[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2912 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>






115th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2912

To expand the capacity and capability of the ballistic missile defense 
          system of the United States, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 15, 2017

   Mr. Young of Alaska (for himself, Mr. Lamborn, Ms. Hanabusa, Mr. 
   Aguilar, Mr. Franks of Arizona, Mr. Bridenstine, Ms. Gabbard, Mr. 
   Fleischmann, Mr. Bishop of Utah, Mr. Shuster, Mr. Gallagher, Mr. 
 Ruppersberger, and Mr. Mast) introduced the following bill; which was 
              referred to the Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
To expand the capacity and capability of the ballistic missile defense 
          system of the United States, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Advancing America's Missile Defense 
Act of 2017''.

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CURRENT STATE OF UNITED STATES MISSILE 
              DEFENSE, FUTURE INVESTMENT, AND ACCELERATING CAPABILITIES 
              TO OUTPACE CURRENT THREATS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) According to the Commander of United States Northern 
        Command, General Lori Robinson, the ground-based midcourse 
        defense (GMD) element of the ballistic missile defense system 
        ``defend[s] the homeland against a limited long-range ballistic 
        missile attack'' and ``is designed to intercept incoming 
        threats in the midcourse phase of flight.''.
            (2) Spanning 15 time zones, the ground-based midcourse 
        defense element of the ballistic missile defense system and its 
        associated elements represents the only system currently 
        capable of defeating an adversary's intercontinental ballistic 
        missile (ICBM) in the midcourse segment of flight.
            (3) Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is a United 
        States Army weapon system that is transportable, globally 
        deployable, and capable of defeating ballistic missiles inside 
        or outside the atmosphere during a missile's terminal phase of 
        flight.
            (4) In response to the aggressive behavior of North Korea, 
        the United States initially deployed a Terminal High Altitude 
        Area Defense battery to the United States territory of Guam in 
        April of 2013, made that deployment permanent in July of 2015, 
        and began to deploy a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
        battery to South Korea in March of 2017.
            (5) Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense is the naval component 
        of the ballistic missile defense system capable of defeating 
        short- to intermediate-range, midcourse-phase, ballistic 
        missile threats and short-range ballistic missiles in the 
        terminal phase.
            (6) The Navy currently has 33 Aegis Ballistic Missile 
        Defense combatants, 5 cruisers (CGs) and 28 destroyers (DDGs), 
        and will add an additional ballistic missile defense-capable 
        destroyer by the end of fiscal year 2017.
            (7) Aegis Ashore is the land-based component of the Aegis 
        Ballistic Missile Defense system and is currently capable of 
        defeating short- to intermediate-range ballistic missile 
        threats.
            (8) In 2015, the United States deployed the first Aegis 
        Ashore unit to Romania, and in 2018, the United States plans to 
        deploy an Aegis Ashore unit to Poland.
            (9) The current leader of North Korea, Kim Jong-un, has 
        threatened a ``preemptive nuclear strike'' against the United 
        States and has publicly stated that North Korea ``can tip new-
        type intercontinental ballistic rockets with more powerful 
        nuclear warheads'' capable of ranging the United States 
        mainland.
            (10) Kim Jong-un has rapidly increased the cadence of 
        nuclear and ballistic missile testing.
            (11) North Korea's testing is steadily progressing toward 
        their stated goal and has achieved some notable successes, 
        including its first submarine-launched ballistic missile in 
        2016 and its first solid-fueled, medium-range ballistic missile 
        in early 2017.
            (12) According to General John E. Hyten, Commander of 
        United States Strategic Command, during a hearing of the 
        Committee on Armed Services of the Senate on February 11, 2017, 
        ``the North Koreans launched a new solid, medium-range 
        ballistic missile . . . A solid rocket [that] can be rolled out 
        and launched at a moment's notice.''.
            (13) General Hyten further testified that the February 11th 
        test also ``showed a new technology [and] a new North Korean 
        capability . . . [The North Koreans] moved what was 
        demonstrated at sea onto land, onto a new launcher, and did it 
        in a very quick way.''.
            (14) On May 14, 2017, North Korea launched a new missile, 
        reported as a Hwasong-12, that reportedly flew a highly lofted 
        trajectory reaching an altitude of over 2,000 kilometers and 
        traveling more than 700 kilometers in distance before falling 
        into the East Sea.
            (15) Several senior officials at the Department of Defense 
        have publicly stated their belief that, due to the new pace of 
        North Korean missile testing, it is no longer a matter of if 
        North Korea gets the capability to threaten the contiguous 
        United States with a nuclear intercontinental ballistic 
        missile, but when North Korea will achieve that capability.
            (16) During the past six years, under the regime of Kim 
        Jong-un, North Korea has conducted approximately 80 ballistic 
        missile and three nuclear tests.
            (17) During the same span of six years, the Missile Defense 
        Agency, due to funding reductions, budget uncertainty, and a 
        risk-averse testing culture, has only conducted four flight 
        tests of the ground-based midcourse defense element of the 
        ballistic missile defense system.
            (18) Since 2006 and adjusted for inflation, funding for the 
        Missile Defense Agency's budget has decreased 23.4 percent, 
        from $11,000,000,000 to $8,400,000,000.
            (19) Meanwhile, Iran continues to develop ballistic 
        missiles in violation of United Nations Security Council 
        Resolution 2231 (2015), has developed medium-range ballistic 
        missiles to target Israel and other allies of the United 
        States, and is working towards an intercontinental ballistic 
        missile capability.
            (20) In March 2013, in response to a nuclear detonation by 
        North Korea, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, citing 
        ``irresponsible and reckless provocations'', announced plans to 
        restore the number of deployed ground-based interceptors from 
        30 to 44 by the end of 2017.
            (21) The Missile Defense Agency will soon finish the 
        expansion to 44 ground-based interceptors and begin the 
        construction of a new S-band radar, the Long Range 
        Discrimination Radar (LRDR), at Clear Air Force Station, 
        Alaska, starting in 2018.
            (22) The Missile Defense Agency is currently researching, 
        testing, and developing the Configuration-3 (C3) booster, a 
        selectable two- or three-stage booster, and has plans to field 
        this capability by September 30, 2023.
            (23) Section 1682 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
        for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note) 
        directs the Director of the Missile Defense Agency to modernize 
        and improve the reliability of the ground-based interceptor 
        fleet by speeding the development of the redesigned kill 
        vehicle (RKV) to replace all capability-enhancement I 
        exoatmospheric kill vehicles by September 30, 2022.
            (24) Section 1681 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
        for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note) 
        makes the multi-object kill vehicle (MOKV), which is a new 
        technology that would allow single interceptors to engage more 
        than one target, a program of record and directs the Director 
        of the Missile Defense Agency to begin rigorous flight testing 
        of a multiple-object kill vehicle for the ground-based 
        midcourse defense system by 2020.
            (25) Section 1680 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
        for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note) 
        required the Secretary of Defense to report on the efforts of 
        the Department of Defense to develop and deploy an airborne or 
        other boost phase defense system for missile defense by fiscal 
        year 2025.
            (26) Section 1685 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
        for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92) requires the Director 
        to commence the concept definition of a space-based ballistic 
        missile intercept layer to the ballistic missile defense system 
        and to draft operational concepts for how a space-based 
        ballistic missile intercept layer would function in the context 
        of a multi-layer missile defense architecture.
            (27) Section 1683 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
        for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92) and section 238 of the 
        National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (Public 
        Law 113-66) requires the Director to plan the future 
        construction of an additional missile defense site in the 
        United States, including the possibility of a site on the East 
        Coast of the United States that is capable of protecting the 
        homeland.
            (28) The Department of Defense and the Missile Defense 
        Agency are continuing to deploy Aegis Ballistic Missile 
        Defense, Aegis Ashore, and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
        systems to more robustly defend members of the Armed Forces, 
        allies and partners of the United States, cities and population 
        centers in the United States, and critical infrastructure of 
        the United States.
            (29) The current United States missile defense 
        architecture, including the ground-based midcourse defense and 
        terminal segment defenses like the Terminal High Altitude Area 
        Defense, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, Aegis Ashore, and 
        Patriot Air and Missile Defense System, are presently capable 
        of defending deployed Armed Forces of the United States, as 
        well as allies and partners of the United States.
            (30) General Robinson, in testimony before the Committee on 
        Armed Services of the Senate on April 6, 2017, stated ``As 
        adversaries continue to pursue credible and advanced 
        capabilities, we too must evolve our missile defense 
        capabilities to outpace increasingly complex threats.''.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
Secretary of Defense should use the upcoming Ballistic Missile Defense 
Review (BMDR) and the Missile Defeat Review (MDR) to accelerate the 
development of new and existing means to increase the capacity, 
capability, and reliability of the ground-based midcourse defense 
element of the ballistic missile defense system and other missile 
defense programs.
    (c) Acceleration of Development of Certain Advanced Missile Defense 
Technologies Toward Fielding.--
            (1) In general.--To the degree practicable, the Director of 
        the Missile Defense Agency shall use the policies of the 
        Department of Defense to accelerate the development, testing, 
        and fielding of the redesigned kill vehicle, the multi-object 
        kill vehicle, the C3 booster, a space-based sensor layer, an 
        airborne laser on unmanned aerial vehicles, and an additional 
        missile defense site, including the completion of any 
        outstanding environmental impact statements (EISs) for an 
        additional missile defense site on the East Coast or in the 
        Midwest regions of the United States.
            (2) Priority.--The Director shall prioritize the 
        development of capabilities listed in paragraph (1) subject to 
        annual authorization and appropriation of funding.
            (3) Development.--The Director shall use sound acquisition 
        processes and program management to develop the capabilities 
        set forth in paragraph (1).

SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION TO INCREASE CURRENT GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE 
              DEFENSE CAPACITY BY 28 GROUND-BASED INTERCEPTORS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) A report from Johns Hopkins University, published in 
        2015, and entitled ``North Korea's Nuclear Futures: Technology 
        and Strategy'', concluded that, by 2020, North Korea could have 
        as many as 100 nuclear weapons.
            (2) By December 31, 2017, the United States will have 44 
        operational ground-based interceptors distributed between Fort 
        Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.
            (3) Missile Field 1 and Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely have 
        the capacity to house an additional 14 and 6 ground-based 
        interceptors, respectively, without the added infrastructure 
        costs of some common ground systems.
            (4) A report by the Department of Defense, submitted to 
        Congress in 2013, and entitled ``Homeland Defense Hedging 
        Policy and Strategy'', recommended acquiring 14 operational and 
        testing spares for increased testing requirements and to 
        support increased capacity as a hedge against emerging threats.
    (b) Increase in Capacity.--The Secretary of Defense shall, subject 
to the annual authorization of appropriations and the annual 
appropriation of funds for National Missile Defense, increase the 
number of United States ground-based interceptors by 28.
    (c) Report to Congress.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Missile Defense 
        Agency shall submit to the congressional defense committees (as 
        defined in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code) a 
        report on infrastructure requirements to increase the number of 
        ground-based interceptors at Missile Field 1 and Missile Field 
        2 at Fort Greely to 20 ground-based interceptors each.
            (2) Contents.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall 
        include the following:
                    (A) An analysis of the strategic, operational, and 
                tactical benefits of adding additional ground-based 
                interceptors at each missile field.
                    (B) A detailed description of the infrastructure 
                needed and costs associated with expanding each missile 
                field.
                    (C) An identification of any environmental, 
                technical, or logistical barriers to expanding each 
                missile field.
                    (D) Any analysis of alternatively using Missile 
                Field 4 and Missile Field 5 to increase the number of 
                ground-based interceptors.
            (3) Form.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall 
        be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.
    (d) Deployment.--Not later than December 31, 2021, the Secretary of 
Defense shall--
            (1) execute any requisite construction to ensure that 
        Missile Field 1 or Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely or 
        alternative missile fields at Fort Greely which may be 
        identified pursuant to subsection (c), are capable of 
        supporting and sustaining additional ground-based interceptors;
            (2) deploy 14 additional ground-based interceptors to 
        Missile Field 1 or an alternative missile field at Fort Greely 
        as soon as technically feasible; and
            (3) identify a ground-based interceptor stockpile storage 
        site for a minimum of 14 ground-based interceptors.

SEC. 4. MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY REPORT ON INCREASING NUMBER OF GROUND-
              BASED INTERCEPTORS UP TO 100.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) In six years of being in power, Kim Jong-un has 
        conducted more missile tests, and more than twice as many 
        nuclear tests, as both his father and grandfather conducted in 
        their 60 total years of being in power.
            (2) According to senior Department of Defense officials, 
        Iran, which has the most active and diverse ballistic missile 
        development program in the Middle East, may be able to deploy 
        an operational intercontinental ballistic missile by 2020.
            (3) A 2013 Department of Defense report to Congress, 
        entitled ``Homeland Defense Hedging Policy and Strategy'', 
        stated that the most cost-effective and near-term option for 
        increasing homeland interceptor capacity is at existing missile 
        fields.
            (4) Phase 3 of former President Clinton's ``3+3'' strategy 
        for national missile defense outlined as many as 250 
        interceptors.
            (5) The 2000 Final Environmental Impact Statement for Fort 
        Greely included the authorization for up to 100 ground-based 
        interceptors to ensure that growth would not incur any 
        unexpected environmental delays.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that it is the 
policy of the United States to maintain and improve, with the allies of 
the United States, an effective, robust layered missile defense system 
capable of defending the citizens of the United States residing in 
territories and States of the United States, allies of the United 
States, and deployed Armed Forces of the United States.
    (c) Report to Congress.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Missile Defense 
        Agency shall submit to the congressional defense committees a 
        report on increasing the capacity of the ground-based midcourse 
        defense element of the ballistic missile defense system.
            (2) Contents.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall 
        include the following:
                    (A) An identification of potential sites--new or 
                existing--to allow for the increase of up to 100 
                ground-based interceptors.
                    (B) An analysis of the strategic, operational, 
                tactical, and cost benefits of each site.
                    (C) A description of any environmental, legal, or 
                tactical challenges associated with each site.
                    (D) A detailed description of the infrastructure 
                needed and costs associated with each site.
                    (E) A summary of any completed or outstanding 
                environmental impact statements (EIS) on each site.
                    (F) An operational evaluation and cost analysis of 
                the deployment of transportable ground-based 
                interceptors, including an identification of potential 
                sites, including in the eastern United States and at 
                Vandenberg Air Force Base, and an examination of any 
                environmental, legal, or tactical challenges associated 
                with such deployments, including to any sites 
                identified in subparagraph (A).
                    (G) A determination of the appropriate fleet mix of 
                ground-based interceptor kill vehicles and boosters to 
                maximize overall system effectiveness and increase its 
                capacity and capability, including the costs and 
                benefits of continued inclusion of capability 
                enhancement II (CE-II) Block 1 interceptors after the 
                fielding of the redesigned kill vehicle.
                    (H) A description of the planned improvements to 
                homeland ballistic missile defense sensor and 
                discrimination capabilities and an assessment of the 
                expected operational benefits of such improvements to 
                homeland ballistic missile defense.
                    (I) The benefit of supplementing ground-based 
                midcourse defense elements with other, more 
                distributed, elements, including both Aegis ships and 
                Aegis Ashore installations with Standard Missile-3 
                Block IIA and other interceptors in Hawaii and at other 
                locations for homeland missile defense.
            (3) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.

SEC. 5. EVALUATION AND EVOLUTION OF TERRESTRIAL GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE 
              DEFENSE SENSORS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) United States missile defense sensors are the 
        unheralded backbone of the missile defense architecture of the 
        United States, positioned to provide the Armed Forces with 
        critical data needed to successfully intercept threats from 
        rogue nations like Iran and North Korea.
            (2) The United States uses a wide variety of UHF, L-, S-, 
        and X-band ground-based sensors and only a few infrared space-
        based sensors for early warning, tracking, and discrimination 
        of ballistic missiles.
            (3) The United States currently has operational upgraded 
        early warning radars (UEWRs) for homeland missile defense at 
        Beale Air Force Base, California, Fylingdales, United Kingdom, 
        and Thule Air Force Base, Greenland, and will soon add upgrade 
        early warning radars at Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and Clear Air 
        Force Station, Alaska.
            (4) Originally constructed in the 1970s, the COBRA DANE 
        radar at Eareckson Air Station on Shemya, Alaska, provides 
        critical information on missile defense threats to the Armed 
        Forces.
            (5) The Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR), a new, 
        land-based, S-band radar on Clear Air Force Station will begin 
        to deliver persistent long-range discrimination, precision 
        tracking, and hit estimation when construction completes on the 
        radar by 2020.
    (b) Report to Congress.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Missile Defense 
        Agency, in coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force, 
        shall submit to the congressional defense committees (as 
        defined in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code) a 
        report on the status of the integrated layers of missile 
        defense radars.
            (2) Contents.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall 
        include the following:
                    (A) A detailed analysis of the expected 
                improvements resulting from the integration of the Long 
                Range Discrimination Radar into the missile defense 
                system architecture of the United States, including--
                            (i) any adjustments to homeland missile 
                        defense tactics, techniques, and procedures;
                            (ii) possible adjustments to ground-based 
                        midcourse defense shot-doctrine and required 
                        interceptor capacity;
                            (iii) possibilities for direct integration 
                        with Fort Greely's Command and Control node; 
                        and
                            (iv) impacts on regional missile defense 
                        systems including Aegis Ballistic Missile 
                        Defense, Aegis Ashore, and Terminal High 
                        Altitude Area Defense.
                    (B) A detailed comparison of the capabilities of 
                Long Range Discrimination Radar and the COBRA DANE 
                radar, including--
                            (i) the unique capabilities of each radar;
                            (ii) the overlapping capabilities of each 
                        radar; and
                            (iii) the advantages and disadvantages of 
                        each radar's location.
                    (C) A modernization plan for the long-term 
                continued operations and maintenance of the COBRA DANE 
                radar or a plan to replace its capability if COBRA DANE 
                cannot remain operational, and the costs associated 
                with each plan.
    (c) Assessment by Comptroller General of the United States.--Not 
later than 90 days after the date on which the Director submits the 
report under subsection (b)(1), the Comptroller General of the United 
States shall--
            (1) complete a review of the plan required by subsection 
        (b)(2)(C); and
            (2) submit to the congressional defense committees (as 
        defined in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code) a 
        report on such review that includes the findings and 
        recommendations of the Comptroller General.
    (d) Form.--The reports submitted subsections (b) and (c) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 6. DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF A SPACE-BASED MISSILE DEFENSE 
              SENSOR ARCHITECTURE.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The Missile Defense Agency currently operates the Space 
        Tracking and Surveillance System-Demonstration (STSS-D), a two 
        satellite constellation for testing purposes, which uses 
        sensors capable of detecting visible and infrared light and 
        serves as an experimental space tracker for the ballistic 
        missile defense system.
            (2) Conceptually developed in 2009, the Precision Tracking 
        Space (PTSS) would have provided the persistent space-based 
        tracking of ballistic missiles, including object 
        characterization and discrimination, and would have also 
        supported homeland, regional, and theater missile defense.
            (3) Projected to enter orbit in 2018, the Missile Defense 
        Agency and the Applied Physics Laboratory of Johns Hopkins 
        University is currently conducting a Space-based Kill 
        Assessment (SKA) experiment, a network of small sensors hosted 
        on commercial satellites, used to collect the energy signature 
        of the impact between a ballistic missile threat and an 
        interceptor from the ballistic missile defense system.
            (4) Section 236 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
        for Fiscal Year 2014 (Public Law 113-66) required the Secretary 
        of Defense to conduct an evaluation of options and alternatives 
        for future sensor architectures for ballistic missile defense 
        in order to enhance the ballistic missile defense capabilities 
        of the United States.
            (5) General John Hyten, Commander of the United States 
        Strategic Command, has argued for the ``deployment of a global 
        space-based sensor system with discrimination capability'' as a 
        ``critical component to improving the effectiveness of our 
        deployed interceptors'' and to provide ``multiple response 
        especially as potential adversaries embark on improving 
        countermeasures against our [missile defense] systems.''.
            (6) Admiral James Syring, the Director of the Missile 
        Defense Agency, has stated, ``From a missile defense 
        perspective, we have to develop a future operational space 
        layer. Given where the threat is going with hypersonics and 
        more ICBMs and so forth this persistent tracking and 
        discrimination capability from space is a must.''.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
Department of Defense shall develop a resilient space-based missile 
defense sensor layer to provide persistent, launch-to-intercept 
tracking, discrimination, and kill assessment of ballistic missile 
threats and provide this capability to the Armed Forces as soon as 
technically feasible.
    (c) Space-Based Missile Defense Sensor Architecture.--
            (1) Development.--The Director of the Missile Defense 
        Agency shall develop a highly reliable space-based missile 
        defense sensor architecture for the ground-based midcourse 
        defense system using sound acquisition practices.
            (2) Deployment.--The Director shall--
                    (A) conduct rigorous testing of the space-based 
                missile defense sensor architecture developed under 
                paragraph (1) as soon as technically feasible; and
                    (B) produce and deploy a space-based missile 
                defense sensor architecture as soon as technically 
                feasible after the date on which the Director 
                successfully carries out subparagraph (A).
    (d) Capabilities and Criteria.--The Director shall ensure that the 
space-based missile defense sensor architecture developed under 
subsection (c)(1) provides the following functions and capabilities:
            (1) Sensor functions.--At a minimum, missile defense-
        related sensors shall include the following:
                    (A) Detection.
                    (B) Tracking.
                    (C) Characterization.
                    (D) Classification.
                    (E) Discrimination.
                    (F) Debris mitigation.
                    (G) Kill assessment.
            (2) Sensor architecture capabilities.--At a minimum, 
        maximization or improvement of sensor-related capabilities 
        shall include the following:
                    (A) Handling of increasing raid sizes.
                    (B) Precision tracking of threat missiles.
                    (C) Providing fire-control-quality tracks of 
                evolving threat missiles.
                    (D) Enabling launch-on-remote and engage-on-remote 
                capabilities.
                    (E) Discriminating lethal objects (warheads) from 
                other objects.
                    (F) Effectively assessing the results of 
                engagements.
                    (G) Enabling enhanced shot doctrine.
                    (H) Integrating with all elements of the current 
                missile defense system, including the Terminal High 
                Altitude Area Defense, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, 
                Aegis Ashore, and Patriot Air and Missile Defense 
                System.
                    (I) Such other capabilities as the Secretary of 
                Defense determines appropriate.
    (e) Program Management.--The management of the space-based missile 
defense sensor architecture developed under subsection (c) shall report 
directly to the Deputy Director of the Missile Defense Agency.
    (f) Report on Funding Profile.--The Director shall include with the 
budget justification materials submitted to Congress in support of the 
budget of the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2018 (as submitted 
with the budget of the President under section 1105(a) of title 31, 
United States Code) a report on the funding profile necessary to carry 
out subsection (c).

SEC. 7. AUTHORIZATION FOR MORE GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE TESTING.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) General John Hyten, Commander of the United States 
        Strategic Command, stated that North Korea is quickly advancing 
        their missile and nuclear technology because their rapid 
        testing cadence allows them to quickly apply lessons learned in 
        testing to advance new capabilities.
            (2) General Hyten characterized the current irregular 
        testing environment in the United States as ``the wrong kind of 
        testing environment'' due to risk-aversion and fear of failure.
            (3) Regular missile defense testing, including ground 
        testing and non-intercept tests, not only improves the missile 
        defense system, but also gives the members of the Armed Forces 
        experience with and confidence in their tactics, techniques, 
        and procedures.
            (4) Since 2006 and adjusted for inflation, funding for 
        testing of the ground-based midcourse defense element has 
        decreased 83.5 percent, from more than $400,000,000 to 
        $65,800,000.
            (5) Section 1689 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
        for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328) requires the Director 
        of the Missile Defense Agency to administer a flight test of 
        the ground-based midcourse defense element of the ballistic 
        missile defense system at least once each fiscal year.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) at a minimum, the Missile Defense Agency should 
        continue to flight test the ground-based midcourse defense 
        element at least once each fiscal year;
            (2) the Department of Defense should allocate increased 
        funding to homeland missile defense testing to ensure that our 
        defenses continue to evolve faster than the threats against 
        which they are postured to defend;
            (3) in order to rapidly innovate, develop, and field new 
        technologies, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency should 
        continue to focus testing campaigns on delivering increased 
        capabilities to the Armed Forces as quickly as possible; and
            (4) the Director of the Missile Defense Agency should seek 
        to establish a more prudent balance between risk mitigation and 
        the more rapid testing pace needed to quickly develop and 
        deliver new capabilities to the Armed Forces.
    (c) Report to Congress.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Missile Defense 
        Agency shall submit to the congressional defense committees (as 
        defined in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code) a 
        revised missile defense testing campaign plan that accelerates 
        the development and deployment of new missile defense 
        technologies.
            (2) Contents.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall 
        include the following:
                    (A) A detailed analysis of the acceleration of each 
                of following programs:
                            (i) Redesigned kill vehicle.
                            (ii) Multi-object kill vehicle.
                            (iii) Configuration-3 booster.
                            (iv) Lasers mounted on small unmanned 
                        aerial vehicles.
                            (v) Space-based missile defense sensor 
                        architecture.
                            (vi) Such additional technologies as the 
                        Director considers appropriate.
                    (B) A new deployment timeline for each of the 
                programs in listed in subparagraph (A) or a detailed 
                description of why the current timeline for deployment 
                technologies under those programs is most suitable.
                    (C) An identification of any funding or policy 
                restrictions that would slow down the deployment of the 
                technologies under the programs listed in subparagraph 
                (A).
                    (D) A risk assessment of the potential cost-
                overruns and deployment delays that may be encountered 
                in the expedited development process of the 
                capabilities under paragraph (1).
    (d) Report on Funding Profile.--The Director shall include with the 
budget justification materials submitted to Congress in support of the 
budget of the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2018 (as submitted 
with the budget of the President under section 1105(a) of title 31, 
United States Code) a report on the funding profile necessary for the 
new testing campaign plan required by subsection (c)(1).
                                 <all>