[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1891 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>






115th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1891

  To promote peace and justice in Afghanistan, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 28, 2017

  Mr. Cardin introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
             referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
  To promote peace and justice in Afghanistan, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Promoting Peace 
and Justice for the People of Afghanistan Act of 2017''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Definitions.
Sec. 4. Sense of Congress.
                           TITLE I--STRATEGY

Sec. 101. Strategy requirement.
                 TITLE II--SUPPORTING PEACE AND JUSTICE

Sec. 201. Authorization of Afghanistan Peace and Justice Initiative.
Sec. 202. Report on transitioning to peace and justice in Afghanistan.
                TITLE III--SUPPORTING CIVILIAN SECURITY

Sec. 301. Civilian security activities.
Sec. 302. Report on corruption and abuses by civilian security forces.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) As stated by President Donald J. Trump on August 21, 
        2017, ``Military power alone will not bring peace to 
        Afghanistan or stop the terrorist threat arising in that 
        country.''.
            (2) Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson noted, on August 
        22, 2017, that the current fighting in Afghanistan will ``take 
        everyone nowhere, and it is time to begin a process--it may 
        very well be a lengthy process--of reconciliation and a peace 
        accord.''. He further noted that the United States seeks ``to 
        facilitate a reconciliation peace process,'' working with other 
        countries in the region.
            (3) The June 2017 report by the Department of Defense, 
        titled ``Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan'', 
        states ``The U.S. and Afghan Governments agree that the best 
        way to ensure lasting peace and security in Afghanistan is 
        through reconciliation and a political settlement with the 
        Taliban.''.
            (4) On June 6, 2017, the Government of the Islamic Republic 
        of Afghanistan, with the participation of regional and 
        international partners, launched the Kabul Process for Peace 
        and Security Cooperation, which is based on the premise that a 
        stable Afghanistan is necessary for a stable region.
            (5) The Afghanistan High Peace Council was established by 
        the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on 
        September 5, 2010, within the context of the Afghanistan Peace 
        and Reintegration Program and was tasked with negotiating an 
        end to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's 
        conflict with the Taliban in Afghanistan, with input from women 
        and civil society representatives in the country.
            (6) As noted by the Commander of the United States Central 
        Command, General Joseph Votel, in testimony to the Committee on 
        Armed Services of the Senate on March 9, 2017, corruption 
        remains a significant challenge to the capability of the Afghan 
        National Security Forces.
            (7) As stated in the report referred to in paragraph (3), 
        the Afghan Ministry of Interior ``possesses the basic systems 
        and organizations to investigate and adjudicate'' alleged 
        corruption and human rights violations, but ``the political 
        will to hold violators, especially senior officers, accountable 
        remains fragile.''. The report further notes that the Afghan 
        Ministry of Interior lags behind the Afghan Ministry of Defense 
        ``in its capacity to train personnel and units on rule of law 
        and corruption issues.''.
            (8) On June 30, 2016, the President of the Islamic Republic 
        of Afghanistan established the Anti-Corruption Justice Center 
        (ACJC) under the Attorney General's Office to combat high-level 
        corruption within the Government of Afghanistan. The ACJC has 
        since prosecuted several major corruption cases. The 
        Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation 
        Committee in Afghanistan noted, in its August 2017 quarterly 
        report, that the ACJC ``has continued functioning as an 
        effective judicial device to combat corruption in various 
        government organizations.''.
            (9) The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission was 
        established on June 6, 2002, pursuant to the Agreement on 
        Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-
        Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, done in 
        Bonn, Germany, December 5, 2001 (commonly known as the ``Bonn 
        Agreement''), and functions as a national human rights 
        institution working on the protection and promotion of human 
        rights in Afghanistan.
            (10) As stated in the United Nations Assistance Mission to 
        Afghanistan's (UNAMA) 2016 Annual Report on the Protection of 
        Civilians in Armed Conflict in Afghanistan, the number of 
        civilian casualties in Afghanistan in 2016 was the highest 
        since UNAMA began counting such casualties in 2009 and women 
        and children ``continue to be disproportionately affected by 
        the conflict.''. UNAMA also noted, in the 2017 Midyear Report 
        on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in 
        Afghanistan, that ``both child and women casualties rose during 
        the first half of 2017.''.
            (11) The report referred to in paragraph (3) notes that--
                    (A) ``structural barriers, traditional cultural 
                norms, and insecurity'' contributed to the precarious 
                situation of women in Afghanistan and in the 
                Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces; and
                    (B) ``little progress has been made toward 
                implementation'' of the Government of Afghanistan's 
                National Action Plan on United Nations Security Council 
                Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security.
            (12) The New Development Partnership With Afghanistan was 
        launched by the United States Agency for International 
        Development in March 2015 to reinforce the United States 
        ``commitment to results and accountability by linking funds to 
        specific reforms in combating corruption, promoting rule of 
        law, strengthening women's rights, and enhancing private sector 
        growth.''.
            (13) The Afghan Compact, which was launched by the 
        President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in Kabul on 
        August 24, 2017--
                    (A) commits the Government of Afghanistan to key 
                reforms aimed at improving security and creating a more 
                peaceful, stable, and prosperous society; and
                    (B) includes benchmarks in the areas of governance, 
                security, peace and reconciliation, and economy, which 
                reflect global standards.
            (14) The United States has been a leading donor to the 
        Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, which was established in 
        2002, to provide a coordinated financing mechanism for the 
        Government of Afghanistan's budget and priority national 
        investment projects.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate;
                    (B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
                    (C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives; and
                    (D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
                Representatives.
            (2) Atrocity crimes.--The term ``atrocity crimes'' refers 
        to any of the following:
                    (A) ``War crimes'' as defined in section 2441(c) of 
                title 18, United States Code.
                    (B) ``Genocide'' as defined in section 1091(a) of 
                title 18, United States Code.
                    (C) ``Crimes against humanity'' as defined in 
                Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International 
                Criminal Court.
            (3) Gross violations of internationally recognized human 
        rights.--The term ``gross violations of internationally 
        recognized human rights'' has the meaning given the term in 
        section 502B(d)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
        U.S.C. 2304(d)(1)).
            (4) Transitional justice.--The term ``transitional 
        justice'' means the range of judicial, non-judicial, formal, 
        informal, retributive, and restorative measures employed by 
        countries transitioning out of armed conflict to redress 
        legacies of atrocities and promote long-term, sustainable 
        peace.

SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) it is in the national security interests of the United 
        States that the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
        Afghanistan and the Afghan Taliban conclude, through inclusive 
        negotiations, a political settlement in which the Taliban--
                    (A) renounces violence;
                    (B) breaks ties to international terrorism; and
                    (C) accepts the Afghan constitution, including its 
                safeguards to respect human rights, especially of 
                women, girls, and ethnic and religious minorities;
            (2) the United States Government should urge all regional 
        actors to play a constructive role in supporting peace and 
        stability in Afghanistan and the South Asia region, including 
        by--
                    (A) refraining from supporting proxy forces in 
                Afghanistan; and
                    (B) exercising their influence on the Afghan 
                Taliban to renounce violence, break ties with 
                international terrorism, and enter into talks with 
                representatives of the Government of Afghanistan 
                without preconditions;
            (3) the United States Government should bring all the tools 
        at its disposal to bear in seeking a political settlement to 
        the conflict in Afghanistan, including the diplomatic and 
        development expertise at the Department of State and United 
        States Agency for International Development;
            (4) the United States Government should increase its 
        bilateral and multilateral engagement by Cabinet members and 
        other high-level officials in support of a negotiated political 
        settlement, including by continuing to support engagement in 
        the Quadrilateral Coordination Group and other formats for 
        dialogue among regional powers to promote a negotiated 
        settlement to the conflict in Afghanistan;
            (5) the United States Government should stipulate clear 
        conditions for the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan, 
        including guarantees that Afghan territory will not be used to 
        stage attacks on the United States;
            (6) combat operations, including offensive actions and 
        combat-enabling support to operations such as close air 
        support, are inherently government functions that cannot be 
        appropriately carried out by private contractors;
            (7) the United States Government--
                    (A) should not deploy private contractors to 
                undertake combat operations in Afghanistan or embed 
                with the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces; 
                and
                    (B) should respect the sovereignty of the 
                democratically elected Government of the Islamic 
                Republic of Afghanistan over Afghan territory;
            (8) the United States Government should support democratic, 
        accountable, and inclusive governance in Afghanistan;
            (9) the President should use the authority of the President 
        to impose sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights 
        Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114-
        328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) on officials of the Government of 
        Afghanistan and their associates responsible for gross 
        violations of internationally recognized human rights or acts 
        of significant corruption;
            (10) the United States Government should use other existing 
        authorities to implement visa bans and asset freezes on Afghan 
        individuals responsible for corruption;
            (11) it is in the national interests of the United States 
        that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
        effectively upholds civilian security by enforcing the rule of 
        law and ensuring accountability for abuses and corruption 
        committed by state actors;
            (12) approaches, such as the New Development Partnership of 
        the United States Agency for International Development, which 
        link funds provided to the Government of Afghanistan to 
        specific reforms--
                    (A) are important for incentivizing progress by the 
                Government of Afghanistan, including the commitments it 
                has made in the Afghan Compact, and ensuring the 
                effectiveness and sustainable impact of United States 
                assistance; and
                    (B) should be utilized more broadly by the 
                Department of State and the Department of Defense to 
                link funding to specific progress on benchmarks 
                relating to human rights, anti-corruption, and 
                accountable governance, particularly with respect to 
                assistance to Afghan security forces and relevant 
                ministries; and
            (13) The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
        should--
                    (A) implement laws and policies to govern 
                democratically, including through the conduct of 
                regular, inclusive, credible, and transparent 
                elections, and to protect the rights of individuals, 
                civil society, and the media;
                    (B) take consistent steps to protect and advance 
                the rights of women, girls, and ethnic and religious 
                minorities in Afghanistan;
                    (C) effectively implement a whole-of-government, 
                anti-corruption strategy that has been endorsed by the 
                High Council on Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption, as 
                agreed to at the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan in 
                October 2016;
                    (D) prosecute individuals alleged to be involved in 
                corrupt or illegal activities in Afghanistan;
                    (E) take consistent steps to develop a 
                professional, accountable civilian police force and 
                ensure that its use in counter-insurgency aims does not 
                undermine law enforcement and the rule of law;
                    (F) take consistent steps, through the civilian 
                justice system, to investigate and prosecute military 
                and police personnel who are credibly alleged to have 
                violated human rights, and to ensure that the military 
                and the police are cooperating in such cases; and
                    (G) take consistent steps to promote additional 
                transitional justice measures.

                           TITLE I--STRATEGY

SEC. 101. STRATEGY REQUIREMENT.

    (a) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the President shall submit its strategy for United States 
engagement in Afghanistan to the appropriate congressional committees.
    (b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall 
include detailed information on specific steps to be taken to support 
the following objectives:
            (1) A negotiated political resolution to the conflict in 
        Afghanistan in which the Taliban renounces violence, breaks 
        ties to international terrorism, and accepts Afghan 
        constitutional provisions, including those which safeguard 
        human rights.
            (2) Progress toward the withdrawal of United States forces 
        that is based on clearly stipulated conditions and an 
        articulation of those conditions.
            (3) A democratic, accountable, and inclusive Government of 
        the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan chosen in regular, 
        inclusive, credible, and transparent electoral processes.
            (4) Effective, accountable, and sustainable Afghan National 
        Security and Defense Forces that are able to disrupt and 
        degrade the activities of al Qa'ida, Islamic State, and other 
        terrorist groups in Afghanistan.
            (5) Judicial and civilian law enforcement institutions that 
        uphold the rule of law and ensure accountability for official 
        acts of corruption and violations of human rights.
            (6) Regional diplomatic efforts to promote the long-term 
        stabilization of Afghanistan and end safe haven for proxy 
        forces.
    (c) Implementation.--
            (1) Combat operations.--In implementing the strategy 
        required under this section, Federal agencies may not--
                    (A) employ private security contractors to conduct 
                combat operations, including offensive actions and 
                combat-enabling support to operations, inside 
                Afghanistan; or
                    (B) embed such contractors with Afghan military 
                units to engage directly in combat operations.
            (2) Code of conduct.--In employing private security 
        contractors for activities other than combat operations, 
        Federal agencies shall ensure that such contractors--
                    (A) act in accordance with principles, standards, 
                and codes of conduct that are based on international 
                law; and
                    (B) participate in oversight and accountability 
                mechanisms to ensure that their conduct is consistent 
                with such principles, standards, and codes of conduct.

                 TITLE II--SUPPORTING PEACE AND JUSTICE

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF AFGHANISTAN PEACE AND JUSTICE INITIATIVE.

    (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated for the Afghanistan Peace and Justice Initiative, for the 
fiscal years 2018 and 2019, such sums as may be necessary to support 
governmental and nongovernmental activities that promote peace and 
justice.
    (b) Use of Funds.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) 
shall be used for the following activities:
            (1) To support governmental and nongovernmental initiatives 
        to include citizens' input into the work of the Government of 
        Afghanistan's High Peace Council and formal government peace 
        negotiations, including activities to incorporate the input of 
        women, ethnic and religious minorities, and other vulnerable 
        groups.
            (2) To support governmental and nongovernmental 
        initiatives, including initiatives through the Afghan 
        Independent Human Rights Commission, to promote accountability 
        for atrocity crimes, including acts committed by governmental 
        and nongovernmental actors.
            (3) To support governmental and nongovernmental 
        initiatives, including initiatives through the Afghan 
        Independent Human Rights Commission, to promote peace building, 
        transitional justice, and reconciliation, including cross-
        border and regional programming.
    (c) Implementation.--The Secretary of State, in consultation with 
the Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development, shall coordinate and carry out the activities described in 
subsection (b).

SEC. 202. REPORT ON TRANSITIONING TO PEACE AND JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State 
shall submit to Congress a report describing United States diplomatic 
engagement and assistance, including through the Afghan Peace and 
Justice Initiative, to support progress on a negotiated peace 
settlement and transitional justice mechanisms to address atrocity 
crimes in Afghanistan.
    (b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
include the following elements:
            (1) An unclassified summary, with classified annex as 
        necessary, of progress toward a negotiated peace settlement and 
        how the United States Government is supporting such progress 
        through its engagement with governments and other actors in the 
        South Asia and Central Asia regions, including by Cabinet 
        members and other high-level officials.
            (2) A list of officials of the Government of Afghanistan 
        and nongovernmental actors credibly alleged to have committed 
        war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity, a description 
        of the alleged crimes, and a description of steps taken to hold 
        these individuals accountable for the alleged crimes.
            (3) A summary of national-level efforts to promote 
        transitional justice, including forensic efforts and 
        documentation of war crimes, genocide, or crimes against 
        humanity, redress to victims, and reconciliation activities.
            (4) A summary of United States support for Government of 
        Afghanistan and civil society efforts to promote peace and 
        justice at the local level and how these efforts are informing 
        government-level policies and negotiations.

                TITLE III--SUPPORTING CIVILIAN SECURITY

SEC. 301. CIVILIAN SECURITY ACTIVITIES.

    (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated to the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 
account and the Economic Support Fund account, for fiscal years 2018 
and 2019, such sums as may be necessary to support the civilian 
security activities described in subsection (b).
    (b) Use of Funds.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) 
shall be used for the following activities:
            (1) To support the strengthening of oversight mechanisms 
        within the Ministry of Interior to identify and address human 
        rights abuses and corruption committed by Ministry of Interior 
        security forces, including units involved in counter-insurgency 
        activities at the local level and holding territory recently 
        reclaimed from insurgents.
            (2) To support the efforts of the Office of the Attorney 
        General of Afghanistan, including the Anti-Corruption Justice 
        Center, to strengthen the rule of law and bolster the 
        effectiveness of judicial officials and civilian police forces 
        through investigations and prosecutions of such individuals for 
        human rights abuses or corruption, including through support to 
        protect judicial officials, lawyers, victims, and witnesses 
        involved in such investigations and prosecutions.
            (3) To support the Ministry of Interior to operate shelters 
        for women and girls who are victims of human rights abuses and 
        domestic violence and to improve internal investigative 
        mechanisms and gender-sensitive policing in order to enable 
        women and girl victims to safely pursue justice for crimes 
        committed against them.
            (4) To support the work of the Afghan Independent Human 
        Rights Commission or nongovernmental organizations to support 
        accountability for human rights abuses and corruption through 
        work with relevant agencies within the Government of 
        Afghanistan.

SEC. 302. REPORT ON CORRUPTION AND ABUSES BY CIVILIAN SECURITY FORCES.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State 
and the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report to Congress that 
contains--
            (1) a description of progress made by the Ministry of 
        Interior and the Office of the Attorney General of Afghanistan 
        to address gross violations of internationally recognized human 
        rights committed by civilian security forces and of the 
        budgetary resources of the Government of Afghanistan allotted 
        to this effort;
            (2) a summary of criminal prosecutions undertaken against 
        corrupt or abusive civilian security forces during the 
        reporting period and the disposition of such prosecutions;
            (3) a summary of--
                    (A) assistance provided by the Department of State 
                and the Department of Defense to support accountability 
                for human rights abuses and corruption by civilian 
                security forces; and
                    (B) measures to mitigate civilian casualties in 
                counterterrorism operations; and
            (4) a list of benchmarks that are being utilized to 
        incentivize progress on accountability for corruption and gross 
        violations of internationally recognized human rights and the 
        release of funds for on-budget support, including through the 
        Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, to security and other 
        relevant ministries of the Government of Afghanistan.
                                 <all>