congress that the President should develop a diplomatic 
strategy that includes working with United States allies and partners 
to conduct joint maritime training and freedom of navigation operations 
in the Indo-Pacific region, including the East China Sea and the South 
China Sea, in support of a rules-based international system benefitting 
all countries.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 113. COMBATING TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and 
other appropriate officials, shall submit a report to the appropriate 
committees of Congress that contains an assessment of the current and 
future capabilities and activities of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and 
other violent extremist groups in Southeast Asia that pose a 
significant threat to the United States, its allies, and its citizens 
interests abroad.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) 
shall include--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the current number of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-
        linked, and other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters 
        in Southeast Asia;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the estimated number of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-
        linked, and other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters 
        expected to return to Southeast Asia from fighting in the 
        Middle East;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the current resources available to combat the 
        threat of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent 
        extremist group-affiliated fighters in Southeast Asia, and the 
        additional resources required to combat such threat;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) a detailed assessment of the capabilities of 
        ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist 
        group-affiliated fighters to operate effectively in countries 
        such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) a description of the capabilities and 
        resources of governments in Southeast Asia to counter violent 
        extremist groups; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) a list of additional United States resources 
        and capabilities that the Department of Defense recommends 
        providing to governments in Southeast Asia to combat violent 
        extremist groups.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Definitions.--In this section--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the term ``appropriate committees of 
        Congress'' means--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) the Committee on Armed Services of the 
                Senate;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
                the Senate;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) the Committee on Armed Services of the 
                House of Representatives; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
                the House of Representatives; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the term ``ISIS'' means the Islamic State of 
        Iraq and Syria.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 114. CYBERSECURITY COOPERATION.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
there should be robust cybersecurity cooperation between the United 
States and nations in the Indo-Pacific region--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) to effectively respond to cybersecurity 
        threats, including state-sponsored threats;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) to share best practices to combat such 
        threats; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) to strengthen resilience against 
        misinformation and propaganda.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) to build capacity for responding to 
        cybersecurity threats originating in the Indo-Pacific region; 
        and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) to enhance cooperation between the United 
        States and nations in such region for combating such 
        threats.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 115. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL IN THE 
              INDO-PACIFIC REGION.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--The United States Government--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) recognizes that the spread of nuclear weapons, 
        and their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to 
        international peace and security;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) seeks to peacefully address the unique 
        challenge posed to regional and global stability by the illicit 
        use, and the proliferation to and from North Korea, of 
        sensitive nuclear and missile technologies;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) notes efforts by China and Russia--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) to expand and modernize their 
                respective nuclear arsenals; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) to pursue sales of commercial nuclear 
                technologies; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) recognizes the legitimate pursuit by many 
        countries in the Indo-Pacific region of nuclear energy for a 
        variety of peaceful applications.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
the United States Government should undertake all reasonable and 
appropriate efforts to pursue effective arms control and nuclear 
nonproliferation policies in the Indo-Pacific region to limit the 
further spread of potentially dangerous and destabilizing conventional 
and nuclear weapons.</DELETED>

 <DELETED>TITLE II--PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE 
                     INDO-PACIFIC REGION</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 201. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following 
findings:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) According to the United States Chamber of 
        Commerce, by 2030--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) 66 percent of the global middle class 
                population will be in Asia; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) 59 percent of middle class consumption 
                will be in Asia.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) According to the Asian Development Bank--
        </DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) Asian countries have signed 140 
                bilateral or regional trade agreements; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) 75 more trade agreements with Asian 
                countries are under negotiation or concluded and 
                awaiting entry into force.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) The United States has signed free trade 
        agreements with 3 nations in the Indo-Pacific region, namely 
        Australia, Singapore, and the Republic of Korea.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) The member states of the Association of 
        Southeast Asian Nations (referred to in this section as 
        ``ASEAN''), as a group--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) represent the fifth largest economy in 
                the world; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) have a combined gross domestic product 
                of $2,400,000,000,000.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) The economy comprised of ASEAN member states 
        grew by 66 percent between 2006 and 2015, and the total value 
        of bilateral trade between the United States and ASEAN member 
        states has increased by 78 percent since 2004.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) In 2015, the trade surplus of goods sold by 
        companies in ASEAN member states to consumers in the United 
        States was $77,000,000,000, while the United States 2015 trade 
        surplus of services provided to consumers in ASEAN member 
        states was $8,000,000,000.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) According to U.S.-ASEAN Business Council, 
        Inc., goods and services exported from the United States to 
        ASEAN member states support 550,000 jobs in the United 
        States.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) According to the Business Roundtable--
        </DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) the United States, Australia, Brunei, 
                Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, 
                Peru, Singapore and Vietnam were responsible for a 
                combined 40 percent of global gross domestic product in 
                2017; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) United States bilateral trade with the 
                other nations referred to in subparagraph (A) supports 
                15,600,000 jobs in the United States.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (9) According to the United States National 
        Security Strategy--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic 
                Cooperation (APEC) ``remain centerpieces of the Indo-
                Pacific's regional architecture and platforms for 
                promoting an order based on freedom''; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) the United States will ``work with 
                partners to build a network of states dedicated to free 
                markets and protected from forces that would subvert 
                their sovereignty.''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
trade between the United States and the nations in the Indo-Pacific 
region is vitally important to the United States economy, United States 
exports, and jobs in the United States.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 202. TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS, AND 
              REGIONAL ECONOMIC SUMMITS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    Congress supports--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) multilateral, bilateral, or regional trade 
        agreements that increase United States employment and expand 
        the economy;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) formal economic dialogues that include 
        concrete outcomes;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) high-standard bilateral investment treaties 
        between the United States and nations in the Indo-Pacific 
        region;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) negotiations of the Trade in Services 
        Agreement and the Environmental Goods Agreement that include 
        several major Asian economies; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) the proactive, strategic, and continuing high-
        level use of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the 
        East Asia Summit, and the Group of 20 to pursue United States 
        economic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 203. UNITED STATES-ASEAN ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    The President, acting through the United States Trade 
Representative, is authorized to negotiate a comprehensive economic 
engagement framework with the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 204. TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING AND TRADE 
              FACILITATION.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--The President is encouraged to produce a 
robust and comprehensive trade capacity building and trade facilitation 
strategy for the Indo-Pacific region.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
to be appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to carry out 
subsection (a).</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 205. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--The President is encouraged to impose 
penalties on all entities found to be complicit in the theft of United 
States intellectual property, in accordance with applicable law, 
including commercial cyber-enabled theft.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Annual Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President 
shall submit a report to Congress that--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) describes the efforts of the United States 
        Government to combat intellectual property and commercial 
        cyber-enabled theft in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly 
        the People's Republic of China; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) includes a country-by-country assessment of 
        priority areas for United States engagement and capacity 
        building assistance.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
to be appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to sponsor 
bilateral and multilateral activities designed to build capacity in the 
identified priority areas described in the annual report required under 
subsection (b).</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 206. ENERGY PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Indo-Pacific Energy Strategy.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 
        Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of 
        Energy, shall create a United States Government strategy to 
        increase United States exports of energy to the nations in the 
        Indo-Pacific region.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Authorization of appropriations.--There are 
        authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may be necessary 
        to carry out paragraph (1).</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Reliable Energy Partnerships.--It is the sense of 
Congress that--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the President should establish bilateral and 
        regional initiatives to increase energy security in the Indo-
        Pacific region;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the United States should authorize the supply 
        of liquefied natural gas to the nations in the Indo-Pacific 
        region; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the United States should create a dedicated 
        program, in partnership with the private sector and 
        multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank and the Asian 
        Development Bank, to promote universal access to reliable 
        electricity in Myanmar (historically known as 
        ``Burma'').</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 207. LOWER MEKONG INITIATIVE.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the 
Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development, should increase regional engagement in the areas of 
environment, health, education, and infrastructure development with the 
Lower Mekong countries, including--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) assisting to develop programs that focus on 
        forecasting environmental challenges and resilience;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) assisting with transnational cooperation on 
        sustainable uses of forest and water resources with the goal of 
        preserving the biodiversity of the Mekong Basin and access to 
        safe drinking water;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) assisting with education enrollment and 
        broadband internet connectivity, particularly English training 
        and connectivity in rural communities; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) improving global health in the Lower Mekong 
        countries, including--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) reducing the HIV/AIDS infection rate; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) helping regional partners to track and 
                treat malaria and tuberculosis.</DELETED>

<DELETED>TITLE III--PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 
                            REGION</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 301. FINDINGS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    Congress finds that--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the promotion of human rights and respect for 
        democratic values in the Indo-Pacific region is in the United 
        States national security interests;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) there are serious concerns with the rule of 
        law and civil liberties in Cambodia, China, North Korea, Laos, 
        Thailand, and Vietnam, which have all been identified by 
        Freedom House as ``Not Free'';</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) there have been recent disturbing human rights 
        developments in--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) Burma (Myanmar), which has been 
                identified by Freedom House as ``Not Free''; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) the Philippines, which has been 
                identified by Freedom House as ``Partly Free''; 
                and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) according to the National Security Strategy, 
        the United States--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) will ``support, with our words and 
                actions, those who live under oppressive regimes and 
                who seek freedom, individual dignity, and the rule of 
                law'';</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) ``may use diplomacy, sanctions, and 
                other tools to isolate states and leaders who threaten 
                our interests and whose actions run contrary to our 
                values''; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) ``will support efforts to advance 
                women's equality, protect the rights of women and 
                girls, and promote women and youth empowerment 
                programs.''.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 302. TRAFFICKING-IN-PERSONS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    The President is encouraged to pursue additional efforts 
to combat trafficking in persons and human slavery in the Indo-Pacific 
region.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 303. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL DIALOGUES; PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE 
              ENGAGEMENT.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    The Secretary of State should--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) establish high-level bilateral and regional 
        dialogues with nations in the Indo-Pacific region regarding 
        human rights and religious freedom violations;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) establish or support robust, people-to-people 
        exchange programs in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly 
        programs engaging young leaders; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) establish educational exchanges and capacity-
        building programs emphasizing civil society 
        development.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 304. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AND SUSPENSION OF UNITED 
              STATES ASSISTANCE.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Sanctions.--The President is authorized to impose 
sanctions, in accordance with applicable law, including financial 
penalties and visa bans, on any individual or entity that--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) violates human rights or religious freedoms; 
        or</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) engages in censorship activities.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Suspension of Foreign Assistance.--The President is 
authorized, in accordance with applicable law, to terminate, suspend, 
or otherwise alter United States economic assistance to any country 
that has engaged in serious violations of human rights or religious 
freedoms.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 305. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Promotion of Democracy in the Indo-Pacific Region.--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In general.--There is authorized to be 
        appropriated $150,000,000, for each of the fiscal years 2019 
        through 2023, to promote democracy, strengthen civil society, 
        human rights, rule of law, transparency, and accountability in 
        the Indo-Pacific region.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Democracy in china.--Amounts appropriated 
        pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be made available for United 
        States Government efforts, led by the Assistant Secretary of 
        State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, to promote 
        democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in the People's 
        Republic of China.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) Tibet.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to 
        paragraph (1) shall be made available for nongovernmental 
        organizations to support activities preserving cultural 
        traditions and promoting sustainable development, education, 
        and environmental conservation in Tibetan communities in the 
        Tibet Autonomous Region and in other Tibetan communities in 
        China, India, and Nepal.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Freedom of Information to North Korea.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In general.--There is authorized to be 
        appropriated $10,000,000, for each of the fiscal years 2019 
        through 2023, to implement programs to enhance freedom of 
        information efforts with regard to North Korea.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days 
        thereafter through September 30, 2023, the Broadcasting Board 
        of Governors shall submit a report to Congress that describes 
        the implementation of the programs described in paragraph 
        (1).</DELETED>

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Asia Reassurance 
Initiative Act of 2018''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.

   TITLE I--UNITED STATES POLICY AND DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY IN THE INDO-
                             PACIFIC REGION

Sec. 101. Policy.
Sec. 102. Diplomatic strategy.

   TITLE II--PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE INDO-
                             PACIFIC REGION

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 202. Treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific region.
Sec. 203. United States-China relationship.
Sec. 204. United States-India strategic partnership.
Sec. 205. United States-ASEAN strategic partnership.
Sec. 206. United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral security 
                            partnership.
Sec. 207. Quadrilateral security dialogue.
Sec. 208. Enhanced security partnerships in Southeast Asia.
Sec. 209. Commitment to Taiwan.
Sec. 210. North Korea strategy.
Sec. 211. New Zealand.
Sec. 212. The Pacific Islands.
Sec. 213. Freedom of navigation and overflight; promotion of 
                            international law.
Sec. 214. Combating terrorism in Southeast Asia.
Sec. 215. Cybersecurity cooperation.
Sec. 216. Nonproliferation and arms control in the Indo-Pacific region.

   TITLE III--PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE INDO-
                             PACIFIC REGION

Sec. 301. Findings; sense of Congress.
Sec. 302. Trade negotiations, multilateral agreements, and regional 
                            economic summits.
Sec. 303. United States-ASEAN economic partnership.
Sec. 304. Trade capacity building and trade facilitation.
Sec. 305. Intellectual property protection.
Sec. 306. Energy programs and initiatives.
Sec. 307. Lower Mekong initiative.
Sec. 308. Sense of Congress on economic growth and natural resource 
                            conservation.
Sec. 309. Sense of Congress in support of women's economic rights.

  TITLE IV--PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

Sec. 401. Findings.
Sec. 402. Trafficking-in-persons.
Sec. 403. Freedom of the press.
Sec. 404. Democracy, human rights, and labor personnel.
Sec. 405. Bilateral and regional dialogues; people-to-people 
                            engagement.
Sec. 406. Association of Southeast Asian Nations Human Rights Strategy.
Sec. 407. Freedom of information to North Korea.
Sec. 408. Sense of Congress on imposition of sanctions and suspension 
                            of United States assistance.
Sec. 409. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 410. Indo-Pacific human rights and environmental defenders.
Sec. 411. Young leaders people-to-people initiatives.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The Indo-Pacific region--
                    (A) represents nearly 50 percent of the global 
                population;
                    (B) is home to some of the most dynamic economies 
                in the world; and
                    (C) poses security challenges that threaten to 
                undermine United States national security interests, 
                regional peace, and global stability.
            (2) The core tenets of the United States-backed 
        international system are being challenged, including by--
                    (A) China's illegal construction and militarization 
                of artificial features in the South China Sea and 
                coercive economic practices;
                    (B) North Korea's acceleration of its nuclear and 
                ballistic missile capabilities; and
                    (C) the increased presence throughout Southeast 
                Asia of the Islamic State (referred to in this Act as 
                ``ISIS'') and other international terrorist 
                organizations that threaten the United States.
            (3) The economic order in the Indo-Pacific region continues 
        to transform, presenting opportunities and challenges to United 
        States economic interests.
            (4) The United States has a fundamental interest in 
        defending human rights and promoting the rule of law in the 
        Indo-Pacific region. Although many countries in the region have 
        improved the treatment of their citizens, several Indo-Pacific 
        governments continue to commit human rights abuses and place 
        restrictions on basic human rights and political and civil 
        liberties.
            (5) Without strong leadership from the United States, the 
        international system, fundamentally rooted in the rule of law, 
        may wither, to the detriment of United States, regional, and 
        global interests. It is imperative that the United States 
        continue to play a leading role in the Indo-Pacific region by--
                    (A) defending peace and security;
                    (B) advancing economic prosperity; and
                    (C) promoting respect for fundamental human rights.
            (6) In 2017, the Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, 
        and International Cybersecurity Policy of the Committee on 
        Foreign Relations of the Senate held a series of hearings on 
        United States leadership in the Indo-Pacific region, in which--
                    (A) experts, including Representative Randy Forbes, 
                Ambassador Robert Gallucci, Ms. Tami Overby, Dr. Robert 
                Orr, Ambassador Derek Mitchell, Ambassador Robert King, 
                Mr. Murray Hiebert, and others detailed the security 
                challenges, economic opportunities, and imperatives of 
                promoting the rule of law, human rights, and democracy, 
                in the Indo-Pacific region; and
                    (B) Dr. Graham Allison, the Douglas Dillon 
                Professor of Government at the John F. Kennedy School 
                of Government at Harvard University, testified, ``As 
                realistic students of history, Chinese leaders 
                recognize that the role the United States has played 
                since World War II as the architect and underwriter of 
                regional stability and security has been essential to 
                the rise of Asia, including China itself. But they 
                believe that as the tide that brought the United States 
                to Asia recedes, America must leave with it. Much as 
                Britain's role in the Western Hemisphere faded at the 
                beginning of the twentieth century, so must America's 
                role in Asia as the region's historic superpower 
                resumes its place.''.
            (7) The United States National Security Strategy (referred 
        to in this Act as the ``National Security Strategy''), which 
        was released in December 2017, states--
                    (A) ``A geopolitical competition between free and 
                repressive visions of world order is taking place in 
                the Indo-Pacific region. The region, which stretches 
                from the west coast of India to the western shores of 
                the United States, represents the most populous and 
                economically dynamic part of the world. The United 
                States interest in a free and open Indo-Pacific extends 
                back to the earliest days of our republic.''; and
                    (B) ``Our vision for the Indo-Pacific excludes no 
                nation. We will redouble our commitment to established 
                alliances and partnerships, while expanding and 
                deepening relationships with new partners that share 
                respect for sovereignty, fair and reciprocal trade, and 
                the rule of law. We will reinforce our commitment to 
                freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution of 
                territorial and maritime disputes in accordance with 
                international law. We will work with allies and 
                partners to achieve complete, verifiable, and 
                irreversible denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula 
                and preserve the non-proliferation regime in Northeast 
                Asia.''.

   TITLE I--UNITED STATES POLICY AND DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY IN THE INDO-
                             PACIFIC REGION

SEC. 101. POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States to develop and commit to a 
long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and 
principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region that--
            (1) secures the vital national security interests of the 
        United States and our allies and partners;
            (2) promotes American prosperity and economic interests by 
        advancing economic growth and development of a rules-based 
        Indo-Pacific economic community;
            (3) advances American influence by reflecting the values of 
        the American people and universal human rights;
            (4) supports functional problem-solving regional 
        architecture; and
            (5) accords with and supports the rule of law and 
        international norms.

SEC. 102. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY.

    It is the diplomatic strategy of the United States--
            (1) to work with United States allies--
                    (A) to confront common challenges;
                    (B) to improve information sharing;
                    (C) to increase defense investment and trade;
                    (D) to ensure interoperability; and
                    (E) to strengthen shared capabilities;
            (2) to strengthen relationships with partners who--
                    (A) share mutual respect for the rule of law;
                    (B) agree with fair and reciprocal trade; and
                    (C) understand the importance of civil society, the 
                rule of law, and transparent governance;
            (3) to support functional problem-solving regional 
        architecture, including through the Association of Southeast 
        Asian Nations, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the East 
        Asia Summit;
            (4) to emphasize the commitment of the United States--
                    (A) to freedom of navigation under international 
                law;
                    (B) to promote peaceful resolutions of maritime and 
                territorial disputes; and
                    (C) to expand security and defense cooperation with 
                allies and partners, as appropriate;
            (5) to pursue diplomatic measures to achieve complete, 
        verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea;
            (6) to improve civil society, strengthen the rule of law, 
        and advocate for transparent governance;
            (7) to develop and grow the economy through private sector 
        partnerships between the United States and Indo-Pacific 
        partners;
            (8) to pursue multilateral and bilateral trade agreements 
        in a free, fair, and reciprocal manner and build a network of 
        partners in the Indo-Pacific committed to free markets;
            (9) to work with and encourage Indo-Pacific countries--
                    (A) to pursue high-quality and transparent 
                infrastructure projects;
                    (B) to maintain unimpeded commerce, open sea lines 
                or air ways, and communication; and
                    (C) to seek the peaceful resolution of disputes; 
                and
            (10) to sustain a strong military presence in the Indo-
        Pacific region and strengthen security relationships with 
        allies and partners throughout the region.

   TITLE II--PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE INDO-
                             PACIFIC REGION

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    (a) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
            (3) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
        Representatives; and
            (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated for the Department of State, the United States Agency for 
International Development, and, as appropriate, the Department of 
Defense, $1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, 
which shall be used--
            (1) to advance United States foreign policy interests and 
        objectives in the Indo-Pacific region in recognition of the 
        value of diplomatic initiatives and programs in the furtherance 
        of United States strategy;
            (2) to improve the defense capacity of partner nations to 
        resist coercion and deter and defend against security threats, 
        including through foreign military financing and international 
        military education and training programs;
            (3) to conduct regular bilateral and multilateral 
        engagements, particularly with the United States' most highly-
        capable allies and partners, to meet strategic challenges, 
        including--
                    (A) certain destabilizing activities of the 
                People's Republic of China; and
                    (B) emerging threats, such as the nuclear and 
                ballistic missile programs of the Democratic People's 
                Republic of Korea;
            (4) to build new counterterrorism partnership programs in 
        Southeast Asia to combat the growing presence of ISIS and other 
        terrorist organizations that pose a significant threat to the 
        United States, its allies, and its citizens' interests abroad; 
        and
            (5) to increase maritime domain awareness programs in South 
        Asia and Southeast Asia--
                    (A) by expanding the scope of naval and coast guard 
                training efforts with Southeast Asian countries;
                    (B) by expanding cooperation with democratic 
                partners in South Asia, including Bangladesh, Nepal, 
                and Sri Lanka;
                    (C) through intelligence sharing and other 
                information-sharing efforts; and
                    (D) through multilateral engagements, including by 
                involving Japan, Australia, and India in such efforts.
    (c) Countering China's Influence to Undermine the International 
System.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (b) shall be made 
available for United States Government efforts to counter the strategic 
influence of the People's Republic of China, in accordance with the 
strategy required under section 7043(e)(3) of the Department of State, 
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014 
(division K of Public Law 113-76; 128 Stat. 536) and in consultation 
with the appropriate committees of Congress.
    (d) Burma.--None of the amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection 
(b) may be made available for International Military Education and 
Training and Foreign Military Financing Programs for the armed forces 
of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (historically known as 
``Burma'').
    (e) Philippines.--
            (1) In general.--None of the amounts appropriated pursuant 
        to subsection (b) may be made available for counternarcotics 
        assistance for the Philippine National Police unless the 
        Secretary of State determines and reports to the appropriate 
        committees of Congress that the Government of the Philippines 
        has adopted and is implementing a counternarcotics strategy 
        that is consistent with international human rights standards, 
        including investigating and prosecuting individuals who are 
        credibly alleged to have ordered, committed, or covered up 
        extrajudicial killings and other gross violations of human 
        rights in the conduct of counternarcotics operations.
            (2) Exception.--The limitation under paragraph (1) shall 
        not apply to funds made available--
                    (A) for drug demand reduction, maritime programs, 
                or transnational interdiction programs; or
                    (B) to support for the development of such 
                counternarcotics strategy, after consultation with the 
                appropriate committees of Congress.
    (f) Cambodia.--None of the amounts authorized to be appropriated 
pursuant to subsection (b) may be made available for United States 
assistance programs that benefit the Government of Cambodia unless the 
Secretary of State certifies and reports to the appropriate 
congressional committees that the requirements under section 7043(b)(1) 
of division K of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (Public Law 
115-141) have been met.

SEC. 202. TREATY ALLIANCES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION.

    (a) United States-Japan Alliance.--The United States Government--
            (1) is committed to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
        Security between the United States and Japan, done at 
        Washington, January 19, 1960, and all related and subsequent 
        bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded on or 
        before the date of the enactment of this Act;
            (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the 
        United States and Japan in promoting peace and security in the 
        Indo-Pacific region; and
            (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of 
        diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United 
        States and Japan.
    (b) United States-Republic of Korea Alliance.--The United States 
Government--
            (1) is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the 
        United States and the Republic of Korea, done at Washington 
        October 1, 1953, and all related and subsequent bilateral 
        security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the 
        date of the enactment of this Act;
            (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the 
        United States and South Korea in promoting peace and security 
        in the Indo-Pacific region; and
            (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of 
        diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United 
        States and the Republic of Korea.
    (c) United States-Australia Alliance.--The United States 
Government--
            (1) is committed to the Security Treaty Between Australia 
        and the United States of America, done at San Francisco 
        September 1, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral 
        security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the 
        date of the enactment of this Act;
            (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the 
        United States and Australia in promoting peace and security in 
        the Indo-Pacific region; and
            (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of 
        diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United 
        States and Australia.
    (d) United States-Philippines Alliance.--The United States 
Government is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty between the 
Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America, done at 
Washington August 30, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral 
security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date of 
the enactment of this Act, including the Enhanced Defense Cooperation 
Agreement, done at Manila April 28, 2014.
    (e) Thailand.--The United States Government is committed to--
            (1) the Agreement Respecting Military Assistance Between 
        the Government of the United States of America and the 
        Government of Thailand, done at Bangkok October 17, 1950;
            (2) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, done at 
        Manila September 8, 1954; and
            (3) all related and subsequent bilateral security 
        agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, including the Joint Vision Statement 
        for the Thai-United States Defense Alliance, issued in Bangkok 
        November 15, 2012.

SEC. 203. UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONSHIP.

    (a) In General.--The United States Government--
            (1) expresses grave concerns with Chinese actions that 
        seek--
                    (A) to further constrain space for civil society 
                within China; and
                    (B) to undermine a rules-based order in the Indo-
                Pacific region;
            (2) encourages China to play a constructive role in world 
        affairs by demonstrating consistent respect for the rule of law 
        and international norms;
            (3) seeks to build a positive, cooperative, and 
        comprehensive relationship with China--
                    (A) by expanding areas of cooperation; and
                    (B) by addressing areas of disagreement, including 
                over human rights, economic policies, and maritime 
                security; and
            (4) is committed to working with China on shared regional 
        and global challenges, especially--
                    (A) upholding and strengthening the rules-based 
                international system; and
                    (B) the denuclearization of North Korea.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should--
            (1) welcome a decision by China to change course and pursue 
        a responsible results-oriented relationship with the United 
        States and engagement on global issues;
            (2) encourage China to play a constructive role in the 
        Indo-Pacific region and globally; and
            (3) continue to call out Chinese actions that undermine the 
        rules-based international system.

SEC. 204. UNITED STATES-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.

    (a) In General.--The United States Government--
            (1) recognizes the vital role of the strategic partnership 
        between the United States and India in promoting peace and 
        security in the Indo-Pacific region;
            (2) calls for the strengthening and broadening of 
        diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United 
        States and India; and
            (3) is committed to--
                    (A) the New Framework for the United States-India 
                Defense Relationship, done at Arlington, Virginia on 
                June 28, 2005;
                    (B) the United States-India Defense Technology and 
                Trade Initiative, launched in 2012;
                    (C) the Joint Strategic Vision for the Indo-Pacific 
                and Indian Ocean Region, announced on January 25, 2015;
                    (D) the United States-India Joint Statement on 
                Prosperity Through Partnership, issued on June 26, 
                2017; and
                    (E) all related and subsequent bilateral and 
                security agreements and arrangements concluded as of 
                the date of the enactment of this Act.
    (b) India as Major Defense Partner.--Congress makes the following 
findings:
            (1) Section 1292(a)(1)(A) of the National Defense 
        Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328; 130 
        Stat. 2559; 22 U.S.C. 2751 note) requires the recognition of 
        India as a major defense partner.
            (2) The designation of India as a major defense partner, 
        which is unique to India--
                    (A) institutionalizes the progress made to 
                facilitate defense trade and technology sharing between 
                the United States and India;
                    (B) elevates defense trade and technology 
                cooperation between the United States and India to a 
                level commensurate with the closest allies and partners 
                of the United States;
                    (C) facilitates technology sharing between the 
                United States and India, including license-free access 
                to a wide range of dual-use technologies, after taking 
                into account national security concerns; and
                    (D) facilitates joint exercises, coordination on 
                defense strategy and policy, military exchanges, and 
                port calls in support of defense cooperation between 
                the United States and India.

SEC. 205. UNITED STATES-ASEAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should--
            (1) support and reaffirm the elevation of the United 
        States-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (referred to in 
        this section as ``ASEAN'') relationship to a strategic 
        partnership;
            (2) recommit to ASEAN centrality by helping build a strong, 
        stable, politically cohesive, economically integrated, and 
        socially responsible community of nations that has common 
        rules, norms, procedures, and standards which are consistent 
        with international law and the principles of a rules-based 
        Indo-Pacific community;
            (3) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster greater 
        integration among its members;
            (4) recognize the value of--
                    (A) ASEAN engagement with economic, political, and 
                security partners within Asia and elsewhere, including 
                Australia, Canada, the European Union, India, Japan, 
                New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan; 
                and
                    (B) strategic economic initiatives, such as the 
                United States-ASEAN Connect, which demonstrate a 
                commitment to ASEAN and the ASEAN Economic Community 
                and build upon economic relationships in the Indo-
                Pacific region;
            (5) support efforts by the nations comprising ASEAN--
                    (A) to address maritime and territorial disputes in 
                a constructive manner; and
                    (B) to pursue claims through peaceful, diplomatic, 
                and legitimate regional and international arbitration 
                mechanisms, consistent with international law, 
                including through the adoption of a code of conduct in 
                the South China Sea to further promote peace and 
                stability in the Indo-Pacific region;
            (6) support efforts by United States partners and allies in 
        ASEAN--
                    (A) to enhance maritime capability and maritime 
                domain awareness;
                    (B) to protect unhindered access to, and use of, 
                international waterways in the Asia-Pacific region that 
                are critical to ensuring the security and free flow of 
                commerce;
                    (C) to counter piracy;
                    (D) to disrupt illicit maritime trafficking 
                activities such as the trafficking of persons, goods, 
                and drugs; and
                    (E) to enhance the maritime capabilities of 
                countries or regional organizations to respond to 
                emerging threats to maritime security in the Asia-
                Pacific region; and
            (7) urge ASEAN member states to develop a common approach 
        to reaffirm the decision of the Permanent Court of 
        Arbitration's ruling with respect to the case between the 
        Republic of the Philippines and the People's Republic of China.
    (b) Report on Strategic Framework for Engagement With ASEAN.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 
        Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate 
        congressional committees on a strategic framework to administer 
        programs, projects, and activities of the United States to 
        support diplomatic and economic engagement between the United 
        States and ASEAN member countries for the 10-year period 
        beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.
            (2) Elements.--The report required under paragraph (1) 
        shall address the following elements of United States strategy:
                    (A) Promoting commercial engagement between the 
                United States and member countries of ASEAN.
                    (B) Helping member countries of ASEAN use 
                sustainable, efficient, and innovative technologies in 
                their respective energy sectors.
                    (C) Supporting economic conditions in member 
                countries of ASEAN that promote innovation, the 
                creation of new businesses, sustainable growth, and the 
                education of the region's future innovators, 
                entrepreneurs, and business leaders.
                    (D) Working with member countries of ASEAN to 
                improve the policy and regulatory environment for 
                growth, trade, innovation, and investment.
                    (E) Supporting the regional integration objectives 
                of member countries of ASEAN under the ASEAN Economic 
                Community.
                    (F) Partnership opportunities with the governments 
                of other countries friendly to the United States that 
                have committed to a high set of standards for 
                investment and development with ASEAN, as determined by 
                the Secretary of State.

SEC. 206. UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA-JAPAN TRILATERAL SECURITY 
              PARTNERSHIP.

    It is the sense of Congress that the President should develop a 
strategy to deepen the trilateral security cooperation between the 
United States, South Korea, and Japan, including missile defense, 
intelligence-sharing, and other defense-related initiatives.

SEC. 207. QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the security dialogue between the United States, 
        Australia, India, and Japan is vital to address pressing 
        security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region in order to 
        promote--
                    (A) a rules-based order;
                    (B) respect for international law; and
                    (C) a free and open Indo-Pacific; and
            (2) such a dialogue is intended to augment, rather than to 
        replace, current mechanisms.

SEC. 208. ENHANCED SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

    (a) Indonesia.--The United States Government is committed to--
            (1) the United States-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership, 
        done in Washington November 9, 2010;
            (2) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive Defense 
        Cooperation, done in Washington October 26, 2015; and
            (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security 
        agreements and arrangements between the United States and 
        Indonesia concluded on or before the date of the enactment of 
        this Act.
    (b) Malaysia.--The United States Government is committed to--
            (1) the United States-Malaysia Comprehensive Partnership, 
        done at Putrajaya April 27, 2014;
            (2) the Joint Statement for Enhancing the Comprehensive 
        Partnership between the United States of America and Malaysia, 
        done in Washington September 13, 2017; and
            (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security 
        agreements and arrangements between the United States and 
        Malaysia concluded on or before the date of the enactment of 
        this Act.
    (c) Singapore.--The United States Government is committed to--
            (1) the Strategic Framework Agreement Between the United 
        States of America and the Republic of Singapore for a Closer 
        Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security, done at 
        Washington July 12, 2005;
            (2) the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, done at 
        Arlington, Virginia December 7, 2015; and
            (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security 
        agreements and arrangements between the United States and 
        Singapore concluded on or before the date of the enactment of 
        this Act.
    (d) Vietnam.--The United States Government is committed to--
            (1) the United States-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership, 
        done at Washington December 16, 2013;
            (2) the United States-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement on 
        Defense Relations, done at Hanoi on June 1, 2015;
            (3) the United States-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement, done 
        at Washington May 31, 2017; and
            (4) all related and subsequent bilateral and security 
        agreements and arrangements between the United States and 
        Vietnam concluded on or before the date of the enactment of 
        this Act.
    (e) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should deepen diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation, 
especially in the areas of maritime security and counterterrorism, with 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam.

SEC. 209. COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.

    (a) United States Commitment to Taiwan.--It is the policy of the 
United States--
            (1) to support the close economic, political, and security 
        relationship between Taiwan and the United States;
            (2) to faithfully enforce all existing United States 
        Government commitments to Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan 
        Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-8), the 3 joint 
        communiques, and the Six Assurances agreed to by President 
        Ronald Reagan in July 1982; and
            (3) to counter efforts to change the status quo and to 
        support peaceful resolution acceptable to both sides of the 
        Taiwan Strait.
    (b) Arms Sales to Taiwan.--The President should conduct regular 
transfers of defense articles to Taiwan that are tailored to meet the 
existing and likely future threats from the People's Republic of China, 
including supporting the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate 
asymmetric capabilities, as appropriate, including undersea warfare and 
air defense capabilities, into its military forces.
    (c) Travel.--The President should encourage the travel of high-
level United States officials to Taiwan, in accordance with the Taiwan 
Travel Act (Public Law 115-135).

SEC. 210. NORTH KOREA STRATEGY.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of 
        Korea has flagrantly defied the international community by 
        illicitly developing its nuclear and ballistic missile 
        programs, in violation of United Nations Security Council 
        Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 
        2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 
        (2017 ).
            (2) The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of 
        Korea engages in gross human rights abuses against its own 
        people and citizens of other countries, including the United 
        States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan.
            (3) The United States is committed to pursuing a peaceful 
        denuclearization of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
        through a policy of maximum pressure and engagement, in close 
        concert with its partners.
    (b) Policy of the United States With Respect to Sanctions Against 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.--
            (1) Statement of policy.--It is the policy of the United 
        States to continue to impose sanctions with respect to 
        activities of the Government of the Democratic People's 
        Republic of Korea, persons acting for or on behalf of such 
        government, or other persons in accordance with Executive Order 
        13687 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to imposing additional 
        sanctions with respect to North Korea), Executive Order 13694 
        (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking the property of 
        certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled 
        activities), Executive Order 13722 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; 
        relating to blocking the property of the Government of North 
        Korea and the Workers' Party of Korea, and prohibiting certain 
        transactions with respect to North Korea), and Executive Order 
        13810 (82 Fed. Reg. 44705; relating to imposing additional 
        sanctions with respect to North Korea), as such Executive 
        orders are in effect on the day before the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, until the Democratic People's Republic 
        of Korea is no longer engaged in the illicit activities 
        described in such Executive orders, including actions in 
        violation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions 
        referred to in subsection (a)(1).
            (2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after terminating any 
        sanction with respect to the activities of the Government of 
        the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a person acting for 
        or on behalf of such government, or any other person provided 
        for in an Executive order listed in subsection (a), the 
        Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate 
        congressional committees justifying the termination of the 
        sanction and explaining the relationship between such 
        termination and the cessation of any illicit activity that 
        violates any of the United Nations Security Council resolutions 
        referred to in subsection (a)(1) by such Government or person.
            (3) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall 
        be construed to limit the authority of the President pursuant 
        to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
        1701 et seq.).
    (c) Policy of the United States With Respect to Negotiation on the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile 
Programs.--It is the policy of the United States that the objective of 
negotiations with respect to the nuclear and ballistic missile programs 
of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea be the complete, 
verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of such programs.
    (d) Report on a Strategy to Address the Threats Posed by, and the 
Capabilities of, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the 
        Secretary of State, or a designee of the Secretary, shall 
        submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees 
        that describes actions taken by the United States to address 
        the threats posed by, and the capabilities of, the Democratic 
        People's Republic of Korea.
            (2) Elements.--Each report required under paragraph (1) 
        shall include--
                    (A) a summary of ongoing efforts by the United 
                States to identify strategies and policies, including 
                an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of such 
                strategies and policies--
                            (i) to achieve peaceful denuclearization of 
                        the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; and
                            (ii) to eliminate the threat posed by the 
                        ballistic missile program of the Democratic 
                        People's Republic of Korea;
                    (B) an assessment of--
                            (i) potential road maps toward peaceful 
                        denuclearization of the Democratic People's 
                        Republic of Korea and the elimination of the 
                        nuclear and ballistic missile threats posed by 
                        the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; and
                            (ii) specific actions that the Democratic 
                        People's Republic of Korea would need to take 
                        for each such roadmap to become viable;
                    (C) a summary of the United States strategy to 
                increase international coordination and cooperation, 
                whether unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally, 
                including sanctions enforcement and interdiction, to 
                address the threat posed by the nuclear and ballistic 
                missile programs of the Democratic People's Republic of 
                Korea, which shall include--
                            (i) a description of the actions taken by 
                        the Secretary of State, or designees of the 
                        Secretary, to consult with governments around 
                        the world, with the purpose of inducing such 
                        governments to fully implement the United 
                        Nations Security Council resolutions referred 
                        to in subsection (a)(1);
                            (ii) a description of the actions taken by 
                        such governments to fully implement United 
                        Nations Security Council resolutions related to 
                        the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
                            (iii) a list of countries with governments 
                        that the Secretary has determined are 
                        noncooperative with respect to implementing the 
                        United Nations Security Council resolutions 
                        referred to in subsection (a)(1); and
                            (iv) a plan of action to engage, and 
                        increase cooperation with respect to the 
                        Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with the 
                        governments of the countries on the list 
                        described in clause (iii);
                    (D) an assessment of the adequacy of the national 
                export control regimes of countries that are members of 
                the United Nations, and multilateral export control 
                regimes, that are necessary to enforce sanctions 
                imposed with respect to the Democratic People's 
                Republic of Korea pursuant to the United Nations 
                Security Council resolutions referred to in subsection 
                (a)(1); and
                    (E) an action plan to encourage and assist 
                countries in adopting and using authorities necessary 
                to enforce export controls required by United Nations 
                Security Council resolutions.
            (3) Form of report.--Each report required under this 
        subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
        include a classified annex.
    (e) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) representatives of the United States shall use the 
        voice and vote of the United States in all international 
        organizations, as appropriate, to advocate for the expulsion of 
        the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from such 
        organizations, until such time as the Democratic People's 
        Republic of Korea meets its commitments under the United 
        Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in subsection 
        (a)(1); and
            (2) the Secretary of State should work to induce countries 
        to meet their commitments under the United Nations Security 
        Council resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1), including 
        by considering appropriate adjustments to the diplomatic 
        posture and foreign assistance of the United States with 
        governments that the Secretary has determined are 
        noncooperative with respect to implementing the United Nations 
        Security Council resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1).

SEC. 211. NEW ZEALAND.

    The United States Government is committed to--
            (1) the Wellington Declaration, signed on November 5, 2010, 
        which reaffirmed close ties and outlined future practical 
        cooperation between the United States and New Zealand;
            (2) the Washington Declaration, signed on June 19, 2012, 
        which strengthened the defense relationship by providing a 
        framework and strategic guidance for security cooperation and 
        defense dialogues; and
            (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security 
        agreements and arrangements between the United States and New 
        Zealand concluded on or before the date of enactment of this 
        Act.

SEC. 212. THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.

    (a) In General.--It is the sense of Congress that the United States 
should--
            (1) support strong United States engagement with the 
        nations of the South Pacific, including Fiji, Kiribati, the 
        Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, 
        Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, 
        Tuvalu, and Vanuatu;
            (2) deepen its cooperation with the nations of the South 
        Pacific in areas of mutual interest, including--
                    (A) fisheries and marine resource conservation;
                    (B) environmental challenges and resilience;
                    (C) global health;
                    (D) development and trade; and
                    (E) people-to-people ties; and
            (3) continue to provide assistance to the Pacific Islands, 
        as appropriate, to support the rule of law, good governance, 
        and economic development.
    (b) United States-Compacts of Free Association.--It is the sense of 
Congress that the Compacts of Free Association entered between the 
United States and the Freely Associated States (Republic of Marshall 
Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of 
Palau)--
            (1) enhance the strategic posture of the United States in 
        the Western Pacific;
            (2) reinforce United States regional commitment;
            (3) preempt potential adversaries from establishing 
        positional advantage; and
            (4) further self-governance, economic development, and 
        self-sufficiency of the Freely Associated States.

SEC. 213. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT; PROMOTION OF 
              INTERNATIONAL LAW.

    (a) Freedom of Navigation.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to conduct, as part of its global Freedom of Navigation 
        Program, regular freedom of navigation, and overflight 
        operations in the Indo-Pacific region, in accordance with 
        applicable international law; and
            (2) to promote genuine multilateral negotiations to 
        peacefully resolve maritime disputes in the South China Sea, in 
        accordance with applicable international law.
    (b) Joint Indo-Pacific Diplomatic Strategy.--It is the sense of 
Congress that the President should develop a diplomatic strategy that 
includes working with United States allies and partners to conduct 
joint maritime training and freedom of navigation operations in the 
Indo-Pacific region, including the East China Sea and the South China 
Sea, in support of a rules-based international system benefitting all 
countries.

SEC. 214. COMBATING TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

    (a) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
        ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate;
                    (C) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
                Representatives; and
                    (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives.
            (2) ISIS.--The term ``ISIS'' means the Islamic State of 
        Iraq and Syria.
    (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and 
other appropriate Federal officials, shall submit a report to the 
appropriate committees of Congress that contains an assessment of the 
current and future capabilities and activities of ISIS-linked, al-
Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist groups in Southeast Asia that 
pose a significant threat to the United States, its allies, and its 
citizens interests abroad.
    (c) Elements.--The report required under subsection (b) shall 
include--
            (1) the current number of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and 
        other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters in Southeast 
        Asia;
            (2) an estimate of the number of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-
        linked, and other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters 
        expected to return to Southeast Asia from fighting in the 
        Middle East;
            (3) an analysis of the amounts and sources of ISIS-linked, 
        al Qaeda-linked, and other various extremist group affiliated-
        fighters in Southeast Asia;
            (4) the current resources available to combat the threat of 
        ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist 
        group-affiliated fighters in Southeast Asia, and the additional 
        resources required to combat such threat;
            (5) a detailed assessment of the capabilities of ISIS-
        linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-
        affiliated fighters to operate effectively in the Indo-Pacific 
        region, including the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia;
            (6) a description of the capabilities and resources of 
        governments in Southeast Asia to counter violent extremist 
        groups; and
            (7) a list of additional United States resources and 
        capabilities that the Department of Defense and the Department 
        of State recommend providing to governments in Southeast Asia 
        to combat violent extremist groups.

SEC. 215. CYBERSECURITY COOPERATION.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that there 
should be robust cybersecurity cooperation between the United States 
and nations in the Indo-Pacific region--
            (1) to effectively respond to cybersecurity threats, 
        including state-sponsored threats;
            (2) to share best practices to combat such threats; and
            (3) to strengthen resilience against misinformation and 
        propaganda.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 
2019 through 2023--
            (1) to build capacity for responding to cybersecurity 
        threats originating in the Indo-Pacific region; and
            (2) to enhance cooperation between the United States and 
        Indo-Pacific nations for combating such threats.

SEC. 216. NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION.

    (a) In General.--The United States Government--
            (1) recognizes that the spread of nuclear and other weapons 
        of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, constitutes a 
        threat to international peace and security;
            (2) seeks to peacefully address the unique challenge posed 
        to regional and global stability by the illicit use, and the 
        proliferation to and from North Korea, of sensitive nuclear and 
        missile technologies, and other weapons of mass destruction;
            (3) notes efforts by China and Russia--
                    (A) to expand and modernize their respective 
                nuclear arsenals, including through significant 
                research and development resources in hypersonic glide 
                vehicles and other advanced technologies; and
                    (B) to pursue sales of commercial nuclear 
                technologies; and
            (4) recognizes the legitimate pursuit by many countries in 
        the Indo-Pacific region of nuclear energy for a variety of 
        peaceful applications.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States Government should undertake all reasonable and appropriate 
efforts to pursue effective arms control and nonproliferation policies 
in the Indo-Pacific region to limit the further spread of weapons of 
mass destruction and their means of delivery.

   TITLE III--PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE INDO-
                             PACIFIC REGION

SEC. 301. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) According to the United States Chamber of Commerce, by 
        2030--
                    (A) 66 percent of the global middle class 
                population will be living in Asia; and
                    (B) 59 percent of middle class consumption will 
                take place in Asia.
            (2) According to the Asian Development Bank--
                    (A) Asian countries have signed 140 bilateral or 
                regional trade agreements; and
                    (B) 75 more trade agreements with Asian countries 
                are under negotiation or concluded and awaiting entry 
                into force.
            (3) Free trade agreements between the United States and 3 
        nations in the Indo-Pacific region (Australia, Singapore, and 
        the Republic of Korea) have entered into force.
            (4) The member states of the Association of Southeast Asian 
        Nations (referred to in this section as ``ASEAN''), as a 
        group--
                    (A) represent the fifth largest economy in the 
                world; and
                    (B) have a combined gross domestic product of 
                $2,400,000,000,000.
            (5) The economy comprised of ASEAN member states grew by 66 
        percent between 2006 and 2015, and the total value of bilateral 
        trade between the United States and ASEAN member states has 
        increased by 78 percent since 2004.
            (6) In 2015, the trade surplus of goods sold by companies 
        in ASEAN member states to consumers in the United States was 
        $77,000,000,000, while the United States 2015 trade surplus of 
        services provided to consumers in ASEAN member states was 
        $8,000,000,000.
            (7) According to US-ASEAN Business Council, goods and 
        services exported from the United States to ASEAN member states 
        support 550,000 jobs in the United States.
            (8) According to the Business Roundtable--
                    (A) the United States, Australia, Brunei, Canada, 
                Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, 
                Singapore and Vietnam were responsible for a combined 
                40 percent of global gross domestic product in 2017; 
                and
                    (B) United States bilateral trade with the other 
                nations referred to in subparagraph (A) supports 
                15,600,000 jobs in the United States.
            (9) According to the United States National Security 
        Strategy--
                    (A) ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
                ``remain centerpieces of the Indo-Pacific's regional 
                architecture and platforms for promoting an order based 
                on freedom''; and
                    (B) the United States will ``work with partners to 
                build a network of states dedicated to free markets and 
                protected from forces that would subvert their 
                sovereignty.''.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that trade 
between the United States and the nations in the Indo-Pacific region is 
vitally important to the United States economy, United States exports, 
and jobs in the United States.

SEC. 302. TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS, AND REGIONAL 
              ECONOMIC SUMMITS.

    Congress supports--
            (1) multilateral, bilateral, or regional trade agreements 
        that increase United States employment and expand the economy;
            (2) formal economic dialogues that include concrete, 
        verifiable, and measured outcomes;
            (3) high-standard bilateral investment treaties between the 
        United States and nations in the Indo-Pacific region;
            (4) negotiations of the Trade in Services Agreement and the 
        Environmental Goods Agreement that include several major Asian 
        economies; and
            (5) the proactive, strategic, and continuing high-level use 
        of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the East Asia 
        Summit, and the Group of 20 to pursue United States economic 
        objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.

SEC. 303. UNITED STATES-ASEAN ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP.

    The President is authorized to negotiate a comprehensive economic 
engagement framework with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

SEC. 304. TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING AND TRADE FACILITATION.

    (a) In General.--The President is encouraged to produce a robust 
and comprehensive trade capacity building and trade facilitation 
strategy for the Indo-Pacific region.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to carry out subsection 
(a).

SEC. 305. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION.

    (a) In General.--The President is encouraged to make enforcement of 
United States intellectual property laws a top priority, including 
taking all appropriate action to deter and punish commercial cyber-
enabled theft of intellectual property.
    (b) Annual Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall 
submit a report to Congress that--
            (1) describes the efforts of the United States Government 
        to combat intellectual property violations and commercial 
        cyber-enabled theft in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly 
        the People's Republic of China; and
            (2) includes a country-by-country assessment of priority 
        areas for United States engagement and capacity building 
        assistance.
    (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to sponsor bilateral and 
multilateral activities designed to build capacity in the identified 
priority areas described in the annual report required under subsection 
(b).

SEC. 306. ENERGY PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES.

    (a) Indo-Pacific Energy Strategy.--
            (1) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 
        President shall establish a comprehensive, integrated, 
        multiyear strategy to encourage the efforts of Indo-Pacific 
        countries to implement national power strategies and 
        cooperation with United States energy companies to develop an 
        appropriate mix of power solutions to provide access to 
        sufficient, reliable, and affordable power in order to reduce 
        poverty and drive economic growth and job creation.
            (2) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized 
        to be appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to carry 
        out paragraph (1).
    (b) Reliable Energy Partnerships.--It is the sense of Congress 
that--
            (1) the President should establish bilateral and regional 
        initiatives to increase energy security in the Indo-Pacific 
        region;
            (2) the United States should reaffirm support for liquefied 
        natural gas exports to the nations in the Indo-Pacific region;
            (3) the United States should seek to establish partnership 
        between Department of Energy national laboratories and Indo-
        Pacific countries to provide technical assistance on electrical 
        grid development and for the development and deployment of new 
        and advanced energy technologies; and
            (4) the United States should explore opportunities to 
        partner with the private sector and multilateral institutions, 
        such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, to 
        promote universal access to reliable electricity in Myanmar 
        (historically known as ``Burma'').

SEC. 307. LOWER MEKONG INITIATIVE.

    The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Administrator of 
the United States Agency for International Development, should increase 
regional engagement in the areas of environment, health, education, and 
infrastructure development with the Lower Mekong countries, including--
            (1) assisting in the development of programs that focus on 
        forecasting environmental challenges and resilience;
            (2) assisting with transnational cooperation on sustainable 
        uses of forest and water resources with the goal of preserving 
        the biodiversity of the Mekong Basin and access to safe 
        drinking water;
            (3) assisting with education enrollment and broadband 
        internet connectivity, particularly English training and 
        connectivity in rural communities; and
            (4) improving global health in the Lower Mekong countries, 
        including--
                    (A) reducing the HIV/AIDS infection rate; and
                    (B) helping regional partners to track and treat 
                malaria and tuberculosis.

SEC. 308. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH AND NATURAL RESOURCE 
              CONSERVATION.

    It is the sense of Congress that the President should encourage the 
governments of countries in the Indo-Pacific region and United States 
private sector interests with operations and investments in the region 
to deploy agriculture practices that--
            (1) conserve natural resources; and
            (2) preserve culturally and ecological valuable lands and 
        water bodies.

SEC. 309. SENSE OF CONGRESS IN SUPPORT OF WOMEN'S ECONOMIC RIGHTS.

    It is the sense of the Congress that the United States should--
            (1) support activities that secure private property rights 
        and land tenure for women in developing countries in Asia, 
        including--
                    (A) establishing legal frameworks to give women 
                equal rights to own, register, use, profit from, and 
                inherit land and property;
                    (B) improving legal literacy to enable women to 
                exercise the rights described in subparagraph (A); and
                    (C) increasing the capacity of law enforcement and 
                community leaders to enforce such rights;
            (2) work with Asian civil society, governments, and 
        multilateral organizations to increase the capability of 
        disadvantaged women and girls in Asia--
                    (A) to realize their rights;
                    (B) to determine their life outcomes;
                    (C) to assume leadership roles; and
                    (D) to influence decision-making in their 
                households, communities, and societies; and
            (3) seek to expand access to appropriate financial products 
        and services for women-owned micro, small, and medium-sized 
        enterprises in Asia.

  TITLE IV--PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

SEC. 401. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The promotion of human rights and respect for 
        democratic values in the Indo-Pacific region is in the United 
        States' national security interest.
            (2) Continued support for human rights, democratic values, 
        and good governance is critical to a successful United States 
        diplomatic strategy in the Indo-Pacific.
            (3) Strong support for human rights and democracy in the 
        Indo-Pacific region is critical to efforts to reduce poverty, 
        build rule of law, combat corruption, reduce the allure of 
        extremism, and promote economic growth.
            (4) There are serious concerns with the rule of law and 
        civil liberties in Cambodia, China, North Korea, Laos, 
        Thailand, and Vietnam, which have all been identified by 
        Freedom House as ``Not Free''.
            (5) There have been unacceptable human rights developments 
        in--
                    (A) Burma (Myanmar), which has been identified by 
                Freedom House as ``Not Free'', according to the 
                Department of State, and the Department of State has 
                declared that the violence against the Rohingya 
                constitutes ethnic cleansing;
                    (B) the Philippines, which has been identified by 
                Freedom House as ``Partly Free'', and where there are 
                continued disturbing reports of extra-judicial 
                killings; and
                    (C) China, where forced disappearances, extralegal 
                detentions, and lack of due process in judicial 
                proceedings remain troublesome.
            (6) according to the National Security Strategy, the United 
        States--
                    (A) will ``support, with our words and actions, 
                those who live under oppressive regimes and who seek 
                freedom, individual dignity, and the rule of law'';
                    (B) ``may use diplomacy, sanctions, and other tools 
                to isolate states and leaders who threaten our 
                interests and whose actions run contrary to our 
                values''; and
                    (C) ``will support efforts to advance women's 
                equality, protect the rights of women and girls, and 
                promote women and youth empowerment programs''.

SEC. 402. TRAFFICKING-IN-PERSONS.

    The President is encouraged to pursue additional efforts to combat 
trafficking in persons and human slavery in the Indo-Pacific region.

SEC. 403. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) United States Government officials should lead by 
        example--
                    (A) by continuing to advocate for freedom of the 
                press in the Indo-Pacific region; and
                    (B) by engaging with the press corps at every 
                appropriate opportunity; and
            (2) the United States should advocate and support a 
        Ministerial to Advance Press Freedom in the Indo-Pacific to 
        convene government and civil society, including journalists, to 
        discuss and address the challenges facing press freedom in the 
        Indo-Pacific region.

SEC. 404. DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR PERSONNEL.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) United States embassies and consulates in the Indo-
        Pacific region should have personnel, as appropriate, who are 
        dedicated to reporting on and advancing United States 
        democracy, human rights, labor, anti-corruption, and good 
        governance policy interests; and
            (2) appropriate resources should be made available to carry 
        out such activities.

SEC. 405. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL DIALOGUES; PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE 
              ENGAGEMENT.

    The Secretary of State should, as appropriate--
            (1) establish high-level bilateral and regional dialogues 
        with nations in the Indo-Pacific region regarding human rights 
        and religious freedom violations;
            (2) establish or support robust, people-to-people exchange 
        programs in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly programs 
        engaging young leaders; and
            (3) establish educational exchanges and capacity-building 
        programs emphasizing civil society development.

SEC. 406. ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGY.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should continue to work with ASEAN to improve the capacity of 
ASEAN to address human rights, democracy, and good governance issues in 
Southeast Asia.
    (b) Strategy.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a strategy 
to the appropriate congressional committees to increase cooperation 
with ASEAN to promote human rights, democracy, and good governance in 
Southeast Asia.
    (c) Contents.--The strategy submitted under subsection (b) should 
include--
            (1) an assessment of the types of United States Government 
        resources available to support increased cooperation; and
            (2) an assessment to identify entities within ASEAN that 
        the United States could potentially support or partner with to 
        promote human rights, democracy, and good governance in 
        Southeast Asia.

SEC. 407. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION TO NORTH KOREA.

    The President is encouraged to continue efforts to enhance freedom 
of information access with regard to North Korea.

SEC. 408. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AND SUSPENSION 
              OF UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE.

    (a) Sanctions.--It is the sense of Congress that the President 
should impose sanctions, in accordance with applicable law and other 
relevant authorities, including targeted financial penalties and visa 
bans, on any individual or entity that--
            (1) violates human rights or religious freedoms; or
            (2) engages in censorship activities.
    (b) Suspension of Foreign Assistance.--It is the sense of Congress 
that the President should, in accordance with applicable law, 
terminate, suspend, or otherwise alter United States economic 
assistance to any country that has engaged in serious violations of 
human rights or religious freedoms.

SEC. 409. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    (a) Promotion of Democracy in the Indo-Pacific Region.--
            (1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated 
        $210,000,000, for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, 
        to promote democracy, strengthen civil society, human rights, 
        rule of law, transparency, and accountability in the Indo-
        Pacific region, including for universities, civil society, and 
        multilateral institutions that are focusing on education 
        awareness, training, and capacity building.
            (2) Democracy in china.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to 
        paragraph (1) shall be made available for United States 
        Government efforts, led by the Assistant Secretary of State for 
        Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, to promote democracy, the 
        rule of law, and human rights in the People's Republic of 
        China.
            (3) Tibet.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) 
        shall be made available for nongovernmental organizations to 
        support activities preserving cultural traditions and promoting 
        sustainable development, education, and environmental 
        conservation in Tibetan communities in the Tibet Autonomous 
        Region and in other Tibetan communities in China, India, and 
        Nepal.

SEC. 410. INDO-PACIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENDERS.

    (a) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``human rights and 
environmental defenders'' means individuals, working alone or in 
groups, who nonviolently advocate for the promotion and protection of 
universally recognized human rights, fundamental freedoms, land issues, 
or the conservation of local ecosystems if the advocacy of such issues 
may result in the risk of safety or life.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that human 
rights and environmental defenders in the Indo-Pacific region have been 
facing increased difficulties with the rise of unprecedented crackdowns 
and conflicts.
    (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated such sums as may be necessary to support human rights and 
environmental defenders through the Department of State's Human Rights 
Defenders Fund.

SEC. 411. YOUNG LEADERS PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE INITIATIVES.

    There are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may be 
necessary, for fiscal years 2019 through 2025, to support Indo-Pacific 
young leaders initiatives, including the Young Southeast Asian Leaders 
Initiative, the ASEAN Youth Volunteers Program, and other people-to-
people exchange programs that focus on building the capacity of 
democracy, human rights, and good governance activists in the Indo-
Pacific region.
                                                       Calendar No. 616

115th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                                S. 2736

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

     To develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, 
multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific 
                    region, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

            October 3 (legislative day, September 28), 2018

                       Reported with an amendment