[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3025 Introduced in House (IH)]
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115th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 3025
To strengthen security and deterrence in Europe and to hold the Russian
Federation accountable for violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
June 22, 2017
Mr. Smith of Washington (for himself, Ms. Speier, Mr. Garamendi, Ms.
Bordallo, Mr. Courtney, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Brady of Pennsylvania, Mrs.
Murphy of Florida, Mr. Gallego, Mrs. Davis of California, Mr. Moulton,
Mr. Brown of Maryland, Mr. Cooper, Ms. Shea-Porter, Mr. Norcross, Mr.
Veasey, Ms. Tsongas, Mr. McEachin, Ms. Rosen, Ms. Hanabusa, Mr.
O'Halleran, and Mr. Suozzi) introduced the following bill; which was
referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the
Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined
by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as
fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To strengthen security and deterrence in Europe and to hold the Russian
Federation accountable for violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Fostering Unity Against Russian
Aggression Act of 2017''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, Commander of the United
States European Command, testified before the House Armed
Services Committee on March 27, 2017, that ``Today we face the
most dynamic European security environment in history.'' and
that ``Russia's malign actions are supported by its diplomatic,
information, economic, and military initiatives.''.
(2) The Russian Federation continues to be in violation of
INF Treaty as a result of testing and deploying a new nuclear-
capable cruise missile.
(3) The Russian Federation has shifted to a military
doctrine that envisions using nuclear weapons in an attempt to
end a failing regional conventional conflict. On June 25, 2015,
Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work and then-Vice-Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral James Winnefeld testified
before the House Armed Services Committee that ``Russian
military doctrine includes what some have called an `escalate
to de-escalate' strategy--a strategy that purportedly seeks to
deescalate a conventional conflict through coercive threats,
including limited nuclear use. We think that this label is
dangerously misleading. Anyone who thinks they can control
escalation through the use of nuclear weapons is literally
playing with fire. Escalation is escalation, and nuclear use
would be the ultimate escalation.''.
(4) General Scaparrotti noted in his March 27, 2017,
testimony before the House Armed Services Committee that
``Moscow's provocative rhetoric and nuclear threats increase
the likelihood of misunderstanding and miscalculation.''.
(5) The Russian Federation continues to conduct ongoing
influence campaigns aimed at undermining democracies around the
world. According to an assessment by the intelligence
community, ``Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an
influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the U.S. presidential
election'', which included the use of the Russian military
intelligence organization. The intelligence community also
assessed that Russia would apply lessons learned to future
influence efforts worldwide, including against United States
allies and their election systems.
(6) The Russian Federation continues its aggression on its
periphery. In 2008, the Russian Federation fomented conflict in
Georgia. The Russian Federation has also illegally occupied and
attempted to annex Crimea. Further, the Russian Federation is
directing combined Russian-Separatist units in eastern Ukraine,
actively inciting violence and prolonging the most significant
conflict in Europe.
(7) The investment of over $5 billion in the European
Reassurance Initiative (ERI), now the European Deterrence
Initiative (EDI), has proven successful in significantly
enhancing the ability of United States forces, NATO allies, and
regional partners to deter Russian aggression. EDI has not only
assured our European allies and partners but supported
essential investments in NATO's military capacity,
interoperability, and agility.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Russian Federation should return to compliance with
the INF Treaty in a verifiable manner as soon as possible;
(2) the risks of miscalculation in a crisis are exacerbated
by the Russian Federation's shift to a military doctrine of
``escalate to de-escalate'', lowering the threshold for Russian
use of nuclear weapons and thereby increasing the risk of using
nuclear weapons, potentially escalating in to a massive nuclear
exchange;
(3) strengthening effective and credible conventional
deterrence, particularly on the northeastern flank of NATO, is
a political and military priority;
(4) NATO's formal adoption at the 2014 Wales Summit of the
goal for each member state to allocate at least two percent of
its gross domestic product to its national defense budget
within a decade should be commended, as increased defense
spending by NATO member states is strongly encouraged to
maintain the alliance's strategic vitality through the
enhancement of its collective capacity;
(5) reaffirming support for the principle of collective
defense in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for NATO
allies is vital to a strong and meaningful alliance and is not
conditional;
(6) subversive and destabilizing activities by the Russian
Federation targeting NATO allies and partners causes concern
and should be condemned;
(7) strengthened deterrence efforts by NATO allies,
including NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence, should be commended
and enhancing defense cooperation efforts with NATO allies and
partners should be encouraged;
(8) European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) investments are
long-term and, as such, Congress expects future budgets to
reflect United States commitment by planning for funding in the
base budget, and further EDI should build on United States
presence by increasing the United States permanent force
posture; and
(9) credible deterrence requires steadfast cooperation and
joint action with NATO allies and partners and other United
States allies and partners in Europe.
SEC. 3. STRATEGY TO COUNTER THREATS BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
(a) Strategy Required.--The Secretary of Defense, in consultation
with each of the Secretaries of the military departments, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the commanders of each of the regional and
functional combatant commands, shall develop and implement a
comprehensive strategy to counter threats by the Russian Federation.
(b) Report Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall
submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the
strategy required by subsection (a).
(2) Elements.--The report required by this subsection shall
include the following elements:
(A) An evaluation of strategic objectives and
motivations of the Russian Federation.
(B) A detailed description of Russian threats to
the national security of the United States, including
threats that may pose challenges below the threshold of
armed conflict.
(C) A discussion of how the strategy complements
the National Defense Strategy and the National Military
Strategy.
(D) A discussion of the ends, ways, and means
inherent to the strategy.
(E) A discussion of the strategy's objectives with
respect to deterrence, escalation control, and conflict
resolution.
(F) A description of the military activities across
geographic regions and military functions and domains
that are inherent to the strategy.
(G) A description of the posture, forward presence,
and readiness requirements inherent to the strategy.
(H) A description of the roles of the United States
Armed Forces in implementing the strategy, including--
(i) the role of United States nuclear
capabilities;
(ii) the role of United States space
capabilities;
(iii) the role of United States cyber
capabilities;
(iv) the role of United States conventional
ground forces;
(v) the role of United States naval forces;
(vi) the role of United States air forces;
and
(vii) the role of United States special
operations forces.
(I) An assessment of contributions of United States
allies and partners in countering Russian threats and a
description of the roles of allies and partners in
implementing and sustaining the strategy.
(J) An assessment of the force requirements needed
to implement and sustain the strategy.
(K) A description of the logistical requirements
needed to implement and sustain the strategy.
(L) An assessment of the technological research and
development requirements needed to implement and
sustain the strategy.
(M) An assessment of the training and exercise
requirements needed to implement and sustain the
strategy.
(N) An assessment of the budgetary resource
requirements needed to implement and sustain the
strategy through December 31, 2030.
(O) A discussion of how the strategy provides a
framework for future planning and investments in
regional defense initiatives, including the European
Deterrence Initiative.
(3) Form.--The report required by this subsection shall be
submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified
annex.
SEC. 4. STRATEGY TO INCREASE CONVENTIONAL PRECISION STRIKE WEAPON
STOCKPILES IN THE UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND'S AREAS
OF RESPONSIBILITY.
(a) Strategy Required.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall develop and
implement a strategy to increase conventional precision strike
weapon stockpiles in the United States European Command's areas
of responsibility.
(2) Elements.--The strategy required by this subsection
shall include necessary increases in the quantities of such
stockpiles that the Secretary determines will enhance
deterrence and warfighting capability of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization forces.
(b) Report Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than April 1, 2018, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense
committees a report on the strategy required by subsection (a).
(2) Form.--The report required by this subsection shall be
submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified
annex.
SEC. 5. PLAN TO COUNTER THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION.
(a) Plan Required.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall develop and
implement a plan to counter the military capabilities of the
Russian Federation.
(2) Elements.--The plan required by this subsection shall
include the following:
(A) Accelerating programs to improve the capability
of United States military forces to operate in a Global
Positioning System (GPS)-denied or GPS-degraded
environment.
(B) Accelerating programs of the Department of the
Army to counter Russian unmanned aircraft systems,
electronic warfare, and long-range precision strike
capabilities.
(C) Countering unconventional capabilities and
hybrid threats from the Russian Federation.
(D) Any other elements that the Secretary
determines to be appropriate.
(b) Report Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than April 1, 2018, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense
committees a report on the plan required by subsection (a).
(2) Form.--The report required by this subsection shall be
submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified
annex.
(c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the strategy for the Department of Defense to counter
unconventional warfare threats posed by adversarial state and
non-state actors required by section 1097 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-
92) has not yet been submitted to the congressional defense
committees and should be submitted without further delay; and
(2) concerns persist over the growing sophistication of
unconventional and hybrid state-sponsored threats by the
Russian Federation as demonstrated through its advancement and
integration of conventional warfare, economic warfare, cyber
and information operations, intelligence operations, and other
activities to undermine United States national security
objectives as well as the objectives of United States allies
and partners in Europe.
SEC. 6. PLAN TO PROVIDE TRAINING TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES OF
UNITED STATES ALLIES AND PARTNERS TO COUNTER CYBERSPACE
OPERATIONS AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the establishment by the Commander of the United States
European Command of the interagency Russian Information Group
to counter Russian information operations against the United
States and United States allies and partners should be
supported and cooperation and synchronization of efforts and
activities with the Department of State's Global Engagement
Center and with the NATO Strategic Communications Center of
Excellence should be encouraged;
(2) the Secretary of Defense should, to the extent
appropriate, prioritize the transfer of funds as authorized
under section 1287(e) of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328; 130 Stat. 2546) to
the Department of State's Global Engagement Center specifically
for the purpose of countering Russia state-sponsored propaganda
aimed at undermining the national security interests of the
United States and United States allies and partners; and
(3) the Secretary of Defense should prioritize providing
funding to the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of
Excellence and the NATO Strategic Communication Center of
Excellence or purposes of enhancing cooperation with NATO
allies to counter cyberspace operations of the Russian
Federation against the national security interests of the
Untied States and United States and allies and partners.
(b) Plan Required.--The Secretary of Defense shall develop and
implement a plan to provide training to the national security forces of
United States allies and partners for the purpose of building the
capacity of such forces to counter cyberspace operations and
information operations of the Russian Federation.
(c) Report Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than April 1, 2018, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense
committees a report on the plan required by subsection (b).
(2) Form.--The report required by this subsection shall be
submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified
annex.
SEC. 7. REPORT ON MAINTAINING AND EXPANDING FORWARD PRESENCE OF UNITED
STATES MILITARY FORCES AND PERSONNEL IN EUROPE.
(a) Report Required.--Not later than April 1, 2018, the Secretary
of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a
report on the strategy of the Department of Defense maintaining and
expanding forward presence of United States military forces and
personnel in Europe.
(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include
the following with respect to United States European Command areas of
responsibility:
(1) An assessment of the additional permanently stationed
forces in Europe required to meet United States strategic
requirements and the operational requirements of the geographic
combatant commander.
(2) An assessment of the infrastructure capacity of
existing European locations and their ability to accommodate
additional forces.
(3) An overview of new locations in Europe that might be
considered for permanently stationed forces and the estimated
cost and scope of infrastructure investments, to include
improvements to training areas, which would be required at
those locations to support permanently stationed forces,
including an assessment of what infrastructure investments
might be provided by the host-nation as well as new
construction or modernization of existing facilities that would
be funded by the United States.
(4) A detailed list of investments in equipment, supplies,
logistics, storage, and maintenance, at current and new
locations in Europe, required to support additional permanently
stationed forces.
(5) An assessment of the readiness advantages and
disadvantages associated with stationing additional permanent
forces at European locations.
(6) A discussion of potential challenges with stationing
additional permanent forces or developing new locations for
permanently stationed forces as a result of treaty obligations,
international agreements, or other legally binding instruments.
(c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted
in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 8. REPORT ON IMPROVING TRAINING AREAS IN THE UNITED STATES
EUROPEAN COMMAND'S AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY.
(a) Report Required.--Not later than April 1, 2018, the Secretary
of Defense, in coordination with the Secretaries of the military
departments, the Commander of the United States European Command, and
the Commander of the United States Special Operations Command, shall
submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the
location, capabilities, and capacities of training areas in the United
States European Command's areas of responsibility, including air and
ground ranges, range complexes, military training routes, and special-
use areas.
(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include
the following:
(1) An inventory of such training areas that are utilized
by United States Armed Forces or with respect to which United
States Armed Forces have access.
(2) An overview of the capabilities and capacity of such
training areas to support permanent and rotational forward
presence of United States Armed Forces.
(3) An assessment of any capability gaps of such training
areas that limit the ability to meet training standards of
United States Armed Forces.
(4) Details of current and planned investments in training
infrastructure to mitigate identified capability gaps, help
meet United States training standards, and support additional
permanent or rotational forces in Europe, to be funded by the
NATO, the United States, or United States allies or partners.
SEC. 9. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ENHANCING MARITIME CAPABILITIES.
Congress notes the 2016 Force Structure Assessment (FSA) that
increased the requirement for fast attack submarine (SSN) from 48 to 66
and supports an acquisition plan that enhances maritime capabilities
that address this requirement.
SEC. 10. PLAN TO REDUCE THE RISKS OF MISCALCULATION AND UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES THAT COULD PRECIPITATE A NUCLEAR WAR.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
(1) the Russian Federation has adopted a dangerous nuclear
doctrine that includes a strategy of ``escalate to de-
escalate'', which could lower the threshold for Russian use of
nuclear weapons in a regional conflict; and
(2) such nuclear doctrine exacerbates the risks of
miscalculation and unintended consequences that could
precipitate a nuclear war.
(b) Plan Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than March 1, 2018, the
Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of the
Joint Chief of Staff, the Commander of the United States
Strategic Command, and the Commander of the United States
European Command, shall submit to the congressional defense
committees a plan that includes options to reduce the risk of
miscalculation and unintended consequences that could
precipitate a nuclear war.
(2) Elements.--The plan required under this subsection
shall include--
(A) an assessment of the value of military-to-
military dialog to reduce such risk; and
(B) any other recommendations the Secretary
determines to be appropriate.
SEC. 11. PLAN TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION BY REASON OF NON-COMPLIANCE BY THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION WITH THE INF TREATY.
(a) In General.--Not later than April 1, 2018, the President shall
submit to the congressional defense committees a plan to impose
sanctions with respect to the Russia Federation by reason of non-
compliance by the Russian Federation with the INF Treaty.
(b) Elements.--The plan required under subsection (a) should
include expanding asset freezes and travel bans, prohibiting financial
transactions, prohibiting government-to-government contracts, and any
other sanctions that the President determines to be appropriate.
(c) Termination.--The plan required under subsection (a) shall
provide for termination of sanctions described in the plan beginning on
the date on which the President submits to the appropriate
congressional committees a certification that the Russian Federation
has verifiably returned to compliance with the INF Treaty.
(d) Cooperation.--The Secretary of State shall seek to cooperate
with United States allies and partners to maximize the effect of
sanctions described in the plan required under subsection (a).
SEC. 12. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Congressional defense committees.--The term
``congressional defense committees'' has the meaning given such
term in section 101 of title 10, United States Code.
(2) INF treaty.--The term ``INF Treaty'' means the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-
Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, commonly referred to as the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed at
Washington, December 8, 1987, and entered into force June 1,
1988.
(3) NATO.--The term ``NATO'' means the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization.
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