[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6534 Introduced in House (IH)]

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115th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6534

         To phase out the use of private military contractors.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 25, 2018

Ms. Schakowsky (for herself, Mr. Grijalva, Mr. Gutierrez, Ms. Lee, Mr. 
McGovern, Mr. Polis, Ms. Shea-Porter, Mr. Raskin, Mr. Pocan, Ms. Moore, 
  Mr. Pallone, Ms. Jayapal, Mr. Khanna, and Mr. Rush) introduced the 
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
 and in addition to the Committees on Armed Services, and Intelligence 
 (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the 
  Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
           within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
         To phase out the use of private military contractors.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Stop Outsourcing Security Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) The United States Government is increasingly relying on 
        armed private security contractors to perform mission-critical 
        and emergency essential functions that historically have been 
        performed by United States military or Government personnel.
            (2) As of March 2011, the Department of Defense had 
        approximately 155,000 contract employees operating in Iraq and 
        Afghanistan, as compared to 145,000 members of the United 
        States Armed Forces operating in these two theaters of war.
            (3) As of March 2011, the Department of Defense had 
        deployed 9,207 armed private security contractors in Iraq and 
        18,971 in Afghanistan, a change from 10,743 and 4,111, 
        respectively, in March 2009.
            (4) As of April 1, 2011, the Department of State had over 
        2,500 security contractors in Iraq and 1,272 in Afghanistan, 
        under the Worldwide Personal Protective Services (WPPS) 
        contract.
            (5) In September 2009, photos were published showing 
        employees of ArmorGroup North America (AGNA), hired by the 
        Department of State to provide security at the United States 
        Embassy in Kabul, engaging in lewd sexual hazing and 
        harassment.
            (6) Before the September 2009 incident, the Department of 
        State had issued multiple deficiency notices, a cure notice, 
        and a show-cause notice expressing grave concerns about the 
        company's performance on the contract; one State Department 
        official even wrote that the company's deficiencies ``endanger 
        performance of the contract to such a degree that the security 
        of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul is in jeopardy''.
            (7) On July 7, 2011, the Department of Justice announced 
        that Armor Group North America paid a $7.5 million settlement 
        to resolve charges that the company submitted false claims for 
        payment on a State Department contract; the settlement resolves 
        claims that AGNA guards violated the Trafficking Victims 
        Protection Act by visiting brothels in Kabul with the knowledge 
        of AGNA's management, as well as allegations that AGNA 
        misrepresented the prior work experience of 38 third country 
        nationals hired to guard the embassy.
            (8) A 2010 Senate Armed Services Committee investigation 
        found that EOD Technology, the company hired to take over 
        protection of the Kabul Embassy from AGNA, was suspected of 
        hiring local warlords with possible Taliban ties, and in March 
        2011 the EODT contract was terminated for default.
            (9) In May 2009, four men employed as military trainers for 
        Paravant LLC, a Blackwater affiliate, fired on a civilian 
        vehicle in Kabul, killing two Afghans and wounding a third; two 
        of the guards were convicted of involuntary manslaughter in 
        March 2011.
            (10) On September 16, 2007, individuals hired by the 
        company then known as Blackwater USA opened fire on Baghdad's 
        Nisour Square, killing 17 Iraqis and wounding at least 20 
        others.
            (11) In August 2010, XE Services, LLC, the company formerly 
        known as Blackwater, entered into a civil settlement with the 
        State Department, under which the company agreed to pay a 
        penalty of $42 million for 288 alleged violations of the Arms 
        Export Control Act (AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms 
        Regulations (ITAR).
            (12) In July 2010, The Washington Post quoted Secretary of 
        Defense Robert Gates as saying ``This is a terrible confession 
        . . . I can't get a number on how many contractors work for the 
        Office of the Secretary of Defense.''.
            (13) On October 18, 2007, Secretary Gates stated that the 
        work of many contractors in Iraq is ``at cross-purposes to our 
        larger mission in Iraq,'' and that ``right now those missions 
        are in conflict''.
            (14) In 2007, the Committee on Oversight and Government 
        Reform of the House of Representatives investigated 
        Blackwater's employment practices and found that the company's 
        classification of its security guards may have allowed the firm 
        to avoid paying Social Security, Medicare, and Federal income 
        and employment taxes.
            (15) On Christmas Eve 2006, Blackwater contractor Andrew 
        Moonen, while drunk, shot and killed a guard to Iraqi Vice 
        President Adil Abd-al-Mahdi in the Green Zone, and though Mr. 
        Moonen lost his job with Blackwater as a result of this 
        incident, he was promptly hired by Combat Support Associates, 
        another Department of Defense contractor, and sent to work in 
        Kuwait.
            (16) In the wake of the 2004 killing of four Blackwater 
        contractors in Fallujah, the families of the men killed filed a 
        civil suit against the company, alleging that Blackwater failed 
        to properly equip and man its armored vehicles; after nearly 
        seven years in court, the case was thrown out when the families 
        could reportedly no longer pay the court costs.
            (17) XE Services, LLC, the company formerly known as 
        Blackwater, has also faced allegations of weapons smuggling and 
        improperly licensing firearms; in April 2010, five former 
        Blackwater employees, including former president Gary Jackson 
        and former executive vice president William Wheeler Mathews, 
        Jr., were indicted on charges including conspiring to violate 
        Federal firearm laws, possession of unregistered firearms, and 
        obstruction of justice. Jackson and Mathews later pleaded 
        guilty to a misdemeanor firearms recordkeeping violation.
            (18) In response to a request from the Committee on 
        Oversight and Government Reform of the House of 
        Representatives, the Inspector General of the Small Business 
        Administration investigated Blackwater in 2008 and found that 
        the company may have misrepresented its small business status, 
        enabling it to qualify for $110,000,000 in government contracts 
        set aside specifically for small businesses.
            (19) Signed affidavits were filed in a civil lawsuit 
        against Blackwater that company founder Erik Prince views 
        himself ``as a Christian crusader tasked with eliminating 
        Muslims and the Islamic faith from the globe'', that he 
        knowingly deployed ``demonstrably unfit men'' to Iraq, and that 
        he used illegal ammunition, including a bullet designed to 
        explode after entering the human body, among other charges.
            (20) In November 2007, a contractor employed by DynCorp 
        International, LLC, reportedly shot and killed an unarmed taxi 
        driver who, according to witnesses, posed no threat to the 
        DynCorp convoy.
            (21) A January 2007 report by the Special Inspector General 
        for Iraq Reconstruction stated that DynCorp billed the United 
        States for millions of dollars of work that was never 
        authorized.
            (22) In October 2007, an audit report issued by the Special 
        Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction stated that the 
        Department of State ``does not know specifically what it 
        received for most of the $1,200,000,000 in expenditures under 
        its DynCorp Contract for the Iraqi Police Training Program''.
            (23) Congress does not have complete access to information 
        about all security contracts, the number of armed private 
        security contractors working in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other 
        combat zones, the number of contractors who have died, and any 
        disciplinary actions taken against contract personnel or 
        companies.
            (24) The Central Intelligence Agency paid two contractor 
        psychologists $81 million to devise an interrogation program 
        that yielded very little intelligence and may have violated 
        United States law and international human rights treaties.
            (25) In 2016, it was reported that Erik Prince was under 
        investigation by the Department of Justice and other Federal 
        agencies for attempting to broker military services to foreign 
        governments and possible money laundering.
            (26) A 2011 report by the Project On Government Oversight 
        found the government paid significantly more for contractors to 
        staff certain contingency operation positions, including 
        security guards and language specialists.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Mission critical or emergency essential functions.--The 
        term ``mission critical or emergency essential functions''--
                    (A) means--
                            (i) activities for which continued 
                        performance is considered essential to support 
                        combat systems and operational activities;
                            (ii) activities whose delay, absence, or 
                        failure of performance would significantly 
                        affect the broader success or failure of a 
                        military operation; or
                            (iii) functions, the compromise of which 
                        would degrade the system effectiveness in 
                        achieving the core mission for which it was 
                        designed; and
                    (B) includes--
                            (i) the provision of protective services, 
                        including diplomatic security services;
                            (ii) the provision of security advice and 
                        planning;
                            (iii) military and police training;
                            (iv) prison administration;
                            (v) interrogation;
                            (vi) intelligence and counterintelligence;
                            (vii) counterterrorism; and
                            (viii) the provision of support for the 
                        conduct of operations or security cooperation.
            (2) Contingency operation.--The term ``contingency 
        operation'' has the meaning provided by section 101(a)(13) of 
        title 10, United States Code.
            (3) Other significant military operations.--The term 
        ``other significant military operations'' means activities, 
        other than combat operations, that are carried out by United 
        States Armed Forces in an uncontrolled or unpredictable high-
        threat environment where personnel performing security 
        functions may be called upon to use deadly force.
            (4) Specified congressional committees.--The term 
        ``specified congressional committees'' means the following 
        committees:
                    (A) The Committee on Armed Services, the Committee 
                on Oversight and Government Reform, the Committee on 
                Appropriations, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and 
                the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
                House of Representatives.
                    (B) The Committee on Armed Services, the Committee 
                on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the 
                Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Foreign 
                Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
                the Senate.

SEC. 4. REQUIREMENT FOR GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL TO PERFORM DIPLOMATIC 
              SECURITY IN AREAS OF CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS AND OTHER 
              SIGNIFICANT MILITARY OPERATIONS.

    Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the Secretary of State shall ensure that all personnel working on 
behalf of the United States at any United States diplomatic or consular 
mission in areas of contingency operations and other significant 
military operations are provided diplomatic security services only by 
United States Government personnel.

SEC. 5. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO CONTRACTORS PERFORMING MISSION 
              CRITICAL OR EMERGENCY ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS IN ALL AREAS OF 
              CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS AND OTHER SIGNIFICANT MILITARY 
              OPERATIONS.

    (a) Report by President.--
            (1) Requirement.--Not later than June 1, 2019, the 
        President shall submit to the specified congressional 
        committees a report on the status of planning for the 
        transition away from the use of private contractors for mission 
        critical or emergency essential functions by January 1, 2020, 
        in all areas of contingency operations and other significant 
        military operations.
            (2) Additional matters covered.--If the report submitted 
        under paragraph (1) states that the relevant agencies will not 
        be able to transition to government and military personnel for 
        such functions by January 1, 2020, the President shall include 
        in the report the following:
                    (A) A statement of the reasons why the relevant 
                agencies are unable to do so, the date by which they 
                will be able to do so, and the plan to ensure that they 
                will be able to do so by that date.
                    (B) A certification that--
                            (i) all contract employees have undergone 
                        background checks to ensure that they do not 
                        have criminal records and have not been accused 
                        of human rights abuses;
                            (ii) no contract employees are subject to 
                        pending criminal charges;
                            (iii) all contract employees are under the 
                        jurisdiction of section 3261 of title 18, 
                        United States Code (relating to military 
                        extraterritorial jurisdiction);
                            (iv) contract employees, if accused of 
                        crimes by the host country, must remain in 
                        United States custody; and
                            (v) contracts include whistleblower 
                        protections for employees to provide good faith 
                        information to management, government agencies, 
                        and Congress of any contract violations, human 
                        rights abuses, or criminal actions.
            (3) Form of report.--The report required by this subsection 
        shall be submitted in unclassified form, to the maximum extent 
        possible, but may contain a classified annex, if necessary.
    (b) Examination of Contractor Accounting Practices.--Any individual 
or entity under contract with the Federal Government to provide mission 
critical or emergency essential functions after January 1, 2020, shall 
allow the specified congressional committees to examine their 
accounting practices with respect to any such contract quarterly and 
upon request.
    (c) Requirements Relating to Contract Renewals.--Any contract with 
the Federal Government requiring personnel to perform mission critical 
or emergency essential functions that is proposed to be renewed after 
the date of the enactment of this Act may be renewed only if--
            (1) the President reports to the specified congressional 
        committees that the relevant agency does not have adequate 
        personnel to perform the duties stipulated in the contract; and
            (2) the President certifies that--
                    (A) all contract employees have undergone 
                background checks to ensure that they do not have 
                criminal records and have not been accused of human 
                rights abuses;
                    (B) no contract employees are subject to pending 
                criminal charges;
                    (C) all contract employees are under the 
                jurisdiction of section 3261 of title 18, United States 
                Code (relating to military extraterritorial 
                jurisdiction);
                    (D) contract employees, if accused of crimes by the 
                host country, must remain in the custody of the United 
                States; and
                    (E) the contract includes whistleblower protections 
                for employees to provide good faith information to 
                management, government agencies, and Congress of any 
                contract violations, human rights abuses, or criminal 
                actions.

SEC. 6. CONGRESSIONAL ACCESS TO CONTRACTS.

    (a) Requirement To Allow Congress Access to Copies and Descriptions 
of Certain Contracts and Task Orders.--
            (1) Requirement regarding contracts and task orders before 
        enactment.--The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, 
        the Secretary of the Interior, and the Administrator of the 
        United States Agency for International Development shall allow 
        the chairman and the ranking minority member of each specified 
        congressional committee access to a copy of, and a description 
        of the work performed or to be performed under, each contract, 
        and each task order issued under an existing contract, in an 
        amount greater than $5,000,000 entered into by the Department 
        of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of the 
        Interior, and the Agency for International Development, 
        respectively, during the period beginning on October 1, 2001, 
        and ending on the last day of the month during which this Act 
        is enacted for work to be performed in areas of contingency 
        operations and other significant military operations.
            (2) Form of submissions.--The copies and descriptions 
        required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified 
        form, to the maximum extent possible, but may contain a 
        classified annex, if necessary.
    (b) Reports on Contracts for Work To Be Performed in Areas of 
Contingency Operations and Other Significant Military Operations.--The 
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the 
Interior, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
International Development shall each submit to each specified 
congressional committee a report not later than 60 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act that contains the following information:
            (1) The number of persons performing work in areas of 
        contingency operations and other significant military 
        operations under contracts (and subcontracts at any tier) 
        entered into by Department of Defense, the Department of State, 
        the Department of the Interior, and the United States Agency 
        for International Development, respectively.
            (2) The total cost of such contracts.
            (3) The total number of persons who have been wounded or 
        killed in performing work under such contracts.
            (4) A description of the disciplinary actions that have 
        been taken against persons performing work under such contracts 
        by the contractor, the United States Government, or the 
        government of any country in which the area of contingency 
        operations or other significant military operations is located.
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