[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6010 Introduced in House (IH)]

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115th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 6010

    To require an unclassified interagency report on the political 
influence operations of the Chinese Government and Communist Party with 
         respect to the United States, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              June 5, 2018

  Mr. Smith of New Jersey (for himself, Ms. Kaptur, Mr. Meadows, Mr. 
 Perry, Mr. Hultgren, Mr. Pittenger, and Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) introduced 
  the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign 
   Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a 
 period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for 
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the 
                          committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
    To require an unclassified interagency report on the political 
influence operations of the Chinese Government and Communist Party with 
         respect to the United States, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be referred to as the ``Countering the Chinese 
Government and Communist Party's Political Influence Operations Act''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--Unless otherwise 
        specified, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
        means--
                    (A) in the House of Representatives--
                            (i) the Committee on Foreign Affairs;
                            (ii) the Committee on Armed Services;
                            (iii) the Committee on Appropriations;
                            (iv) the Committee on the Judiciary;
                            (v) the Committee on Education and the 
                        Workforce; and
                            (vi) the Permanent Select Committee on 
                        Intelligence; and
                    (B) in the Senate--
                            (i) the Committee on Foreign Relations;
                            (ii) the Committee on Armed Services;
                            (iii) the Committee on Appropriations;
                            (iv) the Committee on the Judiciary;
                            (v) the Committee on Health, Education, 
                        Labor, and Pensions; and
                            (vi) the Select Committee on Intelligence.
            (2) Political influence operations.--Unless otherwise 
        specified, the term ``political influence operations'' means 
        efforts to coerce and corrupt United States interests, 
        institutions, or individuals and foster in the United States 
        attitudes, behavior, decisions, or outcomes favorable to the 
        Chinese Government or Communist Party through coordinated and 
        often concealed application of disinformation, press 
        manipulation, economic coercion, targeted investments, 
        corruption, or academic censorship.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) The Chinese Government and Communist Party employ a 
        wide range of political, informational, and economic measures 
        to influence, coerce, intimidate, or undermine United States 
        interests or the interests of United States partners and 
        allies.
            (2) According to the December 2017 National Security 
        Strategy of the United States of America, ``[A]lthough the 
        United States seeks to continue to cooperate with China, China 
        is using economic inducements and penalties, influence 
        operations, and implied military threats to persuade other 
        states to heed its political and security agenda.''.
            (3) The political influence operations efforts of the 
        Chinese Government and Communist Party have received less 
        scrutiny than the efforts of the Russian Government, but given 
        China's economic strength and the growing apparatus being used 
        to spread its influence globally, efforts to promote its 
        authoritarian ideal pose significant and consequential long-
        term challenges to United States interests and values.
            (4) The Chinese Government and Communist Party use both 
        overt and covert means to target the political and economic 
        elite, the media and public opinion, civil society and 
        academia, and members of the Chinese diaspora.
            (5) The Chinese Government and Communist Party employs an 
        array of government entities, friendship and exchange 
        organizations, and government funded foundations, think-tanks, 
        educational and other projects to carry out political influence 
        operations, often called ``united front work''.
            (6) The Chinese Government and Communist Party's political 
        influence operations aim is to secure the regime's political 
        stability domestically and spread globally its political and 
        economic model as superior to those of Western democracies.
            (7) The Chinese Government and Communist Party's political 
        influence operations take advantage of the open and democratic 
        nature of the United States, including constitutional 
        protections for free speech and a free press, and the desire by 
        some individuals or institutions to attract Chinese investment, 
        gain access to Chinese markets, or attain greater global 
        influence.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
Chinese Government and Communist Party's political influence operations 
are not ``soft power'' intended to persuade, but ``sharp power'' 
intended to penetrate or corrupt democratic countries, foster attitudes 
and behavior favorable to the Chinese Government's interest through 
disinformation, coercion, and other means, and to widen the scope of 
authoritarian influence globally. It is further the sense of Congress 
that Congress and the American public need reliable and current 
information to understand the malign goals of these political influence 
operations, identify the key institutions, individuals, entities, and 
ministries that carry out such operations, and distinguish them from 
the cultural, educational, and people-to-people exchanges which benefit 
both the United States and China.
    (c) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States 
to--
            (1) clearly differentiate between the Chinese people and 
        culture and the Chinese Government and Communist Party in 
        official statements, media, and messaging, and to ensure that 
        efforts to curtail Beijing's political influence operations do 
        not lead to the targeting of Chinese-Americans or the Chinese 
        diaspora, as they are most often the victims and primary 
        targets of political influence operations;
            (2) take steps to ensure that Chinese nationals who are 
        legally studying, living, or working temporarily in the United 
        States know that intimidation or surveillance by the Chinese 
        Government and Communist Party is an unacceptable invasion of 
        their rights while they reside in the United States;
            (3) enhance cooperation and coordination with Australia, 
        Canada, and Taiwan (Republic of China), whose governments and 
        institutions have faced acute pressure from the Chinese 
        Government and Communist Party's political influence 
        operations, and with other allies globally, to counter such 
        operations, curtail advances of authoritarian ideals that 
        challenge democratic values and international human rights 
        norms, and create strategies to ensure countries in Africa, the 
        Western Hemisphere, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere are aware of 
        China's ``sharp power'' and work collaboratively to counter 
        coercive, covert, and corrupting elements;
            (4) develop a strategic assessment and long-term strategy 
        to counter the Chinese Government and Communist Party's 
        political influence operations, censorship, propaganda, and 
        disinformation that undermines democratic institutions, targets 
        United States citizens or nationals or intimidates their 
        families in China; and uses economic tools, market access, 
        cyberattacks, or other capabilities to undermine the freedoms 
        of speech, expression, press, association, assembly, religion, 
        or academic thought;
            (5) implement more advanced transparency requirements 
        concerning collaboration with Chinese actors for media 
        agencies, universities, think tanks, and government officials, 
        among others, and raise awareness, through various forums about 
        the goals and methods of the Chinese Government and Communist 
        Party's political influence operations and common patterns and 
        approaches used by Chinese intelligence agencies or related 
        actors;
            (6) require Confucius Institutes, and any other think 
        tanks, academic programs, or nongovernmental organizations 
        funded primarily by the Chinese Government or Chinese 
        Government-affiliated entities and operating in the United 
        States, to register under section 2 of the Foreign Agents 
        Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 612);
            (7) seek ways to increase Chinese language proficiency 
        among mid-career professionals; and
            (8) create more flexible tools to screen investments from 
        Chinese Government or Chinese Government-backed sources to 
        protect against the takeover of United States companies by 
        Chinese state-owned or state-driven entities, and to protect 
        institutions or business sectors critically important to United 
        States national security and the viability of democratic 
        institutions.

SEC. 4. REPORT ON THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNIST PARTY'S 
              POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.

    (a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
heads of relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees an unclassified report on Chinese 
Government and Communist Party political influence operations with 
respect to the United States, including efforts to corrupt United 
States governmental or nongovernmental institutions or individuals, 
efforts to coerce or threaten United States citizens or legal permanent 
residents or their families or relatives living in China, and efforts 
to undermine democratic institutions and the freedoms of speech, 
expression, press, association, assembly, religion, or academic 
thought.
    (b) Contents.--The report required under subsection (a) shall also 
include recommendations for the President and Congress relating to the 
following:
            (1) Whether additional resources or authorities are needed 
        to counter Chinese Government and Communist Party's political 
        influence operations in the United States, including in concert 
        with allies.
            (2) Ways to use existing resources to develop core 
        competencies among Federal agencies and the Armed Forces in the 
        subject area of Chinese political influence operations.
            (3) The advisability of establishing, within the Department 
        of State, a permanent office relating to Chinese Government and 
        Communist Party's political influence operations.
            (4) Whether regular public reports on the Chinese 
        Government and Communist Party's political influence operations 
        are needed to inform Congress and the American public of the 
        scale and scope of such operations.
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