[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6534 Introduced in House (IH)]
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115th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 6534
To phase out the use of private military contractors.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
July 25, 2018
Ms. Schakowsky (for herself, Mr. Grijalva, Mr. Gutierrez, Ms. Lee, Mr.
McGovern, Mr. Polis, Ms. Shea-Porter, Mr. Raskin, Mr. Pocan, Ms. Moore,
Mr. Pallone, Ms. Jayapal, Mr. Khanna, and Mr. Rush) introduced the
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
and in addition to the Committees on Armed Services, and Intelligence
(Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the
Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall
within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To phase out the use of private military contractors.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Stop Outsourcing Security Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The United States Government is increasingly relying on
armed private security contractors to perform mission-critical
and emergency essential functions that historically have been
performed by United States military or Government personnel.
(2) As of March 2011, the Department of Defense had
approximately 155,000 contract employees operating in Iraq and
Afghanistan, as compared to 145,000 members of the United
States Armed Forces operating in these two theaters of war.
(3) As of March 2011, the Department of Defense had
deployed 9,207 armed private security contractors in Iraq and
18,971 in Afghanistan, a change from 10,743 and 4,111,
respectively, in March 2009.
(4) As of April 1, 2011, the Department of State had over
2,500 security contractors in Iraq and 1,272 in Afghanistan,
under the Worldwide Personal Protective Services (WPPS)
contract.
(5) In September 2009, photos were published showing
employees of ArmorGroup North America (AGNA), hired by the
Department of State to provide security at the United States
Embassy in Kabul, engaging in lewd sexual hazing and
harassment.
(6) Before the September 2009 incident, the Department of
State had issued multiple deficiency notices, a cure notice,
and a show-cause notice expressing grave concerns about the
company's performance on the contract; one State Department
official even wrote that the company's deficiencies ``endanger
performance of the contract to such a degree that the security
of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul is in jeopardy''.
(7) On July 7, 2011, the Department of Justice announced
that Armor Group North America paid a $7.5 million settlement
to resolve charges that the company submitted false claims for
payment on a State Department contract; the settlement resolves
claims that AGNA guards violated the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act by visiting brothels in Kabul with the knowledge
of AGNA's management, as well as allegations that AGNA
misrepresented the prior work experience of 38 third country
nationals hired to guard the embassy.
(8) A 2010 Senate Armed Services Committee investigation
found that EOD Technology, the company hired to take over
protection of the Kabul Embassy from AGNA, was suspected of
hiring local warlords with possible Taliban ties, and in March
2011 the EODT contract was terminated for default.
(9) In May 2009, four men employed as military trainers for
Paravant LLC, a Blackwater affiliate, fired on a civilian
vehicle in Kabul, killing two Afghans and wounding a third; two
of the guards were convicted of involuntary manslaughter in
March 2011.
(10) On September 16, 2007, individuals hired by the
company then known as Blackwater USA opened fire on Baghdad's
Nisour Square, killing 17 Iraqis and wounding at least 20
others.
(11) In August 2010, XE Services, LLC, the company formerly
known as Blackwater, entered into a civil settlement with the
State Department, under which the company agreed to pay a
penalty of $42 million for 288 alleged violations of the Arms
Export Control Act (AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR).
(12) In July 2010, The Washington Post quoted Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates as saying ``This is a terrible confession
. . . I can't get a number on how many contractors work for the
Office of the Secretary of Defense.''.
(13) On October 18, 2007, Secretary Gates stated that the
work of many contractors in Iraq is ``at cross-purposes to our
larger mission in Iraq,'' and that ``right now those missions
are in conflict''.
(14) In 2007, the Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform of the House of Representatives investigated
Blackwater's employment practices and found that the company's
classification of its security guards may have allowed the firm
to avoid paying Social Security, Medicare, and Federal income
and employment taxes.
(15) On Christmas Eve 2006, Blackwater contractor Andrew
Moonen, while drunk, shot and killed a guard to Iraqi Vice
President Adil Abd-al-Mahdi in the Green Zone, and though Mr.
Moonen lost his job with Blackwater as a result of this
incident, he was promptly hired by Combat Support Associates,
another Department of Defense contractor, and sent to work in
Kuwait.
(16) In the wake of the 2004 killing of four Blackwater
contractors in Fallujah, the families of the men killed filed a
civil suit against the company, alleging that Blackwater failed
to properly equip and man its armored vehicles; after nearly
seven years in court, the case was thrown out when the families
could reportedly no longer pay the court costs.
(17) XE Services, LLC, the company formerly known as
Blackwater, has also faced allegations of weapons smuggling and
improperly licensing firearms; in April 2010, five former
Blackwater employees, including former president Gary Jackson
and former executive vice president William Wheeler Mathews,
Jr., were indicted on charges including conspiring to violate
Federal firearm laws, possession of unregistered firearms, and
obstruction of justice. Jackson and Mathews later pleaded
guilty to a misdemeanor firearms recordkeeping violation.
(18) In response to a request from the Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform of the House of
Representatives, the Inspector General of the Small Business
Administration investigated Blackwater in 2008 and found that
the company may have misrepresented its small business status,
enabling it to qualify for $110,000,000 in government contracts
set aside specifically for small businesses.
(19) Signed affidavits were filed in a civil lawsuit
against Blackwater that company founder Erik Prince views
himself ``as a Christian crusader tasked with eliminating
Muslims and the Islamic faith from the globe'', that he
knowingly deployed ``demonstrably unfit men'' to Iraq, and that
he used illegal ammunition, including a bullet designed to
explode after entering the human body, among other charges.
(20) In November 2007, a contractor employed by DynCorp
International, LLC, reportedly shot and killed an unarmed taxi
driver who, according to witnesses, posed no threat to the
DynCorp convoy.
(21) A January 2007 report by the Special Inspector General
for Iraq Reconstruction stated that DynCorp billed the United
States for millions of dollars of work that was never
authorized.
(22) In October 2007, an audit report issued by the Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction stated that the
Department of State ``does not know specifically what it
received for most of the $1,200,000,000 in expenditures under
its DynCorp Contract for the Iraqi Police Training Program''.
(23) Congress does not have complete access to information
about all security contracts, the number of armed private
security contractors working in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other
combat zones, the number of contractors who have died, and any
disciplinary actions taken against contract personnel or
companies.
(24) The Central Intelligence Agency paid two contractor
psychologists $81 million to devise an interrogation program
that yielded very little intelligence and may have violated
United States law and international human rights treaties.
(25) In 2016, it was reported that Erik Prince was under
investigation by the Department of Justice and other Federal
agencies for attempting to broker military services to foreign
governments and possible money laundering.
(26) A 2011 report by the Project On Government Oversight
found the government paid significantly more for contractors to
staff certain contingency operation positions, including
security guards and language specialists.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Mission critical or emergency essential functions.--The
term ``mission critical or emergency essential functions''--
(A) means--
(i) activities for which continued
performance is considered essential to support
combat systems and operational activities;
(ii) activities whose delay, absence, or
failure of performance would significantly
affect the broader success or failure of a
military operation; or
(iii) functions, the compromise of which
would degrade the system effectiveness in
achieving the core mission for which it was
designed; and
(B) includes--
(i) the provision of protective services,
including diplomatic security services;
(ii) the provision of security advice and
planning;
(iii) military and police training;
(iv) prison administration;
(v) interrogation;
(vi) intelligence and counterintelligence;
(vii) counterterrorism; and
(viii) the provision of support for the
conduct of operations or security cooperation.
(2) Contingency operation.--The term ``contingency
operation'' has the meaning provided by section 101(a)(13) of
title 10, United States Code.
(3) Other significant military operations.--The term
``other significant military operations'' means activities,
other than combat operations, that are carried out by United
States Armed Forces in an uncontrolled or unpredictable high-
threat environment where personnel performing security
functions may be called upon to use deadly force.
(4) Specified congressional committees.--The term
``specified congressional committees'' means the following
committees:
(A) The Committee on Armed Services, the Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform, the Committee on
Appropriations, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives.
(B) The Committee on Armed Services, the Committee
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the
Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Foreign
Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate.
SEC. 4. REQUIREMENT FOR GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL TO PERFORM DIPLOMATIC
SECURITY IN AREAS OF CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS AND OTHER
SIGNIFICANT MILITARY OPERATIONS.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of State shall ensure that all personnel working on
behalf of the United States at any United States diplomatic or consular
mission in areas of contingency operations and other significant
military operations are provided diplomatic security services only by
United States Government personnel.
SEC. 5. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO CONTRACTORS PERFORMING MISSION
CRITICAL OR EMERGENCY ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS IN ALL AREAS OF
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS AND OTHER SIGNIFICANT MILITARY
OPERATIONS.
(a) Report by President.--
(1) Requirement.--Not later than June 1, 2019, the
President shall submit to the specified congressional
committees a report on the status of planning for the
transition away from the use of private contractors for mission
critical or emergency essential functions by January 1, 2020,
in all areas of contingency operations and other significant
military operations.
(2) Additional matters covered.--If the report submitted
under paragraph (1) states that the relevant agencies will not
be able to transition to government and military personnel for
such functions by January 1, 2020, the President shall include
in the report the following:
(A) A statement of the reasons why the relevant
agencies are unable to do so, the date by which they
will be able to do so, and the plan to ensure that they
will be able to do so by that date.
(B) A certification that--
(i) all contract employees have undergone
background checks to ensure that they do not
have criminal records and have not been accused
of human rights abuses;
(ii) no contract employees are subject to
pending criminal charges;
(iii) all contract employees are under the
jurisdiction of section 3261 of title 18,
United States Code (relating to military
extraterritorial jurisdiction);
(iv) contract employees, if accused of
crimes by the host country, must remain in
United States custody; and
(v) contracts include whistleblower
protections for employees to provide good faith
information to management, government agencies,
and Congress of any contract violations, human
rights abuses, or criminal actions.
(3) Form of report.--The report required by this subsection
shall be submitted in unclassified form, to the maximum extent
possible, but may contain a classified annex, if necessary.
(b) Examination of Contractor Accounting Practices.--Any individual
or entity under contract with the Federal Government to provide mission
critical or emergency essential functions after January 1, 2020, shall
allow the specified congressional committees to examine their
accounting practices with respect to any such contract quarterly and
upon request.
(c) Requirements Relating to Contract Renewals.--Any contract with
the Federal Government requiring personnel to perform mission critical
or emergency essential functions that is proposed to be renewed after
the date of the enactment of this Act may be renewed only if--
(1) the President reports to the specified congressional
committees that the relevant agency does not have adequate
personnel to perform the duties stipulated in the contract; and
(2) the President certifies that--
(A) all contract employees have undergone
background checks to ensure that they do not have
criminal records and have not been accused of human
rights abuses;
(B) no contract employees are subject to pending
criminal charges;
(C) all contract employees are under the
jurisdiction of section 3261 of title 18, United States
Code (relating to military extraterritorial
jurisdiction);
(D) contract employees, if accused of crimes by the
host country, must remain in the custody of the United
States; and
(E) the contract includes whistleblower protections
for employees to provide good faith information to
management, government agencies, and Congress of any
contract violations, human rights abuses, or criminal
actions.
SEC. 6. CONGRESSIONAL ACCESS TO CONTRACTS.
(a) Requirement To Allow Congress Access to Copies and Descriptions
of Certain Contracts and Task Orders.--
(1) Requirement regarding contracts and task orders before
enactment.--The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State,
the Secretary of the Interior, and the Administrator of the
United States Agency for International Development shall allow
the chairman and the ranking minority member of each specified
congressional committee access to a copy of, and a description
of the work performed or to be performed under, each contract,
and each task order issued under an existing contract, in an
amount greater than $5,000,000 entered into by the Department
of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of the
Interior, and the Agency for International Development,
respectively, during the period beginning on October 1, 2001,
and ending on the last day of the month during which this Act
is enacted for work to be performed in areas of contingency
operations and other significant military operations.
(2) Form of submissions.--The copies and descriptions
required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified
form, to the maximum extent possible, but may contain a
classified annex, if necessary.
(b) Reports on Contracts for Work To Be Performed in Areas of
Contingency Operations and Other Significant Military Operations.--The
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the
Interior, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development shall each submit to each specified
congressional committee a report not later than 60 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act that contains the following information:
(1) The number of persons performing work in areas of
contingency operations and other significant military
operations under contracts (and subcontracts at any tier)
entered into by Department of Defense, the Department of State,
the Department of the Interior, and the United States Agency
for International Development, respectively.
(2) The total cost of such contracts.
(3) The total number of persons who have been wounded or
killed in performing work under such contracts.
(4) A description of the disciplinary actions that have
been taken against persons performing work under such contracts
by the contractor, the United States Government, or the
government of any country in which the area of contingency
operations or other significant military operations is located.
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