[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2658 Referred in Senate (RFS)]
<DOC>
115th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 2658
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
December 11, 2017
Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
AN ACT
To provide humanitarian assistance for the Venezuelan people, to defend
democratic governance and combat widespread public corruption in
Venezuela, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Venezuela
Humanitarian Assistance and Defense of Democratic Governance Act of
2017''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 4. Requirement for strategy to provide humanitarian assistance to
the people of Venezuela.
Sec. 5. Requirement for strategy to coordinate international
humanitarian assistance.
Sec. 6. Support for efforts at the United Nations on the humanitarian
and political crisis in Venezuela.
Sec. 7. Support for Organization of American States Inter-American
Democratic Charter.
Sec. 8. Concerns and report on the involvement of Venezuelan officials
in corruption and illicit narcotics
trafficking.
Sec. 9. Sanctions on persons responsible for public corruption and
undermining democratic governance in
Venezuela.
Sec. 10. Concerns over PDVSA transactions with Rosneft.
Sec. 11. Report on activities of certain governments in Venezuela.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The deterioration of democratic governance and the
economic crisis in Venezuela have led to an unprecedented
humanitarian situation in which people are suffering from
severe shortages of essential medicines and basic food
products.
(2) According to the World Health Organization, Venezuela
had a shortage of necessary medications and medical supplies
of--
(A) 55 percent in 2014;
(B) 67 percent in 2015; and
(C) 75 percent in 2016.
(3) According to a Human Rights Watch 2016 report, it is
increasingly difficult for many Venezuelans, particularly those
in lower- or middle-income families, to obtain adequate
nutrition and there are reports of symptoms of malnutrition,
particularly in children.
(4) Maternal deaths in Venezuela increased by 66 percent
from 2015 to 2016 while infant deaths increased by 30 percent.
(5) There were 240,000 confirmed malaria cases in Venezuela
in 2016--a 76 percent increase over 2015.
(6) A survey--conducted jointly by the Central University
of Venezuela, the Andres Bello Catholic University, and the
Simon Bolivar University--found that almost 75 percent of
Venezuelans lost an average of at least 19 pounds in 2016 as a
result of a lack of proper nutrition amidst the country's
economic crisis.
(7) Despite massive shortages of basic foodstuffs and
essential medicines, Nicolas Maduro has rejected repeated
requests from the Venezuelan National Assembly and civil
society organizations to bring humanitarian aid into the
country.
(8) The International Monetary Fund has estimated that in
Venezuela in 2016 the country's gross domestic product
contracted by 12 percent and inflation rate reached 720
percent, and has stated that Venezuela had the worst growth and
inflation performance in the world.
(9) The International Monetary Fund has not convened an
Article IV Executive Board consultation for Venezuela since
September 13, 2004, which greatly limits the extent of
information available to the international community about the
severity of the Venezuelan economic crisis.
(10) Venezuela's political, economic, and humanitarian
crisis is fueling social tensions that are resulting in growing
incidents of public unrest, looting, violence among citizens,
and an exodus of Venezuelans abroad.
(11) These social distortions are taking place amidst an
alarming climate of criminal violence. According to the United
Nations Office on Drug and Crime, Caracas, Venezuela had the
highest per capita homicide rate of any capital city in the
world in 2015 at 120 murders per 100,000 citizens.
(12) In 2016, 18,155 Venezuelans submitted asylum requests
in the United States, which was the greatest number of requests
by any nationality, according to U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services.
(13) International and domestic human rights groups, such
as Foro Penal Venezolano, recognize more than 600 political
prisoners in Venezuela, including opposition leader and former
Chacao mayor Leopoldo Lopez, Judge Maria Lourdes Afiuni,
Caracas Mayor Antonio Jose Ledezma Diaz, National Assembly
Deputy Gilber Caro, and former San Cristobal mayor Daniel
Ceballos.
(14) According to media accounts, over 125 people lost
their lives as the result of public demonstrations and protests
in Venezuela since April 2017.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) Nicolas Maduro should permit the delivery of
international humanitarian assistance to address the widespread
and deeply concerning shortages of essential medicines and
basic food products faced by the people of Venezuela;
(2) it is in the best interest of the Venezuelan people for
the Government of Venezuela to engage with multilateral
institutions to ameliorate the effects of the country's ongoing
economic, social, and humanitarian crisis;
(3) Nicolas Maduro should immediately release all political
prisoners and respect internationally recognized human rights
in order to facilitate the conditions for political
negotiations and dialogue in Venezuela;
(4) Nicolas Maduro and the Supreme Tribunal of Justice of
Venezuela should take steps to reinstate the full powers and
authorities of the National Assembly of Venezuela in accordance
with the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela;
(5) Venezuela's National Electoral Council should establish
a specific timeline to hold national, regional, and municipal
elections in accordance with the Constitution of the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela and allow supervision of credible
international electoral observers; and
(6) the United States should support meaningful efforts
towards a substantive dialogue through which all parties uphold
their commitments and agree to specific deadlines to restore
respect for Venezuela's constitutional mechanisms and resolve
the country's political, economic, and humanitarian crisis.
SEC. 4. REQUIREMENT FOR STRATEGY TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO
THE PEOPLE OF VENEZUELA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives
and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate a strategy to provide
humanitarian assistance to the people of Venezuela through credible and
independent nongovernmental organizations operating in Venezuela or in
neighboring countries to alleviate the suffering of the Venezuelan
people.
(b) Matters to Be Included.--The strategy required under subsection
(a) shall include the following:
(1) A description of how and to what extent the following
assistance will be provided:
(A) Public health commodities for Venezuelan health
facilities and services, including medicines on the
World Health Organization's List of Essential Medicines
and basic medical supplies and equipment.
(B) Basic food commodities and nutritional
supplements needed to address growing malnutrition and
improve food security for the people of Venezuela, with
a specific emphasis on the most vulnerable populations.
(C) Technical assistance to ensure health and food
commodities are appropriately selected, procured, and
distributed, predominantly through local
nongovernmental organizations.
(2) An identification of United States Agency for
International Development best practices in delivering
humanitarian assistance and how such best practices are being
utilized in providing humanitarian assistance to Venezuela.
SEC. 5. REQUIREMENT FOR STRATEGY TO COORDINATE INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the
appropriate United Nations humanitarian agencies should conduct and
publish an independent assessment on--
(1) the extent and impact of the shortages of food and
medicine in Venezuela; and
(2) the efforts needed to resolve such shortages.
(b) Strategy.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, shall submit a multi-year strategy to the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
the House of Representatives that--
(1) describes how the United States will secure support
from international donors, including regional partners in Latin
America and the Caribbean, for the provision of humanitarian
assistance to the people of Venezuela; and
(2) identifies governments that are willing to provide
financial and technical assistance for the provision of such
humanitarian assistance to the people of Venezuela and a
description of such assistance.
SEC. 6. SUPPORT FOR EFFORTS AT THE UNITED NATIONS ON THE HUMANITARIAN
AND POLITICAL CRISIS IN VENEZUELA.
(a) Initial Efforts.--The President shall instruct the Permanent
Representative of the United States to the United Nations to use the
voice and vote of the United States to secure the necessary votes--
(1) to place the humanitarian and political crisis in
Venezuela on the agenda at the United Nations; and
(2) to secure a Presidential Statement from the United
Nations urging the Government of Venezuela to allow the
delivery of humanitarian relief and to lift bureaucratic
impediments or any other obstacles so that independent
nongovernmental organizations can provide the proper assistance
to the people of Venezuela without any interference by such
government.
(b) Additional Efforts.--
(1) In general.--If the Government of Venezuela refuses to
allow the delivery of humanitarian relief and lift bureaucratic
impediments and any other obstacles described in subsection
(a)(2), then beginning not later than 30 days after the
conclusion of the efforts of the United Nations described in
such subsection, the President shall instruct the Permanent
Representative of the United States to the United Nations to
use the voice and vote of the United States to secure the
adoption of a resolution described in paragraph (2).
(2) Resolution described.--The resolution of the United
Nations described in paragraph (1) is a resolution--
(A) directing the Government of Venezuela to
promptly allow safe and unhindered access for
humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners,
including possible support from neighboring countries;
and
(B) calling on the Government of Venezuela to--
(i) allow the delivery of food and
medicine;
(ii) end human rights violations;
(iii) agree to free, fair and transparent
elections with credible international
observers;
(iv) cease violence; and
(v) release all political prisoners.
SEC. 7. SUPPORT FOR ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES INTER-AMERICAN
DEMOCRATIC CHARTER.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Article 1 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter,
adopted by the Organization of American States in Lima on
September 11, 2001, affirms, ``The peoples of the Americas have
a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation
to promote and defend it.''.
(2) Article 19 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter
states ``an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic
order or an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional
regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in a member
state, constitutes, while it persists, an insurmountable
obstacle to its government's participation in sessions of the
General Assembly . . . and other bodies of the Organization.''.
(3) Article 20 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter
provides--
(A) ``In the event of an unconstitutional
alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously
impairs the democratic order in a member state, any
member state or the Secretary General may request the
immediate convocation of the Permanent Council to
undertake a collective assessment of the situation and
to take such decisions as it deems appropriate.''; and
(B) ``The Permanent Council, depending on the
situation, may undertake the necessary diplomatic
initiatives, including good offices, to foster the
restoration of democracy.''.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) Nicolas Maduro, the National Electoral Council of
Venezuela, and the Supreme Tribunal of Justice of Venezuela
have carried out systematic efforts to undermine, block, and
circumvent the authorities and responsibilities of the
Venezuelan National Assembly as mandated in the Constitution of
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela;
(2) such efforts by Nicolas Maduro and the Supreme Tribunal
of Justice of Venezuela amount to an unconstitutional
alternation of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs
the democratic order in Venezuela; and
(3) the Secretary of State, working through the United
States Permanent Mission to the Organization of American
States, should take additional steps to support ongoing efforts
by the Secretary General of the Organization of American
States--
(A) to invoke the Inter-American Democratic
Charter;
(B) to advance a collective assessment of the
situation in Venezuela; and
(C) to promote diplomatic initiatives to foster the
restoration of Venezuelan democracy.
SEC. 8. CONCERNS AND REPORT ON THE INVOLVEMENT OF VENEZUELAN OFFICIALS
IN CORRUPTION AND ILLICIT NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The deterioration of governance in Venezuela has been
exacerbated by the involvement of senior officials of the
Government of Venezuela, including members of the National
Electoral Council, the judicial system, and the Venezuelan
security forces, in acts of corruption and illicit narcotics
trafficking and related money laundering.
(2) In March 2015, the Department of the Treasury's
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network determined that
approximately $2,000,000,000 had been siphoned from Venezuela's
public oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela S.A., in conjunction
with its designation of the Banca Privada d'Andorra as a
Foreign Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering
Concern.
(3) On August 1, 2016, General Nestor Reverol, Venezuela's
current Minister of Interior and former National Guard
commander, was indicted in a United States district court for
participating in an international cocaine trafficking
conspiracy.
(4) On November 18, 2016, Franqui Francisco Flores de
Freitas and Efrain Antonio Campo Flores, nephews of Nicolas
Maduro and Venezuelan First Lady Cilia Flores, were convicted
in a United States district court on charges of conspiring to
import cocaine into the United States.
(5) On February 13, 2017, the Department of the Treasury's
Office of Foreign Assets Control designated Tareck Zaidan El
Aissami Maddah for his involvement in illicit narcotics
trafficking, pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
Designation Act (21 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.; title VIII of Public
Law 106-120).
(6) The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign
Assets Control has designated additional individuals and senior
Venezuelan officials for their involvement in illicit narcotics
trafficking, pursuant to such Act, including--
(A) Venezuelan national Samark Jose Lopez Bello,
who is the primary front man and money launderer for
Tareck Zaidan El Aissami Maddah;
(B) Hugo Armando Carvajal Barrios, who is the
current National Assembly Deputy and the former
Director of Venezuela's Military Intelligence
Directorate;
(C) Henry de Jesus Rangel Silva, who is the current
Governor of Trujillo State and the former Director of
Venezuela's Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention
Services;
(D) Ramon Emilio Rodriguez Chacin, who previously
served as the Minister of Interior; and
(E) Freddy Alirio Bernal Rosales, who previously
served as the Mayor of the Libertador municipality of
Caracas.
(7) On September 12, 2017, Ambassador William Brownfield
testified before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics
Control that drug trafficking organizations in Venezuela have
``completely penetrated virtually every security, law
enforcement, and justice-related institution'' and that ``there
will be no long-term, democratic, prosperous and secure
solution in Venezuela until there is a solution to the drug
trafficking organization presence''.
(b) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Corruption.--The term ``corruption'' means the extent
to which public power is exercised for private gain, including
by bribery, nepotism, fraud, or embezzlement.
(2) Grand corruption.--The term ``grand corruption'' means
corruption committed at a high level of government that--
(A) distorts policies or the central functioning of
the country; and
(B) enables leaders to benefit at the expense of
the public good.
(c) Reporting Requirement.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, acting
through the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and in
consultation with the intelligence community (as defined in
section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3003(4))), shall submit a report to Congress that describes the
involvement of senior officials of the Government of Venezuela,
including members of the National Electoral Council, the
judicial system, and the Venezuelan security forces, in acts of
corruption in Venezuela, with a specific emphasis on acts of
grand corruption.
(2) Additional elements.--The report submitted under
paragraph (1) shall--
(A) describe how the acts of corruption described
in the report pose direct challenges for United States
national security and international security;
(B) identify individuals that frustrate the ability
of the United States to combat illicit narcotics
trafficking; and
(C) include input from the Drug Enforcement
Administration, the Office of Foreign Assets Control,
and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.
(3) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex. The unclassified portion of the report shall be made
available to the public.
SEC. 9. SANCTIONS ON PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR PUBLIC CORRUPTION AND
UNDERMINING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN VENEZUELA.
(a) Finding.--Executive Order 13692 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note), which
was signed on March 8, 2015, established sanctions against individuals
responsible for undermining democratic processes and institutions and
involved in acts of public corruption that were not included in the
Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014 (Public
Law 113-278).
(b) Sanctions.--Section 5 of the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights
and Civil Society Act of 2014 (Public Law 113-278) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``or'' at the
end;
(B) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph
(5);
(C) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
``(3) is responsible for, or complicit in, ordering,
controlling, or otherwise directing, significant actions or
policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions;
``(4) is a government official, or a senior associate of
such an official, that is responsible for, or complicit in,
ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, acts of
significant corruption, including the expropriation of private
or public assets for personal gain, corruption related to
government contracts or the extraction of natural resources,
bribery, or the facilitation or transfer of the proceeds of
corruption to foreign jurisdictions; or''; and
(D) in paragraph (5) (as redesignated), by striking
``paragraph (1) or (2)'' and inserting ``paragraph (1),
(2), (3), or (4)''; and
(2) in subsection (e), by striking ``December 31, 2019''
and inserting ``December 31, 2022''.
(c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the
President and Secretary of State should seek to encourage partner
countries of the Organization of American States, the European Union,
and the United Nations to impose sanctions with respect to Venezuelan
individuals that are similar to sanctions imposed by the United States
with respect to such Venezuelan individuals.
SEC. 10. CONCERNS OVER PDVSA TRANSACTIONS WITH ROSNEFT.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In late 2016, Venezuelan state-owned oil company
Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (referred to in this section as
``PDVSA''), through a no-compete transaction, secured a loan
from Russian government-controlled oil company Rosneft, using
49.9 percent of PDVSA's American subsidiary, CITGO Petroleum
Corporation, including its assets in the United States, as
collateral. As a result of this transaction, 100 percent of
CITGO is held as collateral by PDVSA's creditors.
(2) CITGO, a wholly owned subsidiary of PDVSA, is engaged
in interstate commerce and owns and controls critical energy
infrastructure in 19 States in the United States, including an
extensive network of pipelines, 48 terminals, and 3 refineries,
with a combined oil refining capacity of 749,000 barrels per
day. CITGO's refinery in Lake Charles, Louisiana is the sixth
largest refinery in the United States.
(3) The Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on
Rosneft, which is controlled by the Russian Government, and its
Executive Chairman, Igor Sechin, following Russia's military
invasion of Ukraine and its illegal annexation of Crimea in
2014.
(4) The Department of Homeland Security has designated the
energy sector as critical to United States infrastructure.
(5) The growing economic crisis in Venezuela raises the
probability that the Government of Venezuela and PDVSA will
default on their international debt obligations, resulting in a
scenario in which Rosneft could come into control of CITGO's
United States energy infrastructure holdings.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) control of critical United States energy infrastructure
by Rosneft, a Russian government-controlled entity currently
under United States sanctions, would pose a significant risk to
United States national security and energy security;
(2) the President should take all necessary steps to
prevent Rosneft from gaining control of critical United States
interstate energy infrastructure;
(3) a default by PDVSA on its loan from Rosneft, resulting
in Rosneft coming into possession of PDVSA's United States
CITGO assets, would warrant careful consideration by the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States;
(4) if PDVSA defaults on its debt obligations, the
Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control
should review CITGO's transactions with United States persons
to assess and ensure compliance with United States sanctions
policies and regulations; and
(5) the Department of Homeland Security should conduct an
assessment of the security risks posed by foreign control of
CITGO's United States energy infrastructure holdings and keep
the relevant committees of Congress fully informed of its
findings and any subsequent strategy to address vulnerabilities
to United States energy security as a result.
SEC. 11. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF CERTAIN GOVERNMENTS IN VENEZUELA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, acting through the
Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State and in
consultation with the intelligence community, shall submit to Congress
a report that describes the full extent of cooperation by the
Governments of the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China,
Cuba, and Iran with the Government of Venezuela and the Venezuelan
armed forces.
(b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. The unclassified
portion of the report shall be made available to the public.
(c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given such term in section 3(4) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).
Passed the House of Representatives December 7, 2017.
Attest:
KAREN L. HAAS,
Clerk.