[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1442 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
115th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 1442
To establish United States policy for the Arctic region for the next 10
years, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
June 26, 2017
Mr. Sullivan introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To establish United States policy for the Arctic region for the next 10
years, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Securing Our Arctic Interests Act of
2017''.
SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION TO PROCURE UP TO SIX POLAR-CLASS ICEBREAKERS.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The strategic importance of the Arctic continues to
increase as the United States and other countries recognize the
military significance of the sea lanes and choke points within
the region and understand the potential for power projection
from the Arctic into multiple regions.
(2) The economic significance of the Arctic continues to
grow as nations around the globe begin to understand the
potential for maritime transportation through, and economic and
trade development in, the region.
(3) Given the potential for maritime accidents, oil spills,
and illegal fishing near the exclusive economic zone of the
United States, increases in human, maritime, and resource
development activity in the Arctic region are expected to
create additional mission requirements for the Department of
Defense and the Department of Homeland Security.
(4) The Bering Strait is experiencing significant increases
in international traffic from vessels transiting the Northern
Sea Route, increases which are projected to continue if
decreases in sea ice coverage continue.
(5) Russia has prioritized the development of Arctic
capabilities and has made significant investments in military
infrastructure in the Arctic, including the creation of a new
Arctic Command and the construction or refurbishment of 16
deepwater ports and 14 airfields in the region.
(6) Russia currently has approximately 40 icebreakers,
including several nuclear-powered icebreakers, is currently
constructing four, and is planing to build an additional eight.
(7) On May 15, 2015, former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter
stated that ``[t]he Arctic is going to be a major area of
importance to the United States, both strategically and
economically in the future--it's fair to say that we're late to
the recognition of that''.
(8) On July 6, 2015, Admiral Paul F. Zukunft, the
Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, stated with
respect to United States strategic presence and supporting
infrastructure of the United States in the Arctic that
``[w]e're not even in the same league as Russia right now.
We're not playing in this game at all''.
(9) On January 12, 2017, Secretary of Defense James Mattis
stated that ``[t]he Arctic is key strategic terrain . . .
Russia is taking aggressive steps to increase its presence
there . . . I will prioritize the development of an integrated
strategy for the Arctic. I believe that our interests and the
security of the Arctic would benefit from increasing the focus
of the Department of Defense on this region''.
(10) Section 1068 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92) requires a new
Department of Defense ``Strategy to Protect the United States
National Security Interests in the Arctic Region''.
(11) Section 1095 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328) requires the
Department of Defense to designate a Department of Defense
Strategic Arctic Port.
(12) In January 2017, the Department of Defense released a
report entitled ``Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect
United States National Security Interests in the Arctic
Region'' to ``update the ways and means the Department of
Defense intends to use to achieve its objectives as it
implements the 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region'',
including--
(A) enhancing the capability of United States
forces to defend the homeland and exercise sovereignty;
(B) strengthening deterrence at home and abroad;
(C) strengthening alliances and partnerships;
(D) preserving freedom of the seas in the Arctic;
(E) engaging public, private, and international
partners to improve domain awareness in the Arctic;
(F) evolving the infrastructure and capabilities of
the Department in the Arctic consistent with changing
conditions and needs;
(G) providing support to civil authorities, as
directed;
(H) partnering with other departments and agencies
of Government, and other nations, to support human and
environmental security; and
(I) supporting international institutions that
promote regional cooperation and the rule of law.
(13) In June 2014, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) reported that the Coast Guard was experiencing a gap in
its heavy icebreaking capability and was without a heavy
icebreaker from 2010 to 2013.
(14) Since 2013, the United States Coast Guard has operated
just one heavy icebreaker--the Polar Star--and one medium
icebreaker--the Healy--which is less capability and capacity
than the United States Coast Guard has historically had in its
fleet.
(15) The only other heavy icebreaker of the United States
Coast Guard--the Polar Sea--has been inactive since
experiencing major engine damage in June 2010.
(16) In June 2016, the Government Accountability Office
reported on the status of the Arctic strategy of the United
States Coast Guard and how it had been unable to fulfill a
portion of its polar icebreaking responsibilities due to its
aging icebreaker fleet.
(17) Senior Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security,
and Office of Management and Budget officials have acknowledged
that, at historical funding levels, the Coast Guard cannot
afford to recapitalize and modernize its assets in accordance
with the current plan.
(18) In July 2010, the Coast Guard first identified a need
for a new icebreaker fleet of 3 heavy cutters and 3 medium
cutters to fulfill its statutory missions.
(19) Preliminary estimates for the acquisition cost for
detailed development and construction of the first new heavy
icebreaker for the United States have been as high as
$1,000,000,000.
(20) The Coast Guard is currently partnering with the Navy,
through an Integrated Program Office, in an attempt to leverage
the shipbuilding expertise of the Navy.
(b) Authority To Procure Icebreakers.--The Secretary of the
department in which the Coast Guard is operating may, in consultation
with the Secretary of the Navy, enter into a contract or contracts for
the procurement of up to six polar-class icebreakers, including--
(1) polar-class heavy icebreakers; and
(2) polar-class medium icebreakers.
(c) Comptroller General of the United States Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 45 days after the date of
the enactment of the this Act, the Comptroller General of the
United States shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services
of the Senate and the House of Representatives, the Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate, and the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of
Representatives a report assessing the cost and procurement
schedule for new United States icebreakers.
(2) Elements.--The report required in paragraph (1) shall
include an analysis of the following:
(A) The current status of the efforts of the Coast
Guard to acquire new icebreaking capability, including
coordination through the Integrated Program Office.
(B) Actions being taken by the Coast Guard to
incorporate key practices from other nations that
procure icebreakers to increase knowledge and reduce
costs and risks.
(C) The extent by which the cost and schedule for
building Coast Guard icebreakers differs from those in
other countries, if known.
(D) The extent that innovative acquisition
practices (such as multiyear funding and block buys)
may be applied to icebreaker acquisition to reduce the
cost and accelerate the schedule.
(E) A capacity replacement plan to mitigate a
potential icebreaker capability gap if the Polar Star
cannot remain in service.
(F) Any other matters the Comptroller General
considers appropriate.
SEC. 3. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REVIEW OF NAVY CAPABILITIES IN THE ARCTIC
REGION.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In recent years, the retreat of polar sea ice in the
Arctic, combined with an expected increase in human activity in
the region, has heightened the interests of the United States
and other nations in the Arctic region.
(2) Diminishing sea ice has made some Arctic waters
navigable for longer periods and, as a result, may contribute
to new economic opportunities in commercial shipping, resource
extraction, tourism, and commercial fishing.
(3) Arctic Region Policy, as outlined in National Security
Presidential Directive-66 and Homeland Security Presidential
Directive-25, states that ``[t]he United States has broad and
fundamental national security interests in the Arctic region,''
including ``such matters as . . . deployment of sea and air
systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime
presence, and maritime security operations; and ensuring
freedom of navigation and overflight''.
(4) The January 2017 report of the Department of Defense
entitled ``Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United
States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region''
states that ``[i]n support of the U.S. national security
interest in preserving all of the rights, freedoms, and uses of
the sea and airspace recognized under international law, DoD
will preserve the global mobility of U.S. military and civilian
vessels and aircraft throughout the Arctic, as in other
regions. This includes conducting Freedom of Navigation
operations to challenge excessive maritime claims when and
where necessary''.
(5) In regard to the ability of the United States Navy to
conduct Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the Arctic
region, on June 15, 2017, Admiral John Richardson, Chief of
Naval Operations, stated that ``[i]t's absolutely true that we
don't have the capacity or the capability''.
(b) Reports.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Navy shall
submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the
capabilities of the Navy in the Arctic region.
(2) Elements.--The report required in paragraph (1) shall
include an analysis of the following:
(A) The current naval capabilities of the
Department of Defense in the Arctic region, with a
particular emphasis on surface capabilities.
(B) Any gaps that exist between the current naval
capabilities described in paragraph (1) and the ability
of the Department to fully execute its updated strategy
for the Arctic region.
(C) Any gaps in the capabilities described in
paragraph (1) that require ice-hardening of existing
vessels or the construction of new vessels to preserve
freedom of navigation in the Arctic region whenever and
wherever necessary.
(D) An analysis and recommendation of which Navy
vessels could be ice-hardened to effectively preserve
freedom of navigation in the Arctic region when and
where necessary, in all seasons and weather conditions.
(E) An analysis of any cost increases or schedule
adjustments that may result from ice-hardening existing
or new Navy vessels.
(3) Comptroller general of the united states review.--Not
later than 90 days after the date on which the Secretary
submits the report required by paragraph (1), the Comptroller
General of the United States shall submit to the congressional
defense committees a review of the report, including any
matters in connection with the report and the review that the
Comptroller General considers appropriate.
(4) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) and the review
under paragraph (3) shall each be submitted in unclassified
form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 4. DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR THE ARCTIC REGION.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Current Department of Defense jurisdiction over the
Arctic Region is a classic case study in operational seams
between three geographic combatant commands--the United States
Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), the United States European
Command (USEUCOM), and the United States Pacific Command
(USPACOM)--and involving two functional combatant commands--the
United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and the United
States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).
(2) Within the Arctic Region, the United States European
Command has primary responsibility for the key adversary, the
United States Pacific Command has operational control of the
United States forces located in Alaska that are best trained
for Arctic conditions, and the United States Northern Command
has the assigned role as the ``Department of Defense Advocate
for Arctic Capability''.
(3) Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, there is
no single person directly responsible for the coordination of
Arctic security issues and, while the United States Northern
Command is the ``Advocate for Arctic Capabilities'', the
January 2017 report of the Department of Defense entitled
``Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States
National Security Interests in the Arctic Region'' was largely
written from within the United States European Command.
(b) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Arctic Region.--
(1) In general.--There is a Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for the Arctic Region. The Deputy Assistant Secretary
shall be appointed by the Secretary of Defense from among
individuals who have an extensive understanding of security
environment in the Arctic and Antarctic regions, current United
States capabilities for the Arctic and Antarctic regions and
future gaps in such capabilities, and other appropriate policy
matters relating to the Arctic and Antarctic regions.
(2) Reporting.--The Deputy Assistant Secretary shall report
to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs.
(3) Duties.--Subject to the authority, direction, and
control of the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, the Deputy Assistant Secretary
shall assist the Assistant Secretary by overseeing the
following:
(A) Advocacy for United States national security
interests in the Arctic region, including United States
citizens, territory, freedom of navigation, and
economic and trade interests.
(B) Mitigation of operational seams between
relevant geographic and functional combatant commands
in order to improve unity of effort among the combatant
commands with responsibility for the Arctic region.
(C) Identification of any capability gaps and
resource gaps in the Arctic region and the formulation
of plans to mitigate these gaps.
(D) Identification of actions by foreign nations
which increase the threat to United States interests in
the Arctic region, and the formulation of plans to
mitigate these actions.
(E) Planning of military-to-military cooperation
with partner nations that have mutual security
interests in the Arctic region.
(4) Discharge of duties.--Subject to the authority,
direction, and control of the Assistant Secretary, in carrying
out the duties specified in paragraph (3), the Deputy Assistant
Secretary shall work closely with the following:
(A) The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering.
(B) The Director of the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency.
(C) The Director of the Missile Defense Agency.
(D) The Director of the Strategic Capabilities
Office (or any successor organization).
(E) The United States Northern Command.
(F) The United States European Command.
(G) The United States Pacific Command.
(H) The United States Strategic Command.
(I) The United States Transportation Command.
(J) The Alaska Command.
SEC. 5. REPORT ON INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIRED TO PROTECT NATIONAL SECURITY
INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE ARCTIC REGION.
(a) Report Required.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
congressional defense committees a report setting forth the
requirements and investment plans for military infrastructure required
to protect United States national security interests in the Arctic
region.
(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include
the following:
(1) A review of the operational plan for the protection of
United States national security interests in the Arctic region,
including strategic national assets, United States citizens,
territory, freedom of navigation, and economic and trade
interests in the region.
(2) A description of United States military capabilities
required to implement the operational plan, including types of
forces, major weapon systems, and logistics required for
operations in Arctic terrain.
(3) A description of the installations, infrastructure, and
deep water ports for deployment of assets required to support
the operational plan, including the stationing, deployment, and
training of military forces for operations in the Arctic
region.
(4) An investment plan to establish the installations and
infrastructure required to implement the operational plan.
(c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted
in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 6. IMPROVEMENT OF DOMAIN AWARENESS IN THE ARCTIC REGION.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Current Department of Defense and commercial satellite
constellations do not provide sufficient space coverage to
offer consistent coverage of the Arctic and Polar regions.
(2) The United States military currently faces significant
challenges in its ability to operate in the Arctic region,
given these current communications, navigational, and domain
awareness shortfalls.
(3) The September 2016 report of the International Security
Advisory Board entitled ``Report on Arctic Policy'' stated that
``the Arctic presents some unique problems of domain awareness,
given that it is a region with limited telecommunications
capability, unique geography, and remote and indigenous
populations''.
(4) The January 2017 report of the Department of Defense
entitled ``Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United
States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region''
concluded that ``[c]ommand and control of forces are challenged
by limited satellite and terrestrial communications above 65
degrees north'' and affirmed that ``[a]ddressing gaps in key
enablers, particularly C5ISR, domain awareness, remote sensing
and observing capabilities, ice prediction, and weather
forecasting remains a priority''.
(b) Report Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall
submit to the congressional defense committees a report on
strategies to improve United States communications, domain
awareness, and navigational capabilities in the Arctic region.
(2) Elements.--The report under paragraph (1) shall include
the following:
(A) An identification of domain awareness,
communications, and navigational requirements in the
Arctic region.
(B) A plan to leverage potential or existing
partnerships with United States allies, State and local
governments, and commercial industries to meet
immediate domain awareness, communications, and
navigational requirements in the Arctic region,
including the possible use of improved--
(i) satellite imagery and communications;
(ii) terrestrial communications; and
(iii) unmanned aerial systems.
(C) Any other urgent needs with respect to the
capabilities described in paragraph (1) that the
Secretary considers appropriate.
(3) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
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