[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2736 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
115th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 2736
To develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive,
multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific
region, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
April 24, 2018
Mr. Gardner (for himself, Mr. Markey, Mr. Rubio, Mr. Cardin, and Mr.
Young) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred
to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive,
multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific
region, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Asia Reassurance
Initiative Act of 2018''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Statement of policy on United States engagement in the Indo-
Pacific region.
TITLE I--PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
REGION
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific region.
Sec. 103. United States-China relationship.
Sec. 104. United States-India strategic partnership.
Sec. 105. United States-ASEAN strategic partnership.
Sec. 106. United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral security
partnership.
Sec. 107. Quadrilateral security dialogue.
Sec. 108. Enhanced security partnerships in Southeast Asia.
Sec. 109. Commitment to Taiwan.
Sec. 110. North Korea strategy.
Sec. 111. New Zealand and the Pacific islands.
Sec. 112. Freedom of navigation and overflight; promotion of
international law.
Sec. 113. Combating terrorism in Southeast Asia.
Sec. 114. Cybersecurity cooperation.
Sec. 115. Nuclear nonproliferation and arms control in the Indo-Pacific
region.
TITLE II--PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC REGION
Sec. 201. Findings; sense of Congress.
Sec. 202. Trade negotiations, multilateral agreements, and regional
economic summits.
Sec. 203. United States-ASEAN Economic Partnership.
Sec. 204. Trade capacity building and trade facilitation.
Sec. 205. Intellectual property protection.
Sec. 206. Energy programs and initiatives.
Sec. 207. Lower Mekong Initiative.
TITLE III--PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION
Sec. 301. Findings.
Sec. 302. Trafficking-in-persons.
Sec. 303. Bilateral and regional dialogues; people-to-people
engagement.
Sec. 304. Imposition of sanctions and suspension of United States
assistance.
Sec. 305. Authorization of appropriations.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Indo-Pacific region--
(A) represents nearly \1/2\ of the global
population;
(B) is home to some of the most dynamic economies
in the world; and
(C) poses security challenges that threaten to
undermine United States national security interests,
regional peace, and global stability.
(2) The core tenants of the United States-backed
international system are being challenged with increasingly
coercive behavior, including--
(A) China's illegal construction and militarization
of artificial features in the South China Sea;
(B) North Korea's acceleration of its nuclear and
ballistic missile capabilities; and
(C) the increased presence throughout Southeast
Asia of the Islamic State (referred to in this Act as
``ISIS'') and other international terrorist
organizations that threaten the United States.
(3) The economic order in the Indo-Pacific region continues
to transform, presenting both opportunities and challenges to
United States economic interests.
(4) The United States has a fundamental interest in
defending human rights and promoting the rule of law in the
Indo-Pacific region. Although many countries in that region
have improved the treatment of their citizens, several Indo-
Pacific countries continue to be human rights abusers and there
are serious concerns with political rights and civil liberties
throughout the Indo-Pacific region.
(5) Without strong leadership from the United States, the
international system, fundamentally rooted in the rule of law,
may wither, to the detriment of United States, regional, and
global interests. It is imperative that the United States
continue to play a leading role in the Indo-Pacific region by--
(A) defending peace and security;
(B) advancing economic prosperity; and
(C) promoting respect for fundamental human rights.
(6) In 2017, the Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific,
and International Cybersecurity Policy of the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate held a series of hearings on
United States leadership in the Indo-Pacific region, in which--
(A) experts, including Representative Randy Forbes,
Ambassador Robert Gallucci, Ms. Tami Overby, Dr. Robert
Orr, Ambassador Derek Mitchell, Ambassador Robert King,
Mr. Murray Hiebert, and others detailed the security
challenges, economic opportunities, and imperatives of
promoting rule of law, human rights, and democracy, in
the Indo-Pacific region; and
(B) Dr. Graham Allison, the Douglas Dillon
Professor of Government at the John F. Kennedy School
of Government at Harvard University, testified, ``As
realistic students of history, Chinese leaders
recognize that the role the U.S. has played since World
War II as the architect and underwriter of regional
stability and security has been essential to the rise
of Asia, including China itself. But they believe that
as the tide that brought the U.S. to Asia recedes,
America must leave with it. Much as Britain's role in
the Western Hemisphere faded at the beginning of the
twentieth century, so must America's role in Asia as
the region's historic superpower resumes its place.''.
(7) The United States National Security Strategy (referred
to in this Act as the ``National Security Strategy''), which
was released in December 2017, states--
(A) ``A geopolitical competition between free and
repressive visions of world order is taking place in
the Indo-Pacific region. The region, which stretches
from the west coast of India to the western shores of
the United States, represents the most populous and
economically dynamic part of the world. The U.S.
interest in a free and open Indo-Pacific extends back
to the earliest days of our republic.''; and
(B) ``Our vision for the Indo-Pacific excludes no
nation. We will redouble our commitment to established
alliances and partnerships, while expanding and
deepening relationships with new partners that share
respect for sovereignty, fair and reciprocal trade, and
the rule of law. We will reinforce our commitment to
freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution of
territorial and maritime disputes in accordance with
international law. We will work with allies and
partners to achieve complete, verifiable, and
irreversible denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula
and preserve the non-proliferation regime in Northeast
Asia.''.
SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES ENGAGEMENT IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC REGION.
It is the policy of the United States to develop, and to commit to,
a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and
principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region that--
(1) preserves peace through strength by securing the vital
national security interests of the United States;
(2) promotes American prosperity by advancing the economic
interests of the United States;
(3) advances American influence by reflecting the values of
the American people and universal human rights; and
(4) accords with and supports the rule of law and
international norms.
TITLE I--PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
REGION
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) In General.--There are authorized to be appropriated for the
Department of State, the United States Agency for International
Development, and, as appropriate, the Department of Defense
$1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, which
shall be used--
(1) to advance United States foreign policy interests and
objectives in the Indo-Pacific region in recognition of the
value of diplomatic initiatives and programs in the furtherance
of United States strategy;
(2) to bolster the United States military presence and
readiness in the Indo-Pacific region for the purpose of
deterring and defending against provocative actions, including
by improving the defense infrastructure and critical munitions
stockpiles of the United States Armed Forces;
(3) to improve the defense capacity of partner nations to
resist coercion and to deter and defend against security
threats, including through foreign military financing and
international military education and training programs;
(4) to conduct regular bilateral and multilateral
exercises, particularly with our most highly-capable allies and
partners, to meet strategic challenges, including--
(A) certain destabilizing activities of the
People's Republic of China; and
(B) emerging threats, such as the nuclear and
ballistic missile programs of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea;
(5) to build new counterterrorism partnership programs in
Southeast Asia to combat the growing presence of ISIS and other
terrorist organizations that pose a significant threat to the
United States, our allies, and our citizens' interests abroad;
and
(6) to increase maritime domain awareness programs in
Southeast Asia--
(A) by expanding the scope of naval and coast guard
training efforts with Southeast Asian countries;
(B) through intelligence sharing and other
information-sharing efforts; and
(C) through multilateral exercises, including by
involving Japan, Australia, and India in such efforts
and exercises.
(b) Countering China's Influence To Undermine the International
System.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) shall be made
available for United States Government efforts to counter the strategic
influence of the People's Republic of China, in accordance with the
strategy required under section 7043(e)(3) of the Department of State,
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014
(division K of Public Law 113-76; 128 Stat. 536) and in consultation
with the appropriate committees of Congress.
(c) Burma.--None of the amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection
(a) may be made available for the programs, initiatives, or
interactions that may benefit the defense sector of the Republic of the
Union of Myanmar (historically known as ``Burma'').
(d) Philippines.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a)
may not be made available for counternarcotics assistance (other than
maritime programs) for the Philippine National Police unless the
Secretary of State certifies and reports to the appropriate committees
of Congress that the Government of the Philippines has adopted and is
implementing a counternarcotics strategy that complies with
international norms of due process.
(e) Cambodia.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) may
not be made available for certain United States assistance programs
that benefit the Government of Cambodia.
(f) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``appropriate
committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives; and
(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
SEC. 102. TREATY ALLIANCES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION.
(a) United States-Japan Alliance.--The United States Government--
(1) is committed to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security between the United States and Japan, done at
Washington, January 19, 1960, and subsequent security
agreements;
(2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the
United States and Japan in promoting peace and security in the
Indo-Pacific region; and
(3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of
diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United
States and Japan.
(b) United States-Republic of Korea Alliance.--The United States
Government--
(1) is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the
United States and the Republic of Korea, done at Washington
October 1, 1953, and subsequent security agreements;
(2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the
United States and South Korea in promoting peace and security
in the Indo-Pacific region; and
(3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of
diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United
States and the Republic of Korea.
(c) United States-Australia Alliance.--The United States
Government--
(1) is committed to the Security Treaty Between Australia
and the United States of America, done at San Francisco
September 1, 1951, and subsequent security agreements between
these 2 nations;
(2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the
United States and Australia in promoting peace and security in
the Indo-Pacific region; and
(3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of
diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United
States and Australia.
(d) United States-Philippines Alliance.--The United States
Government is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America, done at
Washington August 30, 1951, and subsequent bilateral security
agreements, including the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, done
at Manila April 28, 2014.
(e) Thailand.--The United States Government is committed to--
(1) the Agreement Respecting Military Assistance Between
the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Thailand, done at Bangkok October 17, 1950;
(2) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, done at
Manila September 8, 1954; and
(3) all subsequent bilateral security agreements, including
the Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-U.S. Defense Alliance,
issued in Bangkok November 15, 2012.
SEC. 103. UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONSHIP.
(a) In General.--The United States Government--
(1) expresses grave concerns with Chinese actions that
seek--
(A) to further constrain space for civil society
within China; and
(B) to undermine a rules-based order in the Indo-
Pacific region;
(2) encourages China to play a constructive role in world
affairs by demonstrating consistent respect for the rule of law
and international norms;
(3) seeks to build a positive, cooperative, and
comprehensive relationship with China--
(A) by expanding areas of cooperation; and
(B) by addressing areas of disagreement, including
over human rights, economic policies, and maritime
security; and
(4) is committed to working with China on shared regional
and global challenges, especially--
(A) upholding and strengthening the rules-based
international system; and
(B) the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should--
(1) welcome China's decision to change course and pursue
responsible engagement on global issues;
(2) encourage China to play a constructive role in the
Indo-Pacific region and globally; and
(3) continue to call out Chinese actions that undermine the
rules-based international system.
SEC. 104. UNITED STATES-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.
(a) In General.--The United States Government--
(1) recognizes the vital role of the strategic partnership
between the United States and India in promoting peace and
security in the Indo-Pacific region;
(2) calls for the strengthening and broadening of
diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United
States and India; and
(3) is committed to--
(A) the New Framework for the United States-India
Defense Relationship, done at Arlington, Virginia June
28, 2005;
(B) the United States-India Defense Technology and
Trade Initiative, launched in 2012;
(C) the Joint Strategic Vision for the Indo-Pacific
and Indian Ocean Region, announced on January 25, 2015;
and
(D) all related and subsequent bilateral and
security agreements.
(b) India as Major Defense Partner.--Congress makes the following
findings:
(1) Section 1292(a)(1)(A) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328; 130
Stat. 2559; 22 U.S.C. 2751 note) requires the recognition of
India as a major defense partner.
(2) The designation of India as a major defense partner,
which is unique to India--
(A) institutionalizes the progress made to
facilitate defense trade and technology sharing between
the United States and India;
(B) elevates defense trade and technology
cooperation between the United States and India to a
level commensurate with the closest allies and partners
of the United States;
(C) facilitates technology sharing between the
United States and India, including license-free access
to a wide range of dual-use technologies, after taking
into account national security concerns; and
(D) facilitates joint exercises, coordination on
defense strategy and policy, military exchanges, and
port calls in support of defense cooperation between
the United States and India.
SEC. 105. UNITED STATES-ASEAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.
It is the sense of the Senate that the United States should--
(1) support and affirm the elevation of the United States-
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) relationship to
a strategic partnership;
(2) recommit to ASEAN centrality by helping build a strong,
stable, politically cohesive, economically integrated, and
socially responsible community of nations that has common
rules, norms, procedures, and standards which are consistent
with international law and the principles of a rules-based
Indo-Pacific community;
(3) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster greater
integration among its members;
(4) recognize the value of--
(A) ASEAN engagement with economic, political, and
security partners within Asia and elsewhere, including
Australia, Canada, the European Union, India, Japan,
New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan;
and
(B) strategic economic initiatives, such as the
U.S.-ASEAN Connect, which demonstrate a commitment to
ASEAN and the ASEAN Economic Community and build upon
economic relationships in the Indo-Pacific region;
(5) support efforts by the nations comprising ASEAN--
(A) to address maritime and territorial disputes in
a constructive manner; and
(B) to pursue claims through peaceful, diplomatic,
and legitimate regional and international arbitration
mechanisms, consistent with international law,
including through the adoption of a code of conduct in
the South China Sea to further promote peace and
stability in the Indo-Pacific region;
(6) support efforts by United States partners and allies in
ASEAN--
(A) to enhance maritime capability and maritime
domain awareness;
(B) to protect unhindered access to, and use of,
international waterways in the Asia-Pacific region that
are critical to ensuring the security and free flow of
commerce;
(C) to counter piracy;
(D) to disrupt illicit maritime trafficking
activities such as the trafficking of persons, goods,
and drugs; and
(E) to enhance the maritime capabilities of
countries or regional organizations to respond to
emerging threats to maritime security in the Asia-
Pacific region; and
(7) urge ASEAN member states to develop a common approach
to reaffirm the decision of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration's ruling with respect to the case between the
Republic of the Philippines and the People's Republic of China.
SEC. 106. UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA-JAPAN TRILATERAL SECURITY
PARTNERSHIP.
It is the sense of Congress that the President should develop a
strategy to deepen the trilateral security cooperation between the
United States, South Korea, and Japan, including missile defense,
intelligence-sharing, and other defense-related initiatives.
SEC. 107. QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the security dialogue between the United States,
Australia, India, and Japan is vital to addressing pressing
security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region in order to
promote--
(A) a rules-based order;
(B) respect for international law; and
(C) a free and open Indo-Pacific; and
(2) such a dialogue is intended to augment, rather than to
replace, current mechanisms.
SEC. 108. ENHANCED SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.
(a) Indonesia.--The United States Government is committed to--
(1) the U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership, done in
Washington November 9, 2010;
(2) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive Defense
Cooperation, done in Washington October 26, 2015; and
(3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security
agreements between the United States and Indonesia.
(b) Malaysia.--The United States Government is committed to--
(1) the U.S.-Malaysia Comprehensive Partnership, done at
Putrajaya April 27, 2014;
(2) the Joint Statement for Enhancing the Comprehensive
Partnership between the United States of America and Malaysia,
done in Washington September 13, 2017; and
(3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security
agreements between the United States and Malaysia.
(c) Singapore.--The United States Government is committed to--
(1) the Strategic Framework Agreement Between the United
States of America and the Republic of Singapore for a Closer
Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security, done at
Washington July 12, 2005;
(2) the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, done at
Arlington, Virginia December 7, 2015; and
(3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security
agreements between the United States and Singapore.
(d) Vietnam.--The United States Government is committed to--
(1) the U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership, done at
Washington December 16, 2013;
(2) the U.S.-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement on Defense
Relations, done at Hanoi on June 1, 2015;
(3) the U.S.-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement, done at
Washington May 31, 2017; and
(4) all related and subsequent bilateral and security
agreements between the United States and Vietnam.
(e) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should deepen the diplomatic, economic, and security
cooperation, especially in the areas of maritime security and
counterterrorism, with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam.
SEC. 109. COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.
(a) United States Commitment to Taiwan.--It is the policy of the
United States to faithfully enforce all existing United States
Government commitments to Taiwan, as enshrined in the Taiwan Relations
Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-8) and the Six Assurances agreed to by
President Ronald Reagan in July 1982.
(b) Arms Sales to Taiwan.--The President shall conduct regular
transfers of defense articles to Taiwan that are tailored to meet the
existing and likely future threats from the People's Republic of China,
including supporting the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate
asymmetric capabilities, including undersea warfare and air defense
capabilities, into its military forces.
(c) Travel.--The President shall authorize the travel of high-level
United States officials to Taiwan, in accordance with the Taiwan Travel
Act (Public Law 115-135).
SEC. 110. NORTH KOREA STRATEGY.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea has flagrantly defied the international community by
illicitly developing its nuclear and ballistic missile
programs, in violation of United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013),
2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397
(2017).
(2) The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea engages in gross human rights abuses against its own
people and citizens of other countries, including the United
States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan.
(3) The United States is committed to pursuing a peaceful
denuclearization of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
through a policy of maximum pressure and engagement, in close
concert with its partners.
(b) Policy of the United States With Respect to Sanctions Against
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.--
(1) Statement of policy.--It is the policy of the United
States to continue to impose sanctions with respect to
activities of the Government of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, persons acting for or on behalf of such
government, or other persons in accordance with Executive Order
13687 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to imposing additional
sanctions with respect to North Korea), Executive Order 13694
(50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking the property of
certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled
activities), Executive Order 13722 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note;
relating to blocking the property of the Government of North
Korea and the Workers' Party of Korea, and prohibiting certain
transactions with respect to North Korea), and Executive Order
13810 (82 Fed. Reg. 44705; relating to imposing additional
sanctions with respect to North Korea), as such Executive
orders are in effect on the day before the date of the
enactment of this Act, until the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea is no longer engaged in the illicit activities
described in such Executive orders, including actions in
violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718
(2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016),
2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), and 2375 (2017).
(2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after terminating any
sanction with respect to the activities of the Government of
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a person acting for
or on behalf of such government, or any other person provided
for in an Executive order listed in subsection (a), the
Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate
congressional committees regarding the cessation of any illicit
activity that violates United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013),
2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), or 2375 (2017) by such
Government or person.
(3) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall
be construed to limit the authority of the President pursuant
to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1701 et seq.).
(c) Policy of the United States With Respect to Negotiation on the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile
Programs.--It is the policy of the United States that the objective of
negotiations with respect to the nuclear and ballistic missile programs
of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea be the complete,
verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of such programs.
(d) Report on a Strategy To Address the Threats Posed by, and the
Capabilities of, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the
Secretary of State, or a designee of the Secretary, shall
submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees
that describes actions taken by the United States to address
the threats posed by, and the capabilities of, the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea.
(2) Elements.--Each report required under paragraph (1)
shall include--
(A) a summary of ongoing efforts by the United
States to identify strategies and policies, including
an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of such
strategies and policies--
(i) to achieve peaceful denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula; and
(ii) to eliminate the threat posed by the
ballistic missile program of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea;
(B) an assessment of--
(i) potential road maps toward peaceful
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and
the elimination of the nuclear and ballistic
missile threats posed by the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea; and
(ii) specific actions that the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea would need to take
for each such roadmap to become viable;
(C) a summary of the United States strategy to
increase international coordination and cooperation,
whether unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally,
including sanctions enforcement and interdiction, to
address the threat posed by the nuclear and ballistic
missile programs of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, which shall include--
(i) a description of the actions taken by
the Secretary of State, or designees of the
Secretary, to consult with governments around
the world, with the purpose of inducing such
governments to diplomatically and economically
isolate the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea;
(ii) a description of the actions taken by
such governments to implement measures to
diplomatically and economically isolate the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
(iii) a list of countries with governments
that the Secretary has determined are
noncooperative with respect to implementing
measures to diplomatically and economically
isolate the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea; and
(iv) a plan of action to engage, and
increase cooperation with respect to the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with the
governments of the countries on the list
described in clause (iii); and
(D) an assessment of the adequacy of the national
export control regimes of countries that are members of
the United Nations, and multilateral export control
regimes, that are necessary to enforce sanctions
imposed with respect to the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea pursuant to United Nations Security
Council resolutions; and
(E) an action plan to encourage and assist
countries in adopting and using authorities necessary
to enforce export controls required by United Nations
Security Council resolutions.
(3) Form of report.--Each report required under this
subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
include a classified annex.
(e) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) representatives of the United States shall use the
voice and vote of the United States in all international
organizations, as appropriate, to advocate for the expulsion of
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from such
organizations, until such time as the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea meets its commitments under United Nations
Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087
(2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017),
2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017);
(2) the Secretary of State may take such actions as are
necessary to induce countries to take measures to
diplomatically and economically isolate the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, including--
(A) reducing the diplomatic presence in the United
States of countries with governments that the Secretary
has determined are noncooperative with respect to
implementing measures to diplomatically and
economically isolate the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea; and
(B) reducing the diplomatic presence of the United
States in such countries; and
(3) the Secretary of State may terminate or reduce United
States foreign assistance to countries enabling the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea.
SEC. 111. NEW ZEALAND AND THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States supports strengthening diplomatic,
economic, and the security relationship with New Zealand;
(2) the United States supports strong United States
engagement with the nations of the South Pacific, including
Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of
Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon
Islands Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu;
(3) the United States recognizes the strong historical,
strategic and cultural ties to these countries;
(4) the United States should deepen its cooperation with
New Zealand and the nations of the South Pacific in areas of
mutual interest, including--
(A) fisheries and marine resource conservation;
(B) environmental challenges and resilience;
(C) global health;
(D) development and trade; and
(E) people-to-people ties; and
(5) the United States should provide robust foreign
assistance to the Pacific islands.
SEC. 112. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT; PROMOTION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
(a) Freedom of Navigation.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to conduct, as part of its global Freedom of Navigation
Program, regular freedom of navigation and overflight
operations in the Indo-Pacific region, in accordance with
applicable international law; and
(2) to promote genuine multilateral negotiations to
peacefully resolve maritime disputes in the South China Sea, in
accordance with applicable international law.
(b) Joint Indo-Pacific Diplomatic Strategy.--It is the sense of
Congress that the President should develop a diplomatic strategy that
includes working with United States allies and partners to conduct
joint maritime training and freedom of navigation operations in the
Indo-Pacific region, including the East China Sea and the South China
Sea, in support of a rules-based international system benefitting all
countries.
SEC. 113. COMBATING TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and
other appropriate officials, shall submit a report to the appropriate
committees of Congress that contains an assessment of the current and
future capabilities and activities of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and
other violent extremist groups in Southeast Asia that pose a
significant threat to the United States, its allies, and its citizens
interests abroad.
(b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
include--
(1) the current number of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and
other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters in Southeast
Asia;
(2) the estimated number of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked,
and other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters expected
to return to Southeast Asia from fighting in the Middle East;
(3) the current resources available to combat the threat of
ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist
group-affiliated fighters in Southeast Asia, and the additional
resources required to combat such threat;
(4) a detailed assessment of the capabilities of ISIS-
linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-
affiliated fighters to operate effectively in countries such as
the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia;
(5) a description of the capabilities and resources of
governments in Southeast Asia to counter violent extremist
groups; and
(6) a list of additional United States resources and
capabilities that the Department of Defense recommends
providing to governments in Southeast Asia to combat violent
extremist groups.
(c) Definitions.--In this section--
(1) the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate;
(C) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives; and
(2) the term ``ISIS'' means the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria.
SEC. 114. CYBERSECURITY COOPERATION.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that there
should be robust cybersecurity cooperation between the United States
and nations in the Indo-Pacific region--
(1) to effectively respond to cybersecurity threats,
including state-sponsored threats;
(2) to share best practices to combat such threats; and
(3) to strengthen resilience against misinformation and
propaganda.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated such sums as may be necessary--
(1) to build capacity for responding to cybersecurity
threats originating in the Indo-Pacific region; and
(2) to enhance cooperation between the United States and
nations in such region for combating such threats.
SEC. 115. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
REGION.
(a) In General.--The United States Government--
(1) recognizes that the spread of nuclear weapons, and
their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international
peace and security;
(2) seeks to peacefully address the unique challenge posed
to regional and global stability by the illicit use, and the
proliferation to and from North Korea, of sensitive nuclear and
missile technologies;
(3) notes efforts by China and Russia--
(A) to expand and modernize their respective
nuclear arsenals; and
(B) to pursue sales of commercial nuclear
technologies; and
(4) recognizes the legitimate pursuit by many countries in
the Indo-Pacific region of nuclear energy for a variety of
peaceful applications.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States Government should undertake all reasonable and appropriate
efforts to pursue effective arms control and nuclear nonproliferation
policies in the Indo-Pacific region to limit the further spread of
potentially dangerous and destabilizing conventional and nuclear
weapons.
TITLE II--PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC REGION
SEC. 201. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) According to the United States Chamber of Commerce, by
2030--
(A) 66 percent of the global middle class
population will be in Asia; and
(B) 59 percent of middle class consumption will be
in Asia.
(2) According to the Asian Development Bank--
(A) Asian countries have signed 140 bilateral or
regional trade agreements; and
(B) 75 more trade agreements with Asian countries
are under negotiation or concluded and awaiting entry
into force.
(3) The United States has signed free trade agreements with
3 nations in the Indo-Pacific region, namely Australia,
Singapore, and the Republic of Korea.
(4) The member states of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (referred to in this section as ``ASEAN''), as a
group--
(A) represent the fifth largest economy in the
world; and
(B) have a combined gross domestic product of
$2,400,000,000,000.
(5) The economy comprised of ASEAN member states grew by 66
percent between 2006 and 2015, and the total value of bilateral
trade between the United States and ASEAN member states has
increased by 78 percent since 2004.
(6) In 2015, the trade surplus of goods sold by companies
in ASEAN member states to consumers in the United States was
$77,000,000,000, while the United States 2015 trade surplus of
services provided to consumers in ASEAN member states was
$8,000,000,000.
(7) According to U.S.-ASEAN Business Council, Inc., goods
and services exported from the United States to ASEAN member
states support 550,000 jobs in the United States.
(8) According to the Business Roundtable--
(A) the United States, Australia, Brunei, Canada,
Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru,
Singapore and Vietnam were responsible for a combined
40 percent of global gross domestic product in 2017;
and
(B) United States bilateral trade with the other
nations referred to in subparagraph (A) supports
15,600,000 jobs in the United States.
(9) According to the United States National Security
Strategy--
(A) ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) ``remain centerpieces of the Indo-Pacific's
regional architecture and platforms for promoting an
order based on freedom''; and
(B) the United States will ``work with partners to
build a network of states dedicated to free markets and
protected from forces that would subvert their
sovereignty.''.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that trade
between the United States and the nations in the Indo-Pacific region is
vitally important to the United States economy, United States exports,
and jobs in the United States.
SEC. 202. TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS, AND REGIONAL
ECONOMIC SUMMITS.
Congress supports--
(1) multilateral, bilateral, or regional trade agreements
that increase United States employment and expand the economy;
(2) formal economic dialogues that include concrete
outcomes;
(3) high-standard bilateral investment treaties between the
United States and nations in the Indo-Pacific region;
(4) negotiations of the Trade in Services Agreement and the
Environmental Goods Agreement that include several major Asian
economies; and
(5) the proactive, strategic, and continuing high-level use
of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the East Asia
Summit, and the Group of 20 to pursue United States economic
objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.
SEC. 203. UNITED STATES-ASEAN ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP.
The President, acting through the United States Trade
Representative, is authorized to negotiate a comprehensive economic
engagement framework with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
SEC. 204. TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING AND TRADE FACILITATION.
(a) In General.--The President is encouraged to produce a robust
and comprehensive trade capacity building and trade facilitation
strategy for the Indo-Pacific region.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to carry out subsection
(a).
SEC. 205. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION.
(a) In General.--The President is encouraged to impose penalties on
all entities found to be complicit in the theft of United States
intellectual property, in accordance with applicable law, including
commercial cyber-enabled theft.
(b) Annual Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall
submit a report to Congress that--
(1) describes the efforts of the United States Government
to combat intellectual property and commercial cyber-enabled
theft in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly the People's
Republic of China; and
(2) includes a country-by-country assessment of priority
areas for United States engagement and capacity building
assistance.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to sponsor bilateral and
multilateral activities designed to build capacity in the identified
priority areas described in the annual report required under subsection
(b).
SEC. 206. ENERGY PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES.
(a) Indo-Pacific Energy Strategy.--
(1) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of
Energy, shall create a United States Government strategy to
increase United States exports of energy to the nations in the
Indo-Pacific region.
(2) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to carry
out paragraph (1).
(b) Reliable Energy Partnerships.--It is the sense of Congress
that--
(1) the President should establish bilateral and regional
initiatives to increase energy security in the Indo-Pacific
region;
(2) the United States should authorize the supply of
liquefied natural gas to the nations in the Indo-Pacific
region; and
(3) the United States should create a dedicated program, in
partnership with the private sector and multilateral
institutions, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development
Bank, to promote universal access to reliable electricity in
Myanmar (historically known as ``Burma'').
SEC. 207. LOWER MEKONG INITIATIVE.
The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Administrator of
the United States Agency for International Development, should increase
regional engagement in the areas of environment, health, education, and
infrastructure development with the Lower Mekong countries, including--
(1) assisting to develop programs that focus on forecasting
environmental challenges and resilience;
(2) assisting with transnational cooperation on sustainable
uses of forest and water resources with the goal of preserving
the biodiversity of the Mekong Basin and access to safe
drinking water;
(3) assisting with education enrollment and broadband
internet connectivity, particularly English training and
connectivity in rural communities; and
(4) improving global health in the Lower Mekong countries,
including--
(A) reducing the HIV/AIDS infection rate; and
(B) helping regional partners to track and treat
malaria and tuberculosis.
TITLE III--PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION
SEC. 301. FINDINGS.
Congress finds that--
(1) the promotion of human rights and respect for
democratic values in the Indo-Pacific region is in the United
States national security interests;
(2) there are serious concerns with the rule of law and
civil liberties in Cambodia, China, North Korea, Laos,
Thailand, and Vietnam, which have all been identified by
Freedom House as ``Not Free'';
(3) there have been recent disturbing human rights
developments in--
(A) Burma (Myanmar), which has been identified by
Freedom House as ``Not Free''; and
(B) the Philippines, which has been identified by
Freedom House as ``Partly Free''; and
(4) according to the National Security Strategy, the United
States--
(A) will ``support, with our words and actions,
those who live under oppressive regimes and who seek
freedom, individual dignity, and the rule of law'';
(B) ``may use diplomacy, sanctions, and other tools
to isolate states and leaders who threaten our
interests and whose actions run contrary to our
values''; and
(C) ``will support efforts to advance women's
equality, protect the rights of women and girls, and
promote women and youth empowerment programs.''.
SEC. 302. TRAFFICKING-IN-PERSONS.
The President is encouraged to pursue additional efforts to combat
trafficking in persons and human slavery in the Indo-Pacific region.
SEC. 303. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL DIALOGUES; PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE
ENGAGEMENT.
The Secretary of State should--
(1) establish high-level bilateral and regional dialogues
with nations in the Indo-Pacific region regarding human rights
and religious freedom violations;
(2) establish or support robust, people-to-people exchange
programs in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly programs
engaging young leaders; and
(3) establish educational exchanges and capacity-building
programs emphasizing civil society development.
SEC. 304. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AND SUSPENSION OF UNITED STATES
ASSISTANCE.
(a) Sanctions.--The President is authorized to impose sanctions, in
accordance with applicable law, including financial penalties and visa
bans, on any individual or entity that--
(1) violates human rights or religious freedoms; or
(2) engages in censorship activities.
(b) Suspension of Foreign Assistance.--The President is authorized,
in accordance with applicable law, to terminate, suspend, or otherwise
alter United States economic assistance to any country that has engaged
in serious violations of human rights or religious freedoms.
SEC. 305. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) Promotion of Democracy in the Indo-Pacific Region.--
(1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated
$150,000,000, for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023,
to promote democracy, strengthen civil society, human rights,
rule of law, transparency, and accountability in the Indo-
Pacific region.
(2) Democracy in china.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to
paragraph (1) shall be made available for United States
Government efforts, led by the Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, to promote democracy, the
rule of law, and human rights in the People's Republic of
China.
(3) Tibet.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1)
shall be made available for nongovernmental organizations to
support activities preserving cultural traditions and promoting
sustainable development, education, and environmental
conservation in Tibetan communities in the Tibet Autonomous
Region and in other Tibetan communities in China, India, and
Nepal.
(b) Freedom of Information to North Korea.--
(1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated
$10,000,000, for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, to
implement programs to enhance freedom of information efforts
with regard to North Korea.
(2) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter through
September 30, 2023, the Broadcasting Board of Governors shall
submit a report to Congress that describes the implementation
of the programs described in paragraph (1).
<all>