[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1182 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>






115th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1182

 To require certain actions regarding Russian Federation noncompliance 
              with the INF Treaty, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 16, 2017

Mr. Rogers of Alabama (for himself and Mr. Poe of Texas) introduced the 
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, 
and in addition to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, and Intelligence 
 (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the 
  Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
           within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
 To require certain actions regarding Russian Federation noncompliance 
              with the INF Treaty, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
(INF) Treaty Preservation Act of 2017''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
                Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed 
                Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
                Senate; and
                    (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
                Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of 
                the House of Representatives.
            (2) INF treaty.--The term ``INF Treaty'' means the Treaty 
        between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
        Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-
        Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed at Washington December 
        8, 1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988.
            (3) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
        community'' has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of 
        the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).
            (4) New start treaty.--The term ``New START Treaty'' means 
        the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian 
        Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation 
        of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Prague April 8, 2010, 
        and entered into force February 5, 2011.
            (5) Open skies treaty.--The term ``Open Skies Treaty'' 
        means the Treaty on Open Skies, done at Helsinki March 24, 
        1992, and entered into force January 1, 2002.

SEC. 3. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The 2014, 2015, and 2016 Department of State reports 
        entitled, ``Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, 
        Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments'', 
        all stated that the United States has determined that ``the 
        Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the 
        INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-
        launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 
        km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such 
        missiles''.
            (2) The 2016 report also noted that ``the cruise missile 
        developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a 
        ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 
        km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and all 
        launchers of the type used or tested to launch such a missile, 
        are prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty''.
            (3) Potential consistency and compliance concerns regarding 
        the INF Treaty noncompliant GLCM have existed since 2008, were 
        not officially raised with the Russian Federation until 2013, 
        and were not briefed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
        (NATO) until January 2014.
            (4) The United States Government is aware of other 
        consistency and compliance concerns regarding Russia actions 
        vis-a-vis its INF Treaty obligations.
            (5) Since 2013, senior United States officials, including 
        the President, the Secretary of State, and the Chairman of the 
        Joint Chiefs of Staff have raised Russian noncompliance with 
        the INF Treaty to their counterparts, but no progress has been 
        made in bringing the Russian Federation back into compliance 
        with the INF Treaty.
            (6) In April 2014, General Breedlove, the Supreme Allied 
        Commander Europe, correctly stated, ``A weapon capability that 
        violates the INF, that is introduced into the greater European 
        land mass, is absolutely a tool that will have to be dealt with 
        . . . It can't go unanswered.''.
            (7) The Department of Defense in its September 2013 report, 
        Report on Conventional Prompt Global Strike Options if Exempt 
        from the Restrictions of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
        Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of 
        Soviet Socialist Republics, stated that it has multiple 
        validated military requirement gaps due to the prohibitions 
        imposed on the United States as a result of its compliance with 
        the INF Treaty.
            (8) It is not in the national security interests of the 
        United States to be legally prohibited from developing dual-
        capable ground-launched cruise missiles with ranges between 500 
        and 5,500 kilometers, while Russia makes advances in developing 
        and fielding this class of weapon systems.
            (9) A material breach of the INF Treaty by the Russian 
        Federation affords the United States the right to invoke such 
        breach as grounds for suspending the operation of the treaty in 
        whole or in part.

SEC. 4. COMPLIANCE ENFORCEMENT REGARDING RUSSIAN VIOLATIONS OF THE INF 
              TREATY.

    (a) Statement of United States Policy.--It is the policy of the 
United States as follows:
            (1) The actions undertaken by the Russian Federation in 
        violation of the INF Treaty constitute a material breach of the 
        treaty.
            (2) In light of the Russian Federation's material breach of 
        the INF Treaty, the United States is legally entitled to 
        suspend the operation of the INF Treaty in whole or in part for 
        so long as the Russian Federation continues to be in material 
        breach.
            (3) For so long as the Russian Federation remains in 
        noncompliance with the INF Treaty, the United States should 
        take actions to encourage the Russian Federation return to 
        compliance, including by--
                    (A) providing additional funds for the capabilities 
                identified in section 1243(d) of the National Defense 
                Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-
                92; 129 Stat. 1062);
                    (B) establishing a program of record pursuant to 
                section 5 for a dual-capable road-mobile ground-
                launched cruise missile system with a maximum range of 
                5,500 kilometers; and
                    (C) aggressively seeking additional missile defense 
                assets in the European theater to protect United States 
                and NATO forces from ground-launched missile systems of 
                the Russian Federation that are in noncompliance with 
                the INF Treaty.
    (b) Authorization of Additional Appropriations.--
            (1) In general.--In addition to any other amounts 
        authorized to be appropriated for such purposes, there is 
        authorized to be appropriated $500,000,000 for fiscal year 2018 
        for--
                    (A) the development of active defenses to counter 
                ground-launched missile systems with ranges between 500 
                and 5,500 kilometers;
                    (B) counterforce capabilities to prevent attacks 
                from these missiles;
                    (C) facilitating the acquisition and transfer to 
                allied countries of missile systems with ranges between 
                500 and 5,500 kilometers; and
                    (D) countervailing strike capabilities to enhance 
                the capabilities of the United States identified in 
                section 1243(d) of the National Defense Authorization 
                Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92; 129 Stat. 
                1062).
            (2) Development.--Of the amount authorized to be 
        appropriated by paragraph (1), $100,000,000 is authorized to be 
        appropriated for activities undertaken to carry out section 5, 
        including with respect to research and development activities.
            (3) Offset.--Notwithstanding the amounts otherwise 
        authorized to be appropriated for the National Nuclear Security 
        Administration for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation for fiscal 
        year 2018, such authorization of amounts is hereby reduced by 
        $500,000,000.

SEC. 5. DEVELOPMENT OF INF RANGE GROUND-LAUNCHED MISSILE SYSTEM.

    (a) Establishment of a Program of Record.--The Secretary of Defense 
shall establish a program of record to develop a dual-capable road-
mobile ground-launched cruise missile system with a range of between 
500 to 5,500 kilometers. The Secretary shall ensure that such system is 
capable of achieving a flight test by not later than one year after the 
date of the enactment of this Act.
    (b) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the 
congressional defense committees a report on the cost, schedule, and 
feasibility to modify the tomahawk, standard missile-3, standard 
missile-6, long-range standoff cruise missile, and Army tactical 
missile system missiles for ground launch with a range of between 500 
and 5,500 kilometers in order to provide any of the capabilities 
identified in section 1243(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92; 129 Stat. 1062).

SEC. 6. NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT RELATED TO RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
              DEVELOPMENT OF NONCOMPLIANT SYSTEMS.

    Not later than 15 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
and every 90 days thereafter during the five-year period beginning on 
such date of enactment, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees and the President a 
report that includes a determination of each of the following:
            (1) Whether the Russian Federation has flight tested, 
        produced, or possesses a system that is inconsistent with the 
        INF Treaty.
            (2) Whether the Russian Federation possesses a system that 
        meets the requirements for initial operational capability that 
        is inconsistent with the INF Treaty.
            (3) Whether the Russian Federation has deployed, or is 
        about to deploy, a system that is inconsistent with the INF 
        Treaty.

SEC. 7. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR CERTAIN ACTIVITIES.

    None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made 
available for fiscal year 2018 or any other fiscal year for the 
Department of Defense may be obligated or expended to extend the 
implementation of the New START Treaty for any year after 2021, permit 
flights by the Russian Federation over the United States or it allies 
pursuant to the Open Skies Treaty, or permit the approval of new or 
updated implementation decisions of the Open Skies Consultative 
Commission pursuant to Article X of the Open Skies Treaty, or any 
license or authorization to export any item or technology to a person 
or entity in the Russian Federation unless the President certifies to 
the appropriate congressional committees that the Russian Federation 
has verifiably eliminated all missiles that are in violation of or may 
be inconsistent with the INF Treaty.

SEC. 8. REPORT ON ANTI-AIR WARFARE DEFENSE CAPABILITY.

    Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report on the number and location of Aegis Ashore sites 
with anti-air warfare capability necessary in Asia and Europe to defend 
deployed forces of the United States and United States allies from 
Russian ground-launched missile systems with a range of 500 to 5,500 
kilometers.

SEC. 9. REVIEW OF RS-26 BALLISTIC MISSILE.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, shall 
conduct a review of the RS-26 ballistic missile of the Russian 
Federation.
    (b) Report Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the 
review conducted under subsection (a). The report shall include--
            (1) a determination whether the RS-26 ballistic missile is 
        covered under the New START Treaty or is a violation of the INF 
        Treaty because Russia has flight-tested such missile to ranges 
        covered by the INF Treaty in more than one warhead 
        configuration; and
            (2) if the Secretary determines that the RS-26 ballistic 
        missile is covered under the New START Treaty, a determination 
        whether the Russian Federation--
                    (A) has agreed through the Bilateral Consultative 
                Commission that such a system is limited under the New 
                START Treaty central limits; and
                    (B) has agreed to an exhibition of such a system.
    (c) Effect of Determination.--If the Secretary of State, with the 
concurrence of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National 
Intelligence, determines that the RS-26 ballistic missile is covered 
under the New START Treaty and that the Russian Federation has not 
taken the steps described under subsection (b)(2), the United States 
Government shall consider for purposes of all policies and decisions 
that the RS-26 ballistic missile of the Russian Federation is a 
violation of the INF Treaty.

SEC. 10. UNITED STATES ACTIONS REGARDING MATERIAL BREACH OF INF TREATY 
              BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

    (a) Declaration of Policy.--Congress declares that because of the 
Russian Federation's violations of the INF Treaty, including the 
flight-test, production, and possession of prohibited systems, its 
actions have defeated the object and purpose of the INF Treaty, and 
thus constitute a material breach of the INF Treaty.
    (b) Report.--Not later than 15 months after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report that contains a determination of the 
President of whether the Russian Federation has flight-tested, 
produced, or is in possession of a ground-launched cruise missile or 
ground-launched ballistic missile with a range of between 500 and 5,500 
kilometers during each of the four consecutive 90-day periods beginning 
on the date of the enactment of this Act.
    (c) United States Actions.--If the determination of the President 
contained in the report required to be submitted under subsection (b) 
is that the Russian Federation has flight-tested, produced, or is in 
possession of any missile described in subsection (b) during each of 
the periods described in subsection (b), the President shall--
            (1) suspend the application of the INF Treaty with respect 
        to the United States; and
            (2) notify the other state parties to the INF Treaty that 
        the Russian Federation is in material breach of the INF Treaty 
        and of the decision of the United States to suspend the 
        application of the INF Treaty with respect to the United 
        States.
                                 <all>