[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2621 Introduced in House (IH)]
<DOC>
115th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 2621
To strengthen security in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, and for other
purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
May 24, 2017
Mr. Thornberry introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committees on
Foreign Affairs, and the Budget, for a period to be subsequently
determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such
provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To strengthen security in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Strengthening
Security in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings and sense of Congress.
Sec. 3. Congressional defense committees defined.
TITLE I--UNITED STATES POLICY AND STRATEGY FOR THE INDO-ASIA-PACIFIC
REGION
Sec. 101. Report on strategy to prioritize United States defense
interests in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.
Sec. 102. Assessment of United States force posture and basing needs in
the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.
TITLE II--MATTERS RELATING TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Sec. 201. Authorization of funds for critical munitions.
Sec. 202. Procurement of ballistic missile interceptors and missile
defense exercises.
Sec. 203. Plan to maintain a forward-stationed combat aviation brigade
in South Korea.
Sec. 204. Extended deterrence commitment to the Asia-Pacific region.
Sec. 205. Assessment of ability of the Air Force to employ bombers and
associated weapons while forward deployed.
Sec. 206. Plan to enhance imagery sharing with allies in the Asia-
Pacific region.
Sec. 207. Plan to increase cyber and information operations,
deterrence, and defense.
Sec. 208. Establishment of joint training exercises and improving
response capabilities for contingency
scenarios.
TITLE III--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS
Sec. 301. Assessment of freedom of navigation operations in the South
China Sea.
Sec. 302. Sense of Congress reaffirming security commitments to the
Governments of Japan and South Korea and
trilateral cooperation between the United
States, Japan, and South Korea.
Sec. 303. Sense of Congress on the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations.
Sec. 304. Sense of Congress on strengthening the defense of Taiwan.
Sec. 305. Sense of Congress on reaffirming the importance of the United
States-Australia defense alliance.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The United States has a national interest in
maintaining the security and stability of the Indo-Asia-Pacific
region.
(2) The substantial forward presence of United States Armed
Forces is instrumental to maintaining security and stability in
the Indo-Asia-Pacific region and to deterring acts of
aggression in the region.
(3) In April 2017, Admiral Harry Harris, Jr., Commander of
the United States Pacific Command, testified that ``of the five
global challenges that currently drive U.S. defense planning
and budgeting--ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), North
Korea, China, Russia, and Iran--four are in the Indo-Asia-
Pacific''. He further testified:
(A) ``North Korea continues to disregard United
Nations sanctions by developing, and threatening to use
intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons
that will threaten the U.S. Homeland.''.
(B) ``China is rapidly building a modern, capable
military that appears to far exceed its stated
defensive purpose or potential regional needs. China's
military is modernization is focused on defeating the
United States in Asia by countering U.S. asymmetric
advantages.''.
(C) ``Russia is modernizing its military and once
again exercising its conventional forces and nuclear
strike capabilities in the Pacific, which also threaten
the Homeland.''.
(D) ``Transnational terrorists, inspired by and in
some cases led by ISIS, have set their sights on the
Indo-Asia-Pacific by supporting and encouraging attacks
in Indonesia, Bangladesh, Philippines, and Malaysia
while recruiting and fund-raising there and
elsewhere.''.
(4) Frank Kendall, former Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, testified in January
2015, that ``U.S. superiority in some key warfare domains is at
risk including United States surface fleet and forward bases in
the Pacific and the United States ability to maintain air
dominance.''.
(5) Continued United States engagement in the Indo-Asia-
Pacific region is fundamental to maintaining security and
stability in the region, and the United States should expand
and optimize cooperative relationships with and among allies
and partners in the region, including Japan, South Korea,
Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Taiwan, New
Zealand, India, Vietnam, Mongolia, Malaysia, Indonesia, and
Burma.
(6) The United States Armed Forces continue to work closely
with the militaries of these and other regional countries to
promote peace, uphold the rules-based order, and deter acts of
aggression.
(7) Secretary of Defense James Mattis, in his confirmation
hearing in January 2017, stated that the ``Pacific theater
remains a priority''. In February 2017, Secretary of Defense
Mattis stated that ``in cooperation with our allies and
partners, the United States seeks to ensure a peaceful, secure,
and free Asia-Pacific region'', and reaffirmed the importance
of the bilateral relationships of the United States with Japan
and South Korea during his visit to Tokyo and Seoul.
(8) In March 2017, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson
emphasized the importance of strengthening the relationships of
the United States with Japan and South Korea, addressing North
Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs through
trilateral cooperation, building a shared commitment to the
rule of law and international norms, and promoting stability
and prosperity throughout the region.
(9) In June 2016, then-Secretary of Defense Ash Carter said
at the Shangri-La Dialogue that the ``United States will stand
with regional partners to uphold core principles, like freedom
of navigation and overflight, and the peaceful resolution of
disputes through legal means and in accordance with
international law . . . and that the United States remains
committed to working with China to ensure a principled
future.''.
(10) Admiral Harris testified in April 2017, ``[The United
States Pacific Command] requires a force posture that credibly
communicates United States resolve, strengthens alliances and
partnerships, prevents conflicts, and in the event of crisis,
responds rapidly across the full range of military operations,
and [the United States Pacific Command's] force posture is
supported by the deployment of rotational forces and the
fielding of new capabilities and concepts that address
operational shortfalls and critical gaps.''. Admiral Harris
also noted that ``threats in the [Indo-Asia-Pacific region]
require United States military forces in the region maintain a
high level of readiness to respond rapidly to a crisis . . .
and the ability of the United States to surge and globally
maneuver ready forces is an asymmetric advantage that must be
maintained.''.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the security, stability, and prosperity of the Indo-
Asia-Pacific region is vital to the national interests of the
United States;
(2) the United States should maintain a military capability
in the region that is able to project power, deter acts of
aggression, and respond, if necessary, to regional threats;
(3) continuing efforts by the Department of Defense to
realign forces, commit additional assets, and increase
investments to the Indo-Asia-Pacific region are necessary to
maintain a robust United States commitment to the region;
(4) the Department of Defense should--
(A) assess its current force posture in the Indo-
Asia-Pacific region to ensure that the United States
maintains an appropriate forward presence in the
region;
(B) invest in critical munitions, undersea warfare
capabilities, amphibious capabilities, resilient space
architectures, missile defense, offensive and defensive
cyber capabilities, and other capabilities conducive to
operating effectively in contested environments; and
(C) enhance regional force readiness through joint
training and exercises, considering contingencies
ranging from grey zone to high-end near-peer conflict;
and
(5) the United States should continue to engage in the
Indo-Asia-Pacific region by strengthening alliances and
partnerships, supporting regional institutions and bodies such
as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), building
cooperative security arrangements, addressing shared
challenges, and reinforcing the role of international law.
SEC. 3. CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES DEFINED.
In this Act, the term ``congressional defense committees'' has the
meaning given such term in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United
States Code.
TITLE I--UNITED STATES POLICY AND STRATEGY FOR THE INDO-ASIA-PACIFIC
REGION
SEC. 101. REPORT ON STRATEGY TO PRIORITIZE UNITED STATES DEFENSE
INTERESTS IN THE INDO-ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.
(a) Required Report.--Not later than February 1, 2018, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense
committees a report on United States defense priorities that addresses
the following:
(1) The security challenges, including threats, emanating
from the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.
(2) The primary objectives and priorities in the Indo-Asia-
Pacific region, including--
(A) the military missions necessary to address
threats on the Korean Peninsula;
(B) the role of the Department of Defense in the
Indo-Asia-Pacific region regarding security challenges
posed by China; and
(C) the primary objectives and priorities for
combating terrorism in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.
(3) Department of Defense plans, force posture,
capabilities, and resources to address any gaps.
(4) The roles of allies, partners, and other countries in
achieving United States defense objectives and priorities.
(5) Actions the Department of Defense could take, in
cooperation with other Federal departments or agencies, to
advance United States national security interests in the Indo-
Asia-Pacific region.
(6) Any other matters the Secretary of Defense determines
to be appropriate.
(b) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted
in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
(c) Annual Budget.--The President, acting through the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, shall ensure that the annual
budget submitted to Congress under section 1105 of title 31, United
States Code, clearly highlights programs and projects that are being
funded in the annual budget of the United States Government that relate
to the strategy referred to in subsection (a).
(d) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the
strategy referred to in subsection (a) should be informed by the
overall strategy to promote United States interests in the Indo-Asia-
Pacific region as required by section 1261 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92; 129 Stat.
1072).
(e) Repeal.--Section 1251 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public
Law 113-291; 128 Stat. 3570) is hereby repealed.
SEC. 102. ASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES FORCE POSTURE AND BASING NEEDS IN
THE INDO-ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) An enduring United States presence and engagement
across the Indo-Asia-Pacific region provides the critical
access and infrastructure necessary to accomplish United States
defense priorities, expands the global reach of the United
States across the Pacific, and facilitates a rapid United
States response to complex crises and contingencies.
(2) Forward-stationed active duty members of the Armed
Forces, forward-deployed rotational units, and reserve forces
assigned to the United States Pacific Command remains essential
for United States planning, logistics, and operations, as well
as fulfilling commitments with United States treaty allies.
(3) Admiral Harry Harris, Jr., Commander of the United
States Pacific Command, testified in February 2016 that ``the
tyranny of distance and short indications and warning timelines
place a premium on robust, modern, and agile forward-stationed
forces at high levels of readiness''.
(b) Assessment Required.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall conduct an
assessment of United States force posture and basing needs in
the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.
(2) Elements.--The assessment required under paragraph (1)
shall include the following:
(A) A review of military requirements based on
operation and contingency plans, scenarios,
capabilities of potential adversaries, and any assessed
gaps or shortfalls of the Armed Forces.
(B) A review of current United States military
force posture and deployment plans of the United States
Pacific Command.
(C) An analysis of potential future realignments of
United States forces in the region, including options
for strengthening United States presence, access,
readiness, training, exercises, logistics, and pre-
positioning.
(D) A discussion of political, diplomatic,
economic, and military factors that may influence the
United States posture.
(E) Any recommended changes to the United States
posture in the region.
(F) Any other matters the Secretary of Defense
determines to be appropriate.
(c) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than March 1, 2018, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense
committees a report that includes the assessment required under
subsection (b).
(2) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified
annex.
TITLE II--MATTERS RELATING TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF FUNDS FOR CRITICAL MUNITIONS.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Admiral Harry Harris, Jr., Commander of the United
States Pacific Command, testified in February 2016 ``critical
munitions shortfalls are a top priority and concern . . .
munitions are a major component of combat pre-positioning, but
fiscal pressure places this at risk''.
(2) Admiral Harris stated that ``Weapons improvement
priorities include long-range and stand-off strike weapons,
longer-range anti-ship weapons, advanced air-to-air munitions,
theater ballistic/cruise missile defense, torpedoes, naval
mines, and a cluster munitions replacement.''.
(3) Admiral Harris further indicated that ``if additional
resources were to become available, I would prioritize
investment in the following areas . . . procure additional
critical munitions (AIX-9X, AIM-120D, SM-6, MK-48)''.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Department of Defense should address shortfalls in
critical munitions inventories and make improvements in
critical munitions capabilities;
(2) insufficient critical munition investments will limit
the ability of the Armed Forces to perform required missions;
and
(3) improvements to critical munition capabilities should
include pre-positioning arrangements, infrastructure for
munition storage and security, and logistical requirements for
critical munitions.
(c) Availability of Funds.--
(1) Authorization.--There is authorized to be appropriated
to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2018
$1,000,000,000 to address shortfalls in critical munition
inventories and to improve critical munition capabilities.
(2) Capability and capacity areas.--Paragraph (1) shall
apply with respect to the following:
(A) AIM-120.
(B) AIM-9X.
(C) Precision-Guided Anti-Ship Missiles.
(D) Standard missile-2.
(E) Standard missile-6.
(F) Evolved sea sparrow missiles.
(G) Laser direct attack munition.
(H) Miniature air launched decoy jammers.
(I) Fuzes for hard target penetrators.
(J) Massive ordnance penetrators.
(K) Army tactical missile system.
(L) Guided multiple launch rocket system.
(M) Tomahawk land attack missiles.
(N) Joint standoff weapon.
(O) Joint air-to-surface standoff missile extended
range.
(P) Sonobuoys.
(Q) MK48 heavy weight torpedos.
(R) MK48 torpedo modifications.
(S) MK54 light weight torpedos.
(T) Any other weapon system determined appropriate
by the Secretary of Defense.
(d) Notification.--Not later than 30 days before taking any action
to obligate funds authorized by subsection (c)(1), the Secretary of
Defense shall notify the congressional defense committees of any
proposed obligation and provide a detailed justification for such
proposed obligations.
SEC. 202. PROCUREMENT OF BALLISTIC MISSILE INTERCEPTORS AND MISSILE
DEFENSE EXERCISES.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) In April 2017, Admiral Harry Harris, Jr., Commander of
the United States Pacific Command, testified that ``Pacific
Commands Integrated Air and Missile Defense priority is to
establish a persistent, credible, and sustainable ballistic
missile defense presence by forward deploying the latest
advancements in missile defense technologies to the Indo-Asia-
Pacific. Accordingly, TPY-2 radars in Japan, the THAAD system
on Guam, and the Sea-Based X-band radar based in Hawaii defend
the U.S. homeland and our allies.''.
(2) In February 2016, General Curtis Scaparrotti, former
Commander of the United States Forces, Korea, testified that
``North Korea's missile program continues to develop, so it is
critical for the Alliance to continue to build a layered and
interoperable BMD capability . . . and consider a high-altitude
missile defense capability.''.
(b) Procurement.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the
Department of Defense for fiscal year 2018 $1,000,000,000 to procure
terminal high altitude area defense interceptors or lower-tier air and
missile defense interceptors, including standard missile-3, Patriot
Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missile segment enhancement, and Patriot
guidance enhanced missile TBM.
(c) Exercises.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the
Department of Defense for fiscal year 2018 $15,000,000 for exercises to
be conducted by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Commander of the United States Pacific Command, and the Commander of
the United States Northern Command for joint and other exercises with
the armed forces of the Governments of Japan, South Korea, Australia,
and the United States for the defense against and defeat of ballistic
missile forces of North Korea.
(d) Notification.--Not later than 30 days before taking any action
to obligate funds authorized by subsection (b) or (c), the Secretary of
Defense shall notify the congressional defense committees of any
proposed obligation and provide a detailed justification for such
proposed obligations.
SEC. 203. PLAN TO MAINTAIN A FORWARD-STATIONED COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADE
IN SOUTH KOREA.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The National Commission on the Future of the Army
established by the National Commission on the Future of the
Army Act of 2014 (title XVII of Public Law 113-291) found that
the Army is incurring unacceptable risk in capabilities that
would be required early for major contingencies, and that
retaining an eleventh combat aviation brigade in the regular
Army would help meet these demands.
(2) The Commission also found that with an eleventh combat
aviation brigade, the Army would be better postured to retain a
forward stationed aviation brigade in South Korea, a major
advantage over rotating forces as currently planned, and
shortfalls in capabilities would decline significantly.
(3) The Army of the United States currently plans to begin
rotational sourcing in 2019 to meet the Combat Aviation Brigade
requirement in South Korea.
(4) The Commission expressed concern that this rotational
approach may present unacceptable risk, given terrain and
aviation mission complexities in South Korea.
(5) The Commission found that ``forward stationing of the
combat aviation brigade in South Korea would provide air crews
greater familiarity with the demanding environment and enable
greater interoperability with U.S. allies and partners for
`fight-tonight' readiness''.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of the Army
and the Chief of Staff of the Army, should retain an eleventh combat
aviation brigade of the regular Army in South Korea.
(c) Plan.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the
Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army, shall submit
to the congressional defense committees a plan that includes an
assessment of the actions necessary, and additional resources required,
to retain an eleventh combat aviation brigade in South Korea.
(d) Form.--The plan required under subsection (c) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
SEC. 204. EXTENDED DETERRENCE COMMITMENT TO THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review reaffirmed the
commitment of the United States to extended deterrence and
continued protection of the treaty allies of the United States
under the United States nuclear umbrella.
(2) The United States-Republic of Korea Deterrence Strategy
Committee and the United States-Japan Extended Deterrence
Dialogue provide valuable communication channels for ensuring
the commitment of the United States to the policy of extended
nuclear deterrence and allow for bilateral discussions on how
the range of United States capabilities--including the United
States nuclear umbrella--can be leveraged to credibly deter,
and if necessary, defeat, North Korean nuclear weapons, weapons
of mass destruction, and missile threats and aggression.
(3) Statements by officials of the United States have
consistently emphasized the United States commitment to
providing extended deterrence and defense across the full
spectrum of military capabilities, including nuclear
capabilities.
(4) On September 9, 2016, President Obama responded to a
North Korean nuclear test by issuing the following statement,
``I restated to President Park and Prime Minister Abe the
unshakable U.S. commitment to take necessary steps to defend
our allies in the region, including through our deployment of a
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery to the ROK,
and the commitment to extended deterrence, guaranteed by the
full spectrum of U.S. defense capabilities.''.
(5) On October 14, 2016, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General Joseph Dunford, ``reaffirmed the ironclad
commitment of the U.S. to defend both the ROK and Japan and
provide extended deterrence guaranteed by the full spectrum of
U.S. military capabilities, including conventional, nuclear,
and missile defense capabilities''.
(6) On October 19, 2016, Secretary of Defense Ashton
Carter, stated, ``the U.S. commitment to the defense of South
Korea is unwavering. This includes our commitment to provide
extended deterrence, guaranteed by the full spectrum of U.S.
defense capabilities. Make no mistake: Any attack on America or
our allies will not only be defeated, but any use of nuclear
weapons will be met with an overwhelming and effective
response.''.
(7) On October 19, 2016, Secretary of State John Kerry,
during a joint press conference with the South Korean Foreign
Minister, confirmed the United States would ``defend South
Korea through a robust, combined defense posture and through
extended deterrence including the U.S. nuclear umbrella
conventional strike and missile defense capabilities.''.
(8) On February 3, 2017, Secretary of Defense James Mattis,
during a visit to South Korea, stated, ``America's commitments
to defending our allies and to upholding our extended
deterrence guarantees remain ironclad: Any attack on the United
States, or our allies, will be defeated, and any use of nuclear
weapons would be met with a response that would be effective
and overwhelming.''.
(9) In conjunction with the sea- and land-based legs of the
triad, nuclear-capable B-2, B-21, and B-52 bombers and dual-
capable aircraft, including F-35 Block 4 aircraft, are vital to
ensuring the credibility and flexibility of United States
extended deterrence to Japan and South Korea.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the defense of South Korea and Japan must remain a top
priority for the administration;
(2) the United States maintains an unwavering and steadfast
commitment to the policy of extended deterrence, especially
with respect to South Korea and Japan;
(3) bilateral extended deterrence dialogues and discussions
with South Korea and Japan are of great value to the United
States and its partners and must remain a central component of
these relationships;
(4) the United States must maintain a robust nuclear triad,
including nuclear-capable bombers, consisting of the current
and planned Air Force fleet of nuclear-capable B-2, B-21, and
B-52 bombers and dual-capable aircraft including F-35 Block 4
aircraft, to ensure that the full spectrum of military options
associated with the extended deterrence commitments of the
United States remains credible and executable;
(5) the fielding of long-range stand-off weapons in order
to replace the current fleet of air-launched cruise missiles
before such cruise missiles are retired at the end of the
service life of the missiles is absolutely vital to ensuring
the United States remains capable of meeting extended
deterrence commitments in the Asia-Pacific region in the years
to come; and
(6) the timely development, production, and deployment of
the B-21 bomber and F-35 Block 4 dual-capable aircraft are
fundamental to ensure that the United States remains able to
meet extended deterrence requirements in the Asia-Pacific
region far into the future.
SEC. 205. ASSESSMENT OF ABILITY OF THE AIR FORCE TO EMPLOY BOMBERS AND
ASSOCIATED WEAPONS WHILE FORWARD DEPLOYED.
(a) Assessment Required.--The Secretary of Defense shall conduct an
assessment of the ability of the Air Force to employ the full range of
bombers of the Air Force and the associated weapons of such bombers
while forward deployed in support of operational plans, contingency
plans, and warfighting scenarios throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific area
of operations.
(b) Elements.--The assessment under subsection (a) shall include
the following:
(1) An assessment of the capabilities and limitations of
infrastructure and weapons loading equipment required to
support weapons ground transportation and activities for B-1
and B-52 bombers of the Air Force, when forward deployed to
airfields controlled by the United States allies of the United
States in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.
(2) An identification and assessment of any such assessed
limitation that would materially affect operational and
contingency plans and warfighting scenarios in the Indo-Asia-
Pacific region.
(3) Recommendations to mitigate any such infrastructure and
weapon loading equipment support limitations needed to ensure
full employment of bombers and associated weapons in support of
operational plans, contingency plans, and warfighting scenarios
in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.
(c) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
congressional defense committees a report that contains a report that
includes the assessment required under subsection (a).
(d) Form.--The report required under subsection (c) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
SEC. 206. PLAN TO ENHANCE IMAGERY SHARING WITH ALLIES IN THE ASIA-
PACIFIC REGION.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Department of Defense should enhance critical
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities
because such capabilities are a top readiness challenge and
resourcing priority; and
(2) persistent intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capabilities with enhanced detection and
indications and warning are necessary to maintain situational
awareness and provide adequate decisions space for the United
States Pacific Command and United States Forces Korea.
(b) Plan.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense, in consultation
with the Director of National Intelligence, shall develop and
implement a plan for enhancing the sharing of commercial
imagery and national technical means with the Governments of
South Korea and Japan, consistent with the national security of
the United States and with the protection of sources and
methods. The Secretary shall implement such plan with the goal
of enhancing detection, indications, and warning, in order to
improve joint non-proliferation, counterproliferation, and
ballistic missile detection and defense capabilities.
(2) Briefing.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in
coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall
provide to the appropriate congressional committees a briefing
on the plan under paragraph (1).
(3) Appropriate congressional committees.--In this
subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(A) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate
and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives; and
(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 207. PLAN TO INCREASE CYBER AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS,
DETERRENCE, AND DEFENSE.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Cyber threats originating from the Indo-Asia-Pacific
region targeting the United States and the allies of the United
States have increased, including the use of cyber intrusions,
the exfiltration of data in the national interest of the United
States, and espionage.
(2) In February 2016, Admiral Harry Harris, Jr., Commander
of the United States Pacific Command, in his testimony noted
``increased cyber capacity and nefarious activity, especially
by China, North Korea, and Russia underscore the growing
requirement to evolve command, control, and operational
authorities''.
(3) Admiral Harris stated ``that in order to fully leverage
the cyber domain, PACOM requires an enduring theater cyber
capability able to provide cyber planning, integration,
synchronization, and direction of cyber forces.''.
(b) Plan.--The Secretary of Defense shall develop a plan to--
(1) incorporate cyber planning within joint planning
exercises pertaining to the Indo-Asia-Pacific region;
(2) enhance joint, regional, and combined information
operations and strategic communication strategies to counter
Chinese, North Korean, and Russian information warfare, malign
influence, and propaganda activities; and
(3) identify potential areas of cybersecurity collaboration
and partnership capabilities with Asian allies and partners of
the United States.
(c) Briefing.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall provide to the
congressional defense committees a briefing on the plan required under
subsection (b).
SEC. 208. ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT TRAINING EXERCISES AND IMPROVING
RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR CONTINGENCY SCENARIOS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should
conduct enhanced joint force training and exercises that
specifically address full-spectrum threats across combatant
commands; and
(2) the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should also
consider training and exercises that enhance the effectiveness
of the joint force, and partnered forces, to deter and respond
to operational activities conducted below the threshold of
conventional war.
(b) Availability of Funds.--There is authorized to be appropriated
to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2018 $100,000,000 for the
enhancement of joint training and exercises through the Combatant
Commanders Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation Program.
TITLE III--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS
SEC. 301. ASSESSMENT OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH
CHINA SEA.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The United States has a national interest in
maintaining freedom of navigation, freedom of the seas, respect
for international law, and unimpeded lawful commerce, in the
South China Sea.
(2) On February 4, 2017, Secretary of Defense James Mattis
stated, ``Freedom of navigation is absolute, and whether it be
commercial shipping of our U.S. Navy, we will practice in
international waters and transit international waters as
appropriate.''.
(3) In February 24, 2016, Admiral Harry Harris, Jr.,
Commander of the United States Pacific Command, stated that
``Chinese coercion, artificial island construction, and
militarization in the South China Sea threaten the most
fundamental aspect of global prosperity--freedom of
navigation.''.
(4) In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration of the
Hague ruled that China's claims to ``historic rights'' across a
vast expanse of the South China Sea were not valid under the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
(5) The Permanent Court also said that none of the land
formations in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea--
regardless of the party in control--are large enough to warrant
an extension of the exclusive maritime zones beyond the
existing boundary of 12 miles from disputed features in the
South China Sea.
(6) The United States Navy has routinely conducted freedom
of navigation operations within 12 miles of disputed features
in the South China Sea.
(7) On February 24, 2016, Admiral Harris stated that
``these operations [freedom of navigation operations] are an
important military tool to demonstrate America's commitment to
the rule of law, including the fundamental concept of freedom
of navigation''.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States should condemn any assertion that
limits the right to freedom of navigation and overflight; and
(2) the United States should keep to a regular and routine
schedule for Freedom of Navigation Operations in the sea and
air.
(c) Assessment Required.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, shall conduct an assessment of
United States policy on conducting Freedom of Navigation
Operation patrols in the South China Sea.
(2) Elements.--The assessment required under paragraph (1)
shall include the following:
(A) A review of United States policy regarding
freedom of navigation in the global commons, including
in the South China Sea.
(B) A plan for conducting freedom of navigation
operations in the South China Sea with regularity and
frequency.
(d) Report Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than September 30, 2017, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense
committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate a report that includes the assessment required under
subsection (c).
(2) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form and may include a classified
annex.
SEC. 302. SENSE OF CONGRESS REAFFIRMING SECURITY COMMITMENTS TO THE
GOVERNMENTS OF JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA AND TRILATERAL
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, AND SOUTH
KOREA.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States values its alliances with the
Governments of Japan and South Korea, based on shared values of
democracy, the rule of law, free and open markets, and respect
for human rights;
(2) the United States reaffirms its commitment to these
alliances with Japan and South Korea, which are critical for
the preservation of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific
region and throughout the world;
(3) the United States reaffirms its commitment to Article V
of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the
United States of America and Japan, which applies to the
Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands;
(4) the United States supports continued implementation and
expansion of defense cooperation with Japan in accordance with
the 2015 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines and additional measures
to strengthen this defense cooperation, including by expanding
foreign military sales, establishing new cooperative technology
development programs, increasing military exercises, or other
actions as appropriate;
(5) the United States and South Korea share deep concerns
that the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of North Korea
and its repeated provocations pose great threats to peace and
stability on the Korean Peninsula, and the United States
recognizes that South Korea has made important commitments to
the bilateral security alliance, including by hosting a
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system;
(6) the United States and South Korea should continue
further defense cooperation, by enhancing mutual security based
on the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the
Republic of Korea and investing in capabilities critical to the
combined defense;
(7) the United States welcomes greater security cooperation
with, and among, Japan and South Korea to promote mutual
interests and to address shared concerns, including the
bilateral military intelligence-sharing pact between Japan and
South Korea, signed on November 23, 2016, and the trilateral
intelligence sharing agreement between the United States,
Japan, and South Korea, signed on December 29, 2015; and
(8) recognizing that North Korea poses a threat to the
United States, Japan, and South Korea, and that the security of
the three countries is intertwined, the United States welcomes
and encourages deeper trilateral defense cooperation, including
through expanded exercises, training, and information sharing
that strengthens integration.
SEC. 303. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN
NATIONS.
(a) Finding.--Congress finds that 2017 is the 50th anniversary of
the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
which includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Burma, and Cambodia.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States supports the development of regional
institutions and bodies, including the ASEAN Regional Forum,
the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit,
and the expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, to increase regional
cooperation and ensure that disputes are managed without
intimidation, coercion, or force;
(2) the United States recognizes ASEAN efforts to promote
peace, stability, and prosperity in the region, including the
steps taken to highlight the importance of peaceful dispute
resolution and the need for adherence to international rules
and standards.
(3) United States defense engagement with ASEAN and the
ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus should continue to be
forums to discuss shared challenges in the maritime domain and
the need for greater information sharing among ASEAN nations;
and
(4) the United States welcomes continued work with ASEAN
and other regional partners to establish more reliable and
routine crisis communication mechanisms.
SEC. 304. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON STRENGTHENING THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C.
3301 et seq.) codified the basis for commercial, cultural, and
other relations between the United States and Taiwan, and the
Six Assurances are an important aspect in guiding bilateral
relations;
(2) section 3(a) of that Act states that ``the United
States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and
defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable
Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability'';
(3) the United States, in accordance with such section,
should make available and provide timely review of requests for
defense articles and defense services that may be necessary for
Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability;
(4) Taiwan should significantly increase its defense budget
to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability;
(5) the United States should support expanded exchanges
focused on practical training for Taiwan personnel by and with
United States military units, including exchanges between
services, to empower senior military officers to identify and
develop asymmetric and innovative capabilities that strengthen
Taiwan's ability to deter aggression;
(6) the United States should seek opportunities for
expanded training and exercises with Taiwan;
(7) the United States should encourage Taiwan's continued
investments in asymmetric self-defense capabilities that are
mobile, survivable against threatening forces, and able to take
full advantage of Taiwan's geography; and
(8) the United States should continue to--
(A) support humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief exercises that increase Taiwan's resiliency and
ability to respond to and recover from natural
disasters; and
(B) recognize Taiwan's already valuable military
contributions to such efforts.
SEC. 305. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON REAFFIRMING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UNITED
STATES-AUSTRALIA DEFENSE ALLIANCE.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The United States and Australia maintain a critical
strategic relationship underpinned by shared democratic values,
common interests, and strong defense ties.
(2) In 2017, the United States and Australia will mark the
75th anniversary of the Battles of the Coral Sea, Midway, and
Guadalcanal, and Australia has been a loyal ally through modern
engagements, particularly with respect to international efforts
in Afghanistan and against the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL).
(3) The United States and Australia have been bound by the
Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand and the United
States of America, signed at San Francisco on September 1,
1951, which codified military obligations for each party
outside as well as within the Pacific region for the
preservation of peace and stability.
(4) The Force Posture Agreement between the Government of
Australia and the Government of the United States of America,
signed at Sydney on August 12, 2014, strengthened the
relationship between the two countries, a relationship that is
an anchor for peace and security both in the Asia-Pacific
region and worldwide.
(5) Vice President Michael Pence stated on April 22, 2017,
that ``the historic Alliance between the United States and
Australia is inviolate, it is immutable, and it is a beacon
that shines throughout the Asia Pacific and inspires the wider
world''. The Vice President stated that ``the United States
will continue to work closely with Australia'' to secure peace
in the Asia-Pacific region.
(6) Former Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter stated in
2016 that the United States-Australia alliance continues to be
essential in terms of ``accelerating the defeat of ISIL
together in Iraq and Syria''.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States values its alliance with the
Government of Australia, and the shared values and interests
between both countries are essential to promoting peace,
security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Indo-Asia-
Pacific region;
(2) the annual rotations of United States Marine Corps
forces to Darwin, Australia, and enhanced rotations of United
States Air Force aircraft to Australia pave the way for even
closer defense and security cooperation;
(3) the Treaty Between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of Australia Concerning Defense
Trade Cooperation, done at Sydney, September 5, 2007, should
continue to facilitate industry collaboration and innovation to
meet shared security challenges and reinforce military ties;
(4) as described by Australian Prime Minister Malcolm
Turnbull, North Korea is ``a threat to the peace of the
region'' and the United States and Australia should continue to
cooperate to defend against the threat of North Korea's nuclear
and missile capabilities; and
(5) the United States and Australia also should continue to
address the threat of terrorism and strengthen information
sharing.
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