

In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

December 12, 2018.

Resolved, That the bill from the Senate (S. 2736) entitled “An Act to develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region, and for other purposes.”, do pass with the following

AMENDMENT:

Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

1 *SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.*

2 (a) *SHORT TITLE.*—*This Act may be cited as the*
3 *“Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018”.*

4 (b) *TABLE OF CONTENTS.*—*The table of contents for*
5 *this Act is as follows:*

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 2. Findings.

***TITLE I—UNITED STATES POLICY AND DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY IN
THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION***

Sec. 101. Policy.

Sec. 102. Diplomatic strategy.

***TITLE II—PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN
THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION***

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

Sec. 202. Treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific region.

Sec. 203. United States-China relationship.

Sec. 204. United States-India strategic partnership.

Sec. 205. United States-ASEAN strategic partnership.

Sec. 206. United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral security partnership.

Sec. 207. Quadrilateral security dialogue.

Sec. 208. Enhanced security partnerships in Southeast Asia.

Sec. 209. Commitment to Taiwan.

- Sec. 210. North Korea strategy.*
Sec. 211. New Zealand.
Sec. 212. The Pacific Islands.
Sec. 213. Freedom of navigation and overflight; promotion of international law.
Sec. 214. Combating terrorism in Southeast Asia.
Sec. 215. Cybersecurity cooperation.
Sec. 216. Nonproliferation and arms control in the Indo-Pacific region.

***TITLE III—PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN
THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION***

- Sec. 301. Findings; sense of Congress.*
*Sec. 302. Trade negotiations, multilateral agreements, and regional economic
summits.*
Sec. 303. United States-ASEAN economic partnership.
Sec. 304. Trade capacity building and trade facilitation.
Sec. 305. Intellectual property protection.
Sec. 306. Energy programs and initiatives.
Sec. 307. Lower Mekong initiative.
*Sec. 308. Sense of Congress on economic growth and natural resource conserva-
tion.*
Sec. 309. Sense of Congress in support of women’s economic rights.

***TITLE IV—PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC REGION***

- Sec. 401. Findings.*
Sec. 402. Trafficking-in-persons.
Sec. 403. Freedom of the press.
Sec. 404. Democracy, human rights, and labor personnel.
Sec. 405. Bilateral and regional dialogues; people-to-people engagement.
Sec. 406. Association of Southeast Asian Nations Human Rights Strategy.
Sec. 407. Freedom of information to North Korea.
*Sec. 408. Sense of Congress on imposition of sanctions and suspension of United
States assistance.*
Sec. 409. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 410. Indo-Pacific human rights defenders.
Sec. 411. Young leaders people-to-people initiatives.

1 *SEC. 2. FINDINGS.*

2 *Congress makes the following findings:*

3 *(1) The Indo-Pacific region—*

4 *(A) represents nearly 50 percent of the glob-*
5 *al population;*

6 *(B) is home to some of the most dynamic*
7 *economies in the world; and*

1 (C) poses security challenges that threaten
2 to undermine United States national security in-
3 terests, regional peace, and global stability.

4 (2) The core tenets of the United States-backed
5 international system are being challenged, including
6 by—

7 (A) China’s illegal construction and mili-
8 tarization of artificial features in the South
9 China Sea and coercive economic practices;

10 (B) North Korea’s acceleration of its nu-
11 clear and ballistic missile capabilities; and

12 (C) the increased presence throughout
13 Southeast Asia of the Islamic State (referred to
14 in this Act as “ISIS”) and other international
15 terrorist organizations that threaten the United
16 States.

17 (3) The economic order in the Indo-Pacific re-
18 gion continues to transform, presenting opportunities
19 and challenges to United States economic interests.

20 (4) The United States has a fundamental inter-
21 est in defending human rights and promoting the rule
22 of law in the Indo-Pacific region. Although many
23 countries in the region have improved the treatment
24 of their citizens, several Indo-Pacific governments
25 continue to commit human rights abuses and place

1 *restrictions on basic human rights and political and*
 2 *civil liberties.*

3 *(5) Without strong leadership from the United*
 4 *States, the international system, fundamentally root-*
 5 *ed in the rule of law, may wither, to the detriment*
 6 *of United States, regional, and global interests. It is*
 7 *imperative that the United States continue to play a*
 8 *leading role in the Indo-Pacific region by—*

9 *(A) defending peace and security;*

10 *(B) advancing economic prosperity; and*

11 *(C) promoting respect for fundamental*
 12 *human rights.*

13 *(6) In 2017, the Subcommittee on East Asia, the*
 14 *Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy of the*
 15 *Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate held a*
 16 *series of hearings on United States leadership in the*
 17 *Indo-Pacific region, in which—*

18 *(A) experts, including Representative*
 19 *Randy Forbes, Ambassador Robert Gallucci, Ms.*
 20 *Tami Overby, Dr. Robert Orr, Ambassador*
 21 *Derek Mitchell, Ambassador Robert King, Mr.*
 22 *Murray Hiebert, and others detailed the security*
 23 *challenges, economic opportunities, and impera-*
 24 *tives of promoting the rule of law, human rights,*
 25 *and democracy, in the Indo-Pacific region; and*

1 (B) *Dr. Graham Allison, the Douglas Dillon*
 2 *Professor of Government at the John F. Kennedy*
 3 *School of Government at Harvard University,*
 4 *testified, “As realistic students of history, Chi-*
 5 *nese leaders recognize that the role the United*
 6 *States has played since World War II as the ar-*
 7 *chitect and underwriter of regional stability and*
 8 *security has been essential to the rise of Asia, in-*
 9 *cluding China itself. But they believe that as the*
 10 *tide that brought the United States to Asia re-*
 11 *cedes, America must leave with it. Much as Brit-*
 12 *ain’s role in the Western Hemisphere faded at*
 13 *the beginning of the twentieth century, so must*
 14 *America’s role in Asia as the region’s historic su-*
 15 *perpower resumes its place.”.*

16 (7) *The United States National Security Strat-*
 17 *egy (referred to in this Act as the “National Security*
 18 *Strategy”), which was released in December 2017,*
 19 *states—*

20 (A) *“A geopolitical competition between free*
 21 *and repressive visions of world order is taking*
 22 *place in the Indo-Pacific region. The region,*
 23 *which stretches from the west coast of India to*
 24 *the western shores of the United States, rep-*
 25 *resents the most populous and economically dy-*

1 *namic part of the world. The United States in-*
 2 *terest in a free and open Indo-Pacific extends*
 3 *back to the earliest days of our republic.”; and*

4 (B) “Our vision for the Indo-Pacific ex-
 5 *cludes no nation. We will redouble our commit-*
 6 *ment to established alliances and partnerships,*
 7 *while expanding and deepening relationships*
 8 *with new partners that share respect for sov-*
 9 *ereignty, fair and reciprocal trade, and the rule*
 10 *of law. We will reinforce our commitment to*
 11 *freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution of*
 12 *territorial and maritime disputes in accordance*
 13 *with international law. We will work with allies*
 14 *and partners to achieve complete, verifiable, and*
 15 *irreversible denuclearization on the Korean Pe-*
 16 *ninsula and preserve the non-proliferation re-*
 17 *gime in Northeast Asia.”.*

18 ***TITLE I—UNITED STATES POL-***
 19 ***ICY AND DIPLOMATIC STRAT-***
 20 ***EGY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC RE-***
 21 ***GION***

22 ***SEC. 101. POLICY.***

23 *It is the policy of the United States to develop and*
 24 *commit to a long-term strategic vision and a comprehen-*

1 *sive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for*
 2 *the Indo-Pacific region that—*

3 *(1) secures the vital national security interests of*
 4 *the United States and our allies and partners;*

5 *(2) promotes American prosperity and economic*
 6 *interests by advancing economic growth and develop-*
 7 *ment of a rules-based Indo-Pacific economic commu-*
 8 *nity;*

9 *(3) advances American influence by reflecting the*
 10 *values of the American people and universal human*
 11 *rights;*

12 *(4) supports functional problem-solving regional*
 13 *architecture; and*

14 *(5) accords with and supports the rule of law*
 15 *and international norms.*

16 **SEC. 102. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY.**

17 *It is the diplomatic strategy of the United States—*

18 *(1) to work with United States allies—*

19 *(A) to confront common challenges;*

20 *(B) to improve information sharing;*

21 *(C) to increase defense investment and*
 22 *trade;*

23 *(D) to ensure interoperability; and*

24 *(E) to strengthen shared capabilities;*

1 (2) *to strengthen relationships with partners*
 2 *who—*

3 (A) *share mutual respect for the rule of law;*

4 (B) *agree with fair and reciprocal trade;*

5 *and*

6 (C) *understand the importance of civil soci-*
 7 *ety, the rule of law, the free and reliable flow of*
 8 *information, and transparent governance;*

9 (3) *to support functional problem-solving re-*
 10 *gional architecture, including through the Association*
 11 *of Southeast Asian Nations, Asia-Pacific Economic*
 12 *Cooperation, and the East Asia Summit;*

13 (4) *to emphasize the commitment of the United*
 14 *States—*

15 (A) *to freedom of navigation under inter-*
 16 *national law;*

17 (B) *to promote peaceful resolutions of mari-*
 18 *time and territorial disputes; and*

19 (C) *to expand security and defense coopera-*
 20 *tion with allies and partners, as appropriate;*

21 (5) *to pursue diplomatic measures to achieve*
 22 *complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization*
 23 *of North Korea;*

24 (6) *to improve civil society, strengthen the rule*
 25 *of law, and advocate for transparent governance;*

1 (7) to develop and grow the economy through
 2 private sector partnerships between the United States
 3 and Indo-Pacific partners;

4 (8) to pursue multilateral and bilateral trade
 5 agreements in a free, fair, and reciprocal manner and
 6 build a network of partners in the Indo-Pacific com-
 7 mitted to free markets;

8 (9) to work with and encourage Indo-Pacific
 9 countries—

10 (A) to pursue high-quality and transparent
 11 infrastructure projects;

12 (B) to maintain unimpeded commerce, open
 13 sea lines or air ways, and communication; and

14 (C) to seek the peaceful resolution of dis-
 15 putes; and

16 (10) to sustain a strong military presence in the
 17 Indo-Pacific region and strengthen security relation-
 18 ships with allies and partners throughout the region.

19 **TITLE II—PROMOTING UNITED**
 20 **STATES SECURITY INTERESTS**
 21 **IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION**

22 **SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

23 (a) *DEFINED TERM.*—In this section, the term “appro-
 24 priate committees of Congress” means—

1 (1) *the Committee on Appropriations of the Sen-*
2 *ate;*

3 (2) *the Committee on Foreign Relations of the*
4 *Senate;*

5 (3) *the Committee on Finance of the Senate;*

6 (4) *the Committee on Appropriations of the*
7 *House of Representatives;*

8 (5) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the*
9 *House of Representatives; and*

10 (6) *the Committee on Ways and Means of the*
11 *House of Representatives.*

12 (b) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are*
13 *authorized to be appropriated for the Department of State,*
14 *the United States Agency for International Development,*
15 *and, as appropriate, the Department of Defense,*
16 *\$1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through*
17 *2023, which shall be used—*

18 (1) *to advance United States foreign policy in-*
19 *terests and objectives in the Indo-Pacific region in*
20 *recognition of the value of diplomatic initiatives and*
21 *programs in the furtherance of United States strat-*
22 *egy;*

23 (2) *to improve the defense capacity and resil-*
24 *iency of partner nations to resist coercion and deter*
25 *and defend against security threats, including*

1 *through foreign military financing and international*
2 *military education and training programs;*

3 *(3) to conduct regular bilateral and multilateral*
4 *engagements, particularly with the United States’*
5 *most highly-capable allies and partners, to meet stra-*
6 *tegic challenges, including—*

7 *(A) certain destabilizing activities of the*
8 *People’s Republic of China; and*

9 *(B) emerging threats, such as the nuclear*
10 *and ballistic missile programs of the Democratic*
11 *People’s Republic of Korea;*

12 *(4) to build new counterterrorism partnership*
13 *programs in Southeast Asia to combat the growing*
14 *presence of ISIS and other terrorist organizations*
15 *that pose a significant threat to the United States, its*
16 *allies, and its citizens’ interests abroad;*

17 *(5) to help partner countries strengthen their*
18 *democratic systems, with a focus on good governance;*

19 *(6) to ensure that the regulatory environments*
20 *for trade, infrastructure, and investment in partner*
21 *countries are transparent, open, and free of corrup-*
22 *tion;*

23 *(7) to encourage responsible natural resource*
24 *management in partner countries, which is closely as-*
25 *sociated with economic growth; and*

(8) *to increase maritime domain awareness programs in South Asia and Southeast Asia—*

(A) *by expanding the scope of naval and coast guard training efforts with Southeast Asian countries;*

(B) *by expanding cooperation with democratic partners in South Asia, including Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka;*

(C) *through intelligence sharing and other information-sharing efforts; and*

(D) *through multilateral engagements, including by involving Japan, Australia, and India in such efforts.*

(c) *COUNTERING CHINA’S INFLUENCE TO UNDERMINE THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (b) shall be made available for United States Government efforts to counter the strategic influence of the People’s Republic of China, in accordance with the strategy required under section 7043(e)(3) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014 (division K of Public Law 113–76; 128 Stat. 536) and in consultation with the appropriate committees of Congress.*

(d) *BURMA.—None of the amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (b) may be made available for Inter-*

1 *national Military Education and Training and Foreign*
 2 *Military Financing Programs for the armed forces of the*
 3 *Republic of the Union of Myanmar (historically known as*
 4 *“Burma”).*

5 *(e) PHILIPPINES.—*

6 *(1) IN GENERAL.—None of the amounts appro-*
 7 *priated pursuant to subsection (b) may be made*
 8 *available for counternarcotics assistance for the Phil-*
 9 *ippine National Police unless the Secretary of State*
 10 *determines and reports to the appropriate committees*
 11 *of Congress that the Government of the Philippines*
 12 *has adopted and is implementing a counternarcotics*
 13 *strategy that is consistent with international human*
 14 *rights standards, including investigating and pros-*
 15 *ecuting individuals who are credibly alleged to have*
 16 *ordered, committed, or covered up extrajudicial*
 17 *killings and other gross violations of human rights in*
 18 *the conduct of counternarcotics operations.*

19 *(2) EXCEPTION.—The limitation under para-*
 20 *graph (1) shall not apply to funds made available—*

21 *(A) for drug demand reduction, maritime*
 22 *programs, or transnational interdiction pro-*
 23 *grams; or*

1 (B) to support for the development of such
 2 counternarcotics strategy, after consultation with
 3 the appropriate committees of Congress.

4 (f) CAMBODIA.—None of the amounts authorized to be
 5 appropriated pursuant to subsection (b) may be made
 6 available for United States assistance programs that benefit
 7 the Government of Cambodia unless the Secretary of State
 8 certifies and reports to the appropriate congressional com-
 9 mittees that the requirements under section 7043(b)(1) of
 10 division K of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018
 11 (Public Law 115–141) have been met.

12 **SEC. 202. TREATY ALLIANCES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC RE-**
 13 **GION.**

14 (a) UNITED STATES-JAPAN ALLIANCE.—The United
 15 States Government—

16 (1) is committed to the Treaty of Mutual Co-
 17 operation and Security between the United States
 18 and Japan, done at Washington, January 19, 1960,
 19 and all related and subsequent bilateral security
 20 agreements and arrangements concluded on or before
 21 the date of the enactment of this Act;

22 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be-
 23 tween the United States and Japan in promoting
 24 peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and

1 (3) *calls for the strengthening and broadening of*
 2 *diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the*
 3 *United States and Japan.*

4 (b) *UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA ALLI-*
 5 *ANCE.—The United States Government—*

6 (1) *is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty*
 7 *Between the United States and the Republic of Korea,*
 8 *done at Washington October 1, 1953, and all related*
 9 *and subsequent bilateral security agreements and ar-*
 10 *rangements concluded on or before the date of the en-*
 11 *actment of this Act;*

12 (2) *recognizes the vital role of the alliance be-*
 13 *tween the United States and South Korea in pro-*
 14 *moting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region;*
 15 *and*

16 (3) *calls for the strengthening and broadening of*
 17 *diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the*
 18 *United States and the Republic of Korea.*

19 (c) *UNITED STATES-AUSTRALIA ALLIANCE.—The*
 20 *United States Government—*

21 (1) *is committed to the Security Treaty Between*
 22 *Australia and the United States of America, done at*
 23 *San Francisco September 1, 1951, and all related and*
 24 *subsequent bilateral security agreements and arrange-*

1 *ments concluded on or before the date of the enact-*
2 *ment of this Act;*

3 (2) *recognizes the vital role of the alliance be-*
4 *tween the United States and Australia in promoting*
5 *peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and*

6 (3) *calls for the strengthening and broadening of*
7 *diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the*
8 *United States and Australia.*

9 (d) *UNITED STATES-PHILIPPINES ALLIANCE.—The*
10 *United States Government is committed to the Mutual De-*
11 *fense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines and*
12 *the United States of America, done at Washington August*
13 *30, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral security*
14 *agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the*
15 *date of the enactment of this Act, including the Enhanced*
16 *Defense Cooperation Agreement, done at Manila April 28,*
17 *2014.*

18 (e) *THAILAND.—The United States Government is*
19 *committed to—*

20 (1) *the Agreement Respecting Military Assist-*
21 *ance Between the Government of the United States of*
22 *America and the Government of Thailand, done at*
23 *Bangkok October 17, 1950;*

24 (2) *the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty,*
25 *done at Manila September 8, 1954; and*

1 (3) *all related and subsequent bilateral security*
 2 *agreements and arrangements concluded on or before*
 3 *the date of the enactment of this Act, including the*
 4 *Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-United States*
 5 *Defense Alliance, issued in Bangkok November 15,*
 6 *2012.*

7 **SEC. 203. UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONSHIP.**

8 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*The United States Government—*
 9 (1) *expresses grave concerns with Chinese actions*
 10 *that seek—*

11 (A) *to further constrain space for civil soci-*
 12 *ety and religion within China; and*

13 (B) *to undermine a rules-based order in the*
 14 *Indo-Pacific region;*

15 (2) *encourages China to play a constructive role*
 16 *in world affairs by demonstrating consistent respect*
 17 *for the rule of law and international norms;*

18 (3) *seeks to build a positive, cooperative, and*
 19 *comprehensive relationship with China—*

20 (A) *by expanding areas of cooperation; and*

21 (B) *by addressing areas of disagreement, in-*
 22 *cluding over human rights, economic policies,*
 23 *and maritime security; and*

24 (4) *is committed to working with China on*
 25 *shared regional and global challenges, especially—*

1 (A) *upholding and strengthening the rules-*
 2 *based international system; and*

3 (B) *the denuclearization of North Korea.*

4 (b) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
 5 *that the United States should—*

6 (1) *welcome a decision by China to change*
 7 *course and pursue a responsible results-oriented rela-*
 8 *tionship with the United States and engagement on*
 9 *global issues;*

10 (2) *encourage China to play a constructive role*
 11 *in the Indo-Pacific region and globally; and*

12 (3) *continue to call out Chinese actions that un-*
 13 *dermine the rules-based international system.*

14 **SEC. 204. UNITED STATES-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.**

15 (a) *IN GENERAL.—The United States Government—*

16 (1) *recognizes the vital role of the strategic part-*
 17 *nership between the United States and India in pro-*
 18 *moting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region;*

19 (2) *calls for the strengthening and broadening of*
 20 *diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the*
 21 *United States and India; and*

22 (3) *is committed to—*

23 (A) *the New Framework for the United*
 24 *States-India Defense Relationship, done at Ar-*
 25 *lington, Virginia on June 28, 2005;*

1 (B) the United States-India Defense Tech-
2 nology and Trade Initiative, launched in 2012;

3 (C) the Joint Strategic Vision for the Indo-
4 Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, announced on
5 January 25, 2015;

6 (D) the United States-India Joint State-
7 ment on Prosperity Through Partnership, issued
8 on June 26, 2017; and

9 (E) all related and subsequent bilateral and
10 security agreements and arrangements concluded
11 as of the date of the enactment of this Act.

12 (b) *INDIA AS MAJOR DEFENSE PARTNER.*—Congress
13 makes the following findings:

14 (1) *Section 1292(a)(1)(A) of the National De-*
15 *fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public*
16 *Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 2559; 22 U.S.C. 2751 note)*
17 *requires the recognition of India as a major defense*
18 *partner.*

19 (2) *The designation of India as a major defense*
20 *partner, which is unique to India—*

21 (A) *institutionalizes the progress made to*
22 *facilitate defense trade and technology sharing*
23 *between the United States and India;*

24 (B) *elevates defense trade and technology co-*
25 *operation between the United States and India*

1 to a level commensurate with the closest allies
2 and partners of the United States;

3 (C) facilitates technology sharing between
4 the United States and India, including license-
5 free access to a wide range of dual-use tech-
6 nologies, after taking into account national secu-
7 rity concerns; and

8 (D) facilitates joint exercises, coordination
9 on defense strategy and policy, military ex-
10 changes, and port calls in support of defense co-
11 operation between the United States and India.

12 **SEC. 205. UNITED STATES-ASEAN STRATEGIC PARTNER-**
13 **SHIP.**

14 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.*—*It is the sense of Congress*
15 *that the United States should—*

16 (1) support and reaffirm the elevation of the
17 United States-Association of Southeast Asian Nations
18 (referred to in this section as “ASEAN”) relationship
19 to a strategic partnership;

20 (2) recommit to ASEAN centrality by helping
21 build a strong, stable, politically cohesive, economi-
22 cally integrated, and socially responsible community
23 of nations that has common rules, norms, procedures,
24 and standards which are consistent with inter-

1 *national law and the principles of a rules-based Indo-*
 2 *Pacific community;*

3 (3) *urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster*
 4 *greater integration among its members;*

5 (4) *recognize the value of—*

6 (A) *ASEAN engagement with economic, po-*
 7 *litical, and security partners within Asia and*
 8 *elsewhere, including Australia, Canada, the Eu-*
 9 *ropean Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, Nor-*
 10 *way, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan; and*

11 (B) *strategic economic initiatives, such as*
 12 *activities under the United States–ASEAN*
 13 *Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement*
 14 *and the United States-ASEAN Connect, which*
 15 *demonstrate a commitment to ASEAN and the*
 16 *ASEAN Economic Community and build upon*
 17 *economic relationships in the Indo-Pacific re-*
 18 *gion;*

19 (5) *support efforts by the nations comprising*
 20 *ASEAN—*

21 (A) *to address maritime and territorial dis-*
 22 *putes in a constructive manner; and*

23 (B) *to pursue claims through peaceful, dip-*
 24 *lomatic, and legitimate regional and inter-*
 25 *national arbitration mechanisms, consistent with*

1 *international law, including through the adop-*
 2 *tion of a code of conduct in the South China Sea*
 3 *to further promote peace and stability in the*
 4 *Indo-Pacific region;*

5 *(6) support efforts by United States partners*
 6 *and allies in ASEAN—*

7 *(A) to enhance maritime capability and*
 8 *maritime domain awareness;*

9 *(B) to protect unhindered access to, and use*
 10 *of, international waterways in the Asia-Pacific*
 11 *region that are critical to ensuring the security*
 12 *and free flow of commerce;*

13 *(C) to counter piracy;*

14 *(D) to disrupt illicit maritime trafficking*
 15 *activities such as the trafficking of persons,*
 16 *goods, and drugs; and*

17 *(E) to enhance the maritime capabilities of*
 18 *countries or regional organizations to respond to*
 19 *emerging threats to maritime security in the*
 20 *Asia-Pacific region; and*

21 *(7) urge ASEAN member states to develop a*
 22 *common approach to reaffirm the decision of the Per-*
 23 *manent Court of Arbitration’s ruling with respect to*
 24 *the case between the Republic of the Philippines and*
 25 *the People’s Republic of China.*

1 (b) *REPORT ON STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR EN-*
 2 *GAGEMENT WITH ASEAN.*—

3 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than 180 days after
 4 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually
 5 thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of
 6 State, in consultation with other Federal agencies,
 7 shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional
 8 committees on a strategic framework to administer
 9 programs, projects, and activities of the United States
 10 to support diplomatic and economic engagement be-
 11 tween the United States and ASEAN member coun-
 12 tries for the 10-year period beginning on the date of
 13 the enactment of this Act.

14 (2) *ELEMENTS.*—The report required under
 15 paragraph (1) shall address the following elements of
 16 United States strategy:

17 (A) *Promoting commercial engagement be-*
 18 *tween the United States and member countries of*
 19 *ASEAN.*

20 (B) *Helping member countries of ASEAN*
 21 *use sustainable, efficient, and innovative tech-*
 22 *nologies in their respective energy sectors.*

23 (C) *Supporting economic conditions in*
 24 *member countries of ASEAN that promote inno-*
 25 *vation, the creation of new businesses, sustain-*

1 able growth, and the education of the region's fu-
 2 ture innovators, entrepreneurs, and business
 3 leaders.

4 (D) Working with member countries of
 5 ASEAN to improve the policy and regulatory en-
 6 vironment for growth, trade, innovation, and in-
 7 vestment.

8 (E) Supporting the regional integration ob-
 9 jectives of member countries of ASEAN under the
 10 ASEAN Economic Community.

11 (F) Partnership opportunities with the gov-
 12 ernments of other countries friendly to the
 13 United States that have committed to a high set
 14 of standards for investment and development
 15 with ASEAN, as determined by the Secretary of
 16 State.

17 **SEC. 206. UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA-JAPAN TRI-**
 18 **LATERAL SECURITY PARTNERSHIP.**

19 It is the sense of Congress that the President should
 20 develop a strategy to deepen the trilateral security coopera-
 21 tion between the United States, South Korea, and Japan,
 22 including missile defense, intelligence-sharing, and other
 23 defense-related initiatives.

24 **SEC. 207. QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE.**

25 It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) *the security dialogue between the United States, Australia, India, and Japan is vital to address pressing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region in order to promote—*

(A) a rules-based order;

(B) respect for international law; and

(C) a free and open Indo-Pacific; and

(2) *such a dialogue is intended to augment, rather than to replace, current mechanisms.*

SEC. 208. ENHANCED SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA.

(a) *INDONESIA.—The United States Government is committed to—*

(1) the United States-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership, done in Washington November 9, 2010;

(2) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive Defense Cooperation, done in Washington October 26, 2015; and

(3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security agreements and arrangements between the United States and Indonesia concluded on or before the date of the enactment of this Act.

(b) *MALAYSIA.—The United States Government is committed to—*

1 (1) *the United States-Malaysia Comprehensive*
2 *Partnership, done at Putrajaya April 27, 2014;*

3 (2) *the Joint Statement for Enhancing the Com-*
4 *prehensive Partnership between the United States of*
5 *America and Malaysia, done in Washington Sep-*
6 *tember 13, 2017; and*

7 (3) *all related and subsequent bilateral and secu-*
8 *rity agreements and arrangements between the United*
9 *States and Malaysia concluded on or before the date*
10 *of the enactment of this Act.*

11 (c) *SINGAPORE.—The United States Government is*
12 *committed to—*

13 (1) *the Strategic Framework Agreement Between*
14 *the United States of America and the Republic of*
15 *Singapore for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in*
16 *Defense and Security, done at Washington July 12,*
17 *2005;*

18 (2) *the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agree-*
19 *ment, done at Arlington, Virginia December 7, 2015;*
20 *and*

21 (3) *all related and subsequent bilateral and secu-*
22 *rity agreements and arrangements between the United*
23 *States and Singapore concluded on or before the date*
24 *of the enactment of this Act.*

1 (d) *VIETNAM.—The United States Government is com-*
 2 *mitted to—*

3 (1) *the United States-Vietnam Comprehensive*
 4 *Partnership, done at Washington December 16, 2013;*

5 (2) *the United StatesVietnam Joint Vision State-*
 6 *ment on Defense Relations, done at Hanoi on June*
 7 *1, 2015;*

8 (3) *the United StatesVietnam Joint Vision State-*
 9 *ment, done at Washington May 31, 2017; and*

10 (4) *all related and subsequent bilateral and secu-*
 11 *urity agreements and arrangements between the United*
 12 *States and Vietnam concluded on or before the date*
 13 *of the enactment of this Act.*

14 (e) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
 15 *that the United States should deepen diplomatic, economic,*
 16 *and security cooperation, especially in the areas of mari-*
 17 *time security and counterterrorism, with Indonesia, Malay-*
 18 *sia, Singapore, and Vietnam.*

19 **SEC. 209. COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.**

20 (a) *UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.—It is*
 21 *the policy of the United States—*

22 (1) *to support the close economic, political, and*
 23 *security relationship between Taiwan and the United*
 24 *States;*

1 (2) *to faithfully enforce all existing United*
 2 *States Government commitments to Taiwan, con-*
 3 *sistent with the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public*
 4 *Law 96–8), the 3 joint communiques, and the Six As-*
 5 *surances agreed to by President Ronald Reagan in*
 6 *July 1982; and*

7 (3) *to counter efforts to change the status quo*
 8 *and to support peaceful resolution acceptable to both*
 9 *sides of the Taiwan Strait.*

10 (b) *ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN.*—*The President should*
 11 *conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan that*
 12 *are tailored to meet the existing and likely future threats*
 13 *from the People’s Republic of China, including supporting*
 14 *the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate asymmetric*
 15 *capabilities, as appropriate, including mobile, survivable,*
 16 *and cost-effective capabilities, into its military forces.*

17 (c) *TRAVEL.*—*The President should encourage the trav-*
 18 *el of highlevel United States officials to Taiwan, in accord-*
 19 *ance with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115–135).*

20 **SEC. 210. NORTH KOREA STRATEGY.**

21 (a) *FINDINGS.*—*Congress makes the following findings:*

22 (1) *The Government of the Democratic People’s*
 23 *Republic of Korea has flagrantly defied the inter-*
 24 *national community by illicitly developing its nu-*
 25 *clear and ballistic missile programs, in violation of*

1 *United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718*
 2 *(2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270*
 3 *(2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and*
 4 *2397 (2017).*

5 *(2) The Government of the Democratic People's*
 6 *Republic of Korea engages in gross human rights*
 7 *abuses against its own people and citizens of other*
 8 *countries, including the United States, the Republic*
 9 *of Korea, and Japan.*

10 *(3) The United States is committed to pursuing*
 11 *a peaceful denuclearization of the Democratic People's*
 12 *Republic of Korea through a policy of maximum pres-*
 13 *sure and engagement, in close concert with its part-*
 14 *ners.*

15 *(b) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT*
 16 *TO SANCTIONS AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S RE-*
 17 *PUBLIC OF KOREA.—*

18 *(1) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of*
 19 *the United States to continue to impose sanctions*
 20 *with respect to activities of the Government of the*
 21 *Democratic People's Republic of Korea, persons act-*
 22 *ing for or on behalf of such government, or other per-*
 23 *sons in accordance with Executive Order No. 13551*
 24 *(50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property of*
 25 *certain persons with respect to North Korea), Execu-*

tive Order No. 13687 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating
 to imposing additional sanctions), Executive Order
 No. 13694 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking
 the property of certain persons engaging in signifi-
 cant malicious cyberenabled activities), Executive
 Order No. 13722 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to
 blocking the property of the Government of North
 Korea and the Workers' Party of Korea, and prohib-
 iting certain transactions with respect to North
 Korea), and Executive Order No. 13810 (82 Fed. Reg.
 44705; relating to imposing additional sanctions with
 respect to North Korea), as such Executive orders are
 in effect on the day before the date of the enactment
 of this Act, until the Democratic People's Republic of
 Korea is no longer engaged in the illicit activities de-
 scribed in such Executive orders, including actions in
 violation of the United Nations Security Council reso-
 lutions referred to in subsection (a)(1).

(2) *REPORT*.—Not later than 30 days after ter-
 minating any sanction with respect to the activities
 of the Government of the Democratic People's Repub-
 lic of Korea, a person acting for or on behalf of such
 government, or any other person provided for in an
 Executive order listed in subsection (a), the Secretary
 of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the

1 *Treasury, shall submit a report to the appropriate*
 2 *congressional committees justifying the termination of*
 3 *the sanction and explaining the relationship between*
 4 *such termination and the cessation of any illicit ac-*
 5 *tivity that violates any of the United Nations Secu-*
 6 *rity Council resolutions referred to in subsection*
 7 *(a)(1) by such Government or person. The reporting*
 8 *requirement under this paragraph shall terminate on*
 9 *the date that is 5 years after the date of the enact-*
 10 *ment of this Act.*

11 *(3) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this*
 12 *subsection shall be construed to limit the authority of*
 13 *the President pursuant to the International Emer-*
 14 *gency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).*

15 *(c) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT*
 16 *TO NEGOTIATION ON THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUB-*
 17 *LIC OF KOREA’S NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE PRO-*
 18 *GRAMS.—It is the policy of the United States that the objec-*
 19 *tive of negotiations with respect to the nuclear and ballistic*
 20 *missile programs of the Democratic People’s Republic of*
 21 *Korea be the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dis-*
 22 *mantlement of such programs.*

23 *(d) REPORT ON A STRATEGY TO ADDRESS THE*
 24 *THREATS POSED BY, AND THE CAPABILITIES OF, THE*
 25 *DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.—*

1 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than 90 days after
 2 the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180
 3 days thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary
 4 of State, or a designee of the Secretary, in consulta-
 5 tion with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit
 6 a report to the appropriate congressional committees
 7 that describes actions taken by the United States to
 8 address the threats posed by, and the capabilities of,
 9 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

10 (2) *ELEMENTS.*—Each report required under
 11 paragraph (1) shall include—

12 (A) a summary of ongoing efforts by the
 13 United States to identify strategies and policies,
 14 including an assessment of the strengths and
 15 weaknesses of such strategies and policies—

16 (i) to achieve peaceful denuclearization
 17 of the Democratic People’s Republic of
 18 Korea; and

19 (ii) to eliminate the threat posed by the
 20 ballistic missile program of the Democratic
 21 People’s Republic of Korea;

22 (B) an assessment of—

23 (i) potential road maps toward peace-
 24 ful denuclearization of the Democratic Peo-
 25 ple’s Republic of Korea and the elimination

1 *of the nuclear and ballistic missile threats*
 2 *posed by the Democratic People's Republic*
 3 *of Korea; and*

4 *(ii) specific actions that the Demo-*
 5 *cratic People's Republic of Korea would*
 6 *need to take for each such roadmap to be-*
 7 *come viable;*

8 *(C) a summary of the United States strat-*
 9 *egy to increase international coordination and*
 10 *cooperation, whether unilaterally, bilaterally, or*
 11 *multilaterally, including sanctions enforcement*
 12 *and interdiction, to address the threat posed by*
 13 *the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the*
 14 *Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which*
 15 *shall include—*

16 *(i) a description of the actions taken*
 17 *by the Secretary of State, or designees of the*
 18 *Secretary, to consult with governments*
 19 *around the world, with the purpose of in-*
 20 *ducing such governments to fully implement*
 21 *the United Nations Security Council resolu-*
 22 *tions referred to in subsection (a)(1);*

23 *(ii) a description of the actions taken*
 24 *by such governments to fully implement*
 25 *United Nations Security Council resolutions*

1 *related to the Democratic People's Republic*
2 *of Korea;*

3 *(iii) a list of countries with govern-*
4 *ments that the Secretary has determined are*
5 *noncooperative with respect to imple-*
6 *menting the United Nations Security Coun-*
7 *cil resolutions referred to in subsection*
8 *(a)(1); and*

9 *(iv) a plan of action to engage, and in-*
10 *crease cooperation with respect to the Demo-*
11 *cratic People's Republic of Korea, with the*
12 *governments of the countries on the list de-*
13 *scribed in clause (iii);*

14 *(D) an assessment of the adequacy of the*
15 *national export control regimes of countries that*
16 *are members of the United Nations, and multi-*
17 *lateral export control regimes, that are necessary*
18 *to enforce sanctions imposed with respect to the*
19 *Democratic People's Republic of Korea pursuant*
20 *to the United Nations Security Council resolu-*
21 *tions referred to in subsection (a)(1); and*

22 *(E) an action plan to encourage and assist*
23 *countries in adopting and using authorities nec-*
24 *essary to enforce export controls required by*
25 *United Nations Security Council resolutions.*

1 (3) *FORM OF REPORT.*—Each report required
 2 under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassi-
 3 fied form, but may include a classified annex.

4 (e) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.*—It is the sense of Congress
 5 that—

6 (1) representatives of the United States shall use
 7 the voice and vote of the United States in all inter-
 8 national organizations, as appropriate, to advocate
 9 for the expulsion of the Democratic People’s Republic
 10 of Korea from such organizations, until such time as
 11 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea meets its
 12 commitments under the United Nations Security
 13 Council resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1);
 14 and

15 (2) the Secretary of State should work to induce
 16 countries to meet their commitments under the United
 17 Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in
 18 subsection (a)(1), including by considering appro-
 19 priate adjustments to the diplomatic posture and for-
 20 eign assistance of the United States with governments
 21 that the Secretary has determined are noncooperative
 22 with respect to implementing the United Nations Se-
 23 curity Council resolutions referred to in subsection
 24 (a)(1).

1 **SEC. 211. NEW ZEALAND.**

2 *The United States Government is committed to—*

3 *(1) the Wellington Declaration, signed on No-*
 4 *vember 5, 2010, which reaffirmed close ties and out-*
 5 *lined future practical cooperation between the United*
 6 *States and New Zealand;*

7 *(2) the Washington Declaration, signed on June*
 8 *19, 2012, which strengthened the defense relationship*
 9 *by providing a framework and strategic guidance for*
 10 *security cooperation and defense dialogues; and*

11 *(3) all related and subsequent bilateral and secu-*
 12 *rity agreements and arrangements between the United*
 13 *States and New Zealand concluded on or before the*
 14 *date of enactment of this Act.*

15 **SEC. 212. THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.**

16 *(a) IN GENERAL.—It is the sense of Congress that the*
 17 *United States should—*

18 *(1) support strong United States engagement*
 19 *with the nations of the South Pacific, including Fiji,*
 20 *Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of*
 21 *Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea,*
 22 *Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and*
 23 *Vanuatu;*

24 *(2) deepen its cooperation with the nations of the*
 25 *South Pacific in areas of mutual interest, includ-*
 26 *ing—*

1 (A) fisheries and marine resource conserva-
2 tion;

3 (B) environmental challenges and resilience;

4 (C) global health;

5 (D) development and trade; and

6 (E) people-to-people ties; and

7 (3) continue to provide assistance to the Pacific
8 Islands, as appropriate, to support the rule of law,
9 good governance, and economic development.

10 (b) UNITED STATES-COMPACTS OF FREE ASSOCIA-
11 TION.—It is the sense of Congress that the Compacts of Free
12 Association entered between the United States and the Free-
13 ly Associated States (Republic of Marshall Islands, the Fed-
14 erated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau)—

15 (1) enhance the strategic posture of the United
16 States in the Western Pacific;

17 (2) reinforce United States regional commitment;

18 (3) preempt potential adversaries from estab-
19 lishing positional advantage; and

20 (4) further self-governance, economic develop-
21 ment, and self-sufficiency of the Freely Associated
22 States.

1 **SEC. 213. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT;**
 2 **PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.**

3 (a) *FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION.*—*It is the policy of the*
 4 *United States—*

5 (1) *to conduct, as part of its global Freedom of*
 6 *Navigation Program, regular freedom of navigation,*
 7 *and overflight operations in the Indo-Pacific region,*
 8 *in accordance with applicable international law; and*
 9 (2) *to promote genuine multilateral negotiations*
 10 *to peacefully resolve maritime disputes in the South*
 11 *China Sea, in accordance with applicable inter-*
 12 *national law.*

13 (b) *JOINT INDO-PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY.*—*It*
 14 *is the sense of Congress that the President should develop*
 15 *a diplomatic strategy that includes working with United*
 16 *States allies and partners to conduct joint maritime train-*
 17 *ing and freedom of navigation operations in the Indo-Pa-*
 18 *cific region, including the East China Sea and the South*
 19 *China Sea, in support of a rules-based international system*
 20 *benefitting all countries.*

21 **SEC. 214. COMBATING TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.**

22 (a) *DEFINITIONS.*—*In this section:*

23 (1) *APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.*—
 24 *The term “appropriate committees of Congress”*
 25 *means—*

1 (A) the Committee on Armed Services of the
2 Senate;

3 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
4 the Senate;

5 (C) the Committee on Armed Services of the
6 House of Representatives; and

7 (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
8 House of Representatives.

9 (2) *ISIS*.—The term “*ISIS*” means the Islamic
10 State of Iraq and Syria.

11 (b) *REPORT*.—Not later than 180 days after the date
12 of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
13 ligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Sec-
14 retary of Defense, and other appropriate Federal officials,
15 shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Con-
16 gress that contains an assessment of the current and future
17 capabilities and activities of *ISIS*-linked, *al-Qaeda*-linked,
18 and other violent extremist groups in Southeast Asia that
19 pose a significant threat to the United States, its allies, and
20 its citizens interests abroad.

21 (c) *ELEMENTS*.—The report required under subsection
22 (b) shall include—

23 (1) the current number of *ISIS*-linked, *al-Qaeda*-
24 linked, and other violent extremist group-affiliated
25 fighters in Southeast Asia;

1 (2) *an estimate of the number of ISIS-linked, al-*
2 *Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-affili-*
3 *ated fighters expected to return to Southeast Asia*
4 *from fighting in the Middle East;*

5 (3) *an analysis of the amounts and sources of*
6 *ISIS-linked, al Qaeda-linked, and other various ex-*
7 *tremist group affiliated-fighters in Southeast Asia;*

8 (4) *the current resources available to combat the*
9 *threat of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other vio-*
10 *lent extremist group-affiliated fighters in Southeast*
11 *Asia, and the additional resources required to combat*
12 *such threat;*

13 (5) *a detailed assessment of the capabilities of*
14 *ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent ex-*
15 *tremist group-affiliated fighters to operate effectively*
16 *in the Indo-Pacific region, including the Philippines,*
17 *Indonesia, and Malaysia;*

18 (6) *a description of the capabilities and resources*
19 *of governments in Southeast Asia to counter violent*
20 *extremist groups; and*

21 (7) *a list of additional United States resources*
22 *and capabilities that the Department of Defense and*
23 *the Department of State recommend providing to gov-*
24 *ernments in Southeast Asia to combat violent extrem-*
25 *ist groups.*

1 **SEC. 215. CYBERSECURITY COOPERATION.**

2 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.*—*It is the sense of Congress*
 3 *that there should be robust cybersecurity cooperation be-*
 4 *tween the United States and nations in the Indo-Pacific*
 5 *region—*

6 (1) *to effectively respond to cybersecurity threats,*
 7 *including state-sponsored threats;*

8 (2) *to share best practices to combat such threats;*

9 (3) *to strengthen resilience against cyberattacks,*
 10 *misinformation, and propaganda; and*

11 (4) *to strengthen the resilience of critical infra-*
 12 *structure.*

13 (b) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.*—*There are*
 14 *authorized to be appropriated \$100,000,000 for each of the*
 15 *fiscal years 2019 through 2023 to enhance cooperation be-*
 16 *tween the United States and Indo-Pacific nations for the*
 17 *purposes of combatting cybersecurity threats.*

18 **SEC. 216. NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL IN THE**
 19 **INDO-PACIFIC REGION.**

20 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*The United States Government—*

21 (1) *recognizes that the spread of nuclear and*
 22 *other weapons of mass destruction, and their means*
 23 *of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace*
 24 *and security;*

25 (2) *seeks to peacefully address the unique chal-*
 26 *lenge posed to regional and global stability by the il-*

1 *licit use, and the proliferation to and from North*
2 *Korea, of sensitive nuclear and missile technologies,*
3 *and other weapons of mass destruction;*

4 *(3) notes efforts by China and Russia—*

5 *(A) to expand and modernize their respec-*
6 *tive nuclear arsenals, including through signifi-*
7 *cant research and development resources in*
8 *hypersonic glide vehicles and other advanced*
9 *technologies; and*

10 *(B) to pursue sales of commercial nuclear*
11 *technologies; and*

12 *(4) recognizes the legitimate pursuit by many*
13 *countries in the Indo-Pacific region of nuclear energy*
14 *for a variety of peaceful applications.*

15 *(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
16 *that the United States Government should undertake all*
17 *reasonable and appropriate efforts to pursue effective arms*
18 *control and nonproliferation policies in the Indo-Pacific re-*
19 *gion to limit the further spread of weapons of mass destruc-*
20 *tion and their means of delivery.*

1 **TITLE III—PROMOTING UNITED**
 2 **STATES ECONOMIC INTER-**
 3 **ESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC**
 4 **REGION**

5 **SEC. 301. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

6 (a) *FINDINGS.*—Congress makes the following findings:

7 (1) *According to the United States Chamber of*
 8 *Commerce, by 2030—*

9 (A) *66 percent of the global middle class*
 10 *population will be living in Asia; and*

11 (B) *59 percent of middle class consumption*
 12 *will take place in Asia.*

13 (2) *According to the Asian Development Bank—*

14 (A) *Asian countries have signed 140 bilat-*
 15 *eral or regional trade agreements; and*

16 (B) *75 more trade agreements with Asian*
 17 *countries are under negotiation or concluded and*
 18 *awaiting entry into force.*

19 (3) *Free trade agreements between the United*
 20 *States and 3 nations in the Indo-Pacific region (Aus-*
 21 *tralia, Singapore, and the Republic of Korea) have*
 22 *entered into force.*

23 (4) *The member states of the Association of*
 24 *Southeast Asian Nations (referred to in this section as*
 25 *“ASEAN”), as a group—*

1 (A) represent the fifth largest economy in
2 the world; and

3 (B) have a combined gross domestic product
4 of \$2,400,000,000,000.

5 (5) The economy comprised of ASEAN member
6 states grew by 66 percent between 2006 and 2015,
7 and the total value of bilateral trade between the
8 United States and ASEAN member states has in-
9 creased by 78 percent since 2004.

10 (6) In 2015, the trade surplus of goods sold by
11 companies in ASEAN member states to consumers in
12 the United States was \$77,000,000,000, while the
13 United States 2015 trade surplus of services provided
14 to consumers in ASEAN member states was
15 \$8,000,000,000.

16 (7) According to US-ASEAN Business Council,
17 goods and services exported from the United States to
18 ASEAN member states support 550,000 jobs in the
19 United States.

20 (8) According to the Business Roundtable—

21 (A) the United States, Australia, Brunei,
22 Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New
23 Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam were re-
24 sponsible for a combined 40 percent of global
25 gross domestic product in 2017; and

(A) ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic Co-
operation “remain centerpieces of the Indo-
Pacific’s regional architecture and platforms for
promoting an order based on freedom”; and

14 (b) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
15 *that trade between the United States and the nations in*
16 *the Indo-Pacific region is vitally important to the United*
17 *States economy, United States exports, and jobs in the*
18 *United States.*

22 *Congress supports—*

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1 (A) *comply with trade obligations and re-*
 2 *spect, promote, and strictly adhere to the rule of*
 3 *law; and*

4 (B) *increase United States employment and*
 5 *expand the economy;*

6 (2) *formal economic dialogues that include con-*
 7 *crete, verifiable, and measured outcomes;*

8 (3) *negotiations under the auspices of the World*
 9 *Trade Organization, including negotiations to enter*
 10 *into appropriate plurilateral and sectoral agreements;*

11 (4) *full implementation of the World Trade Or-*
 12 *ganization's Trade Facilitation Agreement by Indo-*
 13 *Pacific countries; and*

14 (5) *the proactive, strategic, and continuing high-*
 15 *level use of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation*
 16 *forum, the East Asia Summit, and the Group of 20*
 17 *to pursue United States economic objectives in the*
 18 *Indo-Pacific region.*

19 **SEC. 303. UNITED STATES-ASEAN ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP.**

20 *The President should seek to develop to negotiate a*
 21 *comprehensive economic engagement framework with the*
 22 *Association of Southeast Asian Nations.*

1 **SEC. 304. TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING AND TRADE FACILI-**
 2 **TATION.**

3 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*The President is encouraged to*
 4 *produce a robust and comprehensive trade capacity build-*
 5 *ing and trade facilitation strategy, including leveling the*
 6 *playing field for American companies competing in the*
 7 *Indo-Pacific region.*

8 (b) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.*—*There are*
 9 *authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may be nec-*
 10 *essary to carry out subsection (a).*

11 **SEC. 305. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION.**

12 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*The President should takes steps to*
 13 *strengthen the enforcement of United States intellectual*
 14 *property laws as a top priority, including taking all appro-*
 15 *priate action to deter and punish commercial cyber-enabled*
 16 *theft of intellectual property.*

17 (b) *ANNUAL REPORT.*—*Not later than 180 days after*
 18 *the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually there-*
 19 *after for the following 5 years, the President shall submit*
 20 *a report to Congress that—*

21 (1) *describes the efforts of the United States Gov-*
 22 *ernment to combat intellectual property violations*
 23 *and commercial cyber-enabled theft in the Indo-Pa-*
 24 *cific region, particularly the People’s Republic of*
 25 *China; and*

1 (2) *includes a country-by-country assessment of*
 2 *priority areas for United States engagement and ca-*
 3 *capacity building assistance.*

4 (c) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are*
 5 *authorized to be appropriated to the United States Trade*
 6 *Representative such amounts as may be necessary to spon-*
 7 *sor bilateral and multilateral activities designed to build*
 8 *capacity in the identified priority areas described in the*
 9 *annual report required under subsection (b).*

10 **SEC. 306. ENERGY PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES.**

11 (a) *INDO-PACIFIC ENERGY STRATEGY.—*

12 (1) *STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after*
 13 *the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually*
 14 *thereafter for the following 5 years, the President shall*
 15 *establish a comprehensive, integrated, multiyear strat-*
 16 *egy to encourage the efforts of Indo-Pacific countries*
 17 *to implement national power strategies and coopera-*
 18 *tion with United States energy companies and the*
 19 *Department of Energy national laboratories to de-*
 20 *velop an appropriate mix of power solutions to pro-*
 21 *vide access to sufficient, reliable, and affordable power*
 22 *in order to reduce poverty, drive economic growth and*
 23 *job creation, and to increase energy security in the*
 24 *Indo-Pacific region.*

1 (2) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.*—

2 *There are authorized to be appropriated \$1,000,000*
 3 *for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023 to*
 4 *carry out paragraph (1).*

5 (b) *RELIABLE ENERGY PARTNERSHIPS.*—*It is the*
 6 *sense of Congress that the United States should explore op-*
 7 *portunities to partner with the private sector and multilat-*
 8 *eral institutions, such as the World Bank and the Asian*
 9 *Development Bank, to promote universal access to reliable*
 10 *electricity in the Indo-Pacific region, including Myanmar*
 11 *(historically known as “Burma”).*

12 **SEC. 307. LOWER MEKONG INITIATIVE.**

13 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*The Secretary of State, in coopera-*
 14 *tion with the Administrator of the United States Agency*
 15 *for International Development, should increase regional en-*
 16 *gagement in the areas of environment, health, education,*
 17 *and infrastructure development with the Lower Mekong*
 18 *countries, including—*

19 (1) *assisting in the development of programs that*
 20 *focus on forecasting environmental challenges and re-*
 21 *silience;*

22 (2) *assisting with transnational cooperation on*
 23 *sustainable uses of forest and water resources with the*
 24 *goal of preserving the biodiversity of the Mekong*
 25 *Basin and access to safe drinking water;*

1 (3) *assisting with education enrollment and*
2 *broadband internet connectivity, particularly English*
3 *training and connectivity in rural communities; and*

4 (4) *improving global health in the Lower Mekong*
5 *countries, including—*

6 (A) *reducing the HIV/AIDS infection rate;*

7 *and*

8 (B) *helping regional partners to track and*
9 *treat malaria and tuberculosis.*

10 (b) *REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date*
11 *of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter*
12 *through 2023, the Secretary of State, in cooperation with*
13 *the Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-*
14 *national Development, shall submit a report to Congress*
15 *that includes—*

16 (1) *a list and evaluation of Lower Mekong Ini-*
17 *tiative activities since its inception in 2009;*

18 (2) *a strategy for any increased regional engage-*
19 *ment and measures of success for the activities de-*
20 *scribed in paragraph (1); and*

21 (3) *an accounting of funds used to execute Lower*
22 *Mekong Initiative activities.*

1 **SEC. 308. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH**
 2 **AND NATURAL RESOURCE CONSERVATION.**

3 *It is the sense of Congress that the President should*
 4 *encourage the governments of countries in the Indo-Pacific*
 5 *region and United States private sector interests with oper-*
 6 *ations and investments in the region to deploy agriculture*
 7 *practices that—*

8 *(1) conserve natural resources; and*

9 *(2) preserve culturally and ecological valuable*
 10 *lands and water bodies.*

11 **SEC. 309. SENSE OF CONGRESS IN SUPPORT OF WOMEN'S**
 12 **ECONOMIC RIGHTS.**

13 *It is the sense of the Congress that the United States*
 14 *should—*

15 *(1) support activities that secure private prop-*
 16 *erty rights and land tenure for women in developing*
 17 *countries in Asia, including—*

18 *(A) establishing legal frameworks to give*
 19 *women equal rights to own, register, use, profit*
 20 *from, and inherit land and property;*

21 *(B) improving legal literacy to enable*
 22 *women to exercise the rights described in sub-*
 23 *paragraph (A); and*

24 *(C) increasing the capacity of law enforce-*
 25 *ment and community leaders to enforce such*
 26 *rights;*

(2) *work with Asian civil society, governments, and multilateral organizations to increase the capability of disadvantaged women and girls in Asia—*

(A) to realize their rights;

(B) to determine their life outcomes;

(C) to assume leadership roles; and

(D) to influence decision-making in their households, communities, and societies; and

(3) seek to expand access to appropriate financial products and services for women-owned micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises in Asia.

TITLE IV—PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

SEC. 401. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The promotion of human rights and respect for democratic values in the Indo-Pacific region is in the United States' national security interest.

(2) Continued support for human rights, democratic values, and good governance is critical to a successful United States diplomatic strategy in the Indo-Pacific.

(3) Strong support for human rights and democracy in the Indo-Pacific region is critical to efforts to

1 *reduce poverty, build rule of law, combat corruption,*
 2 *reduce the allure of extremism, and promote economic*
 3 *growth.*

4 *(4) There are serious concerns with the rule of*
 5 *law and civil liberties in Cambodia, China, North*
 6 *Korea, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, which have all*
 7 *been identified by Freedom House as “Not Free”.*

8 *(5) There have been unacceptable human rights*
 9 *developments in—*

10 *(A) Burma (Myanmar), which has been*
 11 *identified by Freedom House as “Partly Free”,*
 12 *and the Department of State has declared that*
 13 *the violence against the Rohingya constitutes eth-*
 14 *nic cleansing;*

15 *(B) the Philippines, which has been identi-*
 16 *fied by Freedom House as “Partly Free”, and*
 17 *where there are continued disturbing reports of*
 18 *extra-judicial killings; and*

19 *(C) China, where forced disappearances, ex-*
 20 *tralegal detentions, invasive and omnipresent*
 21 *surveillance, and lack of due process in judicial*
 22 *proceedings remain troublesome.*

23 *(6) according to the National Security Strategy,*
 24 *the United States—*

1 (A) will “support, with our words and ac-
 2 tions, those who live under oppressive regimes
 3 and who seek freedom, individual dignity, and
 4 the rule of law”;

5 (B) “may use diplomacy, sanctions, and
 6 other tools to isolate states and leaders who
 7 threaten our interests and whose actions run
 8 contrary to our values”; and

9 (C) “will support efforts to advance wom-
 10 en’s equality, protect the rights of women and
 11 girls, and promote women and youth empower-
 12 ment programs”.

13 **SEC. 402. TRAFFICKING-IN-PERSONS.**

14 *The President is encouraged to pursue additional ef-*
 15 *forts to combat trafficking in persons and human slavery*
 16 *in the Indo-Pacific region.*

17 **SEC. 403. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS.**

18 *It is the sense of Congress that—*

19 (1) *United States Government officials should*
 20 *lead by example—*

21 (A) *by continuing to advocate for freedom of*
 22 *the press in the Indo-Pacific region; and*

23 (B) *by engaging with the press corps at*
 24 *every appropriate opportunity; and*

1 (2) *the United States should advocate and sup-*
 2 *port a Ministerial to Advance Press Freedom in the*
 3 *Indo-Pacific to convene government and civil society,*
 4 *including journalists, to discuss and address the chal-*
 5 *lenges facing press freedom in the Indo-Pacific region.*

6 **SEC. 404. DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR PER-**
 7 **SONNEL.**

8 *It is the sense of Congress that—*

9 (1) *United States embassies and consulates in*
 10 *the Indo-Pacific region should have personnel, as ap-*
 11 *propriate, who are dedicated to reporting on and ad-*
 12 *vancing United States democracy, human rights,*
 13 *labor, anti-corruption, and good governance policy*
 14 *interests; and*

15 (2) *appropriate resources should be made avail-*
 16 *able to carry out such activities.*

17 **SEC. 405. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL DIALOGUES; PEOPLE-**
 18 **TO-PEOPLE ENGAGEMENT.**

19 *The Secretary of State should, as appropriate—*

20 (1) *establish high-level bilateral and regional*
 21 *dialogues with nations in the Indo-Pacific region re-*
 22 *garding human rights and religious freedom viola-*
 23 *tions;*

- 1 (2) *establish or support robust, people-to-people*
 2 *exchange programs in the Indo-Pacific region, par-*
 3 *ticularly programs engaging young leaders; and*
 4 (3) *establish educational exchanges and capacity-*
 5 *building programs emphasizing civil society develop-*
 6 *ment.*

7 **SEC. 406. ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS**
 8 **HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGY.**

9 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*
 10 *that the United States should continue to work with*
 11 *ASEAN to improve the capacity of ASEAN to address*
 12 *human rights, democracy, and good governance issues in*
 13 *Southeast Asia.*

14 (b) *STRATEGY.—Not later than 90 days after the date*
 15 *of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, after*
 16 *consultation with the Administrator of the United States*
 17 *Agency for International Development, shall submit a strat-*
 18 *egy to the appropriate congressional committees to increase*
 19 *cooperation with ASEAN to promote human rights, democ-*
 20 *racy, and good governance in Southeast Asia.*

21 (c) *CONTENTS.—The strategy submitted under sub-*
 22 *section (b) should include—*

- 23 (1) *an assessment of the types of United States*
 24 *Government resources available to support increased*
 25 *cooperation; and*

1 (2) *an assessment to identify entities within*
 2 *ASEAN that the United States could potentially sup-*
 3 *port or partner with to promote human rights, de-*
 4 *mocracy, and good governance in Southeast Asia.*

5 **SEC. 407. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION TO NORTH KOREA.**

6 *The President is encouraged to continue efforts to en-*
 7 *hance freedom of information access with regard to North*
 8 *Korea.*

9 **SEC. 408. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IMPOSITION OF SANC-**
 10 **TIONS AND SUSPENSION OF UNITED STATES**
 11 **ASSISTANCE.**

12 (a) *SANCTIONS.—It is the sense of Congress that the*
 13 *President should impose targeted financial penalties and*
 14 *visa ban sanctions, in accordance with applicable law and*
 15 *other relevant authorities, on any individual or entity*
 16 *that—*

17 (1) *violates human rights or religious freedoms;*

18 *or*

19 (2) *engages in censorship activities.*

20 (b) *SUSPENSION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.—It is the*
 21 *sense of Congress that the President should, in accordance*
 22 *with applicable law, terminate, suspend, or otherwise alter*
 23 *United States economic assistance to any country that has*
 24 *engaged in serious violations of human rights or religious*
 25 *freedoms.*

1 **SEC. 409. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

2 (a) *PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC*
3 *REGION.*—

4 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—*There is authorized to be ap-*
5 *propriated \$210,000,000, for each of the fiscal years*
6 *2019 through 2023, to promote democracy, strengthen*
7 *civil society, human rights, rule of law, transparency,*
8 *and accountability in the Indo-Pacific region, includ-*
9 *ing for universities, civil society, and multilateral in-*
10 *stitutions that are focusing on education awareness,*
11 *training, and capacity building.*

12 (2) *DEMOCRACY IN CHINA.*—*Amounts appro-*
13 *priated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be made*
14 *available for United States Government efforts, led by*
15 *the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy,*
16 *Human Rights, and Labor, to promote democracy, the*
17 *rule of law, and human rights in the People's Repub-*
18 *lic of China.*

19 (3) *TIBET.*—*Amounts appropriated pursuant to*
20 *paragraph (1) shall be made available for nongovern-*
21 *mental organizations to support activities preserving*
22 *cultural traditions and promoting sustainable devel-*
23 *opment, education, and environmental conservation*
24 *in Tibetan communities in the Tibet Autonomous Re-*
25 *gion and in other Tibetan communities in China,*
26 *India, and Nepal.*

1 **SEC. 410. INDO-PACIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS.**

2 (a) *DEFINED TERM.*—*In this section, the term*
3 *“human rights defenders” means individuals, working*
4 *alone or in groups, who nonviolently advocate for the pro-*
5 *motion and protection of universally recognized human*
6 *rights and fundamental freedoms if the advocacy of such*
7 *issues may result in the risk of safety or life.*

8 (b) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.*—*It is the sense of Congress*
9 *that human rights defenders in the Indo-Pacific region have*
10 *been facing increased difficulties with the rise of unprece-*
11 *dented crackdowns and conflicts.*

12 (c) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.*—*There are*
13 *authorized to be appropriated \$1,000,000 for each of the*
14 *fiscal years 2019 through 2023 to provide critical assistance*
15 *to human rights defenders through the Department of*
16 *State’s Human Rights Defenders Fund.*

17 (d) *REPORT.*—*Not later than 180 days after the date*
18 *of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter*
19 *through 2023, the Secretary of State, in cooperation with*
20 *the Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-*
21 *national Development, shall submit a report to Congress*
22 *that includes—*

23 (1) *a list and evaluation of the Human Rights*
24 *Defenders Fund activities since its inception;*

1 (2) *a strategy for any increased regional engage-*
 2 *ment and measures of success for the activities de-*
 3 *scribed in paragraph (1); and*

4 (3) *an accounting of funds used to execute the*
 5 *Human Rights Defender Fund activities.*

6 **SEC. 411. YOUNG LEADERS PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE INITIA-**
 7 **TIVES.**

8 *There are authorized to be appropriated \$25,000,000*
 9 *for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023 to support*
 10 *Indo-Pacific young leaders initiatives, including the Young*
 11 *Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative, the ASEAN Youth Vol-*
 12 *unteers Program, and other people-to-people exchange pro-*
 13 *grams that focus on building the capacity of democracy,*
 14 *human rights, and good governance activists in the Indo-*
 15 *Pacific region.*

16 **SEC. 412. SAVINGS PROVISION.**

17 *Nothing in this Act may be construed as authorizing*
 18 *the use of military force.*

Attest:

Clerk.

115TH CONGRESS
2^D SESSION

S. 2736

AMENDMENT